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5FoRewoRd
The general goal of this two-year project running November 2008–April 2011 was 
to contribute to strengthening the basis of democracy, partnership and regional 
cooperation in the partner regions. The specific objective was to share the politi-
cal and sectoral experiences of the Visegrad cooperation in the Western Balkans 
and the Eastern Partnership – among them GUAM – countries in order to sup-
port and advance cooperation in and among these regions by forging new links 
and projects that facilitate the resolution of common problems and the attain-
ment of common objectives.
Core activities of the project were organized around four regional workshops 
in the partner regions (two each in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western 
Balkans) where representatives of relevant regional stakeholders from both target 
regions (such as GUAM Organization in case of the Eastern Neighbourhood and 
the Regional Cooperation Council in case of the Western Balkans and specialized 
regional institutions as applicable) participate, along with government and civil 
society experts and representatives of the EU and other relevant international 
organizations. Workshops were built around key topics, such as regional security 
and intergovernmental cooperation, economic cooperation, cooperation among 
civil societies and cross-border cooperation, with the applicable Visegrad experi-
ences and lessons learned and European standards as cross-cutting themes. The 
outcome of the workshops was presented in thematic assessments that contain 
the summary of proceedings and lessons learned during the workshops, with spe-
cial regard to the initiatives proposed to strengthen regional cooperation. The 
impact of the project was summarized at a final conference. Finally, a web page 
linked to the project has been developed and launched under http://interregion-
al.icdt.hu to publish and disseminate all relevant information based on the actual 
implementation of the project. 
We hereby wish to thank our partners and those who contributed their pre-
cious time and expertise to implement this project: Victor Chirila, Sergiy Gera-
symchuk, Csaba Lőrinczi, Wojciech Paczynski, Jiri Schneider, Tomas Strazay, 
Marianna Török, Žarko Petrović, Gia Nikolaishvili, Ferenc Kalmár, and Katerina 
Ivanova.
Last but not least, our heartfelt thanks goes to the donor of the project, the 
Norwegian-EEA Financial Mechanism for making this publication possible. The 
EEA and Norway Grants are the contribution from Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway for the reduction of social and economic disparities within the Europe-
an Economic Area (EEA). In the period 2004-2009, €1.23 billion in support was 
awarded to 1,250 individual projects, program funds run by central and local gov-
ernments, research and academic institutions, non-governmental organizations 
and businesses in the 12 new EU member states, as well as Greece, Portugal and 
Spain. Norway provides around 97 percent of the total funding. The contribu-
tions of our donor has helped achieve 
• Solidarity - reduce social and economic disparities in Europe;
• Opportunity - support the new EU countries integrate into the European Eco-
nomic Area;
• Cooperation - strengthen political and economic ties between Iceland, Liech-
tenstein and Norway and the 15 beneficiary states.
7IntRoduCtIon
This publication is the result of a series of workshops organized by the Interna-
tional Center for Democratic Transition (ICDT) in the frame of its program “Shar-
ing the Experiences of Visegrad Cooperation (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia) to the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership countries with 
special focus on the GUAM countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldo-
va), which addressed some of the main aspects and ingredients of regional coop-
eration and summarizes the lessons and relevant experiences that the Visegrad 
Group has accumulated in the last twenty years since its formation in 1991.      
 The main objective of the two-year program was to share the political and 
sectoral experiences of the Visegrad Group in order to support deepening re-
gional cooperation in and among the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partner-
ship countries emphasizing the role of inter-regional cooperation in promoting 
stability and European integration. The goals and applied methodology was to 
convene the main actors and stakeholders who play key role in inter-regional (or 
with other word transnational) cooperation such as governments, civil society 
organizations, think-tanks and businesses from these three European regions 
and create a forum discussing the main challenges, aspects and elements of inter-
regional cooperation, sharing experiences and lesson learnt, and best practices as 
well innovations in this field.  
The workshops were organized around four different but interconnected top-
ics and for each workshop a food-for-thought were prepared by ICDT’s expert 
team and during each workshop participants discussed in two groups the regional 
dimension and relevance of the discussed topic and, by the end of each workshop 
the participants discussed recommendations related to the topic of the particu-
lar workshop. The first workshop was organized in Kiev, Ukraine on the role of 
regional cooperation in strengthening regional security and confidence building 
among neighboring countries. The main topic of the second workshop organized 
in Tbilisi, Georgia was the role of economy and trade in inter-regional cooperation 
focused on the experiences learned from Visegrad economic cooperation in the 
context of EU integration and especially membership and applicability of these 
experiences in light of current economic challenges and opportunities in the 
Western Balkans and the GUAM countries in selected policy areas, for instance 
international trade, investment flows and energy co-operation. The third work-
shop was held in Chisinau and focused on the role of cross-border cooperation 
as a multifunctional instrument overcoming natural and political/administrative 
8borders between the countries and also historical animosities and prejudices be-
tween peoples of border regions as well as to bridge the gaps between the “centre” 
and “periphery” promoting of economic growth and development, as well as the 
development of operational local/regional administrative structures. The fourth 
workshop was held in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and discussed the often 
neglected civil society dimension of inter-regional cooperation and, sometimes, 
the pioneer role of civil societies in confidence building and advance good neigh-
borliness.
Four workshops were concluded in a  final closing conference which was held in 
Budapest, where the participants from previous workshops discussed the overall 
and specific applicability of the Visegrad Cooperation in the Western Balkans and 
the Eastern Partnership countries and made recommendations for some follow 
up projects suggesting, for example the creation of inter-regional foundations 
in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership countries inspired by the 
International Visegrad Fund and the continuation of the forum for inter-regional 
cooperation.          
This was the rational framework and description of the program but we can-
not avoid answering to three important questions, namely: what is a region and 
what are the main factors for regional cooperation, beside of significant differenc-
es what are commonalities amongst these three European regions and in which 
extent the Visegrad experiences are applicable in European neighborhood areas. 
Regional cooperation is a crucial instrument in promoting regional stability, 
mitigate interstate and inter-ethnic conflicts and enhance cooperation between 
countries based on mutual benefit and partnership thus contribute to the process 
of European integration.   In the last fifty years one can observed the rise across 
Europe of a new, intermediate, level of government and politics, usually referred 
as the “region”. Michael Keating notes “Yet while the phenomenon is well known 
and documented, there is a less agreement on just what a region is, and how im-
portant is their emergence. The problem is that the term “region” can mean many 
things and can be approached from many different angles. It is a geographical 
space, but this can be conceptualized at several different spatial scales, from the 
local to the supranational. (...) A region may have a historic resonance or provide a 
focus for the identity of its inhabitants. It may represent a landscape, an architec-
ture or a style of cooking. There is often a cultural element, perhaps represented 
by a distinct language or dialect. Beyond this, a region may sustain a distinct civil 
society, a range of social institutions. It can be an economic unit, based on either 
9on a single type of production system. It may be, and increasingly is, a unit of 
government and administration” 1   
So the answer to the question of what a region is not easy because a region 
has many faces –depending on the angle we look at it and these faces could de-
scribed as “objective” factors, which make up a region but some faces of a region 
are “subjective”, personal, sometimes emotional but the manifestations of these 
subjective, personal and emotional elements are too become the factors of a re-
gionalization, since they are interconnected and are in interaction, and has its 
lifetime.  With another word: a process.  
What are the main factors of regions and regionalization? 
First, a region can be described as a geographical area in which the natural com-
ponents are the most important factors that makes up a region. This natural com-
ponent could be  a river, watershed area, sea, mountains, etc. It worth to ana-
lyze that how many tranfrontier/cross-border or even transnational cooperation 
connected to one of the above natural component.  In some cases, the natural 
component has a concrete meaning and space for practical actions, sometime the 
natural space has a symbolic and often political meaning where geopolitical forces 
make their games. But whatsoever, the natural (geographical) components are 
the most important formative “morpheme” for a region. For example, mountains 
like the Carpathians or the Caucasus or a sea like the Barents, or a river like the 
Danube, or the Rhine or the Dniester, etc. are the first, basic level of a cohesive 
notion of a region. 
Second, a region can be defined and described as a cultural entity (culture in 
this context is used in broad terms, i.e., the way how the people relates to and 
“communicate” with the nature and how they communicate and behave with one 
another.) In this context, the most important thing we have to highlight here is 
that the cultural entity, which can be described as “region” is the result of peo-
ples’ adaption to the nature (aculturalization process), which is manifested in the 
way of living and basic productions, which developed historically for centuries. 
The differences are obvious if we are talking about people living in mountains or 
people living are valleys or sea regions. The difference like difference of catching 
1   Regions and Regionalism in Europe. Edited by Michael  Keating, 2004, Introduction by Michael Keating (xi) 
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fishes, building boats, etc., or cutting trees and build rafts to carry the goods for 
trading on the river to people who are living in valleys. Of course, the process 
of globalization has changed this basic and original form of peoples’ interaction 
with nature but we should not forget that this relation formed the languages, tra-
ditions, religions, the form and materials of buildings, tools for agricultural and 
industrial activity, the food the people are eating, rules for community life, etc.
Thirdly, a region can be defined and described as common identity, how the 
peoples are attached to a specific geographically, culturally defined space (“re-
gion”.)  There are two aspects to group identity: how a group identify other group, 
how they are making difference between “we” and “they”, the other way is how an 
individual or a group identify her/himself and themselves (who we are.) Because 
of the European history when the border has changed often (especially in Central, 
Eastern and Southeast Europe), different “identities” cross the border and there 
are common identities based on the same ethnicity and language has a “cross-bor-
der” character but sometimes different ethnic identities (and languages) in cross-
border regions has common identity as in the past they belonged to a geographi-
cal area where the borders of the state and the geographical region were the same 
or, in another case, they have had historically an intensive “cross-border” trade. 
This situation is more complex in Eastern Europe, partly because the frequent 
changes of borders but great part because of the lack of civil society and civic atti-
tude. While in Western Europe identities are inclusive meaning that an individual 
could be proud of his local citizenship in his town, s/he could be also proud of her/
his closest area (small region), proud of her/his nation and, at the same time,  be 
European. Eastern Europe is very different. Here identities are exclusive, obligate, 
impatient and hostile with other identities. This resulted in confuses identities in 
which the ethnic/national identities are over politicized and deformed,  and local/
regional identities are underestimated, oppressed and suppressed.   It takes time 
and a peaceful development is needed Central East Europe and the Balkans to rec-
ognize the multi- layered and inclusive identities and that the multi-ethnicity is 
a huge potential asset to a nation and not a weakness. The cross-border coopera-
tion, especially its micro level: the transfrontier one is an important instrument 
to develop.
Fourthly, market and economic forces are playing an increasingly role to for-
mulate or certain case initiate a region. The spatial impact of economic forces 
made long impact on regional development and play a crucial and sometimes 
leading role in regionalization. For example, itself the European Union, amongst 
other, a large economic area (a region) mostly thanks to the economic and market 
forces.
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Finally, the gravitation of (geo) political forces rooted in historical connections 
and experiences arranged and re-arranged relationships between nations and re-
gions represent another factor of regionalization and manifested in different re-
gional and inter-regional grouping.    
       There are huge differences amongst the three European regions subject of 
this publication. They are different stage of democratic transition and building 
democratic institutions and different phase of European integration but they do 
share more similarities than differences. They are common in common challenges 
such as modernization, transformation their societies, democratization and in-
tegration. The Visegrad Group made a huge progress in transforming its political 
system and society and they are the members of the European Union but they 
collective and living memory on this complex challenge and lesson learnt (includ-
ing failures) they can offer to the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. The other 
connecting element amongst these three European regions is the common his-
torical experiences as they were (and are) under the ruins of collapsed ideologies, 
political and state system and most of them –as István Bibó wrote- are struggling 
with the “misery of small nations” always between big powers in their histories.
Concluding, the fulfillment of the most important priorities and potential fu-
ture development  of the  Visegrad Cooperation makes Visegrad to serve as an 
example and inspiration of regional cooperation. The Western Balkan and East-
ern Partnership countries can also learn lessons from the Visegrad mistakes - 
especially from the period when the V4 reflected intensively internal political 
developments in particular countries or problems in bilateral relations. After 
considering the differences between the V4 and Western Balkans/Eastern Neigh-
borhood regions it is, however, not possible to speak about the total export of 
the Visegrad model of regional cooperation. On the other hand, it is feasible to 
choose some fields of the Visegrad cooperation that are applicable in the Balkans/
Eastern Neighborhhod and intensify collaboration with the two regions. Put it in 
short - the bigger the engagement of the V4 will be, the more intensive will be the 




InteRgoveRnmental FRamewoRk  
FoR RegIonal CooPeRatIon
The Visegrad Group (V4)
“Proto-Visegrád”. The Visegrad Group as regional co-operation with its own character.
Even though there are clearly some limitations to the community frameworks 
of certain geographic, historic, and/or political regions in terms of promoting 
shared interests and positions, it can be still argued that these regional co-ordina-
tions and co-operations are here to stay in the enlarged European Union. Macro-
regional strategies – such as the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region1 initiated by 
the Baltic EU members and the other, more recently adopted EU Strategy for the 
Danube Region2 requested by several Member States, including 3 of the Visegrad 
countries – reflect the contours of larger regions that are perceived to be bound 
together by a geographical feature – a sea or river – as the common thread hold-
ing the participants in a framework of coordinated programmes. These complex 
strategies represent value-added projects for the entire Union which cannot be 
realised without participants as local stakeholders engaged in regular co-ordina-
tion and extensive co-operation at the regional level. More regular and intimate 
regional co-operations within the Union have evolved among smaller numbers 
of the Member States for historic, cultural, and economic reasons that are older 
or deeper than the EU itself, but the sustaining rationale for these formations 
was reinforced by the requirements of effective representation of national and 
regional interests in the context of EU decision- and policy-making. The same 
phenomena can also be observed in the case of the Visegrad co-operation.
The V4 functions differently from some other comparable regional co-opera-
tions of Member States which operate entirely (Benelux Union) or largely (Nor-
dic Council) within the European Union. The classification of the Visegrad Group 
(VG) as a cluster of states brought together by their similarity in terms of size 
1   General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) Conclusions on the European Union Strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region, Doc. 15018/09, 27 October 2009
2   European Union Strategy for Danube Region, Communication from the European Commission, COM(2010) 
715 final, 8 December 2010
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or allocated quota of votes within the EU does not correspond to reality, either. 
The V4 formation is better described as a regional platform of 3 middle-sized or 
smaller states (the Czech Republic, Hungary,  and Slovakia) and one large country 
(Poland) for the possible convergence of national positions and for the external 
presentation of the combined weight of their common position. The most vis-
ible and determinant character of the Visegrad Group is a conspicuous absence 
of organisational definition. Therefore, the V4 formation operates outside the 
confines of permanent bureaucracy and structures. However, this does not imply 
a lack of programmes, regularity, or direction. The agenda of discussion and co-
ordination among the Visegrad countries is set and managed on a rotational basis 
by the state that organises, convenes, and chairs the meetings at all levels from 
experts to presidents for an entire year.
The Visegrad Group represents an instructive example of a flexible formation 
of partners as a surprisingly viable Central European platform for intergovern-
mental collaboration within its own region, and also in the much larger context of 
European multilevel and multilateral governance. In its almost 20 years of evolu-
tion, the V4 framework has incorporated a distinct blend of characteristics. These 
include regular co-ordination without formal organisation, institutionalisation 
without standing structures (except the International Visegrad Fund), a region-
al interest group with a broad range of issues for co-operation, a limited circle 
of participants with recurrent occasions for consultation in extended formats, 
motivated by enlightened self-interests in the combination of individual weights 
behind shared positions. It is a quadrilateral concert animated by the common 
denominator of national policies without the obligation to block solidarity on 
every contested matter with respect to others. 
Many of these features and functions of the Visegrad co-operation gained re-
newed significance and particular utility after the 2004 accession of its partici-
pants into the EU. Within an interdependent economic and political community 
of heterogeneous membership and a widely divergent set of interests, the closer 
co-ordination of the four Central European countries sustained the chances for 
better representation and articulation of their shared needs and aspirations with-
in the Union, in order to overcome inherited conditions by means of European 
integration. 
In the wake of their accession in 2004, the content and purposes of the V4 co-
operation were transformed as the participating countries entered the new realm 
of procedural and legal conditions of multilevel governance and policy-making 
within the European Union. Thus, the momentous event of 2004 called for a re-
definition of national foreign policies in each of the V4 partners, which implied a 
recasting of the purpose and relations within the Group itself.  
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The origins of the Visegrad Group as a regional framework for co-
operation
The Visegrad co-operation formally began when the Presidents, Foreign Minis-
ters, and Parliamentarians of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary gathered in 
Budapest on February 15, 1991 to sign the original Visegrad Declaration. The 
emergence of the Visegrad co-operation (the V3, at that time) was initiated by 
the first post-communist leaderships of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, 
but was necessitated and propelled by the realities and uncertainties of the ex-
ternal economic and political dimensions of the impending transformation. The 
essential mission of the VG was focused on co-operation around two key foreign 
policy goals – the dissolution of Soviet-era security and integration structures 
and accession to the EU and NATO. The V3 effectively pursued common policies 
around a range of issues connected to these two goals and, by the end of 1992, 
the VG as a regional forum for collaboration was well established both within and 
outside the region. 
The History of Visegrad Group from 1990 to 2004
Early years: 1990-1992
In its first years the Visegrad Group’s co-operation was almost exclusively focused 
on foreign policy issues and took the form of intergovernmental collaboration. It 
is commonly acknowledged that the group’s collective approach to the EU played 
an important part in the EU’s decision to sign Europe Agreements with the V3 in 
December of 1991, thereby granting them a ‘privileged’ status with the EU. The 
Visegrad co-operation also yielded important complementary security results as 
far as the relations of the V3 themselves were concerned. The way that the V3 
managed their own underlying tensions caused by minority and other issues car-
ried particular resonance.3 
The relations within the Visegrad framework cemented external perception of 
the V3 as a Central European regional group. The V3 platform for co-operation 
also played a crucial role in the activation of their economic potential through 
the creation of multi-lateral trade liberalisation. Though Western pressure to 
3   Martin Dangerfield: The Visegrád Group in the Expanded European Union: From Preaccession to Postaccession 
Cooperation, East European Politics and Societies 2008, Vol. 22, No. 3
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push ahead with sub-regional integration was a key catalyst, without the Viseg-
rad Group framework it is unlikely that the Krakow Treaty which created CEFTA 
would have been signed in December 1992. 
Adolescence with setbacks: 1993-1998
After the separation of the former Czechoslovakia into two successor states on 
the 1st of January, 1993, the Visegrad co-operation of three countries was trans-
formed into a Visegrad quartet. This did not cause any increase in the intensity 
or density of relations. Quite the opposite: the years from 1993 to 1998 were a 
dormant time in comparison to the initial two years of the Visegrad coopera-
tion from 1990-1992. CEFTA, as the regional framework for increased trade re-
lations, emerged as a successful dimension of sub-regional co-operation in the 
economic field and functioned as a useful area of pragmatic contacts within the 
Visegrad Group. From 1994 onwards the CEFTA machinery included annual sum-
mits of prime ministers, which acted as an important forum for top-level political 
dialogue between the leaders of all of the VG countries and also enabled steady 
progress in the CEFTA project, which helped sustain confidence in sub-regional 
co-operation. Until the expansion of 1996, the meetings of the CEFTA heads of 
governments served as Visegrád summits as well.  CEFTA also provided a frame-
work for various ministerial meetings covering areas into which CEFTA business 
was expanding (for example, agriculture). Also importantly, CEFTA introduced 
the practice of holding meetings at the prime ministerial level, in contrast with 
the first phase of the V4 co-operation, when it functioned  as a forum for the 
Visegrad presidents. When the V4 reconvened in 1999, a regular meeting of 
prime ministers became embedded in the Visegrad process. 4
By 1995 and 1996, external imperatives to co-operate were beginning to off-
set the inclinations for individual approaches to Euro-Atlantic integration. Pres-
sures connected to NATO accession, in particular, stimulated the revival of the 
Visegrad co-operation. With the advent of the opening of EU membership nego-
tiations, the shared aspirations and situations of the Visegrad countries as EU 
candidates began to raise issues of common interest where co-ordination through 
the VG framework could prove potentially helpful in the accession process.
Pre-accession years: 1998-2004
The revival of the V4’s regional platform resulted from its meeting in Bratislava 
in May 1999 and resulted in a significant expansion of the scale and scope of co-
4   Martin Dangerfield: Subregional Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe: Support or Substitute for the ”Return 
to Europe”? In Cameron Ross (Ed.):  Perspectives on the Enlargement of the European Union, Brill, 2002, pp. 106
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operation. The redefined role of the Visegrad Group was based on the idea of ex-
tending co-operation into various avenues and modalities in the internal dimen-
sion of V4 (intra-group) relations.5 The extension and deepening of co-operation 
included: foreign affairs (maintaining V4 image/profile; meetings/consultations/ 
transfer of experience in various fields but especially in the EU/NATO accession 
processes), internal affairs (border and immigration affairs; organised crime, 
drug/people/weapon trafficking, etc.), education and culture, environment, in-
frastructure, and cross-border co-operation. Subsequent protocols signed by the 
V4 governments have added new areas of cooperation, including, for example, 
joint actions on tourism development and promotion.6
Another important improvement in V4 co-operation emerged as relations be-
came more institutionalised, and as the forms and levels of intergovernmental 
channels consolidated. This was necessary to serve and facilitate the expanded 
range of activities and ensure involvement of the relevant bodies. It also proved 
requisite for a more permanent mode of Visegrad co-operation, regardless of po-
litical changes in the composition of the V4 governments. 
One significant element of institutionalisation was introduced through the 
establishment of the International Visegrád Fund (IVF) by the V4 leaders in June 
of 2000. The main idea behind the IVF was to complement the external dimen-
sion of Visegrad co-operation with concrete activities in the internal sphere. The 
main activity of the IVF was determined to be the provision of financial resources 
for projects in the field of education, arts/culture, and science and technology. 
The significance of the IVF is highlighted by the fact that it remained the only per-
manent V4 institution with its own premises, staff, and own resources. The IVF 
commits the Visegrad countries to make financial contributions to the support 
of intra-regional activities as well as, more recently, but increasingly, the transfer 
of the Visegrad experience to other countries outside the V4 framework. The IVF 
has proved to be an important tool for strengthening the Visegrad co-operation 
in its civic dimensions.
5   Contents of Visegrad Cooperation approved by the Prime Ministers’ Summit Bratislava, 14 May 1999
6   Annex to the Contents  of Visegrad Cooperation,  2002
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The Visegrad Group today 
The V4 experience in the course of EU accession
The accession process left an unpleasant mark on political relations among the 
four Central European EU candidates. It noticeably eroded the sense of shared 
interests and solidarity in the face of the choice between individual bargains and 
concerted positions with regard to the demands and conditions of entry set by 
the Union.  By virtue of the very nature of the bilateral negotiation process be-
tween any candidate, on one side, and the EU, represented by the European Com-
mission, on the other side, regardless of the number of other parties involved in 
simultaneous accession procedures at the same time, the complex and prolonged 
game of bargains from chapter to chapter could reasonably be expected to lead 
to individually tailored solutions in the end. After all, accession agreements are 
signed one by one and not as a comprehensive multilateral arrangement envel-
oping every candidate in the large, final package. In the course of preparations 
for accession, the positions of candidates were evaluated individually in country 
reports by the Commission on the basis of the progress they had made in the 
adaptation and harmonisation of their national legal and institutional systems. 
In essence, the bilateral nature of the negotiations determined the approach 
of candidates. Although it might have appeared self-evident to consult and co-
ordinate more closely, and despite the fact that the mode of co-operation had 
been identified, it remained largely an unfulfilled expectation or promise.7 Dur-
ing the accession period, the representatives of the governments of the Visegrad 
countries held many meetings at various levels and often achieved efficient co-
ordination to adopt joint positions and prepare joint statements with regard to 
some key aspects of EU bargaining positions in the negotiations. At the decisive 
moments of the EU summits in 2002 and in 2003, the Visegrad partners failed to 
withstand the pressure and acted not in unity, but rather pursued their visions of 
best individual deals with the Union. Even if all of the Visegrad countries had to 
earn their individual admission as the result of the same sort of laborious entry 
procedure during the same period, in the end the participants from the V4 failed 
altogether to capitalise on their positions as participants in parallel bargaining 
with the same institutional party on the same set of issues in pursuit of the same 
ultimate goal. 
In practice, the attitudes of the V4 countries turned out to be much more com-
petitive than co-operative during the completion of preparations and evaluations 
7   Visegrad countries agree to speak with one voice, Euractiv.com, 1 July 2002
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leading to EU accession. Even if their situation could not have been conceived 
as a game with zero-sum outcome, the unwarranted presumptions of possible 
separate accessions based on the demonstrated merits of each candidate drove 
the Visegrad countries away from each other. At the end of the day, all of the great 
expectations of earlier entry in smaller groups failed and the Union embraced 
10 new members at the same time without differentiation or recognition of any 
individual advancement ahead of others. None of the V4 countries received re-
wards for any real or perceived individual achievement and progress in the form 
of faster or easier accession, and they entered the EU on May 1, 2004 as part of a 
larger assortment of states. 
Besides the divisions that emerged during the accession period, the cluster 
of Visegrad states delivered another illustrative example of their collective fail-
ure to identify and express shared interests at the Convention of 2003, which 
was charged with the elaboration of comprehensive treaty reform. The “European 
constitutional convent” elaborated and presented the draft Constitutional Treaty 
to the heads of state and government of EU members in June 2003. Attitudes 
and expectations of the government representatives of the V4 countries reflected 
their differences in concepts and calculations. These variations presented serious 
obstacles to the articulation of “a single opinion” from the Visegrad Group to rep-
resent common positions on shared concerns as part of the constitutional redefi-
nition of the Union.8 During the Convention, the Visegrad countries as a group 
remained discreetly invisible. By the eve of their simultaneous arrival in the Euro-
pean Union, the V4 group did not appear to be a stable and durable platform for 
co-operation among supposedly natural partners in the European political arena. 
The V4 partners recognised not only the difference in their relative weights 
inside the Union, but also the opportunity for wider choices of occasional allies 
and temporary coalitions. The smaller Visegrad states seemed inclined to consid-
er other EU members of similar size in the Central European region to be natural 
allies for increased co-operation on particular issues defined as matters of com-
mon interests, namely Austria and Slovenia. For this purpose, the first attempts 
at co-operation outside the “Visegrad box” on the basis of perceived similarity 
in size and, thereby, in approaches to the principal issues relating to the future 
of the EU were made during the constitutional redefinition of the Union. At the 
Constitutional Convention, the smaller (Slovakia) or, by EU standards, “middle-
size” Visegrad states (the Czech Republic and Hungary) joined the informal group 
of the so-called “like-minded countries” including Austria, Portugal, Greece, Bel-
8   David Kral: The profile of the Visegrad countries in the future of Europe debate, EUROPEUM Institute for European 
Policy, Woking paper of September 2003
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gium, and the Netherlands.9 However, the targeted collaboration of some of the 
Visegrad countries (Hungary for instance) with regional partners (such as Aus-
tria) at the Convention and even after (for example in their joint support for the 
start of entry talks with Croatia) did not result in the expansion of the Visegrad 
Group to include other Central European members (Austria and Slovenia) of the 
EU.10
Despite the experience of the convention and the closing phases of the proc-
ess leading to the EU’s collective approval for the admission of new members, it 
became apparent that “the lessons of the final stages of EU accession negotiations 
and differences over the contents of the European Constitution played an impor-
tant role in shaping decisions and expectations as to how the VG would operate 
in future.”11 Importantly, these lessons did not lead to the conclusion that the ra-
tionale for V4 co-operation had a limited life-span and had expired 13 years after 
the dissolution of the COMECOM and the Warsaw Pact (in 1991) with the end of 
the transitory phase before entry into the EU (2004). 
Within the new EU frame of reference, the Visegrad countries were likely to 
retain specific shared interests and preferences that would determine the scope 
and orientation of their co-ordination on particular policy aims. In spite of the 
often feeble cohesion and solidarity within the V4 Group during accession years, 
some forms of Visegrad co-operation remained inside the institutional fabric of 
the EU as a sensible and logical, though not self-propelling option. Joint deci-
sions and deliberate efforts had to be made to bolster the weakened bonds of 
real collaboration with identified purposes that went beyond the usual rhetorical 
service paid to traditions and the supposedly natural community of values. In 
light of their experience of limited – both in terms of regularity and efficiency 
– co-ordination before admission, which inevitably questioned the existence of 
any inherent momentum for co-operation after the attainment of their common 
strategic aims, the V4 countries agreed to consciously redefine their relationship 
after their admission to the EU. Bruised, but not broken, their confidence in the 
continued beneficial operation of the Visegrad Group was reflected in the adop-
tion of a pragmatic agenda that, in 2004, announced their declaration on the fu-
ture path for V4 co-operation.12 
9   ibid. pp. 2
10    From Visegrad to Mitteleuropa, The Economist, 14 April 2005
11   Martin Dangerfield: The Visegrad Group in the Expanded European Union: From Pre-accession to Post-accession 
Cooperation, EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference March 31 – April 2, 2005, Austin, USA, pp. 21
12   Declaration of Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the 
Slovak Republic on co-operation of the Visegrad Group countries after their accession to the European Union, 12 May 
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Visegrad today: impacts of accession
The motives and dimensions for continued co-operation within the EU: the for-
mal restatement of V4 purposes after accession
At their summit in Kromeriz right after the entry of all of the Visegrad coun-
tries into the EU, the participants discussed their future relations and collabora-
tion in the context of their newly assumed role as full-fledged members of both 
NATO and the EU. The prime ministers of the V4 Group adopted a new Visegrad 
Declaration on May 12, 2004 to confirm their intentions to maintain the V4 re-
gional framework for consultation and the co-ordination of common interests. 
The 2004 declaration on the revitalisation of Visegrad was conceived to define the 
contours and overall aims of the group as a platform for limited regional multi-
lateralism. With reference to “the key objectives set in the 1991 Visegrad Declara-
tion” the new statement of purpose and objectives of 2004 acknowledged their 
previous achievement “with full satisfaction” and announced the intent of the 
Visegrad Group countries to “continue developing their cooperation as Member 
States of the European Union and NATO”.13 At the same time the new declaration 
did not set priorities for strategic perspectives comparable to the original aims 
of co-operation en route to membership in the principal Euro-Atlantic structures 
of integration. The successful accession was recognised to have opened up new 
opportunities and, at the same time, posed new challenges for “their further co-
operation on issues of common interest”. The agreed common vision of future 
regular contacts and co-ordination stressed that “the co-operation of the Viseg-
rad Group countries will continue to focus on regional activities and initiatives 
aimed at strengthening the identity of the Central European region; in this con-
text, their co-operation will be based on concrete projects and will maintain its 
flexible and open character”.14
In the restatement of the driving rationale behind their co-operation, the 
Visegrad countries identified their next mission as injecting the V4 framework 
with a renewed sense of purpose and direction. The V4 Declaration of May 2004 
was the political expression of intentions confirming their interests in the conti-
nuity and adaptation of their co-operation within the EU, rather than the intro-
duction of any noticeable, formal departure from the practices already in place. 
The heads of the V4 governments adopted an interpretative supplement to their 
general announcement of  further collaboration. They recognised that though 
the context and the purpose of their co-operation had profoundly changed with 
2004, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=940&articleID=3939&ctag=articlelist&iid=1
13   ibid. 
14   ibid.
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the entry of the Visegrad countries into the EU, the informal framework of their 
consultation and co-ordination was meant to remain the same. In the statement 
attached to their declaration, the participants laid out a reference framework that 
identified the dimensions and the mechanisms for further  co-operation.15  
The first dimension was identified as “Co-operation within the V4 area”, in-
cluding diverse issues such as cross-border development of infrastructure and 
environmental programmes, disaster management and civil protection, the fight 
against terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration, Schengen co-operation, 
exchange of experiences on foreign development assistance, co-operation of de-
fence and arms industries, as well as strengthening the areas of cultural, edu-
cational, and civic relations through programmes and activities financed by the 
International Visegrad Fund.
The second dimension covers “Co-operation within the EU” with regard to com-
munity and common policy where the V4 countries expected16 to find common 
ground in the most probable spheres of converging interests. The “internal EU as-
pect” of the Visegrad partnership specified some desirable areas for co-ordination 
and a concerted approach to policy areas of the Union. These comprised active 
participation in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) and contribution to the development of EU foreign relations including its 
neighbourhood policy and strategy towards the Western Balkans. Furthermore, 
V4 co-operation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs foresaw consultations 
and exchange of experience with a view to Schengen co-operation, including the 
protection and management of external EU borders, as well as visa policy. As to 
the economic aspects of concerted Visegrad aspirations inside the system of EU 
policies, the Guidelines only mentioned new possibilities and forms of economic 
co-operation within the European Economic Area and consultations on national 
preparations for joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). No specific 
references were made to the likely fields of closer co-ordination such as the com-
mon agricultural or regional policies of the Union, although these instruments of 
redistribution of resources within the EU represented areas of primary interests 
for all of the Visegrad states.
The third aspect outlined the possibility of the inclusion and flexible combina-
tion of various partners into consultations and co-ordination between the Viseg-
rad Group and their partners, either as individual countries or groups defined by 
their political status, or as a structured formation of states, such as a regional 
15   Guidelines on the Future Areas of Visegrad Co-operation, 2004
http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=940&articleID=3939&ctag=articlelist&iid=1
16   Dangerfield, 2005, pp. 21-22 
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arrangement. In pursuit of better implementation of the common goals, the V4 
stated their intention to seek co-operation with other Central European coun-
tries (most likely Austria and Slovenia), the EU and NATO candidates and aspir-
ing countries, other regional structures (primarily those with valuable experience 
of regional co-operation within the EU such as the Benelux Union or the Nordic 
Council) and other interested countries and organisations (conceivably even from 
outside the EU).
Another dimension of the concerted pursuit of mutually supporting nation-
al or overlapping interests reflects the intentions of the Visegrad countries to 
enhance their co-operation within NATO and other intergovernmental security 
structures. The V4’s co-ordination of their contributions to multilateral policies 
and measures outside the Union was expected to include consultations and con-
certed defence capability developments in NATO, promotion of a common un-
derstanding of security on the basis of the V4 experience among the countries 
aspiring to Euro-Atlantic institutions, as well as consultation and co-operation 
within the OSCE on issues of common concern for the V4 countries, with the 
possibility of joint initiatives. 
The Visegrad partners did not mean to limit co-operation to security matters 
within multilateral frameworks.  Their envisaged consultation, co-operation, and 
exchange of information with international organisations could extend to the 
UN, the Council of Europe, the OECD, and to various other structures in the form 
of possible joint initiatives’ mutual support of candidacies in international or-
ganisations and bodies. 
The agreed mechanism for continued co-operation: regular and occasional 
consultations and co-ordination.
Another section of the restatement determined the channels and levels of sus-
tained co-ordination. Under the subsection on the “Mechanisms of co-operation” 
the V4’s heads of governments envisaged three institutional components of col-
laboration and contacts along the lines of the constitutional distribution of re-
sponsibilities and competencies for foreign relations between the presidential, 
the executive and the legislative branches of political institutions within the par-
ticipating states. The regular meetings of V4 presidents represent the highest for-
mal level of quadrilateral exchanges of opinions or initiatives. With regard to the 
varied political roles and constitutional powers held by presidents in the Viseg-
rad countries, their regular meetings carried more symbolic than practical value. 
Since the definition and implementation of national policies in the V4 Group con-
stitute part of government responsibilities, presidential summits mainly adopt 
declaratory acts and release reassuring statements on common interests, but do 
not take decisions on practical or political issues of any real importance.
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Co-operation between the V4 parliaments offers occasions for discussion and 
co-ordination of legislative programmes and the representatives of V4 national 
parliaments foster regular contacts dominated by current European issues. Inter-
parliamentary co-operation within the Visegrad Group is upheld at the level of 
the Speakers of the V4’s National Assemblies and the Chairmen of Committees 
on European affairs, resulting in the regular adoption of joint statements to reg-
ister the points of their concordance from a political and legislative perspective 
on a wide range of issues representing mutual interests.17
In line with their constitutional character, the institutional and political cen-
tre of gravity of V4 co-operation is firmly anchored in the government policies 
of the participants. A decisive aspect of Visegrad relations is shaped through the 
modalities of intergovernmental co-operation. Although not proclaimed express-
ly, these modalities cover a range of options in accordance with the horizontal 
and vertical division of labour within the political and administrative structures 
of governments. The spectrum of available choices of levels and opportunities 
for direct intergovernmental encounters include specifically organised Visegrad 
events and also occasions set in the broader, international context.  Regular V4 
meetings the participants can count on include an annual official Prime Minis-
ters summit at the end of each presidency to evaluate the achievements and set 
the aims for the next period. Each country in its one-year term in the rotating 
presidency prepares its own programme ensuring the continuity of long-term V4 
co-operation. In addition to regular Visegrad summits of heads of government, 
occasional informal meetings of Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers can take 
place before or on the margin of official programmes of various multilateral insti-
tutions with the participation of V4 countries. 
Lower level intergovernmental contacts among the Visegrad partners include 
intensified communication of V4 national co-ordinators playing a key role in 
practical, quadrilateral co-ordination. The national officials of Visegrad countries 
maintain another important level and modality of co-operation through the con-
sultation and co-ordination process among permanent V4 representations to the 
EU and NATO in Brussels, as well as in all other relevant fora (the Organisation 
17   Out of several examples, only as an illustration: Joint Declaration of the Presidents of the National Parliaments of 
the Visegrad Group Countries, Warsaw, 3 June 2009, www.visegradgroup.eu
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for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations18, the Council of 
Europe, OECD19, WTO, etc.). 
Co-operation in the framework of the Visegrad Group was never meant to re-
main limited to political issues. As was foreseen in the Declaration and Guidelines 
of 2004, sectoral issues or matters of primarily non-political nature may also re-
quire co-ordination and an exchange of positions. Co-ordination in various policy 
fields is assigned to the meetings of ministers of particular areas of governmental 
responsibilities in the V4 or even in a V4+ format, with the inclusion of further 
partners in the discussion and co-ordination on various policy areas and ques-
tions.  The broad range of focal issues within the competence of specific govern-
ment departments or other state authorities is often the subject of the meetings 
held at the level of ministers or senior officials and experts from the V4 countries. 
As the annual, presidential activity reports of the Visegrad countries illustrate20, 
following their EU accession, sectoral co-operations within the V4 group have in-
volved the discussion of a broad range of matters at the meetings, from  justice 
and domestic affairs to civil defence, disaster recovery, patents and intellectual 
property, the environment, and energy cooperation, 
Forms and motivations for continued Visegrad Co-operation 
The practice and general features of a V4 concert within the EU
The key question concerning the feasibility and utility of co-operation after acces-
sion was determined by the nature of the enlarged EU and the relevant patterns 
of co-operation expressed in the changing geometry of coalitions of Member 
States built around identified shared interests in each policy area. Even if the par-
ties agreed in principle to the desirability of continued co-operation in the specific 
context of the Union, it remained uncertain if any permanent and distinct for-
mation of the four Central European states within the EU could be viable as the 
18   During their terms as non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, V4 countries can regularly 
brief and discuss matters with the rest of the Group as was underlined in the report of the Slovakian Presidency which 
coincided with the country’s turn as the Eastern European participant in the work of the principal UN body on interna-
tional security. The Activities of Slovakia’s Visegrad Presidency, 2006-2007, www.visegradgroup.eu
19   Collective membership of V4 countries in the OECD Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)
20   Annual Reports of V4 Presidencies: www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=943
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conduit for specific, coinciding regional interests. Alternatively, the new environ-
ment could serve to reinforce the centrifugal forces of diverse interests, where the 
Visegrad Group would have survived only as a vehicle for internal cross-border 
co-operation within the cluster and lost its relevance in the external aspects of 
co-ordination. 
One of the most important changes for the V4 countries was the move from 
being passive recipients of EU policy to active participants in the formation of 
common policy: instead of simply taking the results of decisions made by others, 
they were now included in policy decision-making.. To varying degrees opportu-
nities opened for the Visegrad countries to make their own contributions to EU 
policies, individually or as a group, with their formal inclusion in the decision-
making machinery of the Union. Since the dominant form of decision-making 
in the EU (with the exceptions of common foreign and security policy, and other 
issues expressly identified in the treaties) is governed by the rule of qualified ma-
jority voting (QMV), the modalities of policy-making in the EU are determined by 
consensus formation and coalition-building to reach the threshold of a required 
number of concurrent votes or ensure a coalition of blocking minorities. Depend-
ing on the issue at stake, the final shape of any compromise or co-operation is 
equally likely to rely on temporary, interest-based coalitions as it is to stem from 
the permanent formats of regional groups, like  Benelux or the Visegrad groups of 
EU member states. In any case, the composition of coalitions and concerts  often 
reflects a temporary or long-term convergence of interests, priorities, and choices 
within the given configuration of EU Member States with regard to the subject 
matter upon which a decision is to be made.
Besides the thematic and sectoral meetings at various levels held in the coun-
try which has current presidency of the Visegrad Group, the operation of the 
Council offers additional terrain of particular importance where regular V4 con-
sultation and co-ordination on current issues from the EU agenda can take place, 
depending on the importance or the urgency the policy debate requires. The 
weekly meetings of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), 
the Political and Security Committee (PSC), and the numerous thematic working 
groups deliver the opportunities when concerted V4 positions and proposals may 
be represented. Since this continuous operation of decision-making processes 
calls for constant attention and opinion from the Member States, efficient partic-
ipation and advancement of shared interests demand synchronised approaches 
among the V4 countries in tune with the cycle of EU policy formation, either at 
the preparatory or the concluding stages. Consequently, after their EU accession, 
the talking points of most V4 consultative gatherings at each – ministerial, am-
bassadorial, or expert – level have been dominated by issues that appear on the 
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agenda of Council sessions and of the meetings of heads of state and government 
in the European Council. This tendency is equally valid for sectoral and foreign 
policy co-operation as well.
With regard to particular issues or policy debates within the Union which are 
of particular interest or relevance for the Visegrad Group as a whole, the result of 
quadrilateral co-ordination may emerge in the form of joint position papers. In 
accordance with the diplomatic mode of operation within the European Union, by 
these instruments of official discourse the V4 countries address matters of shared 
preferences through the presentation of their common stance on policy issues or 
specific questions. These written contributions with the combined weight of ar-
gument from all four countries aim to influence the definition of policy response 
or the elaboration of institutional solutions.  As an illustration of this kind of 
concerted stance on a particular aspect of some larger field of policy-making on 
the Union level, the V4 partners were invited to table their joint position paper by 
the European Commission to contribute to strengthening the eastern dimension 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2007.21 In another example of the de-
livery of shared V4 expectations and preferences in a written notice, the Visegrad 
Group presented its unified position on the issue of European External Action 
Service (EEAS) to other Member States and the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in response to an invitation addressed to 
all Member States by the European Council to encourage national deliberations 
on the new foreign policy instrument of the Union.22 On other occasions, the 
Visegrad partners directly addressed the European Commission through joint 
letters to the responsible members of the EU executive body in order to stimu-
late policy debate or encourage the continuation of certain favourable solutions 
– such as EU financial support for energy infrastructure projects – in fields of 
shared importance for all the V4 countries.23 
As the highest political level and, quite likely, the most consequential context 
for the orchestration of Visegrad positions within the Union, the heads of the 
V4 governments have developed a habit of gatherings prior to the meetings of 
the European Council. The pattern of preliminary “Visegrad summits” in prepara-
tion for the plenary discussions in the European Council has become a discernible 
21   The Visegrad Group contribution to the discussion on the strengthening of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(March 2007), The Visegrad Group Position Paper on the Governance Facility and the Neighbourhood Investment 
Fund (April 2007)
22   Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 10-11 December 2009, Para. 3
23   Matej Hruska: Visegrad countries step up co-operation on EU funding, EUobserver.com, 17 September 2010
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practice among the four partners.24 At their latest summit in July 2010, the V4 
prime ministers pledged to intensify their joint representation within the Union 
and meet regularly ahead of EU summits.25 Admittedly, the V4 replicated an ex-
isting tradition among various members of the Union to co-ordinate before Euro-
pean Council meetings either in an institutionalised format, such as the Benelux 
group, or in a regular but informal bilateral format, such as that performed by the 
French-German duo.26 
The occasional significance and potential impact of V4 co-ordination on EU 
decision-making, even at the level of ministers or the heads of state and govern-
ment, was highlighted by the reaction of the French president to the coordinative 
meeting of the Visegrad Group before the European Council which was convened 
to decide upon the Union’s proposal for the Copenhagen climate conference in 
December 2010. After the EU summit, the head of the French state expressed 
open irritation at the prospect of prepared and concerted positions of the Viseg-
rad members of the Union warning that “if they have to meet regularly before 
each Council that could raise questions”.27 His comment reflected concerns about 
the consequences of not one particular occasion, but rather those of an emerging 
practice with the inherent possibility of more efficient representation of V4 pref-
erences, even in opposition to those Member States which conventionally domi-
nate the scene and shape the outcome of decisions at the highest level. As one of 
the regular participants in the traditional close co-ordination of the largest Mem-
ber States, the French president found the replication of the same practice among 
smaller members inappropriate and potentially disturbing to the well-rehearsed 
operation of the EU summits orchestrated by the largest members. 
Apart from being another sobering example of double-standards, the 
French reaction also illustrated the recognition of the potential consequence 
of the synchronization of Visegrad positions as the articulation of interests 
from a particular subset of EU members with an established facilitating mech-
anism for co-ordination. It became apparent that the representation and pro-
motion of coinciding objectives of the four Central European countries in their 
V4 format could stand a much better chance in the face of political, economic, 
24   Visegrad countries hold mini-summit in Brussels, Euractiv.com, 25 March 2010
25   V4 Summit - V4 PMs pledge to intensify joint representation in EU, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php, 
20/07/2010
26   Ambassador: Eastern Europe asks for fair representation in EEAS, Euractiv.com, 25 March 2010
27   Honor Mahony: Sarkozy warns Visegrad countries not to make a habit of pre-summit meetings, EUobserver, 4 
November 2009
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and psychological pressure from the largest Member States in their role as the 
traditional protagonists of the EU concert. 
V4 candidatures and EU institutions
Mutual support for the candidatures of V4 countries to host European institu-
tions or agencies represents an important dimension of co-ordination where the 
Visegrad partners could demonstrate and prove the practical value of concerted 
aspirations. Appropriate co-ordination – at the highest political level, if necessary 
– was considered to be a necessary expression of solidarity and support for the 
aspirations of the V4 participants as candidates to attain the establishment of EU 
institutions on their soil. The Slovak V4 Presidency in 2006-2007 announced the 
endeavour to initiate consultations on candidatures within the framework of the 
V4 before they were submitted to the EU. At that time, emphasis was primarily 
laid on institutional candidatures with possible co-ordination of personal candi-
dacies in the event of progress in the former area.28 In due course, the V4 partners 
began to put this into practice when they pledged to support the Czech candi-
dature for the seat of the European Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) 
Supervisory Authority in Prague and agreed that support for candidacies should 
always be arranged in advance through consultations at the working level.29 
However, preliminary consultations did not guarantee the elimination of com-
petition or the endorsement of ambitions from another V4 country in the final 
decision on the matter within the Council of the Union.  In the case of the parallel 
applications of Hungary and Poland for the location (Budapest or Wroclaw) of 
the European Institute of Technology and Innovation (EIT) and the withdrawal 
of Hungarian backing for the eventually unsuccessful Slovak quest to bring the 
Agency for the Co-operation of Energy Regulators to Bratislava30 testified to the 
limits of co-ordination in competition and commitment to mutual support for 
national aspirations within the Visegrad group to ensure the location of symbolic 
pieces of EU infrastructures in the respective countries.
In certain instances of co-ordinated V4 support for candidature, the Visegrad 
countries could throw their weight behind not only their own applications for or 
28   The Programme of Slovakia’s V4 Presidency,  2006-2007, pp. 3, www.visegradgroup.org
29   The Report of the Czech Presidency of the Visegrad Group, 2007-2008,  
www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=943
30   EU agency vote revives Slovakia-Hungary language row, Euractive.com, 8 December 2009
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presence in institutions, but in favour of aspirants from other countries as well. 
As an instance of this sort of concerted promotion of a non-Visegrad candidate, 
the V4 and their B3 partners agreed to jointly support the candidature of the 
former Latvian president Vaira Vike-Freiberga to the EU Reflection Group on the 
future of Europe, and expressed their support at the European Council in Decem-
ber of 2007.31
V4 and EU presidencies
Representatives of EU Presidencies at the level of heads of state and government 
are regularly invited to the summits of the Visegrad Group before taking their 
terms at the helm of the European Union. With the advent of the first EU Presi-
dency within the Visegrad region, representatives of incoming EU Presidencies 
came to be regularly invited to V4 summits. After the Portuguese and Slovenian 
Prime Ministers, the French President joined the official Prime Ministerial Viseg-
rad summit as its special guest in June 2008.32 
Within the span of 3 years (2009-2011), three of the V4 countries will chair 
the Council of the European Union as participants in different Presidency Trio 
formations of Member States. Visegrad countries acting as the President of the 
Council are expected to keep their V4 partners informed of preparations for its 
EU Presidency term with a view to the identification of common denominators 
between the largely predetermined EU Presidency programme and the V4 priori-
ties in various realms of common policies. As the experience of the Czech Repub-
lic demonstrated in the first half of 2009, EU Presidency terms may restrain the 
exercise of Visegrad contacts for reasons of simultaneous activities and limited 
capacities.33
There is a certain continuity tothe V4 presence in the temporary but central 
role of the EU Presidency throughout 2011. The position allows the V4, to a lim-
ited degree, to orchestrate the processes of discourse and decision-making with 
the potential to bring some of the V4’s priorities and initiatives not only to the 
attention of other EU members, but to infuse some of the Visegrad perspectives 
into the broader EU policy context. When the EU Presidency is held by one of the 
31   Activities of the Czech Presidency of the Visegrad Group, June 2007 - June 2008, pp. 9, www.visegradgroup.eu/
main.php?folderID=943
32   Supra note, pp. 3
33    Executive Report of the Polish Presidency in the Visegrad Group, July 2008 – June 2009, pp. 1
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V4 countries it carries the possibility of promoting particular and timely ques-
tions from the agenda of co-operation among a small circle of EU countries and 
placing them onto the menu of plenary discussion and policy-making of all 27 
Member States. Undoubtedly, the operation and the agenda of the Union is deter-
mined, in great degree, by the rhythm and cycles of initiatives, discussions, and 
decision-making set in motion well in advance of the actual term of the Member 
State holding the EU Presidency. Nevertheless, each presidency has some limited 
space for priorities in addition to or, more successfully, in relation to, the largely 
pre-defined roadmap of EU legislation and policy process. 
The rare and fortunate (and so far unprecedented) sequence of V4 countries 
(Hungary and Poland) in 2011 in the chairmanship of meetings at all levels of 
Council configurations offers the chance to synchronise the V4’s priorities with 
the opportunities offered by the EU Presidency programmes. This fortunate co-
incidence in the timetables of the external relations and Presidencies of the Eu-
ropean Union with the Visegrad countries temporarily orchestrating the related 
discourse among EU members permits more effective co-ordination of the perti-
nent consultations at both V4 and Union levels.
V4+ formats: Visegrad co-operation with third parties from inside and 
outside the Union
In their 2004 declaration of continued co-operation, the Visegrad countries had 
already emphasised their commitment to close co-operation with “their nearest 
partners in the Central European region”. Geographic proximity seemed to in-
vite a natural collaboration with neighbours, though without clear contours and 
content. Outside the undefined borders of the Central European neighbourhood, 
other “countries within the wider region” (the Baltic republics for instance) and 
“other regional groupings” (the Benelux or the Nordic Council, just to mention 
the most obvious) were identified as possible partners for the Visegrad Group in 
specific areas of common interest. 
The V4’s co-ordination with external partners could take place at all levels of 
contacts. These platforms could be organised either within the Visegrad coun-
tries, generally hosted by the acting presidency state, or in foreign locations ac-
cording to the agenda and the practical needs of co-operation. Meetings of V4 
ministers, political directors of foreign ministries, ambassadors, and consuls, in 
combination with their counterparts from individual partner countries or groups 
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of states, offer opportunities for the presentation of concerted Visegrad Group 
positions, objectives, and initiatives.
One of motives of the V4 invitation to various partners for consultations to 
determine and elaborate common grounds for co-ordination and joint positions 
with the Visegrad countries have resulted in various encounters and co-operation 
initiatives between the V4 and  their partners. Without the enlargement of the 
Visegrad Group, this solution offers an answer to the need for co-operation and 
co-ordination on a larger scale and on diverse issues when an enhanced coalition 
of partners may seem advisable to achieve or reinforce V4 goals. These extended 
meetings contributed to a better representation of common interests and broad-
ened the perspectives for co-ordination of the entire Visegrad Group, reaching 
beyond its own limited circle of countries without the need for permanent en-
gagement of any partner in co-operation across the board.
Although the formal extension of the V4 has never  been considered as a seri-
ous option since its creation, the Visegrad partners proclaimed their willingness 
in 2004 to support broader collaboration with third parties in the so-called “V4+ 
formats”. In these constellations, the V4 countries appear as a group acting in 
concert in its interaction with external partners. Co-operation through these for-
mations can be introduced and maintained for different reasons and with various 
sets of partners. The range of these partners for the Visegrad Four envelops indi-
vidual states, groups of states (the three Baltic or the GUAM countries), as well 
as regional arrangements (Benelux Union or Nordic Council) from within and 
without the European Union. 
One group of countries that meets the V4 regularly as an informal but dis-
cernible composition of partners is the trio of EU Member States on the Eastern 
shores of the Baltic Sea (B3 = Estonia + Latvia + Lithuania). Their co-operation 
with the Visegrad Group in the V4+B3 format represents an important configura-
tion of V4+.  
Another cluster of states that has begun to develop relations with the V4 as 
group is the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan) constellation, 
which partly overlaps the range of the Eastern Partnership countries, but repre-
sent a more formalised set of partners. It held its first formal meeting with the 
Visegrad Group in Athens on the margin of the OSCE Council of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs in December 2009. The occasion was convened to discuss the pros-
pects and means of further co-operation between the two regional formations.34 
34   Information on GUAM meetings held in Athens 
http://embassy.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=343&info_id=5152
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Apart from state parties either as individual partners or as parts of distinct 
political clusters of countries, certain regional frameworks within the Union can 
provide the benefits of experience for the V4 to learn from their best practices 
as closely knit subsets of EU members with a history of sustained co-ordination 
both before joining and also within the Union. Regional trilateral (Benelux Un-
ion) or multilateral (Nordic Council) frameworks serve as natural conduits for 
their simultaneous engagement in co-operation with the Visegrad Group. Coordi-
nation between the V4 and the Benelux and Nordic clutches of EU Member States 
can be expected to deliver discernible results in the implementation of common 
V4-Benelux projects in the framework of the Eastern Partnership and/or in the 
Western Balkans. Dialogue with the Nordic Council could help the Visegrad coun-
tries tap into the accumulated and combined experience of the Nordic states in 
environmental and energy policies.35
In almost all sectors of Visegrad co-operation, V4+ meetings can be convened 
to engage third countries in collaboration on issues of shared common interests. 
Individual states may be invited to thematic meetings either as contributors to, 
or recipients of the results of co-ordinated initiation or implementation of policy 
goals. The subject matter on the agenda of these V4+ occasions determines the 
combination of which Visegrad countries will meet with which external partners. 
A few instances of issues and possible corresponding composition of V4+ forma-
tions may be mentioned as illustration. 
Regional development
When national practices and experience in regional development and the use of 
EU structural funds come under examination at ministerial meetings, Romania 
and Bulgaria usefully complement the four Visegrad states as other recent EU 
members with strong vested interests in consultation and possible co-ordination 
to ensure the sustained availability and most efficient use of these resources from 
the Union’s budget.36
Energy policy
V4+ co-operation on some of the sectoral issues can take on great significance 
when related to matters that may determine the underlying condition of eco-
nomic performance and strategic stability of participants. Among these matters 
35   Press Statement from the Meeting of the Secretary General of the Nordic Council of Ministers with the 
Representatives of the Presidency of the Visegrad Group, 14 May 2008
  The Programme of the Hungarian Presidency of Visegrad Group, 2009-2010, pp.7
36   Executive Report of the Polish Presidency int he Visegrad Group, July 2008 – June 2009, pp. 5
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of comprehensive importance, issues of energy security, supply connection and 
the operation of energy markets – at a regional and at the European level alike 
– stand out as prominent areas for V4 co-ordination in their intra-European and 
extra-European aspects.  The above identified issues of energy policy cannot be 
efficiently coordinated without due consideration to co-ordination with partners 
and the structural conditions beyond the V4 cluster of states. In recognition of 
the need to “energise” broader regional consultations, the Visegrad Group initi-
ated the V4+ Energy Security Summit in Budapest in February 2010.  In addition 
to the V4 officials, high ranking representatives from the countries of Central- 
and South-Eastern Europe from within the EU (Austria, Slovenia, Romania, and 
Bulgaria) and from outside the Union (Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
were invited to the extended Visegrad gathering in search of co-ordinated policy 
responses with regard to common energy supply challenges on the basis of re-
gional co-operation and within the context of EU policy goals. These were envis-
aged to include strengthened co-operation in the further integration of gas net-
works and diversification of routes, as well as sources of supplies, the promotion 
of North-South interconnections through all V4 countries, the acknowledgement 
of a common regional interest in the update of  the EU energy action plan and 
joint efforts for the allocation of EU financial resources to energy infrastructure 
projects.37  As a demonstration of progress on some of the identified aims in the 
conclusion of this V4+ energy discussion, the Hungarian-Romanian gas intercon-
nector opened in October 2010 and was built as an instance of bilateral contribu-
tion to the practical implementation of systematic reinforcement of regional gas 
supply links.38 In line with the stated priorities, the North-South connection of 
gas transportation networks into and across the Visegrad area is currently under 
way, as elements of the piecemeal composition of energy linkages reach different 
phases of construction: conclusion of the underlying intergovernmental agree-
ment (the Hungarian-Slovakian pipeline39), its implementation (Czech-Polish 
link40), or fulfilment (connecting pipeline between Croatia and Hungary41). 
37    Declaration of the Budapest V4+ Energy Security Summit, 24 February 2010
38   Vladimir Socor: Hungary-Romania Gas Interconnector: First Step Towards Region-Wide Network,  Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, 15 October 2010, Volume 7, Issue 186
39   Slovakia, Hungary to sign agreement on building gas pipeline, 15 December 2010, Budapest Business Journal 
online, http://www.bbj.hu/?col=1004&id=55233
40   Central questions, The Economist, 4 March 2010




The Eastern Partnership, formally launched as the Eastern dimension of the Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in May of 2009 in Prague, represents anoth-
er issue area where the Visegrad Group naturally resorts to V4+ formats to extend 
the discussion and co-ordination in this field to interested partners from within 
and without the Union. The extended platform with the V4 at its core could possi-
bly include EU members with expressed intentions and willingness to lead or par-
ticipate, and the target countries of the partnership proposal. Although the idea 
to reinvigorate and differentiate the Eastern aspects of the ENP was not raised 
as a visionary V4 proposal Poland and Sweden’s joint policy design42, the Viseg-
rad countries as a group quickly embraced and internalised the initiative as the 
new focus of their previously emphasised common interests in this dimension of 
European foreign policy in co-operation with other EU Member States43. Some 
“Eastern partners” (Ukraine, Moldova44, and Belarus) have been offered separate 
occasions to meet the Visegrad Group in individually tailored V4+ formats45. In 
its largest, extended version of the V4+ congregation of foreign ministers so far, 
the representatives of the Visegrad Group as the core cluster of the event invited 
all of the heads of national diplomacies of the EaP countries (Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) together with the most probable 
directly interested EU members (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden) and the 
institutional representation of the Union by the 2010-2011 Trio Presidency of 
the Council (practically Spain and Belgium, because Hungary was the host of the 
diplomatic conference) and by the European Commission (through the presence 
of its member responsible for enlargement) attended the occasion devoted spe-
cifically to the further development of the EaP in March 2010. The main objective 
was to find effective ways and means to advance the implementation of the East-
ern Partnership, and to express the commitment of the Trio Presidency to keep 
the issue high on the agenda. 46 The participating ministers stressed the need to 
reinforce the energy security co-operation of all participants, agreed to launch an 
informal group of non-EU countries to support the implementation of the EaP, 
42   Ahto Lobjakas: EU: Poland, Sweden Breathe New Life Into Eastern Neighborhood, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, RFEL.org, 29 May 2008
43   Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group countries, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Sweden, 
24 November 2008
44   Joint Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Visegrad Group Countries and Moldova, 25 October 
2007
45   Executive Report on Polish Presidency in the Visegrad Group, July 2008 – June 2009, pp. 2, 
46   Joint Statement of the foreign ministers of the Visegrad Group at their meeting in Budapest, 2 March 2010
36
and highlighted the importance of connecting the region into European trans-
port infrastructure networks.47
Defence co-operation
To some limited extent, even defence consultations may serve to develop and 
maintain the V4+ format as another dimension of the search for more engage-
ment and inclusion into co-operation with partners such as Ukraine. The invita-
tion to the Ukrainian Defence Minister and Chief of the General Staff to attend 
meetings of the V4 Defence Ministers and Chiefs of General Staff in Prague in 
2008 demonstrated the intention of the Visegrad Group to explore possible ways 
of collaboration and assistance in the reform process of Ukraine in the military 
realm of security.48  
V4 + B3 co-operation on selected issues
From 2006 onward, representatives of the Baltic states began to appear on the 
guest lists of V4 foreign ministerial gatherings in the company of other poten-
tially interested and smaller EU members (Austria and Slovenia) in order to co-
ordinate  joint activities relating to Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the countries 
of the Western Balkans.49 In the shape of meetings between foreign ministers on 
the margin of broader multilateral events, the V4 + B3 co-ordination was set on 
a more regular basis after the initial more thematic and casual encounters. Most 
naturally, when the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) or 
the European Council have been summoned, these occasions provided conven-
ient and recurrent opportunities for consultations between the two groups of 
states on the Eastern flank of the Union in the context of the actual agenda of the 
high-level platforms of EU decision-making.50
A more specific occasion for closer co-ordination within the V4+B3 format 
emerged in relation to the shared Visegrad–Baltic aims to complete their EU ac-
cession with full integration into the free movement within the Schengen area of 
travel without EU border control. Despite their formally accomplished full mem-
bership in the EU, their admission into the one of the inner layers of integration 
47   ibid.
48    Joint Statement of the Ministers of Defence of the Visegrad Group Countries, Prague, 25 April 2008, Para. 1 and 5
49   The Programme of Slovakia’s V4 Presidency, 2006-2007, pp. 2
50   The Activities of the Czech Presidency of the Visegrad Group, 2007-2008, pp. 8
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represented a symbolic aspect and, also, a very practical expression of benefits 
for the populace of the new Member States. The Central European and the Baltic 
countries seemed to converge as natural allies within the EU in recognition of 
their simultaneous aspirations to the Schengen zone. The V4 + B3 coalition of 
seven aspirants pledged sustained and close co-operation within the Union to 
make the Schengen enlargement possible within the shortest possible time per-
spective.51 
A further illustration of the utility of the V4+B3 format as a suitable platform 
for co-ordination on several issues simultaneously between the Visegrad and the 
Baltic regions was when the second part of the summit of the Visegrad Group in 
November 2008 was transformed into a combined Central European and Baltic 
congregation of prime ministers. The meeting of Visegrad and the Baltic countries 
at the highest political level was dedicated to those issues of foreign policy, energy 
security, and transnational challenges that figured prominently not only on their 
national lists of priorities, but also that had arisen at the European Council as 
questions of strategic significance for the entire Union. With respect to shared 
foreign policy interests, the Visegrad and Baltic EU members pronounced their 
expectations that the Union would ensure adequate “financial measures essential 
for an effective implementation of the Eastern Partnership”52. As for energy secu-
rity, the heads of government from the V4+B3 group made their shared consen-
sual opinion clear about the role of the Union: it should “pave the way” for diver-
sification of energy sources and  supply routes to EU Member States. Regarding 
the composite energy-climate package of policy proposals, the V4+B3 cluster of 
countries stressed in their joint conclusion that “all accepted solutions should be 
suitable for all European economy sectors and for all Member States of the EU”53. 
The complex issues at the interface of common environmental and energy 
policies on the agenda of the highest level of V4 + B3 co-ordination demonstrated 
the occasion to take a firm stance on the adoption of decisions in these fields at 
the level of the Union with serious implications for all members. In order to en-
sure the equitable allocation of economic and social burdens of adaptation, the 
V4+B3 coalition stood united in its call for “consensus decision” about the final 
shape and content of the components of the energy-climate packet. The Visegrad 
prime ministers insisted that the specific situations, as well as individual phases 
of development, in the case of each EU Member State should be taken into ac-
51   Statement of the Visegrad-4 and Baltic-3 Foreign Ministers, 13 November 2006, www.visegradgroup.eu 
52   ibid.
53   ibid.
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count and recognised in the final compromise.54 It resonated well among the Bal-
tic countries which willingly embraced the approach represented by the V4 group 
to prepare a common position for the forthcoming difficult and prolonged bar-
gains at every round of the decision-making process in the Council. By their joint 
insistence on unanimity, the Visegrad and Baltic members of the Union sought to 
preserve the last resort of veto in defence of vital national interests if dispropor-
tionate shares of EU commitments were intended to fall upon them. With posi-
tions adopted in concert, both groups –the V4 as well as the B3– of EU Member 
States stood a much better chance of successfully representing their interpreta-
tion of appropriate decision-making and arguing for fairness in the share of costs 
of particular common policies implemented within the Union, and even in the 
broader context of collective international commitments by the EU.
The demonstration of successful sectoral co-operation among the V4 and be-
yond: Entry into the Schengen zone
The V4 states stated their intentions to enter the Schengen zone together. 
They also decided to submit a joint V4 application for participation in the Schen-
gen system.55 The Visegrad countries demonstrated their confidence and political 
will to arrive at the next stage of post-accession integration in team formation. 
In contrast with their competitive pursuit of national aspirations prior to their 
admission to the EU, this time the V4 partners wanted to attain the obvious ben-
efits (shorter national border sections to be controlled) of concerted passage to 
a higher stage of integration as the result of collective efforts and co-ordinated 
preparations. 
The Schengen issue continued to represent a declared key priority for all of the 
V4 partners after 2004 and figured as one of the main focuses of consultations 
and co-ordination in the presidential activities of the Visegrad partners. Until the 
end of 2007, preparations and positions with respect to the conditions and tim-
ing of their Schengen entry were the staple of V4 discussion and co-ordination. 
The inclusion of the V4 countries into the ‘borderless European wonderland’ of 
unrestricted and unimpeded movement of persons carried the primary theme 
for pragmatic co-operation in concreto, not solely within the group, but also with 
other new EU members from the Baltic region sharing the same goals. 
Although their preparations for participation in the system of unified border 
control and visa regulations ultimately depended on individual national meas-
ures to fulfil the technical requirements of watertight border control and seam-
54   Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers, Warsaw, 5 November 2008, Section II.
55   Declaration of Visegrad Group Ministers of the Interior, 19 July 2004
http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=961&articleID=3891&ctag =articlelist&iid=1
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less flow of information, the new Schengen aspirants understood their timely 
and simultaneous arrival as a common goal of mutual benefits. Since these states 
together represent a contiguous stretch of EU members from the Adriatic to the 
Baltic Sea, their joint entry could spare the high costs of border control with each 
other required by the standards of the Schengen system. Their separate admis-
sion to the Schengen area would have demanded the introduction of potentially 
stricter border controls with each other than existed prior to their accession. It 
could have certainly resulted in a juridical division and formal separation through 
the imposition of an internal EU border regime. Strangely enough, the Visegrad 
and the other aspirant countries would have had to apply more rigorous checks 
at their common borders as EU members than before membership. Besides the 
predictable sense of increased separation between the new members, it could 
have meant more costly preparations as the result of the extended border control 
required by the demands of the Schengen system. None of these consequences 
seemed desirable within the Visegrad Group or in the larger cluster of Central 
European and Baltic states. 
Despite their determination and awareness to move in “close formation”, the 
V4 band of partners started to disintegrate as difficulties arose in meeting the 
technical requirements at some point (in case of Slovakia and Poland in 2006) 
and the spectre of the return to the pre-accession practice of national strategies 
– each state on its own – began to appear. After the recognised shortcomings in 
the preparations of some of the V4 countries, the EU members of the Schengen 
zone publicly deliberated the postponement of its enlargement.56 The prospect 
of delay reinvigorated the determination and cohesion of the Visegrad Group. In 
their joint response, the V4 issued open protest against any prolongation of their 
preparation and the resulting deferment of the entry date. In their concerted po-
sition, the V4 emphasised that they treated their Schengen entry as an “absolute 
priority”, and any delay “would be viewed as discrimination”.57 In a concerted 
act of pressure on the European Commission and the Schengen Member States, 
the ministers of foreign affairs of the V4, together with their B3 counterparts 
stressed “their firm interest in joining the Schengen area” in October 2007 ac-
cording to the original timetable. The Visegrad and Baltic partners jointly called 
upon the Commission and the rest of EU members to reaffirm their previous 
commitments. The V4+B3 coalition warned that if this target date happened to 
“be delayed significantly for technical reasons it would affect the credibility of the 
56   Drulakova 2007, pp. 12
57   Visegrad Four protest against Schengen entry delay, Euractive.com, September 2006, Http://www.euractiv.com/
en/enlargement/visegrad-protest-schengen-entrydelay/article
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EU in the public opinion in the new EU Member States”.58 Ultimately, their entry 
into the Schengen area depended not on the aspirations of the V4 countries, but 
on the approval of the abolition of border checks and examination of persons 
between the new and the old Member States. The approval of V4 participation in 
the deeper core of political integration within the mould of the external Schen-
gen borderline had to be adopted in a unanimous decision by the Council. This 
was only possible when all of the Member States inside the Schengen core of the 
Union could be convinced that their internal security would not be jeopardised by 
the extension of free movement of people to the external border of the new mem-
bers. Even if the precise date of their eventual entry did not coincide with their 
exact demand, the inclusion of the V4 and the B3 into the Schengen area took 
place before the end of 2007 as the result of their appropriate technical prepara-
tions and their firm insistence on the original timeline of the moves further and 
deeper into closer integration in one of the political pillars of the Union. 
Does the Visegrad Co-operation Have a Future?
The relevance of the Visegrad Group as regional coalition in EU politics 
and decision-making
The accomplishment of complex undertakings of policy co-ordination and con-
certed implementation, such as the simultaneous rite of passage to the inner core 
of the European Union through the free movement of persons remains a specific 
and spectacular example of synchronisation among the Visegrad countries. It dis-
played the features of rewarding co-operation not only within the V4 cluster, but 
involved further partners from among later EU Member States treading the same 
path to deeper integration. Qualification for a more advanced class of mutual re-
liance and openness certainly marked the high point where the Visegrad Group 
could make the most use of co-operation in its concerted drive as a coalition to 
get over the demanding standards of admission into the Schengen zone. No other 
challenge with the same need for co-ordination and simultaneous fulfilment of 
requirements is currently in sight for the Visegrad countries within the EU. Mem-
bership in the Euro zone (so far only Slovakia has managed to get in), the ultimate 
58   Statement of the Visegrad-4 and Baltic-3 Foreign Ministers, Brussels, 13 November 2006
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enterprise on the path to completion of their gradual integration into every as-
pect of the Union needs to be undertaken individually, not as a group. Experi-
ences and lessons could be usefully shared, but each Visegrad state without the 
common currency yet must meet the criteria through its national economic and 
monetary performance. Even in the absence of landmark challenges that could 
call for a concerted demonstration of readiness and ability of the Visegrad coun-
tries for higher stages of integration, regular and extensive V4 co-ordination can 
be expected to prove a continued utility in a variety of fields, at all levels, and at 
any time in the ordinary operation of Union.  
After the entry of the Lisbon Treaty into force, the European Union has moved 
clearly in the direction of a more supra-national character. The reformed treaty 
framework of the Union has significantly extended the range of matters and poli-
cy areas governed by the community method of qualified majority voting (QMV). 
The nature of decision-making has been significantly altered and shifted towards 
the increased role of supra-national institutions of European politics. Parallel 
with the scope of QMV decision-making, the role of the European Parliament 
(EP) has also been extended decisively. Co-decision with equal standing and par-
ticipation of the Council and the EP in the law-making process has become the 
prevalent mode of legislation under the redesigned allocation of competences 
and institutional powers. 
Two significant implications of these changes must be taken into account in 
the Visegrad countries.
There is an irreversible tendency leading to the full emancipation of the Euro-
pean Parliament as the indispensable partner of the Council with equal legal status 
in the prevailing mode of future legislation within the Union. This will transform 
the political landscape for co-operation among the Visegrad countries within the 
EU institutional framework if the V4 aspires to exercise a discernible influence 
on the final outcome of policy formation and decision-making. Co-operation and 
co-ordination of endeavours may be exercised not only at all levels of the Council 
structure from working groups to EU summits, but within the Committees and in 
the plenary sessions of the European Parliament as well. If and when the shared 
interests of the Visegrad partners can be indentified and moulded into a common 
position, it could be articulated and represented consistently in a concerted man-
ner by the MEPs of these countries, regardless of party affiliations. Besides the 
more familiar ground of the Council’s decision-making environment, the same 
importance should be attributed to the EP as the other leg of the legislative proc-
ess in the co-ordinated promotion of V4 priorities once a unified approach has 
been attained on any particular policy issue within community competencies.
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As to the V4 perspective on decision-making in the Council, the advent of 
more decision-making by a qualified majority leaves less space for protection 
against unfavourable outcomes by the rule of unanimity in the adoption of deci-
sions by Member States in the Council. The resulting restricted use of a national 
veto in defence of declared “vital national interests” increases the likelihood of 
a minority position for Member States on the losing side of “policy battles” un-
less agreeable compromises can be achieved or sufficiently forceful coalitions 
can be assembled to prevent the adoption of unfavourable solutions. The largest 
EU countries naturally represent the crucial centres of gravity in the process of 
any decision-making and the formation of interest groups within the circle of 
27 members. Smaller members must deliberate carefully and gauge the positions 
of others. Lonely voices of less sizeable or influential EU countries do not stand 
much of a chance to change the tune of policy and legislative proposals. There 
are two options for these smaller members if they want to be heard in the Union 
dominated by variable geometry and shifting coalitions. 
They either create stable alliances with larger Member States or rely on re-
gional groupings such as the Baltic, Nordic, Benelux, and Visegrad groups. Both 
options are built on the presumption that the national preferences continue to 
coincide among the partners in any of these coalitions. The sustained concur-
rence of national aspirations and priorities between dominant large Member 
States and their smaller allies or in regional clusters cannot be taken for granted 
permanently. It seems more probable and logical that the particular “missions” 
will determine the “coalitions of changing composition”. Issue areas and policy 
fields would determine the combination of Member States in the course of often 
protracted clashes of interests and concepts before any decision could be reached 
through the accumulation of necessary (qualified) majority.
Co-ordination and elaboration of timely positions and supportive arguments 
within the V4 could give rise to the composition of a larger concert of EU coun-
tries on timely questions of widespread interests across the Union. In a vivid 
illustration of this occasional generative potential of V4 opinion among other 
quarters of the Union, the position paper of the Visegrad Group on the EEAS 
pulled support from several like-minded countries. The articulated expectations 
of the V4 assumed additional importance as it catalysed the formation of a casual 
coalition of, altogether, 15 EU Member States that “broadly allied themselves” 
with the position of the Visegrad countries.59 In this instance, the position taken 
and disseminated by the V4 apparently represented not only Central European 
59   Andrew Rettman: New EU states make bid for more diplomatic clout, EUobserver.com, 10 March 2010
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views, but the perception of a larger section of EU membership that surfaced as 
the Visegrad quartet laid out its joint approach openly. Several other countries 
lined up to endorse the V4 call for equitable and proportionate representation 
of the Member States once it had been articulated and addressed to the entire 
circle of interested parties within the Union. The role of the concerted V4 stance 
on the emerging EEAS serves as an example of mobilisation of an “occasional alli-
ance” with the Visegrad Group at the core of a cluster of EU members converging 
around particular issues in pursuit of shared interests and principles. 
The relative weight of V4 in the EU
The simultaneous admission of the V4 countries highlighted certain important 
distinctions within the Visegrad pack. Prior to their EU membership, the nature 
of the operation of the group had been sustained in the context of a quadrilateral 
relationship among entities with formal equality as participants in an intergov-
ernmental co-operation of sovereign states. All participants were equally indis-
pensable for the adoption and implementation of co-ordinated V4 aims and ini-
tiatives. Upon their entry into the Union, the equal importance of the Visegrad 
partners in decision-making and implementation became manifestly qualified 
inside the European Union. Under the terms of distributed and unequal voting 
weights of EU members, in their individual capacities the Visegrad partners rep-
resent different gravities and potential to exercise any recognisable influence on 
common purposes and outcomes of co-operation at the Union level. EU member-
ship introduced new differentiation into the ranks of the Visegrad countries as 
participants in policy formation and implementation within a much larger multi-
lateral fabric of co-ordination.
Although the Visegrad co-operation is not confined to EU structures and poli-
cies, nevertheless the multilevel governance system of the Union represents the 
overarching framework of orientation under which the overwhelming majority 
of their co-ordination and co-operation inevitably began to take place after 2004. 
Therefore, the weight of each participant in the Visegrad Group had to undergo a 
reassessment against the backdrop of conditions determined by that framework. 
The actual differences between the constituent parts of the V4 platform received 
recognition and gained “special weight” within the EU as the variations in their 
voting powers determined by the demographic characters of these countries 
came to be enshrined in the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union after 
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Nice. The accession of the Visegrad countries accentuated the contrast within the 
cluster. 
The apparent asymmetry between the size and population of Poland and those 
of the other three participants assumed real significance within the Union. The 
acknowledgement and reflection of the “heavier weight” of Poland by the number 
of votes assigned to it within the institutional parameters of EU decision-making 
registered and preserved the stronger potential of Poland to shape policy-making 
processes in comparison with the individual possibilities of the rest of the V4 
Group as new EU members. This had significant impact on the perception regard-
ing the prospects of V4 partnership within the fabric of the European Union. The 
predictable Polish expectation to take its place in recognition of its voting power 
within the league of large Member States soon turned out to present a source of 
potential jealousy and criticism of its ambitions on the part of the three smaller 
Visegrad countries.60
On the other hand, the relative significance of their influence on the result 
of decision-making is certainly limited in the case of each Visegrad country if 
the number of allocated votes is counted separately. Even in the case of Poland, 
the larger stock of votes at its disposal does not suffice to decisively shape the 
outcome of decision-making on its own. Nevertheless, the composite weight of 
concerted V4 votes in the Council equals the combined voting power of Germany 
and France. This formal or, more precisely, numerical equality of V4 votes with 
those of the Franco-German tandem highlights the possible effect of coherent 
and collective positions of the Visegrad partners in the decision-making of the 
Union until 201461. This remarkable inherent potential impact of joint voting-
powers can be exercised by the combined momentum of individually allocated 
quotas of national votes as the most significant and occasionally decisive mani-
festation of the added value of Visegrad co-ordination at crucial moments of EU 
decision-making. 
60   Gniazdowski, 2005, pp. 81
61   In line with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, the current system of calculation – determined in the Treaty of 
Nice of 2000 – of the necessary qualified majority for the adoption of decisions not requiring unanimity is going to 
remain in force until 2014.
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A brief summary of lessons from the V4 regional co-operation within 
the EU since 2004 
In pursuit of more efficient definition and promotion of identified common in-
terests, the Visegrad Group can provide the benefits of regional multilateralism 
in its coordinative and cooperative functions within the circle of participants 
and combine the weights of individual national positions in order to multiply 
their impact outside their own cluster. The inherent potential of multinational 
platforms comprising a number of states, even if as limited as the V4, to attain 
enhanced weight in international matters through their concerted stances and 
acts constitutes the raison d’etre for sustained collaboration, with or without per-
manent institutional structures. Since no consultation is obligatory on any issue 
among the Visegrad partners, any government of the Group may feel free, at any 
time, to choose not to resort to the V4 framework.
Although the operation of the V4 formation entails regular meetings at vari-
ous levels of government, co-operation within the Group has never come close to 
institutionalisation despite a few proposals from some of the participants. Nev-
ertheless, the meetings that take place as a regular part of the V4 process provide 
an opportunity to debate EU affairs and establish whether and to what extent 
the national positions within the Visegrad Group on particular issues coincide, 
enabling the participants to pursue concurrent aims collectively. In spite of a con-
solidated practice of co-operation and the existence of collective interests among 
the V4 as EU members, a natural dose of divergence may be well expected to sur-
face in many cases. In spite of the permanent or temporary coincidence of their 
interests on many issues, nothing predetermines their agreement on any of these 
matters unless the V4 take conscious efforts to hammer out the common points 
in their respective national policies within a regional, European, or broader inter-
national context. 
Notwithstanding the proven utility of the Visegrad Group as a useful and po-
tentially effective platform for the co-ordination of positions, recourse to the V4 
framework has never appeared to warrant the adoption of a united stance and 
univocal representation of Central European positions and perceptions. The es-
sential benefit of the Visegrad formation of states remains its flexibility and avail-
ability as the regional political and sectoral co-operation mechanism to identify, 
co-ordinate, and promote the shared V4 preferences with regard to particular 
policies. The identified aims and choices can be pursued collectively but the pos-
sibility of concerted action does not in any way imply that continued co-ordina-
tion would inevitably lead to common positions, either on issues of particular EU 
policy or matters of intra-regional co-operation.
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Increasingly often, the four countries must anticipate situations where their 
interests may differ considerably in policies regarding the internal market or the 
redistributive instruments of the Union to channel resources for certain com-
monly agreed upon purposes. Controversies and divergences among the Visegrad 
countries do not invalidate the utility of attributed and assumed functions of V4 
co-operation. The cultivation of multilateral discourse among the participants of 
the V4 quartet, especially in cases of disagreement, could still yield the valuable 
benefits of clarity and predictability of their interactions as the Visegrad subset 
of Member States within the larger and complex institutional and procedural set-
ting of the Union. 
As a concert of sovereign states without the formal obligation to discuss any 
policy or action of the participants, the V4 remains remarkably flexible in its 
choice of themes and objectives, as well as instruments to manage and achieve 
them. The source of survival and longevity of the Visegrad co-operation may well 
spring from the very nature of the Group as a platform of choice and not of ne-
cessity. Since their collaboration is clearly optional rather than compulsory, par-
ticipants are not bound “to work through Visegrad or to achieve consensus, but 
can use it when beneficial”62. Within the context of multilevel governance of the 
European Union, the elaboration of unified positions and joint approaches of the 
V4 countries is not an end in itself, but rather the manifestation of common de-
nominators in pursuit of their collectively determined interests in the internal or 
external dimensions of the Union.
GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
The History of GUAM co-operation
The early stage
The current regional co-operative GUAM framework, comprising two East Eu-
ropean (Moldova and Ukraine) and two Caucasian countries (Azerbaijan and 
Georgia) was established in 1997 as a cluster of former of constitutive entities of 
the Soviet Union in search of means to reinforce their newly gained independent 
status through co-operation with other countries in the same situation. In 1999, 
62   Rick Fawn: Visegrad: The Study and the Celebration, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 4, June 2008, pp. 684
47
when Uzbekistan, from Central Asia, joined the GUAM it extended the political 
contours of the co-operative framework to another region of the former Soviet 
political space and transformed the name into GUUAM. 
The grouping of these five former Soviet republics seemed to be just another 
political combination of some of the countries emerging from the ruins of the col-
lapsed Soviet empire. These countries did not even represent a conventional re-
gion in the spatial sense with the diverse geographical vicinity of its components. 
From the foothills of the Carpathian mountains to the steppes of Central Asia, 
the participants stretched across a vast area with no other contours of definition 
than their declared intentions to establish some visible forum for consultation 
and co-operation within a political region of shared aspirations and interests. For 
years, it remained a platform for high-level official meetings without the consoli-
dation of any organisational form or institutions.
Originally, the GUUAM was created mostly as a loose and symbolic frame-
work for co-operation outside the Russian dominated CIS. It demonstrated the 
independent and direct multilateral relations of former imperial territories of the 
Soviet empire without or even in defiance of Russian tutelage. From the outset, 
Moscow has reacted to GUAM with mistrust and hostility, perceiving it as an in-
strument of US influence to constrain and undermine the CIS, which was initi-
ated to serve the interests of Russian foreign policy within the former imperial 
realm.
The institutionalisation of co-operation through the GUUAM reached a phase 
of discernible and consolidated format when the participating states adopted 
their Yalta Charter in 2001. 
The operational character of the first version: the aims and means of co-oper-
ation in the GUUAM format.
June 7, 2001 - 12:10 — naThe GUUAM Charter was adopted and signed at the 
Yalta summit of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, 
the Republic of Uzbekistan, and Ukraine in 2001.63 Before the adoption of a for-
mal founding instrument, several declarative and jointly adopted documents laid 
out the scope and modality of co-operation among the five partner states before 
the conclusion of a specific charter containing all consensual elements and as-
pects of regular contacts and working relations.64 
63   GUUAM Charter, Yalta, Ukraine, 7 June 2001
64   Strasbourg Declaration, 10 October 1997
 Washington Declaration, 24 April 1999
 New York Memorandum of the GUUAM Heads of State, 6 September 2000 
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In the founding instrument of the GUUAM framework, the participating 
states declared that they perceived their regional co-operation to be an instru-
ment of joint contribution to the consolidation of sovereignty, independence, 
and territorial integrity of all partners. The objectives of co-operation within the 
GUUAM were defined with respect to the following set of common interests: 
• the promotion of social and economic development
• the reinforcement and expansion of trade and economic links
• the development and effective use of the transport and communication infra-
structure across their territories
• the strengthening of regional security in all spheres of activity;
• the development of scientific and cultural relations, as well as projects in the 
humanitarian sphere;
• co-ordinated actions in multilateral international organizations;
• a concerted fight against international terrorism, organized crime, and drug 
trafficking.65
Each participant state could submit proposals regarding further possible di-
rections and areas of broadened co-operation. The GUUAM was stated to remain 
open for any new member, which would commit itself to the objectives and prin-
ciples of the regional association set forth in its Charter.
The operation of the GUUAM was sustained by relations and co-ordination 
exercised at three levels – presidential, foreign ministerial, and co-ordinating of-
ficial levels. The adoption of decisions within the GUUAM required consensus 
among all members at every level. Its political direction was determined by the 
annual meeting of the heads of state as the highest platform for joint consulta-
tion and decisions. The presidency in the GUUAM is exercised by each country in 
rotation in alphabetical order for the period between the presidential summits. 
At their meetings, the heads of state as the principal political forum within the 
GUUAM, could adopt decisions on 
• the principal directions of political, economic, and humanitarian cooperation 
within the GUUAM
• the establishment of the GUUAM’s specialised bodies;
• the co-ordination of national positions on urgent international issues of mu-
tual interest.66
In the course of its operation, the platform of foreign ministers functions as 
the executive body for GUUAM convened twice a year to oversee the implemen-
65   GUUAM Charter, Para. 1.
66   ibid., Para. 6.1.
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tation of agreements among the participants and the proposals for the further 
development of their co-operation. These initiatives were submitted for consid-
eration and adoption at the meetings of heads of state.67
For the purpose of maintenance and review of working relations within the 
GUUAM, the Committee of National Co-ordinators (CNC) was established as the 
forum for regular contacts and pragmatic discussions of all aspects of operation 
related to the tasks and aims of GUUAM co-operation identified at the higher po-
litical platforms. The CNC was entrusted with co-ordination of activities among 
the partners to ensure the preparation of the meetings of presidents and foreign 
ministers. The CNC had to convene regularly, at least quarterly or, at the request 
of any of the member, extraordinary sessions could be convened.68
The return to GUAM and its revival
After the defection of Uzbekistan in 2002, the cohesion of the grouping seemed 
questionable which could have consequently undermined the rationality of the 
entire political co-operation. Instead of disintegration and decline as some more 
sceptical predictions suggested, the ‘peaceful coloured revolutions’ – Rose in 
Georgia in 2003 and its Orange version in Ukraine in 2004 – breathed new life 
into the grouping. GUAM relations came to be reinvigorated as the formation 
gained a new sense of direction and meaning with the advent of political forces 
into government in those countries with programmes to redefine their countries’ 
perspectives through increased co-operation and gradual integration with West-
ern institutions. 
In May 2006, the presidents of the four GUAM countries adopted a new 
charter, rules of procedure, and financial regulations. Crucially, the leaders also 
expressed their desire for increased co-operation with NATO and the European 
Union. The organization was renamed as the Organization for Democracy and 
Economic Development-GUAM. As a result of its “reinvention” after almost 
a decade of existence as an annual congregation of heads of state, the regional 
grouping was transformed into an institutionalised platform for regional con-
sultation and policy co-ordination with permanent structures, legal status, and 
co-operative relations with other international formations. At the same summit, 
67   ibid., Para. 6.2.
68   ibid., Para. 6.3.
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the GUAM presidents also signed the legal instruments of economic integration 
among the four countries through the creation of a free-trade zone and a customs 
union. 
The characteristics of GUAM as regional cooperative framework 
The organisational features of the GUAM
The original four GUAM states decided to transform their group into an “interna-
tional regional organization” under the name of Organization for Democracy and 
Economic Development – GUAM and adopted a new Charter.69 The main purpos-
es of the new GUAM were laid out partly in similar terms to those of the previous 
GUUAM, but with added elements as well
• the promotion of democratic values, ensuring rule of law and respect of hu-
man rights
• sustainable development
• the strengthening of international and regional security and stability
• the deepening of European integration for the establishment of common se-
curity
• the expansion of economic and humanitarian co-operation 
• the intensification of political interaction and practical co-operation in areas 
of mutual interest. 
After its redefinition, the GUAM was composed of two principal structures: 
the Council and the Secretariat. The Council was designed as a central institution-
al component for co-ordination and decisions in the organization. It performs its 
function at four levels: heads of state, foreign ministers, national co-ordinators, 
and permanent representatives. The functions, competences, and working order 
of the Council were defined in the present Charter and in the GUAM Rules of 
Procedure.70
69   Charter of Organization for democracy and economic development – GUAM
http://guam-organization.org/en/node/450
70   Article 3, GUAM Charter
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The structures of co-operation within the GUAM
The need for the political and strategic direction of regional co-operation through 
the GUAM remains constant. The highest level where the four partners could take 
the most important decisions remained at the presidential level. The specific for-
mation of the GUAM Council provides the institutional platform for the sum-
mits of presidents from Member States in the shape of the Council of the Heads 
of State (CHS). At its annual meetings, this Council format with its presidential 
participants71 
• defines the priorities and orientation of GUAM activities
• decides on principal issues of its internal structure and functioning and its 
interaction with other states and international organizations
• decides on membership in GUAM and the granting of observer or partner sta-
tus
• addresses the most pressing international issues and takes corresponding de-
cisions and recommendations.
The GUAM Council in its foreign ministerial format meets at least twice a year. 
The Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (CMFA) was charged with various 
responsibilities. In its capacity as the regular quadrilateral forum at the level of 
GUAM governments, the CMFA performs its indispensable political tasks in the 
operational direction of the organisation when it 
• ensures the implementation of decisions and recommendations adopted at 
presidential level
• hold consultations in the field of foreign policy on the issues of mutual interest
• establishes and defines functions and order of work of GUAM working and ad 
hoc bodies for implementation of concrete tasks
• considers and takes decisions on current issues of GUAM activities
• adopts GUAM’s budget for the following year
• prepares the CHS agenda
• takes decisions on other issues envisaged by the present Charter.72
By decisions of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (CMFA), working 
and ad hoc bodies may be established on a permanent or temporary basis; addi-
tionally, meetings of representatives of corresponding ministries and/or agencies 
of the partner countries can be summoned.73  At the levels of strategic direction 
and political guidance, designated national officials from the foreign ministries 
of each Member State ensure the sustained co-ordination of interactions among 
71   Article 4, GUAM Charter
72   Article 5, GUAM Charter
73   Article 3(5), GUAM Charter
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GUAM partners and prepare the CHS and CMFA sessions through the operation 
of the Council of National Co-ordinators (CNC). The CNC conducts its sessions 
at least four times a year. In its fourth format, the Council is composed of the 
Permanent Representatives of the Member States. These Permanent Representa-
tives are accredited to the Secretariat of the GUAM and entitled to the status of 
diplomatic staff. The Council of Permanent Representatives (CPR) was set up to 
carry out its work to provide a standing forum for consultation and co-operation 
in order to facilitate GUAM activities. In this respect, the CPR
• reviews the progress of implementation of strategic and political decisions 
adopted at higher levels
• elaborates the agenda, the drafts of decisions, and other documents for the 
sessions of the Council at higher levels
• takes part in the preparation and conduct of Council sessions at the political 
levels
• adopts decisions within its competence on the issues of GUAM co-operation. 
The Secretariat provides organizational and technical support for GUAM ac-
tivities in line with the provisions of the GUAM Charter and decisions adopted 
by the Council. The Secretariat functions under the supervision of the Secretary 
General and relies on its staff of international officials. The Secretariat prepares 
annual reports on the various aspects and results of GUAM activities, which are 
presented to the CMFA for approval.  The GUAM Secretariat is located in Kiev as 
the capital of its largest member. 
The decisions within the GUAM need to be adopted with the participation of 
all members on the basis of consensus by achieving agreement without voting.74 
The country holding Chairmanship in rotation for a year co-ordinates all activities 
within the GUAM and ensures the implementation of adopted decisions. 
As the financial requisite of its operation as a regional organisation, the GUAM 
has its own budget determined by a decision of the CMFA and implemented in 
accordance with the Financial Provisions of GUAM. The Member States endowed 
the GUAM with international legal personality as they declared it subject to inter-
national law.75 On the ground of consensus among the Member States, the GUAM 
may enter into dialogue and co-operation with other states and international or-
ganizations.76
74   Article 10, GUAM Charter
75   Article 9, GUAM Charter
76   Article 14(1), GUAM Charter
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GUAM and conflict resolution
As a specific aspect of their regional co-operation, GUAM members have sought 
to co-ordinate national positions and initiatives with regard to the resolution of 
the previously violent, currently frozen separatist conflicts within their interna-
tionally recognized borders. The Azeri, Georgian, and Moldovan governments, 
under the threat of possible destabilisation and further losses in the event of a 
violent revival of confrontations in these areas, recognised the potential benefits 
of co-operation in this particular respect. All three of the affected countries real-
ised that they could stand much better chances for the resolution of the conflicts 
in their territories through co-ordination than by seeking individual and unique 
approaches to the violent separatism in their territories. The co-operation of 
the GUAM states within regional (OSCE) and universal fora (United Nations) of 
multilateral security mechanisms became the officially pursued line of concerted 
policy with the prospect of useful application of this experience to other inter-
national organizations as well. As the tools of its implementation, the GUAM 
presidents expressly welcomed the adoption of their action plans for co-operation 
within the UN and OSCE.77
The GUAM states agreed at the highest level to enhance interaction with a 
view to the intensification of the processes of conflict settlement. To that effect, 
they issued a joint declaration at their summit of May 2006 in Kiev78; the GUAM 
presidents emphasised that the unresolved conflicts and illegal military presence 
on the territory of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova undermine the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and political independence of these states, impede the imple-
mentation of full-scale democratic reforms and the achievement of sustainable 
development, and jeopardise regional security and pan-European integration 
processes. They stressed the importance of consolidation of efforts of the GUAM 
partners with the help of the international community to settle conflicts within 
their borders by means of re-integration of the break-away territories. 
77     GUAM Summit Communiqué, 23 May 2006, Kiev
78   Joint Declaration of the heads of state of the Organization for democracy and economic development – GUAM on 
the issue of conflict settlement, 23 May 2006, Kiev
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Regional Co-operation Council (RCC)
The History, Structure, and Operation of the Regional Cooperation 
Council
From Stability Pact to Regional Co-operation Council
The earlier version of a regional initiative aimed at the group of states in the 
Western Balkans was conceived and set on course more than a decade ago. The 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was launched in 1999 as the first compre-
hensive conflict prevention structure aimed as the overarching component of sta-
bilisation and as an instrument of the creation of conditions of peace, state con-
solidation, and economic recovery in the region. The Stability Pact was designed 
to provide a framework for regional co-operation and expedite integration into 
European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Although only an agreement by name (a 
“Pact”), the initiative reached a certain level of institutionalisation with its sec-
retariat in Brussels organised into three units each dealing with major issue ar-
eas. These were called Working Tables to indicate their functions as platforms for 
sustained discourse and co-ordination among the parties. Reflecting the major 
focal categories of shared concerns, Working Table I focused on democratisation 
and human rights; Working Table II was devoted to economic reconstruction, co-
operation, and development matters; meanwhile Working Table III was charged 
with security issues. 
The role of the Pact changed over time. At the beginning it served mostly as 
a platform to channel funds for reconstruction and to co-ordinate donor activi-
ties with their main focus on the infrastructure of regional co-operation. Later 
it evolved into a forum where diverse partners – countries from the region and 
international actors – could engage in multilateral contacts directly with one 
another to identify common problems and devise strategies to tackle them. Its 
broad mandate and strong international support enabled the Stability Pact to 
convince South Eastern European countries to embark on articulated regional co-
operation programmes, which brought about both practical benefits and deeper 
political understanding. As more and more progress was achieved on the ground 
over the years, the political, economic, and social conditions of lasting pacifica-
tion improved throughout the region. As a result of this improvement in the cir-
cumstances and context, the internationally driven process of co-operation in the 
Western-Balkans grew into an established practice and instrument that could be 
turned into a more regionally motivated framework to reflect the transformation 
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of the region, with the interest and capacity to maintain its own co-operative 
structure. This was the main underlying motive for the replacement of the Stabil-
ity Pact with another organisation. 
The new structure was designed around priorities defined by the region it-
self and was officially launched at the inaugural meeting of the Regional Co-op-
eration Council (RCC) in Sofia on February 27, 2008. The RCC was set up with 
the full commitment and support of South Eastern European countries, donor 
countries, and several international organisations active in the region. The Re-
gional Co-operation Council inherited the general purpose of the Stability Pact 
to oversee co-operation processes in South Eastern Europe and to support moves 
towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the region.79 The transforma-
tion of the Pact into the RCC was conceived to infuse new motivation and open 
new prospects in many dimensions of regional co-operation. It was also expected 
to facilitate international support and make it more concrete by the region itself 
assuming more direct responsibility.
The operation and the tasks of RCC
The RCC is an operational manifestation of a broad range of collaborative activi-
ties across the region under the label of the South-East European Co-operation 
Process (SEECP)80.
The RCC functions as a focal point for the set of regional co-operative relations 
and also serves as a forum for the continued involvement of those members of 
the international donor community engaged in SEE in the region. 
The principal role of the RCC is to generate and co-ordinate development 
projects and create a political climate that could enable overall economic and so-
cial advancement in the entire region to the shared benefits of all participants 
generally. To that end, the work of the RCC focuses on five priority areas:
• economic and social development
• infrastructure and energy
• justice and home affairs
• security cooperation
• building human capital and parliamentary co-operation.81
Based on recommendations from the Secretary General, and in accordance 
with political guidelines of the SEECP Summit, the RCC can adopt these priority 
areas in light of progress and developments in the region. Within these domains 
79   Joint Declaration on the Establishment of the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC), 27 February 2008, Para. 1
80   Charter of the South-East European Co-operation Process, 
81   Joint Declaration on the Establishment of the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC) of 27 February 2008, Para. 
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of shared priorities, the general tasks of the RCC82 came to be defined with the 
aims to
• sustain focused regional cooperation in SEE through a regionally-owned and 
led framework
• provide political guidance to and receive substantive input from relevant task 
forces and initiatives active in specific thematic areas of regional co-operation
• promote European and Euro-Atlantic integration
• provide guidance to the Secretariat of the RCC and its Secretary General.
The membership of the RCC covers the participating states of the SEECP, the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on behalf 
of Kosovo (in accordance with UN SC resolution 1244), the EU, as well as those 
donor countries, international organisations, and international financial institu-
tions “actively and substantially engaged in support of regional co-operation in 
SEE”.83 The overall RCC membership envelops 45 countries, organizations, and 
international financial institutions.84 
The organization maintains close working relations with all actors of relevance 
in these areas such as governments, international organizations, international 
financial institutions, regional organizations, various interested private business 
enterprises, and representatives (NGOs) of civil society.
Decisions of the RCC are taken by consensus which must be understood as the 
absence of objection.85 Consequently, the acceptance of requests for membership 
in the RCC depends on the consent of current members.
The structures of RCC
The members of RCC are convened in two formats: the Annual Meeting and the 
meetings of the RCC Board, held quarterly. The Annual Meeting of the RCC is held 
together with the SEECP Summit and at the level of senior civil servants or above. 
This platform is entrusted with the task of ensuring the strategic co-ordination 
and development of the regional co-operation processes, the review and endorse-
ment of  the Annual Report86 on the activities of the regional co-operation in 
82   Statute of the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC), ANNEX II to the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of 
the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC) of 27 February 2008, Para. 3
83   ibid. Para. 8
84   ANNEX I to the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC), 27 February 
2008
85   Statute of the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC), ANNEX II to the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of 
the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC) of 27 February 2008, Para. 12
86   Annual Report of the Secretary General of the Regional Co-operation Council on regional co-operation in South 
East Europe, 2008-2009
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SEE, as well as the Strategic Work Programme87 for the following year. Both are 
prepared and submitted by the Secretary General. The RCC Annual Meeting is 
open to other countries, international organisations and partners as guests upon 
request to and/or at the initiative of the Secretary General, following the consent 
of the members of the RCC Board.88
In between Annual Meetings of the RCC, operational guidance and supervi-
sion of the RCC is provided by the RCC Board. The Board consists of RCC mem-
bers contributing to the budget (For membership of the RCC Board, a minimum 
contribution of 50.000 Euro to the budget of the RCC Secretariat is required.89) 
of the RCC Secretariat, as well as the European Union (previously represented by 
the Troika of the EU Presidency, the European Commission and the Council Sec-
retariat General). The RCC Board meets quarterly and is chaired by the Secretary 
General. RCC Board meetings are convened and prepared by the Secretary Gener-
al. The Board accepts the Annual Report of the Secretary General and adopts the 
Strategic Work Programme for the following year, supports the Secretary General 
in its implementation, and reviews progress over the course of the year.90
The RCC Secretariat
The RCC has a Secretariat based in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) headed by 
the Secretary General. Apart from the Sarajevo headquarters, the Secretariat has 
a Liaison Office in Brussels with the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. 
The Secretariat provides technical, analytical, and organizational support to the 
RCC Secretary General and serves as a co-ordination framework for regional co-
operation activities within SEE as well as an information and focal point for such 
activities. The staff of the Secretariat’ needs to be recruited on a competitive basis 
in accordance with the competencies required, while taking into account gender 
and geographical balance, as appropriate. The working language of RCC meetings, 
as well as of the Secretariat, is English.91 The Secretariat of the RCC is directed 
by the Secretary General and supports the RCC as well as the SEECP in fulfilling 
  Annual Report of the Secretary General of the Regional Co-operation Council on regional co-operation in South East 
Europe, 2009-2010
87   RCC Strategy and Work Programme 2011 – 2013, Sarajevo, 17 June 2010
88   Statute of the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC), ANNEX II to the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of 
the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC) of 27 February 2008, Para. 9
89   Footnote 2 in Statute of the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC), ANNEX II to the Joint Declaration on the 
Establishment of the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC) of 27 February 2008
90   Statute of the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC), ANNEX II to the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of 
the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC) of 27 February 2008, Para. 10
91   ibid. Para. 20, 22-24
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their tasks by working towards the preparation and implementation of decisions 
of the RCC Annual Meeting and Board, as well as decisions of SEECP Summits 
and/or Ministerial meetings.92
The Secretary General of RCC
The RCC Statute envisaged the Secretary General as an active and pivotal insti-
tutional component in the operation of the organisation. The chief executive of-
ficial of the RCC was expected to have strong political stature with a record of 
successful engagement in regional co-operation and also the ability to interact 
with donor states and international organisations and to work with governments 
in the region at the highest appropriate level. Within its mandate, the Secretary 
General performs its duties to 
• promote and facilitate the achievement of RCC objectives
• foster regional co-operation, to follow and co-ordinate regional co-operation 
activities and initiatives in SEE and to support European and Euro-Atlantic 
integration
• chair the quarterly meetings of the RCC Board and co-chair the RCC Annual 
meeting with the SEECP Chairmanships in Office (CiO) Minister of Foreign 
Affairs
• direct the RCC Secretariat through the exercise of executive authority
• maintain close, co-operative contacts with all members and partners of the 
RCC, and in particular with the participating states of the SEECP, as well as 
with relevant regional initiatives and organisations
• provide support to the SEECP through the RCC Secretariat including the prep-
aration of meetings and conferences
• take part in meetings of the SEECP at all levels
• submit an Annual Report on regional co-operation in SEE and an Annual Stra-
tegic Work Plan to the RCC for review and endorsement
• present the strategic aspects of this Annual Report to the SEECP Summit thus 
contributing to the elaboration of the political guidelines of the SEECP
• co-operate closely with all institutions of the EU and its Member States in 
order to support the EU integration process of SEE and to contribute to the 
full complement of regional co-operation activities with the EU integration 
process
• work closely with other international institutions, public organisations, and 
the private sector for the promotion of regional co-operation in SEE
92   ibid. Para. 19
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• support the involvement of civil society actors in regional co-operation proc-
esses
• ensure that the RCC focuses on priority areas for regional co-operation
• facilitate efforts to secure funding for regional co-operation activities under 
the auspices of the RCC.93
The general functions of RCC
The RCC carries out a number of horizontal functions in line with its operation.94 
In their implementation, it is guided by the principles of inclusion and regional 
ownership in line with the Statute of the RCC. These functions are:  
• The representation of the region: Under the political guidance of SEECP, the 
RCC and its Secretary General represent the region in international fora and 
multilateral and bilateral meetings to promote the socio-economic develop-
ment and European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the region.
• Assistance to the SEECP: The RCC develops its relationship with the SEECP, 
using the mechanisms provided by the SEECP Charter and the RCC Statute. 
The RCC Secretariat supports the SEECP in fulfilling its tasks through the 
preparation and implementation of decisions of SEECP Summits and/or Min-
isterial meetings. Annual planning meetings to co-ordinate activities are held 
between the RCC Secretariat and the SEECP Chairmanships in Office (CiO). 
Implementation is monitored through regular quarterly consultations. The 
RCC will provide secretarial and expert assistance to the SEECP CiO.
• Monitoring regional activities: The RCC, through its Secretariat, plays a key 
role in monitoring and reporting on the multitude of regional activities in 
South East Europe. To that end, it seeks information on ongoing and planned 
regional activities by participating, as appropriate, in meetings and events, 
maintaining contacts, exchanging information and, where relevant, setting up 
working arrangements with regional and international organisations active in 
the region. The RCC Secretary General’s Annual Report on Regional Coopera-
tion in South East Europe will cover all relevant regional activities in addition 
to those of the RCC.
• Exerting strategic leadership in regional cooperation: The RCC is also designed 
to exert leadership in the promotion of regional cooperation in South East Eu-
rope in close cooperation with other stakeholders. The added value of RCC lies 
in its expertise and in its capacity to provide regional perspective for a range of 
93   ibid. Para. 13
94   RCC Strategy and Work Programme 2011 – 2013, Sarajevo, 17 June 2010, pp. 8 - 9
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activities and also in the context of the EU integration process. It also plays an 
important role in the assessment of existing cooperation activities, promoting 
the principle of inclusiveness, identifying needs and complementarities, facili-
tating new activities, and improving the existing ones. The RCC also helps re-
gional initiatives to fill the gaps and/or reduce redundancies and overlapping 
areas. Another avenue for useful contribution from the RCC can be found in 
the elaboration of solutions to possible issues arising in regional cooperation 
from the different status of participating states with respect to the EU.
• Providing a regional perspective in donor assistance: The RCC contributes to 
the determination of the implementing programmes that channel external 
development resources. Most importantly, EU assistance under the Instru-
ment for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).  The aim is to ensure that IPA pri-
orities correspond to regional priorities, and to focus attention on the need 
for beneficiaries to cooperate amongst themselves and liaise with other key 
stakeholders and the donor community. The RCC aspires to play a similar role 
regarding assistance to the region from other donors. 
• Support for increased involvement of civil society in regional activities: In its 
above functions, the RCC may perform the role of “catalyst” and “incubator” of 
activities, leaving project implementation to other actors. In a limited number 
of cases, the RCC Secretariat could participate in managing and supporting 
new initiatives. 
Current Trends of Regional Co-operation in the Western Balkans
Developments in priority areas of regional co-operation in South East Europe 
within the RCC framework 95 
During the first 2 years (2008-2010) of its operation, the efforts of the RCC 
were focused on key priorities for further economic and social progress in South 
East Europe: such as 
• the further promotion of democratic values and reforms
• support for the realization of the European perspective, including the consoli-
dation of institutional dialogue with the EU
• the promotion of the region of South East Europe as a reliable partner in the 
international arena
95   Annual Report of the Secretary General of the Regional Co-operation Council on regional co-operation in South 
East Europe, 2009-2010
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• consolidation of the RCC’s structure and role. 
In view of the strong need for development and political collaboration across 
the region, the demand for effective regional co-operative measures underlines 
the increased potential utility of the RCC in nurturing existing programmes and 
platforms, as well as in their consolidation or expansion in areas which have had 
poor results up to now. 
In the second year of its full operation, the RCC developed intensive communi-
cation and co-operation with different branches of national administrations of its 
members from SEE, regional taskforces and initiatives, EU institutions, interna-
tional financial institutions and other donors, as well as with representatives of 
the business community, academia, and civil society in the region. It evolved into 
a regional overarching (umbrella) organisation to include regional stake-holders 
in its co-operations and co-ordinate regional interests as the main interlocutor 
toward external partners. 
Through different regional projects and activities, the RCC has contributed to 
the improvement of regional co-operation in the six priority areas of its opera-
tion, opened ground for substantial strengthening of regional functional linkag-
es, as well as bolstered security, stability, and political collaboration in the region. 
Important added value of these developments is an increased interest of non-
Western Balkan RCC members from South East Europe (Romania and Bulgaria, 
for example) to become more active players with a greater role and higher impact 
in the project design and implementation in the scope of RCC activities.
With the substantial support of the European Commission and considerable 
involvement of the RCC Board members, the RCC developed its Strategy and 
Working Programme for 2011-2013 and also contributed to the definition of the 
content of the IPA Multi-beneficiary Programme for 2011-2013. 
In comparison to the former Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the 
greatest incremental development has so far been achieved in the priority areas 
of “Building Human Capital” and “Justice and Home Affairs”. The RCC was given 
an important role in the development of the Danube Region Strategy. Above all, 
the RCC initiated the Western Balkans 2020 foresight project as the umbrella 
framework for its most important long-term initiatives. 
As a result of increased activities through the RCC, the region is even more 
densely covered with a network of initiatives of materializing regional co-opera-
tion. In this improved landscape, new initiatives emerged, some of them already 
institutionalised, while others, still developing, were at the initial stages of for-
mation. The RCC played a role in the support for, and the promotion of their de-
velopment streamlining activities and the stimulation of regional structures. The 
consolidation and greater efficiency of regional processes and initiatives in joint 
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co-operation of the RCC members from South East Europe, the EU and its institu-
tions, relevant international organizations, international financial institutions, 
as well as other interested partners, lay at the core of RCC activities.
The further enhanced role and mandate of the RCC should be also taken into 
consideration and discussed in order to outline possible modalities for the trans-
formation of strategic perspectives into concrete and deliverable initiatives by 
the Secretariat. These deliberations mainly focused on comprehensive and real-
istic identification of co-operation areas and initiatives of practical advantages 
where the RCC can offer the benefits of co-ordination as its added value at the 
regional level in the forthcoming period of 2011-2013, as indicated in the road-
map of its operation.1 The aim of the RCC Strategy and the Work Programme for 
2011-2013 was to outline the envisaged directions of the activities of the RCC 
for the coming three years in a clear and focused manner. Besides its purpose as 
a strategic outline, the document also sets a concrete timeframe for the realiza-
tion of specific targeted activities of the RCC within the priority areas in the form 
of an Action Plan for the 2011-2013 period. Its strategy and roadmap for work 
between 2011 and 2013 provides the guidelines for the operational concept of 
regional undertakings through the RCC, which determine the implementation 
of the mandate of the RCC. It remains clear that the full implementation of this 
mandate and further development and strengthening of regional cooperation in 
South East Europe remains a task for all of the stakeholders involved in the RCC 
framework, and will require coherent, focused, and targeted efforts and energy.
Examples for prospects and needs for further integration within the re-
gional framework 
a) Liberalisation of trade and investment 
Since its inception, the RCC has engaged with a wide network of regional struc-
tures and initiatives. Some of these structures emerged under the auspices of the 
former Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, while others have been estab-
lished independently as an expression of willingness of the regional actors to find 
solutions at a regional level for common problems. The role of the RCC in the 
elaboration and implementation of these initiatives and structures has been very 
diverse, from providing political support and expert assistance, to helping these 
structures achieve long-term sustainability. The improved co-ordination of the 
1   RCC Strategy and Work Programme 2011 – 2013, Sarajevo, 17 June 2010
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ongoing regional initiatives and task forces represent an important contribution 
to more efficient and result-oriented regional co-operation.
Liberalisation of trade and investment has been considered to be a prerequi-
site for economic revival and development on a regional scale in SEE. The removal 
of impediments to trade and the creation of conditions for the free movement of 
capital are not only necessary to attract foreign direct investment to the region, 
but also indispensable for the inducement of domestic and regional investment 
as well.
b) Security co-operation2 
The region of South East Europe has considerably improved its overall security 
and political stability in the past decade. Due to its specific issues, the process of 
multinational security co-operation is still rather fragmented at this stage and 
it is concentrated mainly on the activities of the acting regional initiatives and 
taskforces, as well as in bilateral programmes. The lack of sufficient resources for 
regional security co-operation activities has exerted a direct effect on the level 
of participation by various national security structures in regional co-operation 
activities, both at bilateral and multilateral levels, as well as with respect to trans-
parency. The same holds true for some projects which have been commenced, 
where the sustainability of follow-up activities has been cast into doubt. 
The challenges and the current status of affairs in regional co-operation in the 
security sector indicate that it is determined by a variety of considerations and 
preferences as politically driven, European and Euro-Atlantic integration moti-
vated, or thematically focused. The regional priorities of the participating coun-
tries range between concentration on bilateral co-ordination and active partici-
pation in multilateral co-operation. The role and the value added of the RCC in 
regional security cooperation aims to maintain and enhance confidence among 
the regional participants through various measures which encompass
• the establishment of a sustainable, integrated, and transparent regionally-
owned cooperation mechanism among governmental security sectors
• the preservation and streamlining of the effective and value added regional 
task forces and initiatives that prove their capabilities to deliver tangible re-
sults
• the initiation of new initiatives with lost costs and high impact on mutual 
transparency.
2   Annual Report of the Secretary General of the Regional Co-operation Council on regional co-operation in South 
East Europe, 2009-2010, pp. 33-36
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The RCC has initiated and developed various, more specific, and sectoral re-
gional mechanisms for co-operation, such as the South East European Defence 
Policy Directors Forum, the South East European Defence Intelligence Forum, 
and the Regional Registry of NGOs working in the security domain. The regional 
dialogue and co-operation mechanisms could still be enhanced. The RCC Secre-
tariat addresses the need for a more coherent and consolidated regional approach 
by taking into account programmes, plans, and the availability of different par-
ticipants, mainly in the Western Balkans. In this respect, the RCC functions as 
the regional platform for direct support to bilateral and multilateral co-operation 
initiatives.
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InteRgoveRnmental CooPeRatIon  
and RegIonal seCuRIty
Introduction
This study provides a comprehensive overview of broad foreign policy and se-
curity policy aspects of the Visegrad cooperation. The wider objective is to map 
out the possibilities of using V4 experiences in the Western-Balkans and in the 
GUAM region.
This paper comprises seven main chapters. The first two chapters address his-
torical background , from the beginning of the Visegrad cooperation to the Euro-
Atlantic integration of the V4 states. The third chapter deals with the Visegrad 
policies towards Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, both within the framework 
of the EU and also as  the policies of individual countries. Of course, when dis-
cussing Eastern-Europe, the so-called ‘Russian factor’ cannot be ignored, there-
fore the relationships of the V4 countries with Russia are also integrated to the 
third chapter.
The fourth chapter is devoted to the global security challenges that the Viseg-
rad, GUAM, and Western Balkan countries have to face. The main topics are the 
proliferation of WMDs, organized crime, terrorism, and energy security. As par-
ticular challenges affect the studied regions differently, these variations are also 
taken into account. 
The fifth chapter addresses regional security projects, both successes and fail-
ures, , in Visegrad countries, in the GUAM, and in the Western-Balkan region. 
When handling this topic, the history of the region obviously has to be taken 
into account, especially that of the Visegrad region. Following the post-Cold War 
transition, EU and NATO integration into Visegrad  was far from being the only 
option,  and the alternatives, such as neutrality, and the so-called “NATO-bis” 
plan, etc.- will also be studied. From this point of view, the GUAM region is con-
siderably less complicated, as the still over-whelming influence of Russia sets the 
general outlines for regional security, especially in terms of defense. On the other 
hand, the Western-Balkan region is much more complex, due to its fragmented 
nature in terms of ethnicity, religion, statehood, etc. At the end of this chapter, 
the cross-regional opportunities have been briefly overviewed. 
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The final two chapters deal with the concrete possibilities of using the V4 ex-
perience in the Western-Balkan and GUAM regions in four particular policy areas 
where Visegrad know-how could be of good use. These are: 1. trust-building in 
foreign, security and defense policy, 2, supporting Euro-Atlantic integration ef-
forts, 3. cooperation in science and education, and 4. energy security. Each area is 
studied in separate sub-chapters.
The historical background of the Visegrad Cooperation in the field 
of security
The origins of the Visegrad cooperation date back to as early as 1335, when the 
King of Hungary, Charles Robert of Anjou, John of Luxemburg, the King of the 
Czech Kingdom, and Kazimir III of Piast, King of Poland, met in Visegrad in order 
to settle a dynastic Polish-Czech conflict with the mediation of the Hungarian 
king. When they met, they also signed an important trade agreement in order to 
counter the overwhelming economic influence of Vienna over long-distance trade 
routes.
Of course, efforts to connect the 1335 royal meeting with the Visegrad co-
operation of today may have only symbolic significance. However, from the his-
torical perspective, the nations of the Visegrad region have had to face the same 
geopolitical threats for centuries: first the Mongol invasion in the 13th century, 
then the Ottoman expansion from the South, the Russian Empire from the East, 
and German imperial ambitions from the West. Though state frameworks and 
borders have changed multiple times in the last two centuries, the nations of the 
region share certain historical memories of fighting the same threats side by side 
– though not always successfully, one has to add. 
One has also to remember that, during the second half of the 19th century, the 
existing multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-faith empires strongly restricted 
– and sometimes suppressed – the national awakening of their ethnic minor-
ity groups. This generated several conflicts in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
but also in the German and Russian Empires. Following the First World War, the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was dissolved, and the Russian Empire was trans-
formed into the Soviet Union, wherein it lost its Central-European territories. 
As a result, the statehood of Poland was restored and, also, a new state, Czecho-
slovakia appeared on the map of Central-Europe. The birth of new nation states 
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resulted in increased ethnic tensions, which, to a certain extent, still affect these 
states’ relationships to each other.
In the second half of the 20th century, all of the Central-European states fell 
victim first to Nazi Germany and then to the Soviet Union. Though the subjuga-
tion processes were different in their timing and details, in their results they were 
similar. The national independence of the Central-European states only began to 
be restored fully after 1989.
When it was formed in 1991, the Visegrad Group had three key objectives:
• to sweep out the remnants of the Communist Bloc in Central Europe
• to overcome the historical conflicts and animosities between Central Euro-
pean countries via close political cooperation.
• to make joint steps in order to support economic transformation in the Viseg-
rad countries and to support each other during Euro-Atlantic integration. 
The ruling political elites of the transition era shared many values, ideas and 
experiences, which also helped them to cooperate.3 
The challenges of Euro-Atlantic integration
On the path to Euro-Atlantic integration, all four Visegrad countries faced ba-
sically the same problems; however, their starting points were rather different. 
NATO accession
As a starting point, one should be aware that, following the end of the Cold War, 
in Central-Europe there were many security policy options, of which NATO inte-
gration was only one. Additionally, NATO integration was not on the agenda of 
any democratic political forces that took part in the systemic change.4 Moreover, 
the Soviet Union (later, Russia) was also strongly opposed to the NATO-approxi-
mation of her former satellite countries. 
In general, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary faced similar challenges, 
as did Slovakia, though with a considerable delay, due to the East-oriented foreign 
policy of the Meciar-era.
First and foremost, the Soviet forces stationed in the V4 countries had to be 
withdrawn. This was an obvious pre-requisite for regaining national sovereignty 
in terms of security and defense policy. The withdrawal of the former Red Army 
3   http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=938 
4   Asmus, pp. 37.
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from the region only concluded in 1994, though the former Soviet defense policy 
framework, the Warsaw Pact, had ceased to exist in mid-1991. 
Even though the foreign forces left the V4 countries,  their newly-minted po-
litical leadership had to face this challenge: they inherited huge, largely conscript 
armies with almost exclusively Communist-oriented, Soviet-minded and trained 
military leaders, the political loyalty of whom was at least questionable. Though, 
in the end, the armed forces did not intervene directly into transition politics at 
all, their informal influence and control over immense economic resources had to 
be addressed by the new, democratic governments. The costs of operating or even 
of maintaining these huge armed forces far exceeded the economic capabilities 
and willingness of the new regimes. Additionally, the entire structure of these 
forces reflected the pre-1989 mind set. These were large, conscription-based ar-
mies, designed for offensive warfare in the Warsaw Pact framework, and they 
were not needed any more with the changing security conditions of the post-Cold 
War era. All in all, serious defense reductions and reforms were hugely necessary 
in all four countries.
According to Ronald D. Asmus, in 1991 two events occurred that definitively 
started to turn the hesitating Central-European governments towards closer co-
operation with NATO. The first was the Yugoslav civil war, which demonstrated 
that the danger of violent ethnic conflicts was far from being over. The need for 
credible security guarantees became obvious, and neither the CSCE, the EU, or 
the WEU could provide such guarantees. The second event was the failed ortho-
dox Communist coup d’état in Moscow in August 1991. Although the coup failed, 
it clearly demonstrated how fragile the Russian transition and stability was – and 
this further strengthened the need for functional security and defense guaran-
tees. The Central-European states had to realize that they lacked any such guaran-
tees, and having only ‘strong ties’ to NATO would not be enough in the worst-case 
scenario: membership was needed. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, of course 
widened their freedom of movement. Thus by the end of 1992, the Polish, Czech, 
and Hungarian national security strategies all officially declared that NATO-ac-
cession was a clear priority for these states.5
The situation gradually changed in 1992-1993. The Clinton-administration 
was much more receptive to the Central-European goals of accession, though, of 
course, not independently of the decreasing Russian resistance. With the rising 
Russian domestic political crisis, namely the open conflict of the President and 
the State Duma, Yeltsin was in need of foreign policy successes with Western-
5   Asmus pp. 47-49.
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Europe in order to demonstrate his reformist commitments both at home and 
abroad. Thus, in August 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed declarations 
both with Polish President Wałęsa and Czech President Havel in which he de-
clared that Russia was not opposed to the long-term NATO accession of Poland 
and the Czech Republic, respectively.
However, of course, the most important factor was the change of the American 
attitude. In 1993 the Clinton-administration decided in favor of NATO-enlarge-
ment to include the Visegrad countries.Thus, in January 1994 the NATO Summit 
in Brussels declared that the Alliance was open for further European countries 
that were able to support the principles of the Washington Treaty  and contribute 
to the security of the North-Atlantic region. As a concrete step, in 1994 NATO 
started the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program that provided a much closer 
framework for cooperation than the NACC had been. 
Within the framework of the PfP program Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
Poland received decisive technical support for conducting the necessary defense 
reforms. The most important components were: the elaboration of functioning 
mechanisms for civilian control over the armed forces; including the establish-
ment of integrated ministries of defense; conducting the structural and person-
nel transformation of the national armed forces.
At the Madrid Summit, held in July of 1997, three Central-European coun-
tries: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were invited to begin accession 
negotiations. The negotiations were conducted that autumn. Thus, in December 
1997, the Protocol on Polish, Czech, and Hungarian NATO accession was signed 
by the NATO ministers of foreign affairs. In 1998 ratification processes were con-
ducted in all NATO member countries as well as in the three joining . Finally on 
March 12, 1999 Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary joined NATO.
The case of Slovakia was slightly different, due to its less pro-Western foreign 
policy during the Meciar-era. Though Slovakia was among the first to join the 
PfP, its co-operation was rather moderate with NATO, and was limited mostly 
to technical and organizational issues, while less attention was paid to political 
matters. The change began in 1998, when the government of Mikulas Dzurinda 
came to power in Bratislava. The new Slovak leadership re-oriented the country 
toward the West, and Slovakia joined the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) 
launched in 1999 and started to actively push for its EU and NATO-integration. 
In these processes Bratislava could count on the active support of the other three 
Visegrad countries, because getting Slovakia on board was obviously of both 
political interest and in the interest of security.. At the November 2002 Prague 
Summit Bratislava was invited to join the Alliance. The accession protocol with 
Slovakia was signed on March 26, 2003, and finally the country became a NATO 
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member on the 29th of March, 2004, together with Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, 
and the three Baltic states.
EU integration
The Visegrad countries had made their first official contacts with the European 
Communities already before the fall of the Iron Curtain. In late June of 1988 the 
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev gave his famous speech in which he declared 
that the Soviet Union was no longer opposed to the establishment of political 
contact between countries of the COMECON and the European Communities. 
This was followed by a joint COMECON-EC declaration on cooperation in July. 
There was rapid reaction in Hungary, and in September 1988 a trade agreement 
on commerce and economic cooperation had already been signed with the Euro-
pean Economic Community.  Warsaw followed a year later. Their motivations were 
obvious: intensification of economic cooperation with the West was inevitable for 
the sustainability of their economies, and such contacts also proved helpful in 
fostering the transition processes. These Trade and Cooperation agreements were 
the first formalized relations between the EC and countries of Central-Europe.
The next important step was the launch of the so-called PHARE (Poland, Hun-
gary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) programme in by the EC, fol-
lowing a G7 request. From 1990 on, all other Central-European countries joined 
the programme.
The Accession Agreements with the EC were signed after the democratic tran-
sition, in December 1991, by Poland, Hungary, and also Czechoslovakia. How-
ever, the ratification processes were time-consuming, thus these agreements – 
under their better known names: the Europe Agreements – came into force only 
in February 1994, and then only with Poland and Hungary. The newly independ-
ent Czech Republic and Slovakia, together with Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic 
States joined in 1995. By signing the association agreements, all of the Visegrad 
states declared that they were striving for full membership, and would not stop at 
‘associate member’ status. The EU did not react on their intentions at this point, 
thus the official text only recognizes the V4 countries accession intentions.
Actually this is perhaps the most important difference between the NATO and 
EU accessions of the Visegrad countries: the will to join the European Commu-
nities was already present from the very beginning, even during the transition 
period. There was not such a lengthy intermediate phase, with many alternative 
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options, as there was in the field of security policy. EC/EU accession was a politi-
cal priority from the very moment national sovereignties were regained.
Accession criteria were set at the Copenhagen EU Summit in June of 1993. Ac-
cording to the decision, the three main tasks to achieve were: 1. establishment of 
stable, functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, respect for human rights, 
etc. (political criteria); 2. a market economy, functioning banking system, etc, as 
the countries had to be able to stand the competition of the EU market (economic 
criteria); 3. adoption of the acquis communautaire, in order to fulfill the duties 
originating from the membership (legal and institutional criteria). In addition to 
these criteria, in Copenhagen decision-makers also added readiness of the Union 
for enlargement as an additional prerequisite. 
In the EU there was a main conceptual question to decide, namely the pace of 
enlargement. Altogether 12 countries had voiced their intentions to join the EU, 
namely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hun-
gary, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Malta. However, there were nu-
merous differences between them, concerning their levels of development, eco-
nomic power, institutional setups, etc. Some countries supported a differentiated 
approach, according to which negotiations would have started only with the six 
most prepared countries, thus with Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hunga-
ry, Slovenia, and Cyprus, while the other six would have been left for the second 
round. The other option was the so-called “regatta model”, according to which ne-
gotiations would have started with all twelve countries, and they would proceed 
according to their individual performance. A compromise was reached in Luxem-
burg at the December 1997 summit: the enlargement process was started with 
all 12 countries, but concrete negotiations began only with the six best-prepared 
ones. Thus, finally, accession negotiations were launched in March 1998 with 
three of the four Visegrad states, while Slovakia was left for the second round.6 
Negotiations were started with the second six states in 1999, at the Helsinki sum-
mit. In Helsinki the EU also decided to finish the accession negotiations by the 
end of 2002 at latest.
However, in the early 2000s negotiations with the first six countries slowed 
down, partly because of problems around the Treaty of Nice, and partly because 
the most complicated questions were left for the end of the negotiations. On the 
other hand, the countries of the Helsinki group advanced rather quickly, with 
the exception of Romania and Bulgaria. Thus, in December 2001, at the Laeken 
Summit, the EU decided in favor of a “big bang” enlargement, in favor of ten 
6   On the reasons and bckground of this decision, see: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epernbrefslovak.
pdf 
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countries of the twelve, including all four Visegrad states. Accession negotiations 
were finished on 12-13 December, at the Copenhagen Summit, where the EU set 
a concrete date for the enlargement: May 1, 2004. 
After the positive outcome, there were no other obstacles in front of the EU 
accession, thus, by the 1st of May, 2004 all four Visegrad countries joined the EU, 
together with the three Baltic states, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus. At this point, 
the original objective of the Visegrad cooperation was fulfilled, as all four coun-
tries had entered both NATO and the EU. 
V4 policies towards Eastern and South-eastern neighbors
The Visegrad Group in general has shared a pro-enlargement stance since their 
accession to the EU. Hungary and Slovakia devote most attention to the Western 
Balkans, while Poland tends to focus on the Eastern Neighborhood, primarily on 
the Ukraine and Belarus. The Czech Republic displays similar interest towards 
both regions, and thus occupies the middle ground, yet it is usually less engaged 
than its Visegrad counterparts. However, the Visegrad states on the whole man-
age to demonstrate a balanced approach despite their somewhat diverging foreign 
policy priorities as they grant mutual backing for each others’ special agendas.
Though all four states are generally in favor of enlargement, in practice the 
main division within the EU between devoted supporters of Euro-Atlantic en-
largement to the Western Balkans and the so-called “laggards”, trying to step on 
the brakes, does not sit on the frontiers of the Visegrad group. Supporters of the 
Western Balkans often manage to influence EU policies while acting together, yet 
such alliances have not been confined to the Visegrad Group. Some of to the most 
committed allies of the Western Balkans, such as Slovenia and Austria, fall out-
side of the Visegrad Group, while among the V4 Slovakia and Hungary are strong 
backers. Although the Czech Republic and Poland also tend to back initiatives 
targeting the Western Balkans, they are hardly a leading force, and push much 
less than Slovenia or Austria. The Czech Republic is usually a quiet supporter and 
is hardly ever at the forefront of such endeavors, though it can be also counted on 
as a reliable partner when it comes to initiatives related to the Western Balkans. 
By contrast, Poland’s approach is often marked by a slight uneasiness driven by 
the fear that focusing too much on the Western Balkans could divert attention 
away from the Eastern Partnership. Poland’s political leaders often treat the two 
issue areas as competing policy agendas, which is why Poland comes across as a 
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reluctant and rather passive advocate of the Western Balkan states’ Euro-Atlantic 
integration process.
The Visegrad states have less leverage when it comes to the so-called ‘high 
policy questions’, such as the constitutional deadlock of Bosnia, the Macedonian 
name dispute, or the frozen conflict in North Kosovo, where the large (and long-
standing) EU member states, together with the United States, dictate the agenda. 
This also means that it is fairly difficult for the Visegrad countries to make their 
voices heard concerning these issues. Although Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
managed to delegate a few politicians to high positions in some of the EU’s Balkan 
missions, they implemented rather than designed EU policy during their terms. 
At the same time, the Visegrad Group’s value added has been at a lower policy 
level where their engagement is expected and appreciated by the long-standing 
EU member states, and where they have been able to shape the EU’s Western 
Balkan policy. 
Altogether, the Visegrad countries’ contribution to the EU’s Balkan policy is 
twofold: on one hand, they keep enlargement on the EU’s agenda and make sure 
that the process is moving forward, while on the other hand they provide practi-
cal assistance to the candidates and accession countries to prepare them for EU 
and NATO membership. 
Towards Eastern Partnership countries
The Eastern policies of the Visegrad states have been thoroughly analyzed in a 
recent publication of the Centre for EU Enlargement Studies of the Central Euro-
pean University, titled: The Eastern Partnership in the Context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and V4 Agenda, edited by Izabela Albrycht, published in 
2010.7 Here we intend to provide only a summary, focusing on the main priori-
ties and institutional backgrounds.
7   Available: http://3csep.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/publications/the-publication_0.pdf 
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The Czech Republic
Czech foreign policy has traditionally been oriented towards Eastern Europe. 
However, Russia was practically off the scope in the 1990s, until Putin came to 
power. The re-emergence of Russia as an important player in Central Europe 
made Czech diplomats rethink their earlier system of priorities and once again 
pay more attention to Eastern Europe. The August 2008 war in Georgia was an-
other factor that increased the need in the Czech Republic for a more effective 
EU Eastern policy. Thus Czech Republic has been fully supportive to the elabora-
tion of the Eastern Partnership project and made it to one of the top priorities of 
the Czech EU presidency. The Eastern Partnership initiative was launched in May 
2009 in Prague.
Czech Eastern policy has traditionally had a very strong focus on human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. Democratization is among the key priorities of Czech 
diplomacy regarding the Eastern neighbourhood. In the Czerny Palace, the Czech 
Foreign Ministry, there is a separate department for coordinating democratiza-
tion efforts.8 Prague’s diplomats are not afraid of frequently criticizing Eastern 
partners, including Russia, over democratic and human rights violations. The 
institutionalized partnership between the Czech Republic and GUAM is aimed 
mostly on democratization objectives. The Czech Republic was in favor of get-
ting Belarus included in the Eastern Partnership, but only following widespread 
democratic reforms.9 
Concerning the institutional background of Czech Eastern policy, the Czech 
Republic has embassies in five Eastern Partnership countries, with the exception 
of Armenia. Additionally, Prague maintains two consulate generals in Ukraine; 
one in Lviv and one in Donetsk. The latter is mostly operated in order to support 
business and tourism connections with Eastern-Ukraine. In addition to these, 
there is also a Czech Center, a cultural institute, operating in Kyiv. The Czech 
Republic has a number of well-known NGO-s operating in the Eastern neighbor-
hood, among other regions. The Association for International Affairs conducts 
research and organizes numerous conferences and trainings. The Civic Belarus 
organization focuses on civil society support in Belarus. The Czech NGO The Peo-
ple in Need is focused on human rights issues all over the globe, including the 
Eastern Partnership region. Research is provided by 3-4 internationally known, 
influential think-tanks in the country, including the Institute of International 
8   Albrycht, pp. 6. 
9   http://www.visegrad.info/enp---eastern-dimension/factsheet/neighbours-of-visegrad-and-eu-eastern-
partnership-.html 
75
Relations Prague, the Europeum, the Prague Security Studies Institute, etc. A par-
ticular feature of Czech foreign policy is the established and well-functioning co-
ordination between governmental and non-governmental foreign policy actors. 
Hungary
Hungarian foreign policy traditionally has had two main strategic directions, 
the Balkans and Eastern-Europe. In both directions, Hungary is interested in 
strengthening the stability and statehood of the neighboring countries, putting 
special emphasis on democratic values, human rights, and market economy prin-
ciples. Supporting the Euro-Atlantic integration effort of the neighboring coun-
tries is also a priority, as having a safe and stable neighborhood is of key impor-
tance for Budapest. 
However, it is important to be aware that the Eastern dimension is limited by 
a number of factors. First and foremost, Hungary always – though not openly – 
has handled her Eastern policy giving priority to Hungarian-Russian relations. 
This, of course, does not mean direct subordination of her non-Russian Eastern 
neighbours, but in Budapest Russian reactions have traditionally been taken into 
account while planning Hungarian foreign policy moves in the Eastern neighbor-
hood. This undeclared ‘Russia first’ approach is primarily justified by Hungary’s 
critical dependence on Russian energy supplies, a fact that is not going to change 
significantly in the next 5-10 years. Second, Russia is a key foreign trade partner 
of Hungary and Budapest desperately needs this income, especially in the circum-
stances of the current economic crisis. Third, Russian companies have acquired 
important positions in the Hungarian economy, particularly in the MOL Hungar-
ian Oil and Gas Company, in the MALEV Hungarian National Airlines, etc. Rus-
sian business presence is strong in Hungary. Fourth, one cannot avoid saying that 
certain private economic interests also play a role in shaping Hungarian-Russian 
relations.
Besides the ‘Russia first’ factor, the lack of resources and infrastructure are 
also hampering factors. Of the six Eastern Partnership countries, Hungary has 
embassies only in five (in Armenia there is no Hungarian embassy), and the ones 
in Georgia and Azerbaijan were opened only recently and operate with very lit-
tle staff. The embassy in Minsk is also a relatively new one. Besides the embas-
sies, Budapest operates only two consulates, both in the Zakarpattya region of 
Ukraine: one in Mukachevo and one in Beregovo. Ukraine is the only country 
in the Eastern neighborhood where there is a considerable number of ethnically 
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Hungarian people living: approximately 150.000 Hungarians live in the above 
mentioned Zakarpattya region.
Of the six Eastern Partnership countries, the South-Caucasus countries are 
simply ‘too far away’ from Budapest: Hungary has very limited historical, politi-
cal, cultural, or economic ties with them. Thus Hungarian Eastern policy is fo-
cused mostly on the three states of the Western-CIS region: Belarus, Ukraine, 
and Moldova. Belarus is also quite far in terms of culture and common history. 
With Ukraine, the difference in size really does matter, as does the strong Rus-
sian influence in the country, and the above mentioned unofficial ‘Russia first’ 
attitude of Budapest. Besides, the minority question also plays an important role 
in Hungarian-Ukrainian relations.
In reality, the Republic of Moldova is the only country in the Eastern neighbor-
hood, where Hungarian foreign policy has already had spectacular successes, and 
has the potential of achieving further ones. Hungary and Moldova have strong 
political ties, dating back to the Soviet times. This is particularly because relying 
on Hungary has always been an attractive option for Moldovan politicians, who 
want to have an alternative EU-partner to Romania. In the late 2000s both the 
commander of the EUBAM mission and the EU Special Representative of Moldova 
were Hungarians, the first Common Application Center for issuing EU-visas was 
operated by the Hungarian embassy in Chisinau, there was a Hungarian top level 
advisor working with the presidency staff of Vladimir Voronin, Hungary provided 
lots of trainings and technical assistance for Moldovan administrative reforms, 
etc. The new Moldovan government of the Alliance for European Integration is 
also closely cooperating with Budapest. An interesting fact is that the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Iurie Leanca, is a fluent Hungarian-speaker: he learned the 
language during his university years in Moscow at the Moscow State Institute of 
International Relations. In addition to its relationship with Moldova, Hungary 
seeks active cooperation and partnership with Azerbaijan, based mostly on en-
ergy security considerations, of course. 
In its institutional background, Hungary lacks a developed network of NGOs 
that could work in the Eastern neighborhood. The most active one (and practi-
cally the only one) is the International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT). 
Aside from the ICDT, only a limited scope of technical and humanitarian assist-
ance is being conducted by NGOs, focused mostly on the Zakarpattya regions of 
Ukraine. In the scientific sphere both the number of personnel specializing in 
Eastern Europe and inter-institutional contacts are very small. However, even 
these limited resources could be used in a much more effective way provided that 
there would be at least some coordination between the various governmental and 
77
non-governmental actors. Unfortunately such co-ordination is practically non-
existent, unlike, for example, in the Czech Republic or Poland.
Poland, historically, has paid special attention and felt particular responsi-
bility towards the countries of Eastern Europe. This commitment originated in 
the middle Ages, from the time of the Polish-Lithuanian Grand Duchy, and has 
been more or less constantly present since then. The tendency was obviously 
strengthened by the border changes following the Second World War. The Polish 
minorities currently living in Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Georgia and - since the 
deportations of the Stalinist era, Kazakhstan –further increase the level of com-
mitment towards the whole region. So do traditional anti-Russian sentiments of 
Polish foreign policy, well-grounded in the history of the Polish-Russian relations.
Generally characterizing Polish Eastern policy, one could say that Poland is 
strongly interested in strengthening the statehood and sovereignty of the post-
Soviet countries that became independent after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. Democratic developments, market economy, rule of law, and respect for 
human rights (including, of course, minority rights) are the key values to be 
strengthened in the neighbourhood. 
However, it is important to note that the actual priorities and amount of re-
sources dedicated to the Polish Eastern policy vary greatly, depending on the ac-
tual government in power. For example, the previous Kaczynski-government put 
great emphasis on strengthening democracy and supporting anti-Russian politi-
cal forces in the region.  The Tusk-government is much more pragmatic, both in 
its relations with Russia and with the countries of the post-Soviet region.
Besides supporting certain political values, fostering economic contacts is also 
high on the Polish Eastern-agenda. Of the six countries of the Eastern neighbor-
hood, Polish political, cultural, and business influence is the strongest in Ukraine, 
due to both historical and current political reasons. 
Poland dedicates special attention to the Eastern dimension of the European 
Neighborhood Policy and particularly to the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which 
originated from a Polish-Swedish initiative. The Polish EU-presidency in the sec-
ond half of 2011 will be a decisive moment in Polish Eastern policy: ministerial 
summits of the EaP are going to take place in Poland and the third Civil Society 
Forum will also be organized there. As it turned out the Eastern Partnership Sum-
mit was even postponed, and instead of in Hungary, it will take place in Poland. 
The prioritized position of Eastern Europe is well reflected in the strong in-
stitutional background of Warsaw’s Eastern policy, both at home and abroad. 
Poland maintains embassies in all six EaP countries, in addition to a number of 
consulates in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Poland has special, institutionalized 
relations with the GUAM; in 2007-2008 there were a set of bilateral meetings 
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between them.10 In another post-Soviet integration group, the Community of 
Democratic Choice, Polish participation has also been of key importance. Besides 
traditional diplomacy, Poland is remarkably strong in the Eastern neighborhood 
in terms of cultural ties, research and education links, scientific contacts, etc. In 
Poland, there is a large, state-operated think tank, the Centre for Eastern Stud-
ies11, that is specialized mostly in the political, security, and economic develop-
ments of the countries of the former Soviet Union, and, to a lesser extent, Cen-
tral Europe. In addition to the OSW, there are also other scientific centers that 
deal with issues related to Eastern-Europe; for example the Polish Institute of 
International Affairs, the Institute of Eastern Studies Foundation that oranizes a 
regular, large scale, scientific Economic Forum in Krynica-Zdrój, smaller Europe-
Russia forums, etc. In addition to institutions with a scientific background, Polish 
Eastern policy may also rely on a well-developed network of NGOs that are highly 
active in Ukraine and Belarus, and are also visible in Moldova and countries of the 
South-Caucasus (primarily in Georgia.) 
All in all, one can state that the Eastern Policy of Poland is definitely the strong-
est and most visible of the V4. Besides pursuing her goals on bilateral bases, War-
saw is also very active in shaping EU policies towards Eastern Europe. Poland’s 
well-developed institutional background and strong local presence in the region 
is a necessary precondition for success, but, of course, alone cannot guarantee it.
Slovakia
Following the EU accession in 2004, Slovak foreign policy kept stressing its sup-
port for stability in the neighborhood and for a more ambitious European for-
eign policy towards the Eastern neighbors. However, Bratislava is well aware of 
the Russian concerns regarding the Eastern policy of the EU, and especially the 
Eastern Partnership. Slovakia is committed to work against such stereotypes and 
change the confrontational logic. 
Slovakia welcomed the launch of the Eastern Partnership and also the inclu-
sion of Belarus. Slovak diplomats stressed many times that they would be against 
any isolation of Belarus. For Slovak foreign policy, both democratization and the 
strengthening of economic ties are important in Belarus. In the Eastern Partner-
10   http://guam-organization.org/guam_and_poland 
11   www.osw.waw.pl 
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ship, clearly Ukraine is the most important country for Slovakia, due to its prox-
imity and to the Slovak minority living there. In 2008 Bratislava adopted a law on 
close-border movement that permitted Ukrainian citizens living closer than 50 
kilometers to the border to travel to Slovakia without a visa. 
The Slovak Republic is the smallest of the V4 by population, thus it is not sur-
prising that the network of Slovak diplomatic representation is not large outside 
the European Union. In the Eastern Neighborhood area, Slovakia has embassies 
only in Belarus and Ukraine. In addition to these, Slovakia has a consulate gen-
eral in Uzhgorod, Ukraine. The existence of this is justified mostly by the already 
mentioned Slovak minority living in the Zakarpattya region of Ukraine. Perhaps 
the most well-known Slovak NGO operating in the Eastern neighborhood is the 
Pontis Foundation. Professional scientific coverage of the region is provided by 
the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association.
Shaping EU Policy 
The four Visegrad states have the best chance of influencing EU policy-making 
when they co-ordinate their national foreign policies. This has been done since 
the very beginning of the Visegrad cooperation: First, they worked together in or-
der to support each other’s Euro-Atlantic integration efforts. Their second shared 
objective was the inclusion of Slovakia. Since the 2004 EU accession, Visegrad 
countries have been very active regarding EU policy towards Eastern Europe by 
gathering support for the Europeanization processes of the post-Soviet region, 
from Georgia to Belarus. The logic behind this is easy to understand: Visegrad 
countries, when they stand alone, have only limited resources to rely on  for their 
foreign policies towards Eastern Europe. On the other hand, they are the most 
affected by the security, stability, and economic problems of the region, as they 
are direct neighbors. 
Since their EU accession, the V4 countries have been in favor of a stronger 
Eastern dimension for the European Neighborhood Policy. Thus the Eastern Part-
nership initiative itself met the wide support of the Visegrad countries during 
its preparation and launch period. The EaP was a priority project of the Czech 
EU Presidency in 2009, and is also very high on both the Hungarian and Polish 
presidential agendas.
The Visegrad countries have consistently pushed for visa liberalization meas-
ures – and in the long run, visa free regimes – for the Eastern neighborhood. The 
lobbying of the Visegrad countries has played an important role in speeding up 
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visa liberalization processes in particularly in Moldova, and also in Ukraine, Geor-
gia, and Armenia.
Regional energy security is another relevant issue. In the spring of 2009 a large 
Visegrad Energy Summit was held in Budapest in order to support the Nabucco 
initiative. Currently the main objective is to get from the EU both political and 
financial support for building the interconnections that would link together the 
gas transportation systems of Central Europe, including those of the Visegrad 
region. 
The Visegrad engagement in the Eastern Partnership region
Besides individual country approaches and efforts to shape EU policy, the four 
Visegrad states coordinate their foreign policies towards Eastern-Europe on 
many issues. Such topics are related to the support for free and fair elections, 
human rights, democratic reforms in the Eastern neighborhood, etc. The ‘classic’ 
foreign policy tools for this are the coordinated declarations of prime ministers, 
foreign ministers, and other political figures. For example, on March 2, 2010  the 
Visegrad foreign ministers dedicated their meeting to the Eastern Partnership. In 
their joint statement they declared their support for the initiative, including such 
concrete details as „enhancing the availability of funding from EIB, EBRD, the 
World Bank, and other international financial institutions to Eastern Partnership 
projects and initiatives.”12 
The Eastern partnership is always mentioned among the priorities of the an-
nually rotating Visegrad presidencies, though, of course, to a varying extent. The 
current Slovak Visegrad Presidency is pushing for an integrated approach in sup-
porting the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western-Balkans and Eastern Part-
nership countries “by using the mechanisms and instruments of the IVF and EU” 
13 Regarding the concrete support given to the Eastern Partnership countries, 
the program emphasizes among other things the importance of visa facilitation, 
pushes for organizing a V4-Eastern Partnership Foreign Ministers Meeting, and 
for reforming the external mandates of the European Investment Bank in order 
12   http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/NR/rdonlyres/3F2BFC13-FFFA-4881-927E-717CD503848F/0/V4_
Joint_Statement_final.pdf 
13   http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/NR/rdonlyres/AF745FE1-E44D-475C-8AD8-3ECD4C970C3A/0/ 
100609_priloha_1a_final_text_of_the_program_V4_Slovak_Presidency_EN.pdf   pp. 2.
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to achieve more balance between funding given to eastern and southern coun-
tries.14
The Visegrad cooperation as an institutional framework is also engaged in the 
Eastern neighborhood, through the International Visegrad Fund (IVF). The IVF 
has an annual budget of 6 million euros, donated equally by the four member 
states. From the money, the Bratislava-centered fund runs various scholarship 
and grant programs. The scholarship program has an annual budget of 1 471 000 
EUR,15 there is a separate scholarship framework designed for Ukrainian stu-
dents, and another for Belarusian students and researchers. Among the grant 
program winners, there were also several applicants from the Eastern neighbor-
hood countries.
Towards candidate and accession countries in the Western 
Balkans
Hungary
Although Hungary has hardly been able to shape “high politics” in the Balkans, its 
role as an outspoken force for further enlargement proved to be decisive at criti-
cal moments within the EU’s institutions. Moreover, Hungary provided practical 
assistance to the Western Balkan states in several areas, helping them to prepare 
for their NATO and EU membership. Specifically, Hungary granted mentoring 
services to Croatia and Montenegro during their NATO accession process. More 
than a year ago Hungary completed its mission in Croatia, and recently started a 
similar program in Montenegro, while its diplomatic representation in Podgorica 
was upgraded to a NATO contact point. Hungary will also assist Serbia in improv-
ing its military capabilities. As a NATO and EU member, Hungary has also con-
tributed to various missions in Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo. 
Hungary’s engagement in the Western Balkans has been meaningful, even if 
it has been a subtle involvement. The fact that three states from the region were 
among the five biggest beneficiaries of Hungarian development assistance in 
2008 also demonstrates the importance of the Western Balkans from a Hungar-
ian foreign policy perspective: Kosovo received 1.24m EUR, Serbia 1.22m EUR, 
14   Ibid. pp. 6-7.
15   http://visegradfund.org/about/basic-facts/ 
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and Montenegro 1.07m EUR.16 Judging by the intensity of relations, Croatia and 
Serbia are the most important countries for Hungary. The other states enjoy less 
attention; for instance a Hungarian Prime Minister visited Bosnia and Herze-
govina in November 2006 for the first time since 1918.17 
In 1999 Hungary launched the Szeged Process within the framework of the 
Stability Pact, which was its first initiative targeting South East Europe, and 
which was meant to support democratic forces in Milošević’s Yugoslavia. In 2004 
the program was slightly redesigned and, subsequently, its main goal became as-
sisting the respective countries in their European integration process. Within 
this framework, the Opportunity for Stability Public Foundation distributes MFA 
funds to NGOs for community development and intercultural communication in 
the region, especially Serbia. In addition, at Hungary’s initiative, the Budapest 
Forum was launched as another pillar of the Szeged process, with the goal of shar-
ingits experiences with EU accession with the Balkan countries.
It should be stressed that economic engagement has become the strongest 
and the fastest growing dimension of Hungary’s involvement in the Western Bal-
kans. While trade used to dominate bilateral economic relations characterized 
by a constant positive Hungarian trade balance, in the last few years Hungarian 
investors, mostly motivated by new market opportunities, have also stepped up 
their activities in South East Europe. The Western Balkans attracted the major-
ity of Hungarian capital exports; as a result Hungarian capital expansion since 
2000 has been to a large extent due to growing investments in the Western Bal-
kan countries. In Montenegro, Hungary is the single biggest investor, where OTP 
Bank and Magyar Telecom carried out the largest investments. In Macedonia, 
Hungary ranked as the second biggest investor owing to Magyar Telecom’s ac-
quisition of the Macedonian telecommunication company, Maktel. Hungary has 
a significant economic presence in Croatia as well, being the fourth biggest inves-
tor there, which is mostly the result of MOL’s acquisition of INA shares in 2008. 
Owing to this deal, the stock value of Hungarian investment reached 2,1 billion 
EUR in Croatia. Energy cooperation has also become an important aspect of 
Hungarian-Croatian relations, which serves as a means for Hungary to lessen its 
vulnerability vis-à-vis Russia. Hungary and Croatia were meant to connect their 
16   Beszámoló a magyar nemzetközi fejlesztési együttműködés 2008-ban megvalósított tevékenységéről (Report 
about the activities of the Hungarian international development cooperation in 2008), Budapest, March 2009.
http://www.kum.hu/NR/rdonlyres/D2DB5DD4-42B2-4D3B-BB59-3F6808D15F03/0/Beszamolo_2008_KB_
utan_modositott_vegleges_gya.pdf. 
17   Imre Szilágyi, “The Hungarian Government’s Western Balkan Policies since the 2006 Elections,” International 
Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs 17 (2008), 4; Pál Dunay, “Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Era of Transition 
(1990-2004),” Foreign Policy Review (2004), 200. 12.
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gas pipelines in 2010, which will be part of a gas pipeline running from the Baltic 
Sea to the Adriatic. This project is part of a wider cooperation initiative within the 
frame of the V4+ aimed at strengthening energy links among the Visegrad group 
and with some of their neighbors, among them Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia from 
the Western Balkans.18 Hungary also wants to participate in building a coastal 
terminal on the Croatian island of Krk, which could receive liquefied gas by tanker 
from countries such as Qatar.19 Although small and medium sized enterprises 
have also begun entering these markets, the size of their investment so far has 
not been significant. 
Slovakia
Much as they are a Hungarian priority, Croatia and Serbia are also the countries 
with top priority for Slovakia in the Western Balkans. Serbia is important for 
several reasons, such as the presence of the Slovak minority in Voivodina and Ser-
bia’s geographical proximity, but also that the two countries share the experience 
of living under an authoritarian regime ostracized by the rest of Europe. Slovak 
politicians share the view that the stability of Serbia is key for overall regional 
stability and that most problems in the Western Balkans are somehow related 
to Serbia. Such considerations underpin the prioritization of Serbia high on the 
Slovak foreign policy agenda.20 
The current Slovak government is continuing the overall Balkan strategy that 
its predecessors developed. Slovakia’s engagement has traditionally focused on 
civil society development in the region and, as such, has had an important social 
impact. Yet, in the economic sphere it is a smaller player than Hungary as it de-
votes fewer funds and carries out less investment in the Western Balkans than its 
southern neighbor. 
Unlike in Hungary, Slovak politicians became leaders of EU policy initiatives 
through the engagement of a few high-profile diplomats such as Eduard Kukan 
who served as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Balkans between 
1999 and 2001, as well as Miroslav Lajčák, who, as the EU’s representative, helped 
to manage the referendum on independence in Montenegro in 2006, and in the 
following year took up the post as the UN High Representative and the EU Special 
Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, in Montenegro Lajčák 
was granted the responsibility of helping to manage and monitor the referen-
18   Declaration of the Budapest V4+ Energy Security Summit, Budapest, 24
th 
of February 2010.
19   “Energy security in Europe, Central questions,” The Economist, 6.03.2010.
20   Milan Šagát, “Slovakia’s Foreign Policy Towards the Western Balkans in 2006,”Yearbook of Slovakia’s
Foreign Policy1 (2007), 110.
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dum process, while another Slovak diplomat, František Lipka became the chair of 
the Montenegrin referendum committee in March 2006.21 Quite recently, Lajčák 
was the one announcing a new EU plan about organizing talks between Belgrade 
and Pristina about technical issues, which indicated that Slovakia is still trying to 
shape EU high politics in the Western Balkans.22
Yet, Slovakia has failed to convert its good political relations in the region 
into a strong Slovak economic presence, as Slovak investments still lag far behind 
those of the other Visegrad countries.23 In 2008 Slovakia ranked as the 35th big-
gest investor in Serbia and as the 32nd in Croatia. For this reason, in 2009, eco-
nomic cooperation became a priority in Slovakia’s Western Balkan policy, demon-
strated by a new government proposal focusing on economic diplomacy and the 
opening of the Slovak-Serbian Economic Forum, among others.24 
In 1999, Slovakia launched the so-called ‘Bratislava process’, a very similar ini-
tiative to Hungary’s Szeged Process. Just like the Szeged Process, it granted sup-
port for the democratic opposition forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
through organizing conferences and workshops. Simultaneously, Slovak NGOs 
got actively engaged in Serbia in the early 2000s and have remained very involved 
since. Consequently, civil society development became a key dimension of Slovak 
engagement in Serbia and the region. 
Within the framework of the Bratislava process, in 2002 Slovakia created the 
Bratislava-Belgrade Fund (BBF) which was meant to provide development aid to 
Yugoslavia (later to Serbia and Montenegro). Its main priorities have been the 
promotion of civil society, infrastructural investments, regional development 
and assisting with the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.25 Subsequently, Al-
bania, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina also became recipients of Slo-
21   Milan Šagát, “Slovakia’s Foreign Policy Towards the Western Balkans in 2006,”Yearbook of Slovakia’s Foreign 
Policy1 (2007), 113.
22   “Lajčak prepares plan for Kosovo,” B92, 2.5. 2010. 
23   For instance, in 2008 Slovakia ranked as the 35th biggest investor in Serbia with its 1,47 million USD 
direct investment according to its yearly investment balance, while Hungary stood at the 13th place with 32 
million USD, while Poland on the 15th  with 24,8 million USD. In Croatia, similarly, in 2009 Slovak investments 
merited the not so impressive 32nd place with 26,7 million EUR invested in the country. Croatian National 
Bank: Statistics, Foreign direct investment in Croatia by the country of origin, http://www.hnb.hr/statistika/
estatistika.htm. 
24   Imre Szilágyi and Tomáš Strážay, “New Dimensions of Cooperation: Hungary and Slovakia’s Joint
Involvement in the Western Balkans,” Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association,
Bratislava 2009, 23.
25   Lessons Learned from Building a Civil Society in Slovakia –Spreading Democracy and Stability in Central 
and Eastern Europe (Round Table at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London), 9.11.2005, 
http://www.ssees.ucl.ac.uk/vasaryova.pdf. 
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vakia’s development aid program.26 The Slovak Foreign Policy Association and the 
Pontis Foundation implement most projects aimed at sharing Slovakia’s EU ac-
cession experiences with the Western Balkan states.27 However, in the last few 
years, aid money has been channeled away from civil society to infrastructure 
development reflecting the aspiration of the government to strengthen Slovakia’s 
economic position in the region and to help small and medium enterprises enter 
the regional markets. 
Czech Republic
Despite prevailing political differences, there is a general consensus within the 
political elite on the need for further enlargement specifically to the Western Bal-
kans, yet the Eastern Partnership is also a high priority. Reflecting these foreign 
policy goals, both the Western Balkans – especially Croatia’s accession process 
and visa liberalization for the region – and the Eastern Partnership were among 
the main priorities of the Czech EU presidency.28 However, as Filip Tesar argued, 
the Czech Republic in reality is more interested in the EU’s eastern neighborhood 
than in the Western Balkans. Since Czech politicians are better informed about 
the Eastern Partnership countries they are also more active in this area. 
Like the other Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic also participates in vari-
ous EU and NATO missions throughout the region. It is worth to mention that 
Czech investment is also quite negligible in the region; the single biggest deal was 
brought about in Albania through the winning tender of the Czech energy compa-
ny ČEZ in 2008.29 ČEZ has recently entered a tender process in Kosovo as well. At 
the same time, however, of the Visegrad group, the Czech Republic gives the most 
development assistance to the region, 4.913m EUR per year,30 out of which most 
funds have been channeled to Serbia (2.88m EUR) and Bosnia (1.453m EUR). 
26   Remarks presented by the President of the Slovak Republic Ivan Gašparovič at the 12th meeting of the 
Presidents of Central European States, “How to complete the process of European integration,“ Zagreb, 14.10. 
2005, Website of the President of the Slovak Republic, http://www.prezident.sk/?remarks-presented-by-the-
president-of-the-slovak-republic-ivan-gasparovic-at-the-12th-meeting-of-the-presidents-of-central-european-states-
how-to-complete-the-process-of-european-integration-zagreb-14-10-2005. 
27   Milan Šagát, “Slovakia’s Foreign Policy Towards the Western Balkans in 2006,”Yearbook of Slovakia’s Foreign 
Policy1 (2007), 116.
28   Jan Richter, “Balkans among Czech EU presidency foreign policy priorities,” Český rozhlas, 9.1.2008, 
http://www.radio.cz/en/article/99413. 
29   Filip Tesar, “The Balkan Dimension of the Czech Foreign Policy: Cornerstones and Political Context,”
unpublished manuscript, 8.
30   Data for the year of 2008. Source: Pontis Foundation, ODA Evaluation in the Visegrad Four, Western 
Balkans Case Study,  December 2009,  http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/en/14521, 7.
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The overall record of the Czech presidency in terms of accomplishments in the 
Western Balkans was rather weak, yet it was a real success of Czech diplomacy 
during the presidency that Montenegro’s application for candidate status had 
been unblocked in the Council in April 2009. Moreover, Albania’s application was 
also accepted. In addition, as another diplomatic triumph for Prague, Štefan Füle 
became the new commissioner for enlargement. 
Poland
Compared to the other Visegrad countries, Poland is less engaged in the Western 
Balkans, since Ukraine and Belarus are its main foreign policy priorities. This is 
also reflected in Polish development policy: in 2010 the greatest share of Polish 
development aid targeted the Eastern Partnership countries and Afghanistan,31 
while Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia only 
received small grants from the respective Polish embassies.32 At the same time, 
Poland’s participation in the Visegrad cooperation and the Regional Partnership 
shapes its Western Balkan policy considerably. Being a member in these regional 
forums it participates in specific initiatives. In general and at a European level, 
in exchange for other Visegrad members’ support for Polish initiatives targeting 
the Ukraine, Poland backs the Visegrad countries’ policy in the Western Balkans. 
Moreover, following the Budapest declaration in 2005, within the frames of the 
Regional Partnership, Poland became responsible for sharing experiences with 
the Western Balkan countries about how to absorb EU funds. Although Polish 
experts have been actively engaged in this program organizing workshops, train-
ing sessions, and study visits, funds were cut for the year of 2009, again reflecting 
that the Western Balkans region was not the highest priority.33 
Poland, however, has a strong presence in the EU and NATO missions in the 
Balkans: 284 troops in KFOR and 120 policemen in EULEX. Polish soldiers made 
up one tenth of the EU’s EUFOR Althea mission in Bosnia, though at the begin-
ning of 2010 the majority of them were pulled out.34 Poland also contributes 
police officers and civilian experts to EUPM. 
31   Presentation of Agnieszka Lada, Research Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw at the workshop 
organized by CENS, CEU, Budapest, May 2010.
32   Pontis Foundation, ODA Evaluation in the Visegrad Four, Western Balkans Case Study,  December 2009, 
http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/en/14521, 8.
33   Tomasz Żornaczuk, “Western Balkans in Poland’s Foreign Policy,” Panorama of Global Security Environment 
2009, CENAA, Bratislava 2009, 237-248: 244.
34   Tomasz Żornaczuk, “Western Balkans in Poland’s Foreign Policy,” Panorama of Global Security Environment 
2009, CENAA, Bratislava 2009, 237-248: 240.
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At the same time, the reluctance of the Polish approach to the Western Bal-
kans sometimes manifests itself. For instance, the Polish government made its 
support of a declaration reaffirming the European perspective of the Western 
Balkans at the Visegrad countries’ foreign ministers meeting in October 2009 
conditional on the promise that in the spring a Visegrad summit would be held on 
the Eastern Partnership. Moreover, at that event Poland was not represented at 
a ministerial level signaling their general lack of interest in the region. Allegedly, 
enlargement will not be among the main priorities of the Polish EU Presidency, 
which starts in July 2011. In general it can be concluded that Poland often backs 
proposals on the Western Balkans in order to gain something on the Eastern 
Partnership front.
Furthermore, Poland refused to sign a declaration calling for a visa-free re-
gime to Serbian citizens, which was certainly not a sign of political good will. 17 
EU members including the Visegrad states joined the declaration which was a 
French initiative in April 2008.  Polish officials argued that Serbian citizens were 
already enjoying a rather generous visa regime in Poland.35 General disinterest 
towards the Western Balkans is also reflected by the low intensity of economic 
relations. Polish exports to the region amount to 0.7% of all Polish exports, and 
investments are also minimal (around a total of 70 million USD in 2007).36 
However, Poland is a clear supporter of further enlargement and, as such, at 
certain moments has provided firm backing to the Western Balkan states. Poland 
backed Macedonia’s NATO accession in the face of the Greek veto, as it disap-
proved of mixing in bilateral issues with conditionality requirements for NATO 
and EU membership. In a similar manner, Poland supported the continuation 
of accession negotiations with Croatia when those were blocked by Slovenia ow-
ing to the maritime issue. Poland hosted an important event during its Visegrad 
presidency in October 2008 displaying a pro-active approach towards Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. A meeting of political directors from Visegrad foreign ministries 
with a representative of the British Foreign Office, Bosnian authorities and Mi-
roslav Lajčák in Sarajevo was meant to draw the attention of Bosnian politicians 
to the Visegrad cooperation, and to boost Lajčák’s reform efforts in Bosnia as a 
high representative. 
On the whole, apart from Poland’s negative approach to the French visa ini-
tiative in April 2008, Poland supports visa liberalization to the Western Balkan 
countries and backs their Euro-Atlantic integration, even if it throws its real 
35   Tomasz Żornaczuk, 238.
36   European Stability Initiative, Debating EU Enlargement - Poland, http://www.esiweb.org/enlargement/?cat
=23#awp::?cat=23. 
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weight behind the aspirations of Ukraine.37 Altogether, Polish foreign policy is 
not necessarily negative but rather passive towards the region. Most of the time 
it follows the EU mainstream and gets engaged in the Western Balkans mostly 
through various forums such as EU or NATO missions or the Visegrad coopera-
tion, rather than at its own initiative. It is noteworthy that the foreign minis-
ter’s yearly statement on Polish foreign policy for 2009 did not even mention the 
Western Balkans, signaling Poland’s general lack of interest.38 
Shaping EU policy
Hungarian and Slovak politicians have been intensively lobbying for the integra-
tion of the Western Balkan states into the Euro-Atlantic structures, by all pos-
sible means and in all possible forums. Hungary and Slovakia have pressed for 
speeding up EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, advocated the countries’ in-
vitation to NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, later to NATO itself, and have 
been pushing for visa liberalization. Fighting against enlargement fatigue can be 
an important contribution in critical moments, such as in March 2005, when the 
European Council was about to decide whether to open membership negotiations 
with Croatia. Hungary and Slovakia, speaking up on behalf of Croatia, probably 
helped to avoid a longer suspension of Croatia’s EU accession process. 
In April 2009, at the initiative of Hungary, a letter was signed by the foreign 
ministers of eight EU member states, among them Poland, Slovakia, and Slove-
nia, addressing the Czech EU Presidency, in which they called for speeding up the 
visa liberalization process of the Western Balkan states, and asked the European 
Commission to give its opinion about the countries’ performance by May 2009. 
By this letter, the signatory governments intended to boost the Czech presiden-
cy’s efforts to accomplish something in the area of visa liberalization during its 
term. In the end, however, the European Commission’s proposal about granting a 
visa-free regime to Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro from January 2010 came 
only after the Czech presidency was over, in July 2009. 
37   Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz of the Institute of Public Affairs, cited in European Stability Initiative, Debating EU 
Enlargement – Poland. http://www.esiweb.org/enlargement/?cat=23#awp::?cat=23.
38   Tomasz Żornaczuk, 239.
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The Visegrad Group Engagement in the Western Balkans
Most recently, as a regional cooperation group, the Visegrad Group reiterated 
their commitment to the Western Balkans during a meeting held under the Slo-
vak Visegrad presidency in October 2010. The participants emphasized that the 
V4 “stands ready to assist the Western Balkan countries in their integration proc-
esses by transfer of relevant expertise, consultations on efficient management 
of IPA funds, ... joint research and student programs, and V4 twinning projects 
in areas such as energy security, transport, and infrastructure networks, Roma 
integration and others.”39
Although the Eastern Partnership countries used to dominate the Visegrad 
cooperation’s external agenda, the Western Balkans became a priority of the 
Visegrad Cooperation under the Hungarian Visegrad presidency between July 
2009 and June 2010, and remained a priority area under the Slovak Presidency, 
as well. Thus, Hungary placing more emphasis on the Western Balkans was a new 
step forward towards a more balanced approach.40 
During the Hungarian V4 presidency the member countries coordinated their 
activities concerning the Western Balkans and presented a united policy towards 
the region in the EU bodies, which was a major achievement. Such Visegrad co-
ordination had occurred before, such as in March 2009 before the Brussels Eu-
ropean Council forum, about how to handle the economic crisis. Provoking an 
angry reaction from president Sarkozy in the fall of 2009 they again tried to forge 
a common position ahead of the next European summit. At that time they dis-
cussed the Czech demand for an exemption from part of the Lisbon Treaty and 
climate change issues. Fearing that they would be squeezed out of the EU’s for-
eign policy the Visegrad states also called for getting a fair share in the EU’s new 
diplomatic corps, in the European External Action Service (EEAS).41 
Under Hungarian leadership, the Visegrad group played a key role in un-
blocking Serbia’s interim trade agreement in December 2009. Granting Bosnia 
and Herzegovina a NATO Membership Action Plan was an important goal of the 
Hungarian Presidency, (which was fulfilled in April 2010). The presidency also 
lobbied for Macedonia’s NATO integration, as well as for the further development 
of NATO-Serbia relations, in particular via the Partnership for Peace.
39   “Visegrad Group Ministerial Statement on the Western Balkans,” Bratislava, 22.10.2010. http://www.mfa.
gov.hu/kum/en/bal/actualities/spokesman_statements/20101025_v4_statement.htm. 
40   Presentation of Tomáš Strážay, at the workshop organized by Central European University, CENS, 
Budapest, May 2010.
41   Andrew Rettman, “New EU states make bid for more diplomatic clout,” www.euobserver.com, 10.3.2010.
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Besides effectively lobbying for enlargement in the EU, the value added of 
the Visegrad Group is the practical assistance they offer to the countries in ques-
tion to prepare for their EU and NATO membership. The Hungarian Presidency 
launched sectoral cooperation initiatives in order to further this second goal. 
Consultations focused on border surveillance, migration, and programs assist-
ing the Western Balkan countries to achieve a visa-free regime in the EU and to 
develop a public administration that effectively addresses the requirements of EU 
integration. In meetings among ministers, improving energy interconnection in 
the region and the incorporation of the Western Balkan countries in the program 
of Trans-European Transport Networks were discussed.42 Importantly, Croatia, 
Serbia, and Bosnia were included in the V4+ energy security cooperation initia-
tive launched in February 2010, which aims to connect the Polish and Croatian 
liquefied gas terminal and support North-South interconnections.
However, the Eastern Partnership countries, primarily the Ukraine, still domi-
nate the V4’s external agenda, even if South East Europe has received more atten-
tion lately. Owing to the efforts of Hungary, the rhetoric has shifted somewhat 
towards the Western Balkans. Yet, most funds from the International Visegrad 
Fund are still channeled to the Ukraine and Belarus rather than to South East Eu-
rope. Although the International Visegrad Fund (IVF) was set up with the central 
aim of fostering cohesion and strengthening cooperation among the V4 coun-
tries, it also has an external dimension offering scholarship programs to citizens 
from candidate and future candidate countries, supporting the sharing of acces-
sion and transition experiences of the V4 countries, and promoting civil society 
development. It is noteworthy that Ukraine and Belarus were the biggest recipi-
ents, with Ukraine being the single biggest beneficiary of total external funding. 
These two countries have attracted 60% of the Visegrad fund’s external assist-
ance, while the Western Balkans only slightly over 10%, which is a telling number 
from the aspect of assessing the external priorities of the Visegrad group.
42   Key Areas of the Presidency of the Visegrad Group 2009-2010, Website of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/foreign_policy/V4_presidency/visegrad_cooperation.htm.
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Visegrad Cooperation and global security challenges
Terrorism
According to the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), operated by the 
American National Counterterrorism Center, within the territories of the Viseg-








Incidents between 2000 and 2010 in the Visegrad countries by perpetrators43
However, though the number of successful attacks was very low, the number of 
unsuccessful attempts was actually higher, as is shown by the TE-SAT database 
of the European Union. The TE-SAT, operational since 2006, uses a different cat-
egorization than the WITS. Besides counting successful and attempted attacks44, 
it also registers the number of arrests that took place in connection with terrorist 
activities. 
In the Visegrad countries, both terrorist and extremist attacks took place, 
though in limited numbers. Hungary has the worst record: in 2009 the right-
wing extremists group, Hungarian Arrows National Liberation Army carried out 
incendiary bomb attacks against the properties of politicians (shown in the WITS 
database as the only not ‘unknown’ attacks). Additionally they planned to carry 
out four attacks against politicians. Three attempts were interrupted by the Hun-
garian authorities in the preparatory phase, while, in the fourth case, the terror-
ists gave up their plans. In Slovakia members of political parties were attacked by 
bombs in 2004, causing a few injuries. No group claimed responsibility. However, 
most incidents shown in the WITS database were connected to organized crime 
groups, and not to political movements.
Cases of extremism were reported from the Czech Republic and from Hun-
gary. In 2009 Czech authorities arrested members of the right-wing extremist 
group “White Justice” because they planned to kill politicians and policemen. 
43   Source: https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?t=Reports&Rcv=Incident&Nf=p_IncidentDate 
|GTEQ+20000101||p_IncidentDate|LTEQ+20101231&N=0 
44   The six TE-SAT categories are: islamist, separatist, left-wing, right-wing, single-issue, not specified.
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Also, in April 2009 Czech extremists attacked a Roma family with Molotov cock-
tails in order to intimidate the whole Roma community of the given settlement. 
In Hungary, in 2008-2010 altogether six Roma persons (including a child) were 
killed in nine attacks, committed by four rightist extremists, motivated by ethnic 
hatred.45 Their cases are not categorized as acts of terrorism, but as hate crimes.
Organized crime
Concerning global security challenges, the overall security situation of the Viseg-
rad countries, of all organized crime, is affected most severely by illegal drugs  and 
human trafficking. 
Drugs trade
All four Visegrad states are heavily affected by the illicit drug trade, mainly by-
heroin and opium trafficking from Asia to Western-Europe. Poland lies on the 
so-called ‘Northern Route’, or Silk Road, on which the heroin produced in Af-
ghanistan makes its way to Western-Europe through Russia, Ukraine, and so on. 
The other three V4 countries are touched by two branches of the ‘Balkans Route.’ 
The northern branch goes through Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to Austria, 
Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The central branch goes from Bulgaria to Mace-
donia, then to Serbia, through Belgrad. Here the transports go either to the West, 
to Croatia, or keep going North, and cross the territory of Hungary and Slovakia 
to the Czech Republic, which is an important regional drug distribution hub.46 
The map below shows the drug trafficking routes crossing the Balkans and the 
Visegrad states: 
45   http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/TE-SAT%202010.pdf pp. 36-39.
46   Márkusz, pp.36.
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The ‘Balkans route’ of smuggling and the Visegrad states47Additionally, the 
Visegrad countries are also crossed by the light drug trafficking routes, originat-
ing mainly from the Benelux-states and North-West Germany and heading to-
wards Central and Eastern Europe. Predominantly hashish and synthetic drugs 
are trafficked along these routes, for example, ‘disco drugs’ from the Netherlands. 
The Schengen-accession of the Visegrad countries significantly reduced the effec-
tiveness  of anti-drug policing inside the Schengen-area.
Until the early 2000s the Visegrad countries were mainly justtransit points 
for international drug trafficking. However, according to the analysis of the Hun-
garian National Security Office in 2008, Hungary already had also become a des-
tination country for the drug trade. In terms of cannabis production, Hungary 
47   http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/754791.gif 
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became practically “self-sufficient”, due to the large number of illegal cannabis 
plantations around the county.48 Besides, according to a 2008 Europol informa-
tion, in the European Union the highest number of illegal synthetic drugs labo-
ratories were operating here: 458 (!) laboratories were discovered, where mostly 
methamphetamines was produced.
Human trafficking
In order to get a comprehensive picture of the human trafficking situation in the 
Visegrad countries, one may refer to the Trafficking in Persons Report 2009, is-
sued by the U.S. Department of State. This document addresses the human traf-
ficking situation of every country, names the main challenges, and evaluates gov-
ernmental measures. 
The Czech Republic is a transit country for women from Ukraine, Moldova, 
Slovakia, Romania, Belarus, and Bulgaria, who are shipped to Western-Europe for 
sexual exploitation. The main destination countries are Germany, the U.K., Den-
mark, and the Netherlands. Besides, the country itself a destination for women 
trafficked from the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, Mongolia, 
and Brazil, mostly for the purpose of forced prostitution. An interesting feature is 
the trafficking of Roma men and women inside the country, mostly for forced la-
bor and again, prostitution. The Czech authorities fully comply with the relevant 
international agreements, victims’ protection is well-functioning, and there is a 
developed NGO-network, assisting prevention and victim protection. 
Hungary itself is an important transit route for women trafficked from Ro-
mania and Ukraine to the Netherlands, the U.K, Denmark, Germany, Austria, 
Ireland, and further away, to the United Arab Emirates. A particular domestic 
phenomenon is the trafficking of women from Eastern-Hungary to Budapest and 
to regions along the border with Austria. The main purpose is commercial sexual 
exploitation. Those Roma women and girls who grow up in orphanages are es-
pecially vulnerable to internal sex trafficking. Performance of the Hungarian au-
thorities in the anti-trafficking fight is constantly improving (for example, police 
implemented a new anti-trafficking database), but there is still a lot to do. Victim 
protection is a critical field: in 2008 the government stopped financial support to 
one NGO, resulting in the closure of one of its victims’ shelters – one of the only 
two in the country.  Generally speaking, the lack of funding seriously hampers the 
Hungarian anti-trafficking policy.49 
48   http://www.nbh.gov.hu/oldpage/evk2008/08-0053.htm#2 
49   http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123362.pdf   pp. 153.
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Poland, as the largest of the Visegrad states, is a significant source country for 
men and women trafficked to Western-Europe (primarily Italy, Austria, France, 
Spain, and Sweden) for sexual exploitation. Besides, it is also a destination coun-
try for women trafficked from the former Soviet Union and Bulgaria, Romania, 
Sudan, China, and Vietnam, also for the purpose of forced prostitution. In ad-
dition, women from Ukraine, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Vietnam are trafficked to 
Poland for forced labor, forced begging and debt bondage. The Polish government 
fully complies with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking: for 
example, the funding for victim care NGOs has been increased, a network of cri-
sis intervention centers is being expanded, and there were several campaigns to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.50
Slovakia is a source, transit and  - due to its size – limited destination coun-
try for women and girls from Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria, the Baltic States, the 
Western-Balkans, and China, trafficked to the Czech Republic, Germany, Austria, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and other Western-European countries, mainly for sexual 
exploitation. Besides, there is a significant internal trafficking of Roma people 
from the Eastern parts of the country to the capital, also for prostitution pur-
poses. Roma children are trafficked to Austria, Italy, and Germany for forced beg-
ging. The Slovak government is making significant efforts to combat trafficking: 
funds allocated for such purposes reached 400.000 USD in 2008; approximately 
half of it was spent on victim assistance. However, there is still a lot of room for 
improvement in the field of anti-trafficking measures, especially regarding suc-
cessful criminal prosecution.51
GUAM countries and global security challenges
From the point of view of global security challenges, the most relevant issues are 
WMD proliferation, terrorism, arms trade and organized crime. In addition to 
these, in the case of the GUAM countries it is also important to study the separa-
tist conflicts these countries have to face, as these conflicts are both causes and 
sources of many other threats. 
50   http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123363.pdf pp. 242.
51   http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123365.pdf  pp. 259.
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Separatist conflicts 
Clearly the number one common element in the security environments and se-
curity perceptions of the GUAM countries is the danger of separatist conflicts. In 
all four GUAM countries, separatist conflicts got “frozen” in the early nineties, 
following civil wars of different duration and intensity. The Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan had already broken out in 1988 and 
ended with a ceasefire agreement in May 1994. South-Ossetia broke away from 
Georgia in 1992, while Abkhazia did so in 1994. 1992 was the year in which the 
short Moldovan civil war ended, and the ceasefire agreement de facto recognized 
Transdnistria as an equal party in the conflict. In three of these four separatist 
conflicts – with the exception of Karabakh - the Russian Federation played an ac-
tive role by supporting the separatist forces both by political and military means. 
In the case of Karabakh, Russia supported Armenia, not the separatist ‘repub-
lic’ itself. Russia has also played a key role in maintaining the resulting ‘de facto 
states’ by stationing Russian forces there, by providing economic support, and 
by blocking practically all settlement efforts of non-Russian origin. As Moldovan 
analyst Nicu Popescu pointed out in regards to Transdnistria – though the exam-
ple fits the other three as well – Russia was interested in prolonging the conflicts, 
instead of solving them.
The motives of Moscow have been multifold. By stationing Russian forces in 
Transdnistria, Abkhazia, and South-Ossetia, regional military influence could 
be maintained even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By keeping the sepa-
ratist “republics” afloat, Russia can practically block or hamper the Westerniza-
tion processes of the kin states, and can still exercise certain control over them. 
Moreover, “operating” the separatist regions provides extreme economic wealth 
to certain Russian political and business circles. 
In Ukraine, Russian support to separatist forces is more complex in nature. 
The region of primary importance is, of course, the Crimea. The Crimea as a terri-
tory was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR only in 1954 and, since the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, the status of the territory has constantly been on the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian agenda, despite the autonomy that the Republic of Crimea enjoys 
inside Ukraine. It has its own parliament and political parties, though the judicial 
system of Ukraine is applied here. These facts, together with the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet being stationed there, provide a fertile ground for separatism. Since the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, Moscow has kept supporting various Russian na-
tionalist forces in the Crimea in order to put pressure on the central government 
in Kyiv. In 2006 a coalition of the Party of current president Yanukovich won al-
most 70% of seats in the Crimean parliament. Another member of this coalition 
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was an extreme pro-Russian party, reportedly financed by Moscow mayor Yuriy 
Luzhkov. They demanded the recognition of Russian as an official language, the 
permitting of dual citizenship – things, which were against the laws of Ukraine. 
Until very recently Russia has actively tried to incite ethnic tensions between 
the Tatar minority in the Crimea and ethnic Slavs. Experts state that there are 
many motives for this behavior. First, if Crimean Tatars radicalized, they would 
lose the support of their biggest donor, the secular Turkey. As a side-effect, the 
regional influence of Turkey would also decrease. Second, sharpening ethnic ten-
sions in the regions also weakens the central government in Kyiv. Third, referring 
to the danger of growing Islamic radicalization, Russia could increase its forces 
stationed in Crimea in order to protect Russian citizens.52 
Arms race and danger of war
In the case of the Moldova-Transdnistria conflict, one can clearly state that none 
of the parties involved would be interested in a military solution. A violent settle-
ment option is clearly out of question. In Georgia before 2008 one could clearly 
see a rapid militarization process on the side of Tbilisi following the ‘Rose Revolu-
tion’. The growing defense spending and the local successes that the Saakashvili-
regime achieved against Adjaria, South-Ossetia, and Abkhazia in a way predicted 
the escalation, which finally happened in August 2008. However, since the war, 
in terms of military danger, the region has calmed down. The Russian recogni-
tion of the ‘independence’ of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, and especially the Rus-
sian military bases established there, clearly rule out any further Georgian attack 
on these regions. Besides, Georgia itself has cut its military spending decisively, 
which is a clear sign that the Georgian leadership has given up the option of mili-
tary solution.
The only region of concern in terms of a possible war is Nagorno-Karabakh. 
The Azerbaijani side keeps stating that Baku is ready to use every possible means 
in order to regain control over Nagorno-Karabakh. Based on its oil and gas rev-
enues, Azerbaijan has increased its defense budget to a worrisome extent in the 
last years. In 2005 the defense spending was in theneighborhood of 542 million 
USD, while in 2009 it had already reached 1434 million USD.53 However, defense 
spending alone is not an objective way of measuring a state’s military capabilities. 
Armenian and international experts seem to agree that Azerbaijan still has to 
conduct a deep military reform, before it could realistically consider a successful 
52   Hedenskog-Larsson 2006:40
53   http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4 
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war for Karabakh. On the other hand, Armenia is member of the Collective Secu-
rity Treaty Organization, thus in the event of a military attack on Armenia – not 
on Karabakh! – Yerevan could count on the support of Russia. Besides, there is a 
large Russian military base in Armenia, and Moscow guarantees the security of 
all the Armenian external borders, thus Yerevan can concentrate its forces on the 
Karabakh region. Moreover, Karabakh itself is a highly militarized region, with 
extremely strong fortifications built along the internal border and with difficult 
terrain conditions all over.
All in all, in the GUAM region the Karabakh-conflict is the only one that may 
pose a danger of war, but only in the medium and long run. However, even this 
war scenario is rather vague, as practically all international actors, including the 
U.S., Russia, the EU, and even Iran - are interested in avoiding a serious military 
confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and such a “concert of powers” 
may well exercise a strong moderating influence on Baku.
Proliferation of WMD
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Ukraine be-
came a nuclear power, due to the warheads and delivery devices ‘inherited’ from 
the Soviet Union. However, the Ukrainian political leadership returned all these 
weapons to the Russian Federation in exchange for strong political and finan-
cial support from the West. Most of the former nuclear weapons launch sites are 
already re-cultivated.54 Ukraine has neither a chemical, nor biological weapons 
program, and though some elements of the old Soviet WMD production infra-
structure are still in Ukraine, these facilities are not used for military purposes 
any more.
Concerning WMD proliferation, the three other GUAM countries did not and 
do not pose a real danger to the global security environment, simply because they 
do not have either such weapons or WMD production capabilities. 
A more relevant source of concern is nuclear safety, and again, only in Ukraine, 
as the three other GUAM states have no nuclear power plants.55 In Ukraine main-
taining the safety of the Chernobyl nuclear site is possible only with the help of 
generous donor funding received from international actors. Besides the old Cher-
54   http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/ukraine/index.html 
55   However, in Georgia there are plans to build a nuclear power station. See, for example: http://www.cipdd.org/
files/43_237_640291_Policybrief3Eng.pdf 
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nobyl site, there are four active large nuclear power plant sites in Ukraine: Rivne, 
Khmelnitski, Zaporizhzhya, and the South-Ukrainian complexes. The country is 
heavily dependent on nuclear energy, approximately 26,6% of its electricity de-
mand is fulfilled by nuclear power plants. As Kyiv plans to maintain the share 
of nuclear energy in the Ukrainian power balance, besides decommissioning the 
oldest reactors, there are plans to build new ones and increase the capacity of the 
some of the older ones.56 
However, though the GUAM states generally do not pose a WMD threat as 
source countries, they are sources of concern as possible transit routes of WMD 
transfers. This applies especially to the security ‘black holes’ meant by the exist-
ence of the separatist de facto states. Due to the nature of the separatist regimes, 
extremely little confirmed information is available on such transfer efforts.
Arms trade
The arms trade is an important factor while trying to analyze the impact of the 
GUAM countries on global security, and also by analyzing their own situation. 
One of the four states, Ukraine, possesses a huge and very diverse defense indus-
try originating from the Soviet era and, thus, has a remarkable export capacity. 
Both in 2008 and 2009 Ukraine was the 14th largest arms exporter of the world. 
The most important customers of the Ukrainian arms industry were Algeria, Az-
erbaijan, China, Georgia, Iraq, India, and Libya.57 In certain cases, Ukraine ex-
ported weapons so modern that Ukrainian armed forces didn’t even have them 
yet, or had them only in very limited numbers. This happened with Buk M1 air 
defense systems, upgrade equipments to BMP-1 vehicles, etc.58
Various Ukrainian firms were reportedly also involved in illegal arms trans-
fers. One may remember, for example, the case of the Ukrainian ‘Faina’ cargo ship 
that delivered weapons to South-Sudan and was hijacked by Somali pirates.59 
World-known ‘Merchant of Death’, Victor Bout also had important Ukrainian 
connections.60 The large-scale arms export of Ukraine is connected not only to 
the huge domestic production capacities, but also to the need of modernizing the 
56   http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf46.html 
57   armstrade.sipri.org 
58   http://rt.com/news/ukraine-involved-in-illegal-arms-trade-timoshenko/ 
59   http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/05/somali-pirates-free-military-ship 
60   http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sierraleone/context.html 
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armed forces and getting rid of the old equipment that may still be sold on third 
world arms markets. 
Moldova, though it has no significant arms industry, is still a country of con-
cern, first, due to the arms production of the separatist Transdnistrian territory, 
and second, because of the large ex-Soviet weapons stockpiles on Transdnistrian 
soil. Moldovan sources have given information many times on the arms sales ac-
tivities of the Transdnistrian ‘state’, though very few cases could be confirmed.61 
Azerbaijan and Georgia are present in the global arms markets mostly as 
buyers. As mentioned before, the situation in Georgia has changed since 2008. 
However, though the country has cut its military budget, arms procurement has 
not stopped, only slowed down. On the contrary, Azerbaijan keeps increasing its 
purchases, and is striving to buy modern, up-to-date equipment: surface-surface 
missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel, tanks and armored personnel car-
riers from Russia, rocket artillery, fighter and attack planes from Ukraine, mine-
protected infantry vehicles from South Africa, etc.62
Terrorism
According to the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, these countries can be 
considered relatively safe places regarding the threat of terrorism. In the last dec-
ade, the number of incidents remained very low, especially when compared to 
the population count. The only exception is Georgia, where most incidents took 
place, either in the three separatist territories (including Adjaria), or in the Geor-
gian-controlled provinces bordering them. Besides, in the Caucasus it is some-
times practically impossible to separate cases of political terrorism and struggles 
of private clans and organized crime groups.
Country Attack Dead Wounded Hostage Victims
Population  
[thousand]
Azerbaijan 10 11 26 0 37 9047
Georgia 121 37 141 26 204 4636
Moldova 5 9 81 0 90 4324
Ukraine 24 5 68 1 74 45 962
61   Pintea, Iurie (2004): ‘The Military Aspect of the Conflict Settlement in the Eastern Part of the Republic of 
Moldova.’ In: Barbarosie, Arcadiu Dr. – Nantoi, Oazu (eds.): Aspects of the Transnistrian Conflict. Institutul de 
Politici Publice. Chişinău. 2004. 95–137.
62   Source: armstrade.sipri.org 
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Incidents between 2000 and 2010 in the GUAM countries63
If one takes a closer look at the perpetrators, it is clearly seen that most terrorism-
related attacks in the GUAM countries are connected either to domestic secular 
political motives, or committed by unknown groups. However, taking into ac-
count the fact that, except for in Azerbaijan, there were no attacks committed by 
a confirmed Islamic group, one may well pre-suppose that most of the unknown 
attacks were connected to organized crime groups. 
Country
Perpetrators
Unknown Secular/Political/Anarchist Islamist Extremists (Sunni)
Azerbaijan 70 59 2
Georgia 63 58 0
Moldova 4 1 0
Ukraine 27 2 0
Incidents by perpetrators 2000 and 2010 in the GUAM countries64
Based on the data above, the GUAM countries are generally not among the tar-
gets of international terrorism. The attacks committed on the territories of the 
GUAM states mostly originated either from issues connected to organized crime 
networks or were related to the existing separatist conflicts. The only slight ex-
ception is Azerbaijan, where there were two incidents committed by Sunni Islam-
ists. However, one has to take into account that besides Sunni extremists, there 
is also a growing potential for Shi’ia extremism in Azerbaijan as well. Presumably 
Shi’ia groups enjoy the support of Iran, which is definitely also a source of concern 
for the United States.65
Organized crime
Organized crime in the broader sense poses a serious threat both to the domestic 
security of the GUAM countries and also to regional security. A particular feature 
of this organized crime is the connection between the separatist de facto states: 
the kin states have no control over these territories, no control or monitoring 
63   Source: https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?t=Reports&Rcv=Incident&Nf=p_
IncidentDate|GTEQ+20000101||p_IncidentDate|LTEQ+20101231&N=0 
64   Source: WITS
65   For more information, see: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav100407a.shtml# 
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regimes are functioning there, nor do national police, customs and taxation au-
thorities, etc. 
Corruption
According to the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, 
three of the four GUAM countries have extremely bad ratings; only Georgia can 
be considered a bit better, (64th on the list) . Moreover, the rankings have not im-
proved considerably in the last 2-3 years. 
Country 2008 2009 2010 Ranking on world list in 2010.
Azerbaijan 1,9 2,3 2,4 134th 
Georgia 3,9 4,1 3,8 68th 
Moldova 2,9 3,3 2,9 105th 
Ukraine 2,5 2,2 2,4 134th 
The GUAM countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index of the Transparency International in 
201066
The marginally better corruption record of Georgia is confirmed by another Trans-
parency International project, the so-called ‘Global Corruption Barometer’. This 
survey measures the percentage of respondents who paid a bribe at least once 
to a service provider. On this list, Georgia leads the group of Newly Independ-
ent States with a 4% grade. Azerbaijan has the worst score, 48%, while Moldova 
has 38% and Ukraine 35%.67 To keep it simple, the Azerbaijani rate means that 
practically every second (!) respondent paid a bribe at least once in 2010. These 
grades clearly show that in the fight against corruption, GUAM states definitely 
have a lot to do, and the fight against corruption could also be an input window 
for international technical support. 
The Drug Trade
Parts of the GUAM region are crossed by drug trafficking routes that bring Af-
ghan heroin to Europe. Though the so-called ‘Northern Route’ leads through the 
Central-Asian republics and Russia,  and Ukraine is also affected. 
66   On the index the higher number of points a country has on a 1,0-10,0 list, the less corrupted the given 
country is, according to domestic perceptions. http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/
cpi/2010/interactive 
67   http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2010/interactive 
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Drug trafficking routes - heroine68
Drugs trafficking routes crossing the GUAM region69
However, if one widens the scope to drug trafficking in general, the picture gets 
much darker. According to data from the BUMAD (Programme for the Preven-
tion of Drug Abuse and the Fight against Drug Trafficking in Belarus, Ukraine, 
and Moldova) project of the United Nations70, the whole GUAM region is crossed 
by various drug trafficking transit routes. This means not only ‘traditional’ East-
68   http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/drugs/images/drhero.jpg 
69   http://bumad.un.kiev.ua/Image/about/en/bg13b.gif 
70   http://bumad.un.kiev.ua/index.php?lang=en&sID=25 
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West transits of Asian heroin and cocaine, but also West-East directed shipments 
of light drugs, such as hashish, amphetamines, etc. 
Ukraine and Moldova (and supposedly Azerbaijan and Georgia, as well) are not only 
transit routes, but also destination countries. Widespread drug use also contrib-
utes to the worsening HIV/AIDS situation, due to re-use of intravenous needles. 
The fight against the drug trade and drug trafficking would require further 
strengthening of border control and customs regimes, an improved legal envi-
ronment and enhancement of laboratory capacities. The EU-operated EUBAM 
mission on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border performs important tasks, but its 
activities are obviously far from being sufficient for the whole region. Though the 
above mentioned BUMAD project ended in 2009, many related problems remain 
unresolved. There is a lot of room in this field for further international assistance. 
Human trafficking
Similar measures would be needed to tackle the widespread human trafficking 
that originates from the GUAM region. In order to get a comprehensive picture of 
human trafficking in and from the GUAM region, one may again rely on the Traf-
ficking in Persons Report 2009.71 According to this global survey, all four GUAM 
countries are important sources, and, to a lesser extent, transit routes for human 
trafficking.
Azerbaijan is a source, destination, and transit country for the trafficking of 
men, women, and children. Men and boys are trafficked mostly to forced labor, 
and the main destination country is Russia. Women and girls are more trafficked 
for forced labor and sexual exploitation to Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Rus-
sia, and also to Iran. There is also significant internal trafficking in the country, 
with children trafficked for the purpose of forced begging. The efforts of the Az-
erbaijani authorities to counter human trafficking are not effective enough, nor 
are victim assistance and protection programs for child victims.72
In Georgia, human trafficking affects mostly women and girls, who are shipped 
to Russia, U.A.E., Turkey, Greece, Germany, and Austria for commercial sexual ex-
ploitation. Besides, humans trafficked from Russia and Ukraine often cross Geor-
gia on their way to the Middle-East. In addition, men and boys from the separa-
tist territories of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia are often trafficked for forced labor 
both in-country and abroad. The Georgian government is significantly increasing 
71   http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/ 
72   http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123361.pdf  pp. 70.
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its efforts to counter human trafficking and victim assistance programs are also 
improving.
Approximately 25.000 Moldovans were trafficked for forced labor: men for 
physical labor, while women and girls mostly for sexual exploitation. The main 
destination countries were Turkey, Russia, Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates, 
and many other Western-European states. Moldovan authorities lack the neces-
sary resources to effectively counter trafficking activities; many relevant projects 
depend on international donors. 
Of the four GUAM countries, clearly Ukraine is the most important in terms 
of human trafficking. Ukraine is a source, transit, and destination country: wom-
en and girls are trafficked all over Europe and also to Russia, Turkey, and the Mid-
dle East for sexual exploitation, while men are often trafficked either for forced 
labor and children for forced begging. Forty-eight percent of trafficking victims 
addressed by the International Migration Organization and its NGO partners in 
2008 suffered sexual exploitation; ten percent were forced to beg. Practically half 
of all victims suffered one form of forced labor or another. Ukrainian authorities 
are not able to efficiently counter human trafficking, though they are “making 
significant efforts to do so.” Victim protection projects are still heavily dependent 
on international donors. 
The Western Balkan countries and global security challenges
Most security threats characterizing the region of South East Europe are of a 
regional nature and do not have a potential global reach. Unfinished statehood 
issues, problems related to the rule of law and the latent social consequences 
of the current economic crisis by and large pose soft security threats, none of 
which currently threaten a resurgence of large-scale armed conflict. Yet, it could 
be argued that political instability, widespread poverty and unemployment, along 
with endemic corruption, unresolved ethnic issues, lack of rule of law, and po-
rous borders is a dangerous mix which makes the region vulnerable to organ-
ized crime and terrorism, which do have wider consequences.73 Moreover, the 
danger of terrorism will be also touched upon briefly. It will be argued that, even 
though organized crime continues to pose a challenge in South East Europe, the 
73   Dejan Anastasijevic, Organized Crime in the Western Balkans, HUMSEC, http://www.etc-graz.at/cms/
fileadmin/user_upload/humsec/Workin_Paper_Series/Working_Paper_Anastasijevic.pdf,  2.
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UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) drew attention to falling trends in such 
activities over the recent years. For instance, despite drug trafficking remaining 
a serious issue throughout the region, regional demand for heroin seems to have 
stabilized according to the 2009 Organized Crime Threat Assessment of Europol 
as, under EU pressure, law enforcement was strengthened against the illicit drug 
trade. In addition, UNODC recorded a significant fall in human trafficking within 
and from South-Eastern Europe. Smuggling in counterfeit goods and cigarettes 
also declined as compared to the 1990s, even if the region remains an important 
source for the EU market as the Europol emphasized.74 At the same time, fight-
ing against corruption and managing migration have been the two areas where 
regional cooperation has been the least effective.75
Most states in the Western Balkans are “weak states” characterized by strong 
external dependency, a high level of informal economic activity, and lack of rule 
of law. The latter means, in essence, widespread corruption, organized crime, 
weak judicial structures, and low administrative capacity.76 Organized crime is 
often connected to state security structures and rooted in the general culture of 
corruption, which is why it is so hard to dismantle. In some places, such as Ko-
sovo, the mostly dysfunctional justice system makes it hard to create a system 
based on the rule of law. As the EU’s latest progress reports highlighted, despite 
the recent positive trends highlighted above, corruption, organized crime and a 
weak judiciary remain an issue in every country of the region including Croatia. 
In Croatia, which is the region’s forerunner, and in Macedonia, which is the other 
EU candidate, corruption remains prevalent in many areas, as the report notes, 
even though anti-corruption efforts have been stepped up with some positive 
results. Yet, a track record of effective investigation, prosecution, and court rul-
ings remains to be established, especially against high level corruption. Moreover, 
Croatia was called on to continue and further intensify its efforts in the field of 
fighting organized crime.77 In the other countries, the situation is not any bet-
ter, for example, in Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, or Kosovo. According to the re-
port, in Bosnia and Serbia “the informal sector, fuelled by weaknesses in tax and 
74   Dr. Sappho Xenakis, “Organized Crime and Corruption in and around South-Eastern Europe: Trends and 
Counter-Efforts,” ELIAMEP Thesis, October 2010.
75   Dr. Sappho Xenakis, “Organized Crime and Corruption in and around South-Eastern Europe: Trends and 
Counter-Efforts,” ELIAMEP Thesis, October 2010, 3.
76   Website of the European Commission, “Western Balkans: Strengthening democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights”, http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical_themes/west_balk/strengthening_democracy/in-
dex_en.htm.
77   European Commission, “Conclusions on Croatia”. Website of the European Commission, Enlargement. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/conclusions_croatia_en.pdf. 
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expenditure policies, as well as in law enforcement, including the fight against 
corruption and organized crime, remains large.” It also adds that in Bosnia drug-
related illegal activities remain one of the most widespread forms of organized 
crime.78 Similarly, in Kosovo and Montenegro organized crime remains a seri-
ous problem, whereas “money laundering and drug-smuggling are key areas of 
concern.”79
One of the legacies of the war period was the close interconnectedness of the 
security sector with organized crime: the involvement of security units in drug 
and weapons trafficking, kidnappings, assassinations, not only in Milosevic’s Ser-
bia but also in the other republics. Security services were also implicated in war 
crimes. In Bosnia and Kosovo the unclear and overlapping jurisdictions of differ-
ent levels of administration, including the international one, makes the problem 
even worse due to the possibility of shifting responsibility among the various lev-
els of law enforcement agencies. During the early 1990s, grey and black econo-
mies were not only tolerated by the state structures in some of the republics, 
but were also controlled by them in order to grant some source of income to the 
impoverished population in the midst of international sanctions, besides bring-
ing huge profits those in power. 
Drug trafficking 
The region is part of a major transit route of drug and human trafficking into 
the European Union and a source of illegal arms trafficking into the war zones of 
Africa and the Middle East. Organized crime groups cooperate well across ethnic 
and national lines throughout the region.80 
Drug smuggling is a global issue, since most of the production targets the 
European and US markets. Although a large variety of drugs are traded in the 
Western Balkans, heroin is the greatest cause for concern due to its destructive 
social and human consequences. One of the trade routes targeting Western Eu-
rope goes from Turkey via Bulgaria and Macedonia to Albania, Croatia, Slovenia, 
78   European Commission, “Conclusions on Croatia”. Website of the European Commission, Enlargement, 33, 
58. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/ba_rapport_2010_en.pdf. 
79   European Commission, “Conclusions on Montenegro”. Website of the European Commission, Enlargement, 7. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/mn_opinion_2010_en.pdf. 
80   Dejan Anastasijević, “Organized Crime in the Western Balkans,” HUMSEC, http://www.etc-graz.at/cms/
fileadmin/user_upload/humsec/Workin_Paper_Series/Working_Paper_Anastasijevic.pdf, 3.
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and northern Italy, from where drugs can reach other parts of Western Europe.81 
The porous borders for instance between Kosovo and Macedonia, Albania and 
Serbia proper, with poorly guarded border crossings, make the job for traffickers 
relatively easy. Kosovo became an important storage site for heroin smuggled in 
from Macedonia or Albania, which, coupled with the presence of large Albanian 
diasporas in Turkey, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, allowed for Albanian 
crime groups to dominate the European drug trafficking business. 
Despite the recent efforts of Serbian authorities to combat drug trafficking 
reflected by introducing stricter legal regulation and recent seizures of heroin 
shipments by the police and customs, the drug is still easy to buy on the streets. 
A lot still needs to be done in order to cut back the flourishing drug trade. Bosnia-
Herzegovina is also part of the Balkan heroin path. Due to its porous borders with 
Serbia and Croatia, it is not difficult to transport drugs from one country to the 
other. Poverty and high unemployment exacerbate the social problems related to 
drug abuse, especially among the young, posing a grave problem particularly in 
Kosovo and Bosnia.82
Human trafficking
Human trafficking from and through the Western Balkans to Western Europe 
also became an acute problem, which called for well-coordinated and firm inter-
national action, bringing about some success in this area. Although it is difficult 
to establish the exact numbers of victims, the International Organization for Mi-
grations estimated for the year of 1997 that 175,000 women were trafficked from 
Central and Eastern Europe, including the former Soviet republics, in that year. 
Most of these women from South East Europe were victims of sexual exploitation, 
and most of them came from poor urban or rural areas. As Dejan Anastasijević 
described it, the main routes included trafficking via Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Slovenia to Austria or Italy; from Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Mon-
tenegro to Albania and across the Adriatic Sea to Italy; and from Romania, Bul-
garia, and Albania through Macedonia to Greece. Besides international human 
trafficking, internal trafficking from rural to urban areas is also prevalent.
81   Dejan Anastasijević, “Organized crime in the Western Balkans,” Trends in Organized Crime (2008) 11: 
430-436, 430.
82   Dejan Anastasijević, “Organized crime in the Western Balkans,” 434.
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There are some international initiatives to combat organized crime in the Bal-
kans, such as the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative Center for fighting 
trans-border crime (SECI) which includes all the Balkan countries plus Hungary 
and Moldova. SECI’s activities range from combating trafficking of drugs, weap-
ons, and human beings over fighting against money laundering to anti-smug-
gling, anti-fraud and anti-terrorism initiatives. Although SECI was quite success-
ful in its efforts against human traffickers, out of the 500 arrested by the end of 
2004 owing to SECI cooperation, only 50 people were legally prosecuted and only 
5 convicted. SPOC (the Stability Pact’s Initiative to Fight Organized Crime) and 
SPAI (the Stability Pact’s Anti Corruption Initiative) are further international in-
struments to fight organized crime, yet are mostly dysfunctional.83 
Clearly, it is in the interest of the EU to do more in order to cut back on organ-
ized crime in the Western Balkans, as its primary target market being the EU 
itself fuels prostitution and drug addiction, with all the dire social side effects, in 
the member states. The consequences of the illegal weapons trade reach beyond 
Europe, fuelling bloody conflicts in Africa and Asia. Last but not least, flourishing 
organized crime in the Western Balkans keeps these societies economically and 
politically unstable, slowing down their Euro-Atlantic integration process, which 
is also working against European interests. According to the Regional Coopera-
tion Council, whereas cooperation among police forces within the region has been 
fairly effective recently yielding considerable results, cooperation among prosecu-
tors and judges has been far less successful.84 
Regional security projects 
Regional Security projects in the transition years: from the 
Quadragonale to the Visegrad Group
Regional integration efforts in the Visegrad Countries had already begun by the 
last years of the Cold War. On November 11, 1989, just two days after the fall 
of the Berlin wall, in Budapest the so-called Quadragonale was formed by Italy, 
Austria, Hungary, and the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. The first main 
83   Dejan Anastasijević, Organized Crime in the Western Balkans, HUMSEC, 14.
84   Dr. Sappho Xenakis, “Organized Crime and Corruption in and around South-Eastern Europe: Trends and 
Counter-Efforts,” ELIAMEP Thesis, October 2010, 3.
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objective of this initiative was to demonstrate that the divisiveness of blocs was 
to be overcome by establishing political, economic, and trade contacts. One has 
to keep in mind that Hungary was at that time still member of the Warsaw Pact, 
Italy was a NATO country, while Austria and Yugoslavia were neutral states. The 
second aim was to develop specific sectoral projects in order to establish real eco-
nomic cooperation between the member states. This initiative was the first insti-
tutional framework to respond the requests of the former Communist countries 
to establish contacts with the West. The Quadragonale became a real political 
success story within a short period of time. In 1990 Czechoslovakia joined that 
group that was re-named to Pentagonale. A year later Poland also joined and the 
group got again a new name: Hexagonale. Finally in 1992 it became the Central-
European Initiative. The security importance of the Quadragonale and its succes-
sors lay not in its security-related contents, but in the fact that this co-operation 
framework in a way de-securitized international relations and political contacts 
between Eastern and Western bloc countries. 
In terms of regional security projects, all V4 countries basically followed the 
same path of development. While the Soviet armed forces were still stationed on 
Polish,  Czechoslovak, and Hungarian soils, the only reasonable direction to take 
was to aim at neutrality. Openly voicing NATO accession intentions was obvious-
ly out of the question until the summer of 1991, when the Warsaw Pact was for-
mally disbanded and the Soviet troops were withdrawn from all three countries. 
Though the latter process lasted until 1994,85 the decisive moment was clearly 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, as this was the precondition for re-gaining 
national sovereignty in issues of foreign and security policy.
In the early nineties, NATO integration was far from being the only policy 
plan for securing national sovereignty and security. In Hungary, the Minister of 
Defense, Lajos Für, announced the doctrine of “circular defense”, according to 
which Hungary should have guaranteed its military security on its own. It took a 
few years for Budapest to realize the un-sustainability of such a plan, so Hungary 
finally committed itself to NATO accession only in 1992. 
For Poland after 1989, solely EU-integration was on the agenda and NATO 
accession would only be added later. At that time Warsaw would have been more 
in favor of an OSCE-guaranteed European security option, and it remained so 
until late 1991-1992. As an alternative, in 1992, Lech Walęsa proposed the idea 
of forming a “NATO bis”, which would have been a Central-European defense or-
85   For more information on the process, see: Maj. Gen. Svetozár Nadovič – Maj. Gen. Hartmut Foertsch – 
Maj. Gen. Imre Karácsony – Maj. Gen. Zdisław Ostrowski: The Great Withdrawal. (Withdrawal of the Soviet – 
Russian Armiy from Central Europe 1990-1994). Bratislava, 2005, Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Repubic. 
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ganization, but this was not realized for a number of reasons. Thus Polish foreign 
policy became committed to NATO-integration finally in 1992.
The Czechoslovak situation was even more complex. After 1989, the Czecho-
slovak foreign policy, led by President Havel and Minister of Foreign Affairs Di-
enstbier, was clearly pushing for the quickest-possible Western integration of the 
country. However, at the same time they also intended to play a strong, regional 
power role, and to forge strong regional cooperation with Poland and Hungary. 
There were also unrealistic suggestions to disband NATO, parallel to the Warsaw 
Pact, etc. The Czech foreign policy changed after the June 1992 elections, and the 
new leadership of Vaclav Klaus started to give up regional power ambitions and 
Euro-Atlantic integration became the sole most important foreign policy goal of 
the Czech Republic. Parallel to these processes, in late 1990 an independent Slo-
vak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was formed inside the federation, and it started 
to push for a distinctive Slovak foreign policy. Slovakia at that time wanted to be 
the “East of the West and the West of the East”, they also pushed for a bridge-role 
between Western and Eastern-Europe, thus Western integration was far from be-
ing the most important foreign policy objective. The pro-Eastern Slovak foreign 
policy of the Mečiar-era was a direct successor of this idea.
In the early ‘90s regional security initiatives were focused mostly on disar-
mament and confidence-building measures. One has to mention first the Con-
ventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement, which Hungary, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia all joined.  Though originally the CFE was designed to mutually 
observe disarmament between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, following the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Central-European member states became in-
creasingly interested in conducting controlling visits to each other’s territory. 
The process proved to be successful, thus it contributed significantly to building 
trust and mutual confidence between these states – at least in terms of military 
security. 
As early as in February 1990 in Ottawa the so-called ‘Open Skies conference’ 
was launched, in which all NATO and Warsaw Pact countries participated. The 
then planned Treaty on Open Skies provided the member states the opportunity 
for unarmed surveillance flights over each other’s territory in order to ensure 
that no military attacks were being prepared. Thus the agreement was obviously 
an important confidence building measure. Though it was signed in March 1992, 
the ratification process ended only in 2000, thus the Treaty on Open Skies en-
tered into force on January 1, 2002. The Treaty played a particularly important 
role in Central- and Eastern Europe during the transition years, as it helped to get 
rid of mutual fears of possible military attacks. 
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The most important and longest lasting regional initiative of the early nineties 
was the Visegrad Declaration, signed in 1991 between Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
and Hungary. The agreement launched a close, though informal, non-institution-
alized cooperation between the three – later, with the dissolution of Czechoslo-
vakia – four member states with the objective of mutually supporting their Euro-
Atlantic integration efforts. This applied both to EU and NATO membership, thus 
this way it was also a kind of security cooperation in the broader sense.
Regardless of the Visegrad principles, following the dissolution of Czechoslo-
vakia, the Slovak government of Vladimir Mečiar was rather in favor of an East-
ern orientation in terms of security policy. At the same time, the first Czech gov-
ernment decided to pursue Euro-Atlantic integration in an individual manner, 
independently from the other three Visegrad members. However, when evaluat-
ing these national policies, one has to remember that in the early nineties NATO 
itself was also not ready for an enlargement, and this changed only in 1993.
In the late nineties, when the NATO-accession of the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, and Poland had already been decided, the three states co-operated closely 
and actively to support the soonest-possible NATO-accession of Slovakia. Get-
ting Slovakia on board was an obvious security - and also defense - interest of the 
three others. Bratislava joined NATO finally in 2004. With this, the original aims 
of the Visegrad Cooperation had been achieved, as all of the member countries 
had joined the Euro-Atlantic structures successfully. 
The Visegrad Group and security cooperation nowadays
Currently in the Visegrad region the most important – and practically only – re-
gional security organization is the Visegrad Group itself. Of course, V4 countries 
are members of many other regional organizations as well, including ones which 
have security-related activities in their portfolios, but most regional security 
projects are carried out in the V4 framework. One should keep in mind that all of 
the V4 countries perceive NATO as the primary guarantor of their security and 
defense. 
In the Visegrad framework, security cooperation is focused mostly on issues 
of soft security, with special emphasis on energy security and border security. 
Several middle and large-scale projects are currently being conducted. A so-called 
Visegrad Security Cooperation Initiative was launched by Czech, Slovak, Hungar-
ian, and Polish experts in order to strengthen the regional security identity, to ex-
plore possible fields of cooperation along mutual interests, and also to exchange 
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information on security and defense-related issues.86 In terms of defense, there 
are plans to set up a Visegrad Battle Group, composed of forces of the four Viseg-
rad countries and to be offered to the EU for international crisis management 
purposes. 
The International Visegrad Fund, established in June 2000 contributes to mu-
tual security and understanding via providing study and scientific exchange op-
portunities between the V4 countries, and supporting cultural and cross-border 
cooperation. The International Visegrad Fund also functions as a common foreign 
policy tool of the V4 countries towards the Eastern Partnership states, as it sup-
ports civil society initiatives and contributes to cultural and scientific exchange. 
Energy security
All four Visegrad countries are dependent on Russian natural gas supplies, though 
to varying extents. Hungary is clearly the most dependent, as Russian gas not 
only plays a prioritized role in the country’s primary energy balance, but Buda-
pest has only one transit route and the country lacks a strategic transit position, 
a fact that makes it highly vulnerable to price hikes. In Slovakia, all natural gas 
used is imported from Russia, but the magisterial Russia-EU gas pipeline crosses 
the country, which gives it a key transit position, thus also a certain security of 
supply. The Czech Republic imports approximately 60% of its gas consumption 
from Russia, while the rest comes from Norway. In the case of Poland, more than 
90% of her gas needs comes from Russia and there is only one transit route that 
is highly vulnerable to supply cuts, as was demonstrated by the earlier Russia-
Belarus gas disputes.
86   For more information, see: Visegrad Security Cooperation Initiative (VSCI). http://www.ata-sac.org/index.
php?cmd=print&sid=244&aid=417  
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Existing (thin line) and planned (thick line) gas pipelines in Central-Europe87
The main energy security problem of the Visegrad region is related to the de-
pendence on Russian gas supplies, namely to the dual lack of alternative sources 
and transit routes. Consequently, diversification of gas supply routes is a key and 
mutual interest of all V4 states. Another problem is the lack of gas interconnec-
tors between the Visegrad countries. As a result, in times of supply crises, the V4 
states cannot import gas from each other, even if one has the reserves necessary 
for helping the other. In order to counter this problem the Visegrad energy se-
curity cooperation has currently prioritized the building of gas interconnectors 
87   Source: http://www.energyinsights.net/cgi-script/csArticles/uploads/4207/Gas%20Map%20Europe.gif 
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both between the V4 states and also in other directions. A Hungarian-Romanian 
interconnector was finished in 2010; a Hungarian-Slovak agreement to build an 
interconnector was signed in December 2010. Another way of strengthening re-
gional energy security is to make old East-West gas pipelines bi-directional, thus 
allowing the import of gas from the West in order to diversify supply routes. All in 
all, building new interconnectors and reconstructing old gas pipelines will allow 
the import of gas from future coastal LNG terminals to the landlocked countries 
of Central-Europe, thus decreasing the dependency on the Russian source and 
Ukrainian and Belarusian transit routes.
As an example, at their energy security summit in February 2010, the V4 
countries together with Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Serbia, Slovenia, and Romania decided to strengthen their energy cooperation 
through further integrating their gas networks and diversifying routes and sourc-
es of supplies. They also called for improving energy cooperation within the EU, 
thus increasing energy security. More specifically they presented plans to con-
nect the planned Croatian and Polish Liquefied Natural Gas terminals, promoted 
implementing the Nabucco and the NETS projects, and supported the Constanta 
LNG terminal and other LNG and CNG projects in the wider Black Sea Region.88
Another example of the energy security cooperation between some V4 and 
GUAM countries is the so-called AGRI project. AGRI is an abbreviation of the Az-
erbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector, a regional gas transportation project. 
The Baku-Tbilisi-Bucharest agreement was signed in April 2010. Hungary joined 
the initiative in September 2010. According to the plan, Azerbaijani gas would 
be transported to Georgian ports via a land pipeline, from there in LNG form 
it would be shipped to Romania, and from Romania it would be transported to 
Hungary – and possibly further to Central-Europe and Western-Europe - via the 
above mentioned, already interconnected land pipelines.89 The overall capacity 
of the AGRI would be some 7 billion cubic meters of gas annually,90 of which Ro-
mania could use approximately 2 billion,91 thus the remaining 5 bcm could con-
tribute to the gas supply diversification efforts of the EU, including the Visegrad 
states. Currently the AGRI project seems to be the most viable concrete energy 
security co-operation project between the GUAM and the Visegrad countries. 
88   Declaration of the Budapest V4+ Energy Security Summit, Budapest, 24th
 
of February 2010. http://www.
visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=859&articleID=27720&ctag=articlelist&iid=1#_ednref1. 
89   http://naturalgasforeurope.com/3483.htm 
90   http://economie.moldova.org/news/azerbaijan-georgia-romania-launch-lng-project-in-the-black-sea-208221-
eng.html 
91   http://www.news.az/articles/13238 
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Regional security and confidence building in the EU’s Eastern 
Neighbourhood 
The Eastern Neighbourhood, and particularly the GUAM countries are of key im-
portance for the European Union in terms of ensuring regional security in the 
broader terms. However, below only the narrower, defense-related aspects of se-
curity are going to be studied.
No enlargement, only stable neighborly relations
Both the original European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership ini-
tiative use a clear wording: they in no way mean any kind of accession perspective 
for the targeted countries, thus these policies must not be perceived as gateways 
to EU membership. The lack of membership perspective is regularly criticized by 
experts92, who argue that the Union deliberately deprives itself of its most ef-
fective foreign policy tool and most effective motivation method, however, these 
complaints obviously do not change the facts.  Thus, regarding the political per-
spectives offered to the neighbors, Romano Prodi’s famous quote seems to be val-
id: neighbors may “share everything with the Union, but institutions.” However, 
as Italian analyst Alberto Chilosi pointed out already in 2006, even this promise 
was not likely to be fulfilled, simply because the EU has been unable to give the 
same economic advantages to the neighbors as it gave to its poorest members.  
Besides, the EU has also been unable to prevent various crises in the common 
neighborhood from happening, let it be the January 2009 gas crisis in Ukraine 
or the post-election crisis in April 2009 in Moldova. Political support provided 
by the EU was weak and indecisive in both cases, as were the economic actions. 
Under such circumstances it is not too surprising that all of the countries of the 
common neighborhood tend to show signs of disillusionment about the ENP. 
Neither the new EU-Ukraine Association Agenda adopted in November 2009, 
nor the new Association Agreement offered to Moldova are likely to change the 
lack of an attractive political offer, which would fundamentally change the nature 
of their relations with the EU. Reading the List of EU-Ukraine Association Agenda 
Priorities for 2010, jointly adopted by the EU and Ukraine on January 26, 2010, 
92   Duleba, 2008
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not much is seen of the “further political association” promised in the Association 
Agenda. Instead, the envisioned political dialogue is going to focus on democracy, 
rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms to be ensured in Ukraine,93 
besides providing technical assistance in fields like border demarcation, custom 
systems upgrade, etc. All in all, one can summarize these developments as ap-
proximation offered to the Eastern neighborhood in fact means facilitating re-
forms within the Eastern neighbors, and not reforming them with the EU.
Cooperation in security and defense and issues of territorial integrity
In the field of security and defense policy, the EU has limited objectives and offers 
related to the common neighborhood. The idea of an active ESDP involvement 
came up as early as 2003, during the Dutch OSCE presidency. The possibility was 
even mentioned in the `Wider Europe` concept, however, at that time the plan 
was aborted. Concerning current involvement, in the three countries studied 
there is only one, a relatively small-scale crisis management mission going on, 
the EUBAM, which assists in controlling the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, thus 
contributing not only to the fight against organized crime, but also indirectly to 
the settlement of the Transdnistrian conflicts. Besides the EUBAM, two other 
missions have been conducted in Georgia: the first-ever civilian mission of the 
EU, the THEMIS in 2004-2005, and the still on-going EU Monitoring Mission, 
which was begun following the war in Georgia in 2008. 
Generally speaking, the presence of EU crisis management operations on the 
ground indeed does contribute to conflict settlement between Moldova and its 
Transdnistrian parts. However, the situation is fundamentally different in Geor-
gia, where the EU monitors have no access to the separatist regions of Abkhazia 
and South-Ossetia.
Ukraine
Of the four GUAM states, EU cooperation is most intensive with Ukraine in the 
field of security and defense. Kyiv already has a long record in cooperating with 
the EU in security and defense policy issues, which actually began well before the 
“Orange Revolution.”  In the early 2000s Ukraine perceived ESDP-cooperation as 
a way of promoting itself as a reliable candidate for accession.  Since then, this has 
93   EU-Ukraine Association Agenda, 2010:6-13
118
mainly prevailed as the leitmotif of Ukrainian attitude to the ESDP. Cooperation 
with NATO has contributed a great deal to the efficiency and professionalism of 
the Ukrainian armed forces, which, of course, has positively affected their value 
and contribution to the ESDP as well. 
In the fields of security and defense policy, the currently valid EU-Ukraine 
Association Agenda prescribes to study the opportunities of how Ukraine could 
contribute to future ESDP operations, as it already has on numerous missions in 
the Balkans.  Special attention is being given to the option of Kyiv participating in 
the “ATALANTA” naval operation, and to a possible Ukrainian contribution to an 
EU Multinational Tactical Battle Group. In cooperation against common security 
threats, such as WMD proliferation, trafficking of nuclear materials, the EU offers 
support in increasing Ukraine’s border security, provides assistance in developing 
the Ukrainian export control system and regulations, and there are also plans 
of joint EU-Ukraine involvement in handling the stockpiles of land mines and 
outdated ammunition in the country. Cooperation on the fight against organ-
ized crime is also an important element, together with border security issues, to 
which the EU Border Assistance Mission actively contributes.
Moldova
With Moldova the EU-involvement in issues of security and defense is centered 
on the Transdnistrian conflict, as the Action Plan prescribes. Since December 
2005 there has been an EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) active on the 
Moldovan-Ukrainian border. The mission provides widespread operational and 
technical assistance to Moldovan and Ukrainian border services, and thus con-
tributes to the fight against various types of organized crime. The mission enjoys 
generous  support both from the Moldovan and Ukrainian sides, and operates 
mostly from Ukrainian territory, with its operational centre in Odessa.
The EU has also managed to get involved in the re-started 5+2 negotiation for-
mat. This Action Plan also prescribes cooperation on various issues of soft secu-
rity, such as trafficking, organized crime, handling of old ammunitions and land-
mines, and border security. Concerning the latter, through the aforementioned 
EUBAM mission the EU has strengthened its presence in the region, and has 
contributed significantly to regional security. Besides its direct presence, EUBAM 
works also as a facilitation forum between Moldova and Ukraine: on  February 16, 
2010 the third meeting of the Heads of National Security Services took place in 
Odessa, organized by the EUBAM.94 
94   http://www.eubam.org/index.php?action=show&sid=chdn5pljelqbe7nl3vsgat3fug3zcc7e&id=790 )
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Georgia
The European Union has been actively participating in security cooperation with 
Georgia, especially through the EU crisis management missions launched to the 
country. The first one was the EUJUST Themis mission that was launched in 
2004, shortly after the successful ‘Rose Revolution’. This mission was the first 
ever civilian operation conducted in the framework of the European Security and 
Defense Policy. The task of the Themis was to assist the judiciary reform of Geor-
gia by providing expert assistance. As the mandate of the mission was only one 
year, and the objectives were met, in 2005 the Themis was terminated.
A second EU crisis management mission was launched following the August 
2008 war between Georgia and Russia. The main objective of the European Union 
Monitoring Mission is to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement 
that ended the conflict. As the primary task is monitoring, participants of the 
EUMM are unarmed. The main weakness of the mission is that the Russian party 
does not allow EU monitors to work in the separatist ‘republics’ of Abkhazia and 
South-Ossetia, though de iure these regions are integral parts of the territory of 
Georgia. From this aspect, though the EUUM is basically successful in fulfilling 
its monitoring task, it cannot contribute significantly to the protection of the ter-
ritorial integrity of Georgia. Moreover, since the Russian recognition of the ‘inde-
pendence’ of the two separatist territories, chances of a peaceful resolution have 
become even lower than they were before August 2008. At this point, the EUMM 
can only monitor the status quo, but cannot contribute to any change in it.
Azerbaijan
Of the four GUAM states, security and defense cooperation with the EU is the least 
intensive with Azerbaijan. Though Baku has been facing territorial separatism in 
Nagorno-Karabakh since 1988, an international settlement mechanism, the so-
called Minsk Group was set up only in 1992 by the predecessor of the OSCE, the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Though in the Minsk Group 
France is one of the three co-chairs, the EU itself plays no institutionalized role in 
the conflict settlement. Chances of any close EU-Azerbaijani security cooperation 
are additionally weakened by the fact the Baku perceives many Western countries 
as potential allies of Armenia, due to the large Armenian Diasporas living there.
However, the EU still plays an important role in the resolution of all South-
Caucasus territorial conflicts via its Special Representative for the Southern-Cau-
casus (EUSR).  The most important feature of the EUSR activities is that the same 
person can represent the EU in all regions and countries involved in the conflict. 
EUSR could cross all borders without any problems, was equally well received in 
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Yerevan, Baku, and Tbilisi,  and he was also able to visit Sukhumi while his advi-
sors made it even to Stepanakert. 
However, with the setup of the EU External Action Service, the position of 
the EU Special Representatives is most probably going to be eliminated, and their 
tasks will be taken over by the EU delegations in each and every country of the 
region. In the Southern-Caucasus the cancellation of the EUSR is perceived very 
negatively: many experts and politicians feel that the EU is ‘downgrading’ the 
region by recalling its Special Representative.
Regional security and confidence-building in the Western Balkans
EU integration can be key in locking the region into a virtuous cycle of long term 
security and development. However, bringing about the next enlargement round 
seems to be more of a challenge than ever before, whereas the stakes are also 
undoubtedly high, involving vital European security interests. On the one hand, 
the candidate and potential candidate countries of the region have to meet stiffer 
conditionality requirements than the former candidates from Central and East-
ern Europe. These include demands seeking to address challenges related to state 
building, post war reconstruction and stabilization, the fostering of good neigh-
borly relations among states, regional cooperation, the return of refugees, ethnic 
and religious reconciliation, and cooperation with the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Yugoslavia in The Hague. While conditionality became more demand-
ing, commitment of the EU to further enlargement has been wavering in the face 
of tougher than expected institutional reform and the deepening world economic 
crisis. 
Several issues could potentially undermine the European prospects of South 
Eastern Europe. On the EU’s side, on the one hand, the inability to speak in one 
voice and the ambiguous nature of conditionality policy hide the greatest risks to 
the enlargement process, which might undermine the credibility of the promise 
of EU integration. In the region, on the other hand, unfinished statehood issues, 
problems related to the rule of law, and the potential social consequences of the 
current economic crisis represent the most serious dangers. 
In general, there is a general consensus in the EU over the European perspec-
tive of the Western Balkans unlike with regards to Turkey’s or the Ukraine’s.  Now 
that the Lisbon Treaty has been ratified, the EU seems to be getting into a more 
pro-enlargement mood. The European Commission recommended giving can-
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didate status to Montenegro in its recent progress report, Serbia’s application 
for membership was sent for opinion to the Commission by the Council, a few 
months after the Council finally approved launching the ratification process of 
Serbia’s SAA. Since December 2010, Bosnian and Albanian citizens have also en-
joyed a visa-free regime with the EU, similarly to their Serbian, Montenegrin, and 
Macedonian counterparts who gained this privilege a year ago.
At the same time, the credibility of conditionality and enlargement fatigue 
in the existing EU have been the major factors that could potentially undermine 
the enlargement process in the future. While the EU most often makes norma-
tive claims, it is often driven by the security considerations or special interests of 
member states, which generates tensions within conditionality policy.95 Some-
times, pressure from EU member states dictates an enlargement agenda that re-
flects the preferences of individual countries, such as the Netherlands blocking 
the implementation of Serbia’s SAA (an obstacle which was removed recently), 
Greece boycotting the launching of membership negotiations with Macedonia, 
or the recently renounced Slovenian threat to block the accession of Croatia due 
to their maritime border issue. Understandably, conditionality driven by selfish 
motives of member states does not motivate compliance.
The second issue is the so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’, which has character-
ized the EU especially since 2005, when the French and Dutch rejected the EU 
constitution. As a result, conditionality demands became stricter; the require-
ment of the EU’s absorption capacity began to be voiced more loudly. Although 
the Irish vote in favor of the Lisbon Treaty removed a major obstacle to further 
enlargement, with the re-election of Merkel as the German chancellor and the 
general victory of the European right in the recent European elections, skepti-
cism regarding further enlargement is not going to go away in the foreseeable 
future. 
The EU gave a clear “European perspective” to the Western Balkan states at 
the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, a promise which has been reaffirmed on 
several occasions since.96 Yet, the inability of the EU to speak in one voice un-
dermines the viability of this perspective and therefore the efficiency of condi-
95   Othon Anastasakis, “The EU’s political conditionality in the Western Balkans: Towards a more pragmatic 
approach”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4, December 2008, 365-77.
96   EU-Western Balkans Summit, Thessaloniki, “Τhe Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans”, Declaration, 21 
June 2003, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_
the_eu/sap/thessaloniki_agenda_en.htm; Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Permanent 
Council No. 718., “Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council from 19-20 June 2008 on the Western 
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tionality and of the enlargement process. While some of the old member states, 
primarily the Netherlands, France, and Germany tend to step on the brakes, the 
newer members together with Austria, Ireland, the UK, and the European Com-
mission push for moving ahead with the process.97 All this sends mixed signals to 
would-be-member countries as the awards of compliance seem to be ever more 
uncertain in the face of a divided EU. As the EU is pushing the actual date of ac-
cession indefinitely into the future, governments could lose courage to go against 
their constituency while trying to fulfill demands, especially those that touch 
upon sensitive issues related to national identity. 
The EU should clarify its conditionality policy, as making the process more 
transparent could encourage better compliance on behalf of the target countries. 
Pure political conditionality should be separated from functional conditionality, 
and, as was done in the case of Central Eastern Europe, their fulfillment should 
be tied to final accession or to the opening of accession negotiations. Political con-
ditionality should not frustrate a state’s graduation other than in cases of overt 
setbacks. 
In addition, functional conditions should be linked to particular policy fields, 
such as increased volumes of structural aid being conditioned on meeting ade-
quate standards in financial control and anti-corruption policies. Turkey joining 
the EU’s customs union could be tied to its application of the EU’s customs re-
gime.98 Clarifying the EU’s conditionality policy through similar measures could 
prevent the mingling of normative, security, and functional claims. 
Risks within the region 
The economic crisis
Vladimir Gligorov assesses that the social consequences of the economic crisis 
are yet to be felt in the Western Balkans in fullness. As these countries hugely 
rely on foreign borrowing and have to deal with significant trade deficits, even 
Balkans Joint Press Statement, 03. November 2006, http://www.eu2006.at/en/News/Press_Releases/March/1103
EUWesternBalkansStatement.html; 
EU Presidency Statement Declaration, Declaration by the Presidency on Western Balkans, 2 April 2009, http://www.
eu2009.cz/en/news-and-documents/news/eu-presidency-statement-14119/. 
97   Geoffrey Pridham, “Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political Conditionality: Aims, Approach, and 
Priorities,” Democratization, Vol.14, No.3, June 2007, pp.446-471, 467.
98   Michael Emerson, “Recalibrating EU Policy towards the Western Balkans”, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 175, October 
2008, 9-10.
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if growth kicks in, labor markets are expected to remain depressed in the near 
future. Although the region is currently recording a 4-6% growth on average after 
general contracting trends in 2009, this does not trickle down in employment in-
creases, since as a side effect of the crisis, governments have to pay back the debt 
from the additional income economic growth generates. Thus, despite positive 
growth trends, employment is expected to decline further and will continue to be 
negative in many of the countries. Serbia was hit the worst in terms of employ-
ment; between April 2008 and April 2009 450 000 jobs were lost, that is 25% of 
all jobs, which has a huge impact. What is worse, this negative trend is far from 
over. Croatia facesa similar problem throughout this winter, between 30 000 and 
50 000 jobs are likely to vanish. This is a serious issue because employment levels 
were already low before the crisis hit, around 40%. Falling income levels can be 
predicted and, therefore, social tensions could increase easily, which might lead 
to a change of government in Serbia and Croatia. In Bosnia and Kosovo mobiliza-
tion because of social hardships in not very likely due to the general awareness 
that public expression of social dissatisfaction might work for the “enemy nation” 
weakening the national cause.99 Although social discontent is unlikely to lead to 
wider mobilization in Bosnia, for instance, the cutting of public-sector wages and 
war veterans’ benefits as a part of an IMF loan package and the further rise in 
unemployment significantly weakens the chance of reaching a compromise on 
the constitutional issue. 100 Similarly, in Serbia, the DS led government is coming 
under increasing pressure due to strikes and protests generated by the economic 
crisis. The government had to implement further cuts in employment and public 
sector spending in order to meet the deficit targets agreed upon with the IMF. A 
series of strikes in early 2010 indicates wide social discontent over low and un-
paid wages.101 
If the middle class, which in the recent years began to stabilize its position, 
falls victim to the crisis, that in turn could disrupt social peace, which could 
even endanger the accession process of the region. Such worries are not without 
grounds considering the high level of unemployment rates:around 20% in Serbia, 
33% in Macedonia, 44% in Bosnia, and over 45% in Kosovo.102 Social stability and 
99   Presentation by Vladimir Gligorov, The Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies, at the 
conference “Reaching out to the Balkans in times of crisis,” organized by the Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, and ELIAMEP, Athens, 12-14 November 2010.
100   Economic Intelligence Unit, Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Country Report - Main Report,” 1 October 2009, www.eui.
com. 
101   Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Serbia, February 2010, 6.
102   Economic Intelligence Unit, country reports, www.eui.com. 
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cohesion is thus relatively fragile and can be easily broken. That in turn might 
boost the popularity of nationalist parties, which might even lead to renewed 
low-scale, inter-ethnic violence. Although it is hard to predict the probability of 
such pessimistic scenarios, the risks are real, therefore the EU should upgrade its 
economic assistance in the region to avoid a social backlash, which might weaken 
pro-EU political forces and their social base.103 
The EU has been pushing for regional cooperation among the Western Balkan 
states, which was primarily facilitated by the Stability Pact for South East Europe 
(recently renamed as the Regional Cooperation Council). Promoting regional 
cooperation became also an important goal of the Stabilization and Association 
Process (SAP). Embedded in the Stability Pact’s second working table, CEFTA is 
the region’s trade cooperation framework, which, however, has not been func-
tioning in a very efficient manner. CEFTA tariffs are higher and more diverse than 
those of the EU and, thus, allow for more trade diversion, plus the countries are 
burdened by the current system’s complicated rules of origin. 104 In addition, Ser-
bia has been rejecting “Kosovo Customs” stamps which are meant to certify the 
origin of goods for Kosovo since Kosovo proclaimed independence. This move 
obstructs Kosovo’s proper participation in CEFTA trade.105 
The other major field of cooperation is infrastructure development, which 
was the primary focus of the Stability Pact. However, the overall outcome of the 
cooperation was a big disappointment for various reasons. In Bosnia, internal 
borders obstruct cooperation in infrastructure development, while in the region 
generally, local entrepreneurs are not as interested in trade liberalization, the free 
market, and regional cooperation as they are busy maintaining their protected 
national markets. 
Although corruption is endemic, perhaps an even more serious problem is a 
state strongly influenced by big firms. These companies are typically mostly en-
gaged in import activities rather than in export, and thus are less interested in 
trade liberalization. The strong influence of business monopolies over political 
and economic structures poses one of the greatest systemic difficulties in Serbia 
today. As Srđan Cvijić has argued in a policy brief, powerful businesses keep a 
firm grip on the political parties, which leads to non-transparent party financing, 
103   “Regional envoy warns economic crisis could spark new political turmoil in Balkans”, SETimes,
2 April 2009, www.setimes.com.
104   S. Kathuria (ed.), Western Balkan Integration and the EU – An Agenda for Trade and Growth, World Bank, 
2008.
105   United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
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prevents liberalization of markets, and drives up domestic prices, thus distorting 
competition. Simultaneously, party leaders strongly control their parties, as man-
dates cannot be exercised freely by deputies but effectively belong to the parties. 
As a result “undisciplined parliamentarians” can be kicked out by the party leader-
ship. This kind of centralization of the political system, together with the parties’ 
dependence on businesses, breeds corruption and prevents further progress in 
the area of de-politicization of public administration and spoils efforts to create 
an independent judiciary.106 This is a problem that cannot be addressed through 
anti-corruption measures. The result is lagging liberalization; moreover, there is 
no real interest in the region to bring about true regional cooperation.
The EU appropriates funds to the Western Balkan countries through the In-
strument for Pre-Accession (IPA), which replaced the previous CARDS program. 
Yet, the IPA funds available for the Western Balkans are considerably less than 
the amount of pre-accession resources before the enlargements of 2004 and 
2007, (the Western Balkans countries receive only half of the assistance that was 
given to Romania and Bulgaria in 2006, before their accession). Moreover, due to 
the differentiation between potential and actual candidates, the countries most 
in need cannot access funds in the most important fields of development. 
A way of dealing with this problem could be by gradually increasing the struc-
tural funds available to the countries of the region towards the levels granted to 
the new member states. This could also serve as a very tangible incentive to carry 
out reforms related to the judiciary and fighting corruption. The EU could use 
conditional funding in an effective way to ensure the implementation of judicial 
and anti-corruption reforms before accession.107
A recent World Bank study called for including the Western Balkans in the EU’s 
customs union. The accession experience of the Central Eastern European states 
also indicates that a customs union which induces intra-industry trade is a major 
engine for economic development. This could speed up the region’s economic in-
tegration into the EU and could stimulate economic progress. At the same time, 
this would be a positive sign to investors who would treat the region as part of the 
EU’s internal market, while reducing incidences of border corruption.108 
Moreover, the EU plans to sign a Transport Community Treaty with the coun-
tries of the Western Balkans, which was expected before the end of 2010, but 
106   Srđan Cvijić, “The new Serbia: fast forward towards the EU?”, Policy Brief, European Policy Centre, January 
2009.
107   Michael Emerson, “Recalibrating EU Policy towards the Western Balkans”, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 175, 
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still is under negotiations. The treaty establishes a common transport community 
between the EU and the Western Balkans, fostering the latter’s integration into 
the EU’s single market. Besides creating a single market in transport, the treaty 
envisages legal harmonization with EU laws concerning transport and the devel-
opment of core transport networks planned for the region, as well as making bor-
der crossing easier.109 In addition, in December 2009, the European Commission, 
the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and 
bilateral donors established the Western Balkans Investment Framework, which 
is a financing initiative which pools grant resources for priority infrastructure 
financing in the South East Europe.110
The Danube strategy, to be finalized during the Hungarian presidency, is 
a further opportunity for infrastructural cooperation and development. It is a 
macro-regional program with specific initiatives including environmental, infra-
structure, and energy projects, which have a real potential to connect the Western 
Balkans to the EU in a meaningful and practical way. Yet, its real significance is yet 
to be seen, as currently there are no additional funds available for its financing.
Outstanding issues of ‘stateness’
Bosnia
As the risk of renewed ethnic violence has diminished considerably, the great-
est challenge is now how to make the state functional. The constitutional order 
based on the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) is intensely contested: The Serbians are 
demanding closure of the OHR and claiming their right to hold a referendum on 
independence, while the Bosnians want a centralized state. While both of these 
positions are unfeasible, they both challenge the DPA, yet are mutually exclusive, 
making a compromise very hard to reach. However, if the country remains in its 
present, divided form, the EU will be unable to negotiate further with Bosnia 
towards membership. Although the EU imposes conditionality on the state, the 
Bosnian state can act only on the basis of a consensus among both the entities 
and the three constituent nations. 
109   “Transportation Issue in the Balkans,” 2.7.2010. www.trt-world.com.
110   Western Balkans Investment Framework, http://www.wbif.eu/About/. 
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The next issue on the agenda is the handover from the OHR to the EUSR. It is 
not yet clear what will be the competencies of the new EU mission, more precisely 
whether it will have any of the same powers as Bonn. Most EU member states 
would favor giving it a weaker mandate, while the US and the UK want it to retain 
some of the “hard” prerogatives, which could be used as a last resort in defense of 
the Dayton Agreement.111 
In light of the irreconcilable positions of the Bosnian and the Serbian sides, the 
worsening political climate, and the economic crisis, it is questionable whether 
Bosnia is ready for a weak EU envoy deprived of the OHR’s strong legal powers.112 
Yet, the existence of the OHR serves as a perverse incentive allowing Bosnian 
politicians to shift political responsibility to the OHR. The OHR thus, inciden-
tally, poses an obstacle to much-needed constitutional changes. If a solution is 
not found soon to the country’s ills, there is a danger that Bosnia will remain a 
dysfunctional state for a considerable time, remaining outside of the enlargement 
process, characterized by social tensions, marginalization, and a lack of economic 
development, thus continuing to be a source of soft security threats for the whole 
region.
The visa liberalization process showed that the EU has considerable leverage 
over Bosnian politicians when it offers tangible rewards coupled with credible 
conditionality.
In May 2009, when the European Commission published its negative assess-
ment of the country’s visa progress as a result of which Bosnia was not included 
in the first wave of visa liberalization, it impelled the country to make remarkable 
progress. The Bosnian parliament adopted important laws in an urgent procedure 
related to border control, military equipment, international legal aid in criminal 
matters, the prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorist activi-
ties, accelerated the process of introducing biometric passports, and adopted a 
law in September 2009 to establish an anti-corruption agency. The visa liberali-
zation demonstrates well how the perspective of tangible benefits can motivate 
otherwise uncompromising Bosnian politicians to cooperate and reach difficult 
agreements
As several analysts have recently argued, what Bosnia needs is clearly articu-
lated, specific conditions that it needs to meet rather than high level political 
meetings in the international media spot light where the country’s constitutional 
ills would be solved at once by a ‘magic bullet’. While high publicity does not fos-
111   Florian Bieber, “EU and Nato and Bosnia”, 25.12.2009, http://fbieber.wordpress.com/2009/04/03/do-we-
need-to-worry/. 
112   “Bosnia’s future, A tearing sound”, The Economist, 4.4.2009.  
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ter large or small compromises, the visa liberalization process has shown that the 
country can adopt  the necessary measures in an efficient way when conditions 
are clear and the rewards are clear and immediate. Thus, the fact that the Hun-
garian presidency will not hold another high level summit on the constitutional 
reform is probably a wise decision, as more is likely to be achieved by pursuing 
quiet, less politicized incremental changes. One such approach could be to en-
courage amendment of the Bosnian constitution so that it would not discrimi-
nate against individuals who do not belong to the three constituent nationalities. 
The European Court of Human Rights ruled in December 2009 that the exclusion 
of Jews and Roma from Bosnia’s highest state offices is unlawful discrimination, 
which should be a reason to remove all discriminatory provisions from the coun-
try’s constitution.113 
Kosovo
Kosovo’s various ills are related to its unclear status. This problem is unlikely to 
be solved any time soon, as recognition of its statehood cannot be expected from 
Serbia and the remaining five EU member states in the foreseeable future. This 
seems to be the case, despite the recent ruling of the ICJ on Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence, which the court ruled was not against international law. In real-
ity, Kosovo’s independence is limited and its status is not much clearer than was 
before. Blurring the lines of responsibility, international authorities, the Interna-
tional Civilian Office (ICO), the European Union’s Special Representative (EUSR), 
EULEX and UNMIK all share some degree of state sovereignty in various areas.114 
Kosovo was able to join the WTO and IMF, but entering other international in-
stitutions such as the UN will be a challenge due to Russian, Serbian, and other 
countries’ refusal to recognize its independent status.
Institutional confusion disturbs not only its international position, but also 
its internal functioning, which can be best illustrated by the situation of Peter 
Feith who is the International Civilian Representative (ICR). His schizophrenic 
status is a result of his doubly detested mandate. He, as the EU’s Special Repre-
sentative, must be status neutral, yet he is, at the same time, the head of the ICO, 
which is in charge of implementing the Ahtisaari plan that explicitly endorses 
Kosovo’s independence.115 As five EU member states oppose independence, they 
do not recognize Peter Feith as the head of the ICO. These countries accept him 
113   Human Rights Watch, European Court: Landmark Ruling on Racial and Religious Exclusion, 22.12.2009. 
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only as the EUSR, which could undermine his position and the policies he is will-
ing to undertake.116
Moreover, it is difficult to see how economic progress could develop in a coun-
try which, due to its contested status, will hardly be regarded as a secure business 
environment by foreign investors. Under the present economic circumstances 
where 45% of the population lives on under 1,5 US dollars a day and unemploy-
ment is around 45%, social peace can be hardly expected, even without the ex-
isting ethnic divides.117 Therefore, encouraging economic development is key to 
Kosovo’s security and should be a high priority for the EU and the international 
community in Kosovo. As a very important step, obstacles which prevent Kos-
ovo’s participation in the CEFTA cooperation should be removed. 
Economically, northern Kosovo is better off than its south due to Serbian in-
vestment, yet it continues to be an unstable zone, which is controlled by local 
Serbs and Serbia, where Pristina has practically no authority. An resurgence of 
ethnic violence remains a true danger and the rule of law is mostly absent. These 
municipalities operate according to Serbian law, and since neither local admin-
istration nor Serbia’s courts in the north are willing to use the Kosovo Police, 
nothing can be enforced. Serbian judges cannot hear criminal cases; as a result, 
apart from 12 criminal cases heard by EULEX judges in 2009, there has been no 
criminal justice in the Mitrovica District. Albanian judges operating under Ko-
sovo law cannot return to the Mitrovica court due to Serbian resistance, while 
EULEX has not deployed enough international judges to make up for the absence 
of local ones, even though international judges would be acceptable to both the 
Albanian and Serbian parties. 
The main source of insecurity used to be the border crossings between Serbia 
and Kosovo where smuggling of fuels and other goods had been flourishing. This 
was significantly reduced  by Serbia through a serious crack down on smugglers, 
as Serbia suffered most of the damage in the form of lost revenue. At present 
EULEX controls the border crossings that were burned down in February 2008 
and subsequently rebuilt. However, checking people entering from Serbia to Kos-
ovo is usually not very systematic and thorough, as EULEX is unwilling to exercise 
full customs control until the political situation has been clarified. Border cross-
ings thus practically serve as a police checkpoint for Serbian citizens, as their data 
are not entered into computers, and as a true border crossing for everybody else. 
Due to this, the borders are not fully secure and various criminal activities such as 
116   ICG, “Kosovo’s Fragile Transition”, Crisis Group Europe Report N°196, 25 September 2008, www.icg.org., 
11.
117   Thomson Financial News, “Kosovo economy bleak, year after independence move”, 13.02.2009.
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drug trafficking are ongoing, posing significant soft security threats to the whole 
region and beyond.118
Moreover, a remaining source of tension is the situation of Serbs in Kosovo, 
especially in the South. Although Kosovo’s laws and its recently adopted constitu-
tion grant far reaching rights to minorities, including the right to local self gov-
ernments with strong prerogatives and the creation of special protective zones, 
their personal safety still cannot be guaranteed. Despite far reaching cultural 
rights, Kosovo Serbs face considerable intimidation. Interethnic tensions and 
low scale ethnic violence have continued since Kosovo’s proclamation of inde-
pendence.119 Unsurprisingly, less than 10% of the Serbs who fled Kosovo since 
1998-99, including those who left during the riots in 2004, returned; and consid-
erably fewer people came back after the declaration of independence than in the 
previous years.120 It is an encouraging sign that Kosovo Serbs living in the south 
cast their ballots in increasing numbers during Kosovo’s recent elections, disre-
garding calls for a boycott coming from Belgrade. Unlike their ethnic kin living in 
the north, southern Serbs seem to be willing to accept  Kosovo’s new reality and 
participate in its political life.121 
Although Serbia has remained committed to its policy of non-recognition of 
its former province’s independence, in practice its stance has softened somewhat 
since the new DS led government took office in 2008. Due to an agreement be-
tween the EU and Belgrade, EULEX could be deployed in the north on the condi-
tion that it remained status neutral and functioned fully under UN auspices.122 In 
September 2010, the UN General Assembly passed a joint Serbian-EU resolution 
in which ‘the EU pledged to foster “a process of dialogue between the parties” to 
bolster security in the Balkans and help Serbia and Kosovo in their efforts to join 
the EU.’  Due to early elections in Kosovo in December 2010, the talks addressing 
technical questions such as “co-operation on border protection, customs, trade 
and economy, transport, telecommunications, care for historical and cultural her-
itage, and the fight against organized crime” could start in February 2011. The 
Kosovo side is not that keen on the dialogue, as its priority is seeking further 
118   ICG, The Rule of Law in Independent Kosovo, Crisis Group  Europe Report N. 204, 19.05.2010, 18-22.
119   Website of the US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “2008 Human 
Rights Report: Kosovo,” 25.02.2009.
120   Between January and November 2008, UNHCR registered only 533 returnees, compared to the 1.815 
who returned in 2007 or the 1.669 who returned in 2006. Source: “2008 Human Rights Report: Kosovo”, 
25.02.2009.
121   “Turnout and results unclear in Serb areas,” B92, 12.12.2010.
122   “EULEX Receives Green Light”, B92, 27.11.2008, www.b92.co.yu. 
131
recognition and consolidating its institutions, while it sees the talks as “a way 
for Serbia to keep its foot in the door,” i.e. as another opportunity for putting the 
status issue back on the agenda.123 In fact, as Oliver Ivanović, state secretary of 
the Serbian government responsible for Kosovo argued, “every technical question 
comes to the state issue”.124 Yet, according to the stance of the Kosovo govern-
ment, “if Serbia says they will never recognize Kosovo, why should Kosovo talk 
to them?”125 
Altogether, Kosovo’s situation can be characterized best as a frozen conflict 
which could seriously imperil Serbia’s and Kosovo’s EU accession process. With-
out the recognition of all the EU member states, it is hard to imagine how Kosovo 
could become a member. This fact in itself seriously reduces the EU’s leverage 
on Kosovo as a normative power where the US continues to have the greatest 
leverage. In addition, until Kosovo is characterized by such legal, political, and 
institutional instability, the problems of organized crime and corruption cannot 
be seriously addressed.
Clearly, Serbia cannot join the EU with disputed borders, while Kosovo cannot 
function as a normal state under the present conditions (not to mention pursue 
its EU accession). Since the legal resolution of the status question is obviously 
out of sight for the foreseeable future due to Serbia’s resistance , the best the EU 
could do is facilitate a dialogue between the parties over practical matters.126 In 
addition, the EU is planning to give a visa liberalization road map to Kosovo and 
sign a trade agreement with its government soon, which are important steps to 
123   Ylber Hysa, Government Coordinator for the North, Prishtina. Presentation at the conference “Reaching 
out to the Balkans in times of crisis,” organized by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and 
ELIAMEP, Athens, 12-14 November 2010.
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125   Ylber Hysa cited at the conference, “Reaching out to the Balkans in times of crisis,” organized by the 
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prevent Kosovo’s total isolation and marginalization  and keep it from becoming 
a black hole within Europe. 
The Serbian minority deserves more attention from the international com-
munity, which could potentially earn some credibility for the EU in Serbia. Mostly 
rock throwing,  other forms of intimidation, and illegal occupation of properties 
prevents minorities from returning; moreover there were frequent reports about 
Kosovo Albanians destroying Kosovo Serbs’ private property with the intention 
of intimidating them and hindering their return. Importantly, while “real and 
perceived security concerns restrict the freedom of movement” of Serbs, cultural 
rights seem less important or relevant.
Finally, the EU should keep up pressure on Serbia not to obstruct policies 
which aim at improving the situation of the Serbian minority in Kosovo. Granting 
candidate status could be hinged on Serbia ceasing to demand that Kosovo Serbs 
boycott elections and stay away from working for public institutions. 
Macedonia
The name dispute with Greece might easily undermine Macedonian hopes for 
moving forward toward EU integration as it has stalled the country’s accession 
process since 2005 and jeopardized its joining NATO. Yet Macedonians also sig-
nificantly contributed to the deterioration of Greek-Macedonian bilateral rela-
tions by bringing the issue before the ICJ and further provoking Greek national-
ist sentiments. Erecting a statue of Alexander the Great in the middle of Skopje, 
renaming the airport and highway after him, and publishing the ‘Macedonian 
Encyclopedia’ which infuriated not only Greece but Kosovo Albanians and other 
neighbors as well (that was subsequently withdrawn under pressure from the US 
and UK), are indications of the reluctance of Skopje to assume a more compromis-
ing stance.127
If Greece continues to block Macedonia’s EU accession, which is more likely in 
light of the latest Macedonian moves, it is feared that relations between the Alba-
nian minority and Slav Macedonians might deteriorate. As the promise of EU and 
NATO accession was the common goal uniting Albanians and Slav Macedonians 
underpinning also the Ohrid Agreement, losing the European perspective might 
easily undermine security and ethnic harmony.128  
127   “Macedonia embroiled in encyclopedia row,” www.euractiv.com, 13.10.2009.
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The recent election victory of George Papandreou’s left wing Pasok raised 
hopes that Greek-Macedonian relations might thaw in the near future.129 Mac-
edonia can hardly hope for a better Greek prime minister in order to find a way 
out of the crisis, which is why the ball is now in the Macedonian court to adopt a 
more accommodating approach and stop playing the “Greek card” for its domestic 
audience.
Identifying cross-regional opportunities 
As has been argued throughout this paper, the circle of the most committed allies 
of South East Europe does not overlap neatly with the Visegrad group. From the 
Western Balkan states’ point of view, this should not be a problem as long as there 
are a number of countries in the EU which are supporting their cause. However, it 
could be a good opportunity for the Visegrad group to enhance its political weight 
and visibility if the four states could represent the interests of South East Europe 
in the EU bodies in a more coherent and unified way. 
The similarity between Slovakia’s and Hungary’s foreign policy rhetoric and 
priorities concerning the Western Balkans is striking, and in practice the two 
countries often act together in EU bodies. However, this convergence hardly ever 
gets noticed at the level of political public discourse. Despite the recent period of 
tensions between Slovakia and Hungary, the two countries seem to be each oth-
ers’ most natural allies in the Western Balkans, which could be one starting point 
for building trust and better relations in the future. 
As was argued in the introduction, despite its general pro-enlargement rheto-
ric, Poland shows far less enthusiasm towards the Western Balkans than Slova-
kia, Hungary or even the Czech Republic do, which is a potential source of tension 
within the Visegrad group. This is the case despite the fact that 69% of the Polish 
people are in favor of enlargement.  According to Polish analysts, every initiative, 
including the Danube strategy, pointing towards South East Europe is viewed 
by the Polish political leadership with suspicion, as such initiatives might divert 
funds and attention away from the Eastern Partnership countries. 
Yet, there are two key issues on which Polish and the future members’ inter-
ests converge: the EU’s agricultural policy and energy security. In the Western 
129   Sinisa-Jakov Marusic, “Skopje, Athens Hint at Warming Relations”, 12.10.2009, Euractiv.com.
134
Balkan countries there is a large agricultural sector,   and once these states be-
come EU members they can be expected to support preserving the Common Ag-
ricultural Policy. In addition, EU enlargement to South East Europe could increase 
the possibilities for diversifying energy supplies, which would be a welcome de-
velopment from the Polish point of view. 130 In February 2010, at an energy sum-
mit meeting in Budapest of the V4+ including representatives of Austria, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Romania in addition to 
the Visegrad states, the participants adopted a declaration calling for the creation 
of north-south interconnections through all V4 countries, between the planned 
Croatian and Polish liquefied natural gas terminals.131 As several analysts have 
noted, Polish neglect of this region will not pay off in the long run. The EU failing 
in the Western Balkans could weaken support for upgrading the Eastern Partner-
ship policy, and it is very unlikely that aspirations to bring Ukraine into the EU 
could ever materialize without success in the Western Balkans.
In late 2009, the Visegrad Four decided that they would coordinate develop-
ment assistance targeting the Western Balkan region. The amount of assistance 
the Visegrad countries provide is small compared to the large donor agencies such 
as USAID or SIDA, yet if this aid was better coordinated, it could have a more sig-
nificant impact.132 So far there have been a lot of negotiations on this topic, yet 
not much has been agreed on.
Conclusions and relevance of the V4 know-how
The Visegrad cooperation experience may help both the Western-Balkans and 
GUAM countries on four key issues, though to varying extents: 1. trust-building 
in foreign, security, and defense policy, 2. in supporting Euro-Atlantic integration 
efforts 3. co-operation in science and education 4. energy security.  
These four fields are quite similar to the original objectives of the Visegrad co-
operation, laid down in 1991. Trust-building is rather similar to the original goal 
130   European Stability Initiative, Debating EU Enlargement - Poland, http://www.esiweb.org/enlargement/?c
at=23#awp::?cat=23. 
131   Declaration  of the Budapest V4+ Energy Security Summit, Budapest, 24.02.2010, http://www.
visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=859&articleID=27720&ctag=articlelist&iid=1#_ednref1. 
132   Pontis Foundation, Visegrad Four: Donor Coordination for Serbia, Recommendation Brief, September 
2009, http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/tmp/asset_cache/link/0000023291/090930_V4Workshop_Brief.pdf., 2.
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of abolishing the remnants of the communist past. Supporting the Euro-Atlantic 
integration effort is also related to it, and actually the tasks are quite similar: 
establishing stable and functioning democracies, institutional reforms, market 
economy transitions, defense reforms, etc. Scientific and cultural cooperations 
are measures, which may – and actually do – help overcome past grievances via 
building mutual understanding, as they have in Central-Europe. Energy security 
is the only issue that is completely new compared to the original objectives of the 
Visegrad cooperation.
As was demonstrated above, a key contribution of the V4 from viewpoint of 
the Western Balkans is their commitment to the enlargement process. This is a 
value added that can make a difference, especially at critical times when some 
member states are lobbying for a slow down or when decisions are being made 
about whether a country could move to a more advanced stage along its accession 
path. 
Simultaneously, the Visegrad states took on an active role in the Western Bal-
kan countries’ preparation processes for EU and NATO membership. Hungary 
has gotten intensively engaged in the field of military and security services, help-
ing to reform the state intelligence service and the secret data protection system 
in Bosnia, as well as granting mentoring services to improve military capabilities 
to Montenegro, Croatia, and Serbia. Moreover, Hungary has become a forerun-
ner as an investor, stepping well ahead of its Visegrad partners.  Slovakia recently 
followed suit, recognizing the importance of the economic dimension of foreign 
policy, making the fostering of business relations a key priority in its Western 
Balkan strategy. Slovakia’s policy niche, however, has been the democratization 
and civil society development traditionally carried out mostly by Slovak NGOs. 
Reflecting the individual countries’ special expertise, within the Regional Part-
nership, Hungary is responsible for home and justice affairs, Slovakia is in charge 
of civil society development, Poland shares its experiences in how to attain and 
utilize EU assistance funds, while the Czech Republic lends support in the field of 
visa liberalization and participating in the unified market. 
Moreover, within the frames of the Visegrad cooperation, initiatives were 
launched aimed at sectoral cooperation and coordination such as on border 
surveillance, migration, public administration reform, preparation for visa lib-
eralization, improving energy interconnections in the Western Balkans, and the 
incorporation of the countries in the program of Trans European Transport Net-
works.133
133   Key Areas of the Presidency of the Visegrad Group 2009-2010. Website of the Hungarian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Available: http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/foreign_policy/V4_presidency/visegrad_
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Concerning the GUAM countries, the Visegrad Group has no illusions about 
their capabilities - and the GUAM countries must also not have illusions about the 
Visegrad capabilities. Their relationship with Russia dominates the Eastern poli-
cies of all four Visegrad states. This looked somewhat different in the mid-2000s, 
when the internal and external conditions for the democratization efforts were 
much more favorable. As the most important external factor, the United States 
during the first, and especially of the second, Bush-administration, provided 
strong support for these transformation and democratization efforts. Nowadays, 
in the context of the U.S.-Russia “reset”, support for democratic transformation 
in the post-Soviet region is much lower on the American priority list. 
The GUAM countries themselves have also changed a lot. Ukraine, under the 
leadership that emerged from the “Orange Revolution”, was much more receptive 
to such democratic, pro-Western reforms than the present President Ukrainian 
President, Yanukovich, is. While Azerbaijan in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
was interested in participating in the GUAM Organization, at present Baku aims 
more at balancing between Russia, the West, and the East. Georgia also lost its 
prioritized rule to a large extent following the failed August 2008 war: though it 
is still a close ally of the United States, and the Georgian population is absolutely 
in favor of EU-approximation, the country’s NATO accession is currently off the 
agenda, and so is its future EU membership. Only Moldova seems being on the 
same, pro-European track as it was in the early 2000s, but its path has been far 
from being continuous. The country first took another pro-Russian turn in its 
foreign policy in 2006-2007 during the last presidency years of Vladimir Voronin, 
then the Communists lost the elections in April 2009, which was followed by a 
long, still ongoing constitutional crisis. The currently ruling pro-European gov-
ernment, composed of a coalition of the Alliance of European Integration has 
emerged from these turbulent circumstances.  
The Visegrad countries themselves have also changed. The most vehement 
supporter of the democratization of the Eastern neighbourhood, the late Polish 
President Lech Kaczyński, died in an air crash in Smolensk, and his twin brother 
lost the elections. The new Polish President, together with the government, is 
in favor of a more pragmatic policy towards Russia and, following Smolensk, a 
spectacular rapprochement process is going on in Polish-Russian relations. This 
approach of Warsaw, one has to stress again, is in line with the broader trends of 
the U.S.-Russia and EU-Russia relations. In Hungary the government of Viktor 
Orbán has announced that the relationship with Russia enjoys a prioritized role 
cooperation.htm. Last accessed: 28 Dec 2010. 
137
and should be based on ideology-free, pragmatic cooperation. Prague and Bra-
tislava are also in favor of pragmatic bilateral relations with Russia. Generally 
speaking, as individual countries, the foreign policies of all four Visegrad member 
states towards Eastern Europe are dominated by their pragmatic, business-relat-
ed interests towards Russia – a relationship that they do not want to endanger 
seriously. Of course, there are certain issues in their foreign policies in which they 
are to act against Russian interests, such as the case of U.S. missile defense sites , 
or the further Eastern enlargement of the NATO. However, in general, their readi-
ness to confront Russia is much lower than it was in the early 2000s, when they 
could rely on the strong backing of the Bush-administration.
Under such circumstances, it would be unlikely to expect the Visegrad coop-
eration to engage too actively in the Eastern neighbourhood on its own. The In-
ternational Visegrad Fund is concentrating on low political issues, such as scien-
tific and educational cooperation with the Eastern neighborhood, cross-border 
cooperation, environmental issues, etc. However, of course, there are certain dif-
ferences between the V4 countries regarding their approach to the GUAM itself. 
Two of the four Visegrad countries, namely Poland134 and the Czech Republic135 
have institutionalized bilateral cooperation with the GUAM, while Slovakia and 
Hungary have not.
On the other hand, as members of the European Union, the four Visegrad 
states have much bigger chances. They actively support strong EU-engagement in 
the Eastern neighborhood. Particularly important issues are visa liberalization, 
energy security, and support given to civil societies. Additionally, all V4 countries 
are pushing for channeling as much EU funding into the region as possible. The 
launch of the Eastern Partnership has been an important success for Poland and 
the Czech Republic, and is strongly supported by Bratislava and Budapest. The 
consecutive Hungarian and Polish EU Council presidencies in 2011 clearly have 
the possibility to jointly give further impetus to the Eastern Partnership. 
Though taken individually the Visegrad states have not had too many possi-
bilities to engage the GUAM countries, the situation is much different if viewed 
from an EU perspective. In the European Union all four Visegrad countries are 
strong advocates for a stronger EU-engagement in the GUAM regions. This could 
be the main channel for transferring the Visegrad experience to them. Conse-
quently, the GUAM countries should also shift their expectations related to the 
134   For example, see: Communiqué of GUAM-Poland meeting, New York, 27 September, 2007. Available: 
http://guam-organization.org/node/652  Last accessed: 9 Jan 2011. 
135   For example, see: Communiqué of GUAM – Czech Republic meeting. Available:
http://guam-organization.org/node/385 Last accessed: 9 Jan 2011.
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Visegrad countries: instead of trying to achieve bilateral successes, they should 
try to use the lobbying power of the Visegrad states in the European Union to a 
greater extent. 
Recommendation for deepening regional cooperation
The experiences of the Visegrad cooperation could be used mostly in the above 
mentioned four key areas, both in the Western-Balkans and the GUAM region. 
Of course, as many circumstances fundamentally differ between the GUAM coun-
tries and in the Western-Balkans, the V4 experiences have different relevancies 
in these places. Consequently, the two regions will be addressed separately on all 
four issues.
Trust-building in foreign, security and defence policy
In the fields of foreign policy and security, there are still some outstanding issues 
which stem from the conflicts of the 1990s in the Western Balkans, and which 
continue to cause tensions in the region. Bilateral relations are still burdened by 
the consequences of the recent past, even though relations have been improving 
lately on several fronts. While Serbia managed to improve its cooperation with 
the ICTY and, as a result, the ratification of its SAA could be launched in the sum-
mer of 2010, it still needs to make further efforts to capture the remaining high 
profile fugitives Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić. 
Serbia-Kosovo relations are especially problematic, which not only hampers 
Kosovo’s development, but also has wider negative implications on regional coop-
eration initiatives. Serbia was able to build a solid cooperation with EULEX in Kos-
ovo concerning war crimes in Kosovo, yet still challenges Kosovo’s independence, 
despite the ICJ’s advisory opinion which proclaimed that Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence was not against international law. Serbia effectively obstructs Ko-
sovo’s participation in regional initiatives which are not managed under the UN-
MIK umbrella, and rejects Kosovo customs stamps, effectively blocking Kosovo 
exports not only to Serbia but to the EU as well.  This, consequently, undermines 
the effectiveness of the CEFTA’s cooperation. Moreover, Serbia continues sup-
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porting parallel structures in Kosovo, including parallel municipal elections and 
discourages Serb participation in municipal elections run by the Kosovo authori-
ties. Therefore, it is crucial that negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo facili-
tated by the EU soon begin on practical matters.
There are still more than 14 000 people missing in the region as a consequence 
of the conflicts. Resolving this issue is central to the reconciliation process, yet 
the resolutions of these remaining cases has been very slow. The Sarajevo dec-
laration process which was meant the deal with refugee return issues involving 
Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia was given new impetus in March 2010.
Apart from the Kosovo-Serbia problem, bilateral relations in general have im-
proved lately. The reconciliation process was boosted by the Serbian parliament’s 
recent declaration condemning the massacre in Srebrenica. Bilateral relations be-
tween Serbia and Croatia gained new momentum after Croatia’s new president, 
Josipovic took office. Several high level meetings took place and a police coopera-
tion agreement came into force in May of 2010 between the two countries. Serbia 
and Croatia also signed a defense cooperation agreement and an agreement on 
inland navigation. However, the mutual law suit for war crimes and the issue of 
missing persons continue to disturb bilateral relations.
Signaling the increasing level of trust among each other, the Western Balkan 
states participate in various regional initiatives, including the South East Euro-
pean Cooperation Process (SEECP), the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), the 
Central European Free Trade Area Agreement (CEFTA), the Energy Community 
Treaty (ECT), and the European Common Aviation Area Agreement (ECAAA). 
Within the institutional framework of the Regional Cooperation Council they 
participate in several initiatives that concern the security and defense sectors: 
notably the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance 
Centre (RACVIAC) and the South East and East Europe Clearinghouse for the 
Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC). The RCC also launched 
some special regional mechanisms for cooperation in the area of defense, such 
as the South East European Defense Policy Directors Forum, the South East Eu-
ropean Defense Intelligence Forum, and a Regional Registry of NGOs working in 
the security domain.
All Western Balkan states are members of the South-East European Coop-
eration Forum together with Albania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, and Turkey, 
which serves as a platform for political dialogue among the participating coun-
tries in several areas, including security issues, such as on organized crime, drug 
and arms trafficking and terrorism. Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia have been actively 
participating in the preparations for the forthcoming Danube Strategy. Regional 
cooperation, however, is often disturbed by the controversy between Serbia and 
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Kosovo. For instance, Serbia joined the technical negotiations for the Transport 
Community Treaty, yet the signing of it was delayed over differing positions on 
Kosovo.
The V4 is already contributing to the promotion of reform and cooperation in 
this specific area of South East Europe through two different channels. On the 
one hand, the Visegrad countries have launched sectoral cooperation and coor-
dination with the Western Balkan countries on border surveillance, migration, 
and the preparation for the visa liberalization, among other issues. On the other 
hand, considering that the Western Balkan states aspire to NATO membership 
(Croatia, Albania, and Slovenia already achieved it), the Visegrad value added so 
far has been crucial. Specifically Hungary provided valuable assistance to the vari-
ous countries’ state security and defense sector reforms. Yet, unless Kosovo and 
Serbia find a way to cooperate on sectoral policies and practical matters, regional 
cooperation will be stuck at the current level. The Visegrad Four cooperation with 
the Western Balkan countries, which focuses on specific issue areas and mostly 
avoids the level of high politics, could be used as an additional forum for facilitat-
ing dialogue between the two opposing sides. The relations between Slovakia and 
Hungary could serve as an example in the sense that their conflicts at the highest 
political and symbolic level have not undermined policy coordination and coop-
eration between the two states in the Visegrad group.
As was emphasized in the paper, while in terms of “ordinary crime” the region 
performs relatively well, organized crime and corruption pose the most serious 
security challenges. Criminals are often linked with politicians, thus criminaliz-
ing the state itself, while, through the politics of patronage, influential economic 
interest groups gain a considerable degree of control over the state’s govern-
ing structures. Transnational crime operates in trafficking human beings and 
drugs, and money laundering is also prevalent. All these activities are hard to 
fight against as they are facilitated by the culture of corruption and the weak-
ness of state and law enforcement institutions. Thus strengthening the rule of 
law, judicial reform, security sector reform, and anti-corruption measures should 
be high on the agenda in these states, which should be a priority of the Visegrad 
assistance as well. The Visegrad group should bear in mind that merely adopting 
necessary legal measures is not sufficient but needs to be followed by adequate 
implementation, the lack of which has been one of the greatest problems in this 
area in the Western Balkans.136 
136   Human Security in the Western Balkans (HUMSEC): The Impact of Transnational Terrorism and 
Organized Crime on the Peace-Building Process Final Scientific Report, 10, http://www.etc-graz.at/typo3/
fileadmin/user_upload/ETC-Hauptseite/publikationen/Occasional_papers/HUMSEC_occpaper.pdf. 
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Moreover, as was demonstrated by Lada Sadikovic in a recent study, the fail-
ure of state building in Bosnia, coupled with Serbia and Croatia fostering special 
relationships with their co-ethnics in Bosnia through giving them citizenship, 
etc,  undermines the effective functioning of the state which makes it easier for 
criminal groups to gain control in the government.137 The same problem can be 
found in Macedonia and Kosovo, where minority issues weaken the state’s ca-
pacity. Therefore, the Visegrad Group should pay attention to fostering human 
and minority rights protection in the region, recognizing that unresolved ethnic 
grievances fuel instabilities all over the Western Balkans. For instance, address-
ing the security needs of the Serbian minority in Kosovo is a precondition for 
engaging the minority and Serbia in a more constructive way.
In terms of foreign policy, the coordination between the GUAM countries is in-
stitutionalized to a rather similar extent to that between the Visegrad countries: 
there are regular ministerial summits, working group meetings, etc. In terms of 
security, the GUAM countries face a number of challenges with which the Viseg-
rad group has only limited experience: fighting against terrorism, territorial ex-
tremism, etc. However, regarding other security threats, such as drug trafficking 
and organized crime, of course, there is room for increased information sharing 
between the V4 and the GUAM countries.
Concerning defense policy in the GUAM region, unlike in the Western Bal-
kans, there are no territorial claims or grievances between the member states. 
None of them consider the other to be a foe, or a country that poses a military 
threat. However, some trust-building mechanisms that worked in Central-Europe 
could still be useful in the GUAM region as well. Only two of the four GUAM 
countries are signees of The Treaty on Open Skies, Ukraine and Georgia. Neither 
Azerbaijan nor Moldova has yet joined the initiative.  Moreover, one could argue 
that Azerbaijani and Moldovan accession would – at least theoretically - permit 
international surveillance flights ver the separatist territories as well (Nagorno-
Karabakh and Transdnistria, respectively). This would actually be quite useful for 
both the other member states and for Baku and Chisinau, as they would all get 
information on the findings from the fly overs. Some analysts even suggest ex-
tending the Treaty’s application to crisis zones in the OSCE area.138
137   Sadikovic, Lada, “Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Western Balkan System of Security,” in: Transnational 
Terrorism, Organized Crime and Peace-Building;  Human Security in the Western Balkans, edited by Wolfgang 
Benedek et. al. (2010).
138   Open Skies. Implementation and Perspectives. Universität Hamburg. Available: http://censis.informatik.
uni-hamburg.de/openskies/os-implementation.pdf  Last accessed: 10 Jan 2011.
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On the other hand, the CFE Treaty that worked well in Central-Europe has 
much less potential, though all of the GUAM member states are participating in 
it actively. The CFE has serious limitations in the GUAM region, mostly due to 
the continued presence of Russian troops in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia 
and South-Ossetia and in the Transdnistrian part of Moldova. At this point, the 
CFE Treaty cannot fulfill its trust-building role in the GUAM region, especially 
following the declarations of Moscow to suspend Russian participation in 2007.
In addition to the Treaty on Open Skies, there is another similarity of the 
Visegrad cooperation on security and defense and the original GUAM intentions, 
namely the plan to set up a joint GUAM peacekeeping force. Transferring the 
V4 experience on the process of forming a Visegrad battle group could also be of 
good use for the GUAM countries. 
Supporting Euro-Atlantic integration efforts
Concerning the Euro-Atlantic integration, there are fundamental differences 
between the Western-Balkans and GUAM countries, regarding both ambitions 
and chances. Generally speaking, all of the states of the Western-Balkans aspire 
for EU and NATO integration, and three of them have already managed to join 
NATO:Slovenia, Croatia and Albania. The EU accession of Croatia is in upcoming, 
and Serbia is also working actively on EU- and NATO-approximation.
As opposed to the GUAM countries, the Western Balkan states not-yet-in-the-
EU have a clear European perspective; the question is rather the time frame of 
their accession. Pushing enlargement indefinitely into the future is a real danger, 
which can undermine the effectiveness of the EU’s conditionality policy and let 
the region drift away from the European direction. Probably the most important 
role of the Visegrad countries from the viewpoint of South East Europe is their 
sustained commitment to keeping the enlargement process moving ahead. When 
the Visegrad states act together as a block they can turn the tide in favor of the 
accession countries during debates in EU institutions. 
The other Visegrad contribution in terms of supporting Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion efforts is practical assistance given to the candidates and would-be candi-
dates in order to help them prepare for EU and NATO membership. It can be ar-
gued that the Visegrad group has found a policy niche where it can add something 
unique to the EU’s foreign policy. So far, cooperation among the Visegrad states 
in the EU bodies concerning enlargement have been rather ad hoc,  with some 
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states like Slovakia and Hungary being more enthusiastic than others, like Po-
land. By making cooperation and coordination about enlargement matters more 
structured and deliberate, the Visegrad group could enhance its political weight 
in the EU. 
The GUAM countries are in a fundamentally different situation. Two of the 
four, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, have already declared that they do not intend to 
join NATO at all. In the case of Baku, this has been a consistent standpoint, while 
Ukraine gave up its NATO-accession ambitions only under the Yanukovich-pres-
idency. Georgia would still like to join the Alliance; however, since the Bucharest 
summit, and especially since the 2008 war, the chances of Tbilisi doing so have 
significantly decreased. Though one has to keep in mind that the new Strategic 
Concept left the door open for further NATO enlargements... The situation of 
Moldova is ambiguous. The pro-Western political leadership would like to co-
operate more closely with NATO, however, the country’s military doctrine envi-
sions neutrality. Besides, the existing separatist conflicts in Georgia and Moldova 
practically exclude any kind of NATO accession. To sum it up, of the four GUAM 
countries two do not intend to join NATO at all, and the other two – three, to-
gether with Azerbaijan - are excluded due to their domestic territorial conflicts. 
At this point the Visegrad group has not much potential to support the GUAM 
countries in this field.
The situation with the EU is rather different. In Georgia and Moldova the 
population and the political leadership are clearly pro-EU, and both countries’ 
relations with the Union are developing intensely. In Ukraine the Azarov-gov-
ernment declared that EU-accession is still on the foreign policy agenda of Kyiv, 
and though certain domestic processes seem to contradict these intentions, EU-
Ukraine relations are also developing rapidly. The only exception is Azerbaijan, as 
Baku does not intend to join the EU at all.
At this point, the best the V4 countries can do is to lobby actively in the Eu-
ropean Union for further intensification of relations with the three GUAM coun-
tries mentioned above: Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. Though further Eastern 
enlargement is not on the agenda at all, supporting even the EU approximation 
of the three willing GUAM countries is a key political task and responsibility of 
the Visegrad group. 
Cooperation in science and education
The setup and the operational experiences of the International Visegrad Fund 
could very well be used both in the Western-Balkans and in the GUAM countries. 
In the Western Balkans, the Regional Cooperation Council defined as its task 
to  “support the existing reconciliation initiatives in the region, enhanced cultural 
exchange, human contact, events, and other initiatives aimed at relaxing social 
relations in the region and positive profiling of SEE as a place of tolerance and 
rich human capital.” Particularly, the RCC framework places an emphasis on help-
ing the Western Balkan states to use opportunities offered by the EU programs 
such PHARE and IPA to improve their educational policies, educational levels, 
build university networks, and support mobility and student exchanges in the 
region. Additionally the RCC also helps universities and research centers to build 
contacts in the EU. The RCC also supports the creation of the Electronic South 
East Europe (eSEE) initiative, which would be a single and integrated Information 
and Communications Technology (ICT) market in South East Europe.  The South 
East Europe Education Cooperation Network (SEE-ECN) was also launched by 
the Stability Pact for South East Europe, the predecessor of the RCC, which is a re-
gional initiative that supports the exchange of information, ideas, and know-how 
for the reform and quality improvement of education in 11 countries in South 
East Europe.139 
While there is an obvious interest on behalf of the Western Balkan states in 
intensifying contacts with EU member states in the area, including the Visegrad 
Four, improving intra-regional cultural and educational relations should also be 
a priority, which could foster the culture of tolerance and reconciliation. The V4 
experience could be especially useful to further this goal. 
According to the website of the GUAM, although there is a Working Group 
for Culture, Science, and Education, this is not a standing structure, they meet 
only biannually. The last meeting took place on  December 15, 2010.140 Although 
during the meeting participants agreed on the need for organizing joint summer 
schools, not many other concrete results were reached.
Among the currently on-going GUAM projects there are no concrete programs 
dealing with scientific, educational, and cultural exchange; nor does the GUAM 
have an institutionalized coordinating and funding structure for such purposes, 
139   RRC website: www.rcc.int. 
140   5-е заседание Рабочей группы по вопросам культуры, науки и образования. Available: http://guam-
organization.org/node/1088 Last accessed: 10 Jan 2011.
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such as the International Visegrad Fund is. In the authors’ opinion, the Interna-
tional Visegrad Fund could serve as a good example for strengthening scientific, 
educational, and cultural cooperation among the GUAM member states and the 
Western Balkan countries.
Energy security
The energy security-related experiences of the Visegrad group may also be very 
useful both for the Western-Balkans and for the GUAM region. Visegrad experi-
ences are especially relevant for the latter, as their energy security situation is 
quite similar; despite the fact the Azerbaijan is an energy exporter, while the oth-
ers – including all of the V4 states – are energy importer countries. 
Energy-security cooperation in the Western Balkans takes place mostly under 
the auspices of the RCC. The Energy Community Treaty (ECT) promotes coopera-
tion in the field of energy between the countries in the region and between them 
and the EU. On the one hand, it helps the South East European states to adopt the 
EU’s acquis in the field of energy; on the other hand it supports regional coopera-
tion in the area of securing energy supply. The Energy Community (EnC) specifi-
cally set as its goal the construction of energy facilities in the Western Balkans, 
which have a regional significance. The treaty establishing the Transport Commu-
nity (TCT) to be finalized soon will serve as an instrument to integrate the region 
into the European transport networks. The Western Balkan States also signed an 
agreement on the establishment of the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) 
which aims to bring the region into the EU’s Internal Aviation Market, and thus 
decrease the region’s fragmentation in terms of airspace.
Significantly, the V4 countries invited Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia from the 
Western Balkans for closer cooperation in the energy sector in their energy secu-
rity summit in February 2010. Establishing a gas pipeline running from the Adri-
atic to the Baltic Sea and intensifying energy links between the V4 and some of 
its neighbors also serves as a means to lessen the V4’s vulnerability to Russia.1
The overwhelming dependence on Russian gas and oil imports and the exces-
sive reliance on old, Soviet-inherited transit infrastructure are common elements 
of the energy security of V4 and the GUAM countries, as well as of the Western 
1   Declaration of the Budapest V4+ Energy Security Summit, Budapest, 24th
 
of February 2010. http://www.
visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=859&articleID=27720&ctag=articlelist&iid=1#_ednref1. 
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Balkans (with the partial exception of Azerbaijan, as Baku does not need to im-
port Russian energy, though it is still dependent on the transit infrastructure.) 
These similarities justify joint answers very well.
The V4 and GUAM countries could – and already do – cooperate in finding 
alternative supply sources and transit routes for natural gas and oil. As one of the 
GUAM members is a gas exporter, one solution is evident; it has been so since 
the foundation of the GUAM: they should help Azerbaijan to export its gas and 
oil both to the GUAM countries and further on, to the V4 region, without cross-
ing Russian territory. In terms of gas, though, the original GUAM plans to build 
an Azerbaijan-Georgia-Ukraine (partially underwater) pipeline are long gone, the 
spread of LNG technology provides viable alternatives: the V4 countries should 
support the AGRI gas pipeline project of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hun-
gary. In addition, the EU’s Nabucco project also enjoys the wide support of the 
Visegrad group. 
However, in addition to striving for alternative sources and transit routes for 
gas and oil, the Visegrad group could also support the GUAM region by transfer-
ring knowledge and technology of energy saving measures, for example in mod-
ernization of communal heating systems,  introducing new insulation technolo-
gies, etc. Of course, this could mostly be done by private investors, on a business 
basis. However, the necessary regulatory environment for such projects needs to 
be elaborated in the GUAM countries – and, in this field, the Visegrad (and also 
the Baltic!) experience could be very valuable. 
The situation could be similar with the increasing use of renewable energy 
sources in the European Union. The V4 countries already have extensive experi-
ence with renewable energy, and will have even more, in connection with the EU 
policy to increase the share of renewable sources to 20% to 2020. Such knowledge 
and technology could also well be transferred to the GUAM countries, especially 
as it contributes not only to national energy security, but also creates new em-
ployment and business opportunities.
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the Role oF eConomy In RegIonal CooPeRatIon
Introduction
In the history of international relations interstate contacts are traditionally char-
acterised by bilateral relations as opposed multilateral ones. This holds true for 
the East Central European region; additionally, multilateral relations inEurope 
have generally been much less developed than in other parts of the world, and 
have often happened merely because of external pressure. After the systemic 
changes at the beginning of the nineties, the development paths of the East Cen-
tral Europe countries have diverged. 
• The most economically developed region in East Central Europe includes the 
Central European countries that started economic transformation immedi-
ately and which were able to join to the European Union. 
• The western Balkan countries took a different path, mainly because the disin-
tegration of Yugoslavia caused serious political, ethnic, and economic conflicts 
with lasting effects. Their economic cooperation faced extreme difficulties and 
only outside pressure, namely the strategy and policies of the EU, forced a 
strengthening of their cooperation efforts.   
• The disintegration of the Soviet Union has caused a serious economic down-
turn in the post Soviet area. After the federal political centre of the Soviet 
Union disintegrated, the former states failed to preserve the unified economic 
framework created during the Soviet era. Later this became one of the main 
factors behind the profound economic setback and degradation of the most 
technically advanced industrial sectors. This decline swept through practically 
all of the former Soviet states. There have been several attempts in the post-
Soviet area to create a kind of economic cooperation within the region, but 
one question persists: How can Russian and EU influence be balanced?
During the past two decades, the political and economic cooperation between 
the Visegrad countries has tended to run parallel; however, in the 2000s, by 
which time the economies had undergone significant changes and modernised 
in certain areas, the two types of cooperation began to diverge. In the economy, 
corporate relations were beginning to take the leading role while attempts at gov-
ernment-level economic cooperation were no longer in the cards. The coopera-
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tion was driven by microeconomic relations, mostly through trade in corporate 
networks and the direct investments of small and medium sized enterprises. On 
the other hand, the indirect harmonisations of economic policies connected with 
adopting EU regulations were supposed to be a tool to support convergences be-
tween the Visegrad countries’ economies. In the long run outside pressures  have 
indirectly aided a certain convergence of economic policies between the Visegrad 
countries more than created a genuine economic policy coordination. Against the 
backdrop of the dramatic disintegration of the past, integration of the transition 
countries with each other and with the rest of the world is essential to assure con-
tinued recovery and rapid growth. The EU accession countries of Central Europe 
are furthest along this path, of course. They are followed by the countries of the 
Balkans, where it now seems that, in the long term, integration with Europe will 
provide significant political and policy stability and a framework within which 
recovery can take place. 
Regional cooperation is an important element in the stabilisation and associa-
tion process (SAP) preparing the Western Balkan countries for accession to the 
European Union. The EU has, in numerous European Commission and Council 
documents, expressed that it considers regional cooperation extremely impor-
tant. The SAP is a long-term process which offers a general framework for the 
countries in the region to maintain relations with the EU while maintaining 
awareness of the political and economic differences between particular coun-
tries. The EU offers the countries of the SAP country-specific combinations of 
trade allowances (autonomous trade action), economic and financial support, and 
contractual relations (stabilisation and association agreements). In addition to 
regulating bilateral relations, the system of relations in the SAP includes another 
important component: the facilitation and promotion of regional cooperation. In 
essence, this is what is keeping intraregional economic development in motion; 
this is the motivation behind the mitigation of concerns hindering trade between 
the countries. The process is similar to the aims of the Visegrad countries in the 
nineties as they sought to eliminate customs, which eventually occurred under 
the framework of CEFTA. 
In the post-Soviet region, inherited economic relationships are still determi-
nant and ties with Russia are particularly strong.  This situationcalls for an easing 
of these relationships in a number of newly independent states, which is evident 
in the shift towards foreign trade partners and a spectacular decline in the role 
played by post-Soviet partner countries. However, the inherited economic struc-
ture can also lead to the survival and preservation of vertical economic structures 
that had evolved under the Soviet empire.  This can partly account for the fact 
that the exchange of goods in the greater post-Soviet region still plays an impor-
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tant role within the CIS, despite the heavy re-orientation towards foreign trade. 
The very same, most typically, intersectoral relations are increasingly evident in 
capital connections as well. In addition to explanations based on economic foun-
dations, the political factors in the integration-disintegration processes in the 
post-Soviet region are just as important. “The history of integration in the post-
Soviet region seems to be a succession of unimplemented projects. Many reached 
no further than a statement of aims and signing of foundation documents before 
dying.”2 Although, on the basis of the economic growth and internal political sta-
bilisation evident in the early 21st century, at least the partial integration of the 
post-Soviet region seemed a likely reality. This could allow the development of 
a new power centre recognised by the world economy if some of the interested 
states of the region with Russia playing the leading role were to form a union. 
Today the chances of this happening have significantly reduced given the politi-
cal events and processes that have taken place or begun in the meanwhile. The 
countries surrounding Russia will be divided into two large groups in the future: 
a club of countries engaging in closer forms of cooperation (integration) and a 
circle of simple neighbours. Regarding this latter group, the well-known expres-
sion of “good neighbourhood policy” has once again come into prominence and is 
often cited, particularly in the wake of the foundation of the Eastern Partnership.
Economic aspects of Regional Cooperation – theoretical and 
Practical Approaches
The history of the world economy demonstrates that really successful regional 
economic integration has always been achieved by and between either dynami-
cally growing countries, or those that promoted the integration of other partici-
pating nations into a global economy. In these cases, the main aim was never 
to create autarky and find alternatives to import activities within the integrated 
community of countries; instead, the possibility to integrate was always left open 
to other participants and actors in the world economy.
In Central and Eastern Europe in the nineties, all the factors that could poten-
tially prevent political and economic cooperation were evident; at the same time, 
there was little to counteract these negative impacts as circumstances that may 
2   Glinkina 2008: p.5.
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have promoted and deepened cooperation were slow to evolve. Based on experi-
ence, any attempts at regional cooperation even in the wider Central and Eastern 
European region have had the following main limitations and opportunities to 
take into account:
• A common cultural, historical, and geographical past; knowledge of each oth-
er’s countries is one of the main driving forces behind cooperation. However, 
in Central and Eastern Europe, a shared historical past is more likely to gener-
ate tension, the negative impact of which is increasingly evident at times of 
accelerating economic and social changes. Given the negative experiences of a 
shared past, in the wake of the regime change the countries of the region tried 
to avoid each other as much as possible and refused to enter into any kind of 
economic alliance with their former partners.
• The – mostly political – opportunities for cooperation in the early nineties 
were expanded by the security policy vacuum that came about with Russia 
losing her political weight in world politics in the wake of the cold war. This 
driving force was channelled into the NATO enlargement. However, during 
the Yugoslav wars, increasing security and economic risks once again intensi-
fied the need for cooperation. Now mainly energy security-related issues and 
the increasing influence of Russian capital in Central Europe today represent 
shared interests in security policies and the economy for the countries of the 
region. 
• One of the problems preventing swift cooperation in the wider Central Eu-
ropean region is diversity ranging from religious and ethnic differences to 
divergence in the level of economic development and political maturity. Any 
such complex structure will only allow for very flexible cooperation, even at a 
theoretical level. Ethnic tension presents a real danger, especially if the gen-
eral economic situation in the countries concerned is unfavourable; in order to 
alleviate problems in any country, one needs a flourishing economy. 
• There are two fundamental theoretical approaches to the development of sub-
regional cooperation and larger-scale integration, especially from an economic 
perspective. According to one school of thought, subregional cooperation is a 
preparatory step that paves the way for larger integrating organisation. The 
other approach claims that larger-scale cooperation gives rise to subregional 
cooperation. The answer to this theoretical question always depends on the 
level of economic development of the country willing to enter an existing in-
tegration. Integration between less developed countries does not cause rapid 
economic development. These less developed economies generally rely on a 
modernisation centre (an “anchor”) that often lies outside the strict bound-
aries of the region. They need markets, access to technology, management 
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know-how, and other transfers, which can promote rapid economic develop-
ment. So far, only the really developed countries have succeeded in imple-
menting thriving regional cooperation before integrating into a larger unit. In 
all other cases, it was entry on the global economic scene and participation in 
a larger integrated organ that prompted stepped-up economic (and political) 
cooperation.3 
• Countries belonging to the same geographical region are not necessarily each 
others’ primary or natural economic partners. The similarity of economic 
and political priorities tends to promote subregional cooperation more than 
having the heritage of a shared past or geographical proximity. In the pre-
accession years, economic cooperation of the countries in the region was not 
coupled with additional growth impetus.
• Economic cooperation also can be greatly hampered when the countries have 
very similar characteristics, similar comparative advantages, and relative la-
bour productivity. Their economies are not complementary but competitive in 
terms of their structure and potential. This situation can only be resolved with 
economic structural changes induced by the inflow of significant foreign direct 
investments. This was the case in the Visegrad countries, where the economic 
structures had been changed by the end of the nineties, mostly due to new 
production facilities created by foreign investors.
From the mid-1970s on, the entire Central and Eastern European region 
drifted further along the road to complete marginalisation with the gradual de-
cay of COMECON. This was coupled with severe and unfavourable economic con-
sequences as the region had further distanced itself from the dynamical centre 
of development of the world economy. This had very negative psychological and 
frustrating effects, given the fact that this accelerating marginalisation was tak-
ing place right next to the western world. This contrast was even stronger in Hun-
gary than in other countries since Hungary was the most open country in many 
respects. After the regime change, many thought that this kind of marginalisa-
tion would be quickly dispelled since it was believed that the country was lagging 
behind merely because of the different economic and social system it had at the 
time. This expectation, however, proved to be totally unfounded.
Since the foundation of the European Community, there have been two types 
of marginalisation in relation to the integration of Central and Eastern Europe: 
a radical and totally isolating version stemming from the military conflict of the 
3   Inotai (1997).
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cold war, and then a lighter, but still definite process that evolved after the regime 
change which is usually described as the ‘two-’ or ‘multi-speed Europe’.
In the period following WWII, COMECON was the only institution that might 
be seen as a half-hearted attempt at integration. Although COMECON may have 
been very advantageous to certain sectors and companies, it was certainly an un-
favourable arrangement from the perspective of the entire economy. Given the 
lack of market conditions, no real competition could evolve between the compa-
nies. This also established unnatural terms and conditions under which economic 
partners were selected. This economic environment was coupled with the War-
saw Pact, a political-military alliance that was governed by the Soviet Union and 
which determined participating country interests from above and imposed great 
limitations on an individual country’s sovereignty.
In light of such precedents it was a natural reaction after the fall of Commu-
nism that countries in the region were averse to economic and political coop-
eration between the Central and Eastern European countries. None of them was 
intent on taking steps to bring economic/political ties closer, due to the dismal 
memories of the era before the regime change. What’s more, the socialist ver-
sion of integration, i.e. the community of Socialist states, had little meaning for 
the people themselves. Therefore, the breaking of ties between members of the 
Communist elite had automatically meant that the vast majority of cooperation 
initiatives were now a thing of the past as well. 
The Visegrad Cooperation as an Economic Coordinating 
Mechanism
Hungary (and the other Visegrad countries, except for Poland) is considered a 
small-nation economy in terms of its economic power, population, and natural 
resources. The countries of the region have very little room for manoeuvre; it is 
the international economic, political, and technical fields of force, world trends, 
and global and European trends that predetermine the course that development 
has to follow. This has been exacerbated with marginalisation over the past cen-
turies.
The building of regional relations in Central Europe was discouraged by a fear 
that countries in the region shared: that Western Europe might consider merely 
strengthening cohesion and economic ties within the region as an alternative to 
EU integration. Soon it was clear, though, that the developed world treated the 
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Central European region as a whole and was reluctant to deal with the countries 
therein one by one. Looking at things from a western perspective, the lack of co-
operation, especially 2-3 years after the regime change, demonstrated that these 
countries were unable to communicate with each other under the conditions set 
by the market and democracy. It seemed that cooperation between Central Eu-
ropean countries was seen by the developed countries as a sign of maturity, a 
precondition for western integration. It was partly this notion that motivated the 
launch of the economic and political cooperation that led to the creation of the 
Visegrad group and, eventually, to the birth of CEFTA.
Another reason behind the origination of the Visegrad idea was the attempt to 
synchronise the policies of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland against the Sovi-
et Union. One of the most important events that prompted cooperation occurred 
in January 1991, when Soviet forces took military action against Lithuania when 
it  demanded independence. This made it clear that the Soviet Union still posed 
a real threat to the region. Following the Lithuanian incidents, the government 
heads of the three countries met in Visegrad at the beginning of 1991 and agreed 
to set themselves the goal of organically integrating into the European security 
and economic system. The talks were further propelled by the August 1991 coup 
in Moscow, which gave rise to grave concerns in the states of the region. However, 
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the security policy aspect of the 
cooperation had dramatically diminished other topics now dominatedin coopera-
tion talks. At the Prague prime ministerial summit in May of 1992, the future of 
the Visegrad cooperation refined in three areas of great importance. The first was 
development with western institutions, the second was economic cooperation, 
and the third was the reconciliation of opinions and positions concerning world 
economic and political events. Following the declaration of these objectives, how-
ever, the political cooperation within the group soon de facto ended with the 
split-up of Czechoslovakia. The newly forming Czech Republic considered coop-
eration to be an unnecessary remnant of the past and made it clear that with the 
weakened Soviet Union posing a diminished security threat to the region, there 
was no longer a need for Central European cooperation. They feared that only 
the possibility of exploitation lay in the strengthening of economic cooperation. 
However, it was not only the Czech uncertainty that prompted that failure of the 
Visegrad group, but also, and more importantly the changes to the system and 
conditions of the economic and security policies in Central Europe. The essence 
of the response to the altered conditions is well-illustrated by a newspaper article 
written at the time with the following opening sentence: “Visegrad is Dead, Long 
Live CEFTA!”. This was a clear indication that economy was the only area where 
joint action or coordination was or might be required between the four countries.
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For the first half of the nineties, in Western European and US usage the term 
“Visegrad Group” was synonymous with the most developed Central European 
countries.  The Visegrad Group was considered sort of an exclusive elite in Central 
Europe, which was best illustrated by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic’s 
OECD and NATO memberships in the late nineties. The differentiation between 
Central European countries and country groups was also reinforced by the fact 
that the region excelled itself in terms of economic development with a swift 
and smooth transformation of the economy as a result of which, by the spring of 
1998, a new adjective had entered into the vocabulary of the international press 
and international economic organisations; they no longer described Hungary, Po-
land, and the Czech Republic as emerging markets, but as converging markets. 
Due to the question of safeguarding this exclusive role, Poland voiced its reserva-
tions in 1998 concerning the integration of Slovakia into the Visegrad Group, 
however, the situation had taken a swift turn by 1999.
There are also clear-cut periods as far as economic relations are concerned 
in the given countries. The first half of the nineties was clearly characterised by 
loosening economic ties, induced by the previous negative experiences of these 
countries and their common objective to join the European Union. As a result 
of the latter, countries in the region were all primarily trying to build closer eco-
nomic and financial relationships with the EU while efforts to establish regional 
connections remained secondary. In the latter half of the nineties, owing to the 
increasingly effective operations of CEFTA, trade relations began to improve sig-
nificantly, but its subsequent effect remained considerably limited in this period 
partly because of unfavourable growth (demand) processes, and partly owing to 
the efforts made to exploit the potential of EU-trade as much as possible. 
In 1998, with EU-accession talks beginning, there was a compelling external 
pressure to adopt the EU legal frameworks and to introduce related measures. As 
a result of this, the economic policies in the countries of the region converged in 
many respects, since liberalisation measures had created practically identical reg-
ulatory environments. At the same time it was already evident that national eco-
nomic policies in certain areas no longer followed parallel paths, a process which 
accelerated in the 2000s; yet this initially had no clear and obvious effects on eco-
nomic performance. The emerging structural differences in the late 2000s created 
significantly different economic conditions in the specific countries of the region. 
In the wake of the EU-accession, mutual trade and economic relations inten-
sified, while the economic structure was being shaped mainly by large foreign 
companies and their network of suppliers. This period was also characterised by 
the emergence of large regional corporations gaining increasing influence at a 
regional level and interweaving economic ties along new patterns. 
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Experiences since EU accession clearly show that the number of issues hav-
ing a specifically Central European identity has been limited or non-existent. The 
expectation for the post-accession period was that the need to comply with Maas-
tricht criteria would push the Central European countries to decrease economic 
disparities between their countries and the existing EU Member States. The indi-
rect harmonisations of economic policies were supposed to be a tool to support 
convergences between their economies. In the long run it is certainly true that 
outside pressures indirectly helped create a certain convergence of economic poli-
cies between the Visegrad countries independently from economic policy coordi-
nation. Such coordination has been almost non-existent during the past two dec-
ades and only a serious (economic) security policy threat could alter the situation. 
The economic changes of the coming few years will be tied to the transfor-
mation of economic structures and economic policies, which eventually will lead 
to the convergence and synchrony of the economic policies of the countries in 
the region. This period will be strongly influenced by the present economic crisis, 
which may – in an optimal situation – improve competitiveness in the entire re-
gion.
The need for Economic Cooperation
The economic transformation strategies of the Visegrad Group were considered 
to be the flagships of  the transition. However, the individual Visegrad countries 
have taken greatly divergent paths in many respects in the past two decades and 
chosen different ways to conduct their economic reforms; nevertheless the ele-
ments of convergence are still tangible. In the beginning of the transformation, 
Poland attempted to create the conditions required to develop a market economy 
with fast and drastic measures. In the Czech Republic it was thought that the 
foundations of the economy did not really need much adjustment and the coun-
try would be able to build a market economy without much restructuring, while in 
Hungary the swift transformation of certain areas (e.g. privatisation) was set as 
a priority objective, without drastic measures in many other areas. The economic 
positions of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic remained, nevertheless, 
very similar. Owing to the structural reforms launched towards the end of the 
nineties, Slovakia soon joined the most developed group of regional countries. 
On the whole however, these countries went through the very same stages dur-
ing their economic transformation; they each were eventually forced to take the 
same measures. The steps were as follow: acceleration of privatisation with the 
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involvement of foreign investors, more intense attempts to attract FDI; radical 
macro-economic stabilisation measures and the curtailment of real wages; con-
solidation of banks consuming vast budget resources followed by the sale of the 
lion’s share of the banking sector to foreigners. These were the key steps of the 
economic transformation; they were introduced in practically all of the countries, 
albeit with not simultaneously. Although there were differences in the individual 
countries in what they considered to be the focal point and centre of gravity in 
terms of joining the NATO and EU-accession talks, the general tendencies, on the 
whole, converged. 
The economies in the region gained increasing importance in the first half of 
the 2000s. This process gained momentum and grew in importance because of 
Western European companies increasingly taking advantage of the growth po-
tential of the region , even amidst the recurring crises in the world economy. 
Continued liberalisation in Central Europe in accordance with the Association 
Agreements, the realisation of free trade within the CEFTA region, as well as sta-
ble GDP growths gave fresh momentum to expansion of production and the im-
provement of productivity. In contrast to this, Western European growth around 
the turn of the 21st century and shortly afterwards remained modest. As a re-
sult of this, the somewhat small Central European market gained importance in 
international economic relations. The Central and Eastern European region was 
increasingly seen as one of the potential sources to fuel growth in the EU, and this 
only intensified with the imminent Central European enlargement of the EU. The 
large Western European service providers realised significant profits from the pe-
riod of convergence before accession and, later, from the expansion of the single 
market into the countries of the Visegrad region. 
The idea that the countries of the region ought to adopt a common strategy 
during EU-accession talks in order to obtain the best economic concessions prima-
rily from the structural funds was one potential field of cooperation on economic 
issues. Although there had not been reconciled strategies between the candidate 
countries in earlier EU enlargement procedures, it still seemed reasonable to take 
advantage of the possible benefits of this kind of cooperation. Simultaneous talks 
provided the EU with a very strong negotiating position. In a situation like this, 
the possibility of any candidate country with a more lenient negotiation strategy 
providing concessions could have risked it being considered a precedent for the 
EU with other countries that may have adopted a more stringent approach during 
talks. This could have made it necessary to determine a set of common rules for 
negotiation/conduct. These common rules of conduct may have led to the devel-
opment of a common accession strategy, which went beyond the desired objective 
of preventing specific countries from providing excessive concessions. Of course, 
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this common strategy was subordinate to national strategies and amounted to no 
more than shared interests amassed from the individual national strategies. Still, 
cooperation such as this may well have prevented the EU from playing off the 
Central European countries against each other during the accession talks with-
out encountering any resistance. As demonstrated by the accession talks, there 
was no solidarity in this respect between the countries concerned, there was no 
reconciled common strategy; the Visegrad countries pursued their individual in-
terests as much as their own representation abilities, negotiation strategies, and 
relationships with existing members allowed them do to so.
CEFTA
CEFTA was unquestionably the most influential system in the Visegrad region 
out of all of the institutionalised economic cooperation initiatives in the region 
after the regime change. The notion that frameworks of economic cooperation 
ought to be established within the Visegrad Group was already on the agenda in 
1991. In contrast to the politicians, who did not really wish to build deeper politi-
cal or economic relations in the region, it was clear to all economic experts that 
tightening economic ties was inevitable after the drastic loosening of relations 
in the early nineties.4 Statistics presented unquestionable evidence that trade 
turnover between the countries had significantly fallen, which would, sooner or 
later, cause severe problems. Originally the three countries came up with the idea 
of creating a payment union in response to one of the most severe defects of the 
COMECON cooperation, but this notion soon fell into oblivion. The aim now was 
to establish free trade between the states concerned. Free trade zones are con-
siderably looser forms of economic integration, but with states who had, so far, 
failed to establish any form of multilateral economic cooperation between them. 
However, it was still a real cornerstone for cooperation. Parallel to this, the Asso-
ciation Agreements between the three countries and the European Communities 
had practically been fully drafted and, thus, the framework for a partial free-trade 
zone had been laid down towards Western Europe. If these three countries had 
not entered into a similar agreement, trade between them would have been mar-
ginalised in comparison to the trade they were transacting with the European 
Union and the member states of EFTA. This situation evolved nevertheless, since 
4   Dunay (1997).
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the rules of the Association Agreements with the EC had already entered into 
force in the first half of 1992 when the text of the CEFTA agreement had not yet 
even been worded. The objectives of CEFTA were as follows:
• A tripartite agreement on the establishment of a free trade zone was to cover 
all industrial and agricultural produce. 
• The lifting of trade restrictions was to be extended to all tariff and non-tariff 
type restrictions. 
• The tripartite agreement was to be modelled after the agreements made and 
entered into by and between the EU/EFTA and the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean states; however, it was to be built based on symmetry and mutual ben-
efits. 
• The transition period required to achieve full liberalisation was to be 5-10 
years.
The free transfer of goods between the participating countries could have also 
been realised under the frameworks of a customs union. This, however, the coun-
tries of the Visegrad group were not inclined to do for political reasons, for this 
would have required such close cooperation that it would have forced the intro-
duction of common economic policies including the uniform management of im-
ports and common decisions concerning the utilisation of collected duties. If that 
was not enough, the actors outside the region would also have viewed this kind of 
cooperation as an alternative to the EU. 
In this regard – and similarly to the Visegrad group’s political and security 
endeavours – it was expressed that the participating countries had wanted, at 
all costs, to avoid the impression that their regional cooperation would diminish 
the importance of Western European integration. For this reason they had set 
themselves a less spectacular objective, the establishment of a free trade zone. 
The structure of CEFTA was based on the agreements between the parties, the 
EU, and the EFTA. While specific articles were modelled on EFTA, they were har-
monized with the EU model (industrial, agricultural, and general provisions).
The overall objective of CEFTA was to provide the participating countries with 
trade preferences similar to those offered to the four countries by the Association 
Agreements made with the EU. In addition to improving competitiveness, the 
aim of the agreement was to increase purchasing power and maximise FDI to the 
region. The products were classed into three groups: A, B, and C. Tariffs and non-
tariff type restrictions were lifted at varying intervals; between 1995 and 1997 
the duty payable on certain industrial and agricultural products were lowered. 
The trade restrictions on other goods such as cars, textiles, and steel products 
were lifted by 2000. Simultaneously, by the 1st of January, 1997, the parties were 
required to abolish all export tariffs or other equivalent duties.
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The participating countries also agreed not to introduce new quantitative im-
port restrictions or other equivalent measures in their mutual trade activities. 
Nevertheless, CEFTA still did not manage to bring about entirely free trade: (1) 
though it highlighted the importance of lifting agricultural tariffs, it still retained 
a quota system (2) the agreement did not treat non-tariff restrictions appropri-
ately.
Special provisions governed customs administration cooperation, conces-
sions, trade-type state monopolies, payments, the rules of competition, the lib-
eralisation of government procurements, dumping, re-export, and the protection 
of intellectual property, etc. 
Since the Czech leadership made it clear that they did not intend to deepen 
regional cooperation and the relationship between Slovakia and Hungary was 
bumpy, all further measures taken aimed at  developing CEFTA were controlled 
by Budapest and Warsaw. In the spring of 1995, the Prime Ministers of the two 
countries agreed to support the expansion of CEFTA. This, however, was subject 
to two preconditions: (1) The terms and conditions of accession must be defined; 
(2) The constitution of CEFTA must be amended, as it did not originally address 
the question of accession.
From this point onward, membership in the group was subject to three pre-
conditions: (1) GATT- (WTO) membership; (2) The approval of all CEFTA states; 
(3) Conclusion of the Association Agreement with the European Union.
The CEFTA-states made a resolution over the inclusion of Slovenia during 
the September 1995 Brno summit of the heads of government. A resolution was 
made despite the fact the Slovenia’s Association Agreement had not yet been 
signed, but Slovenia’s accession to CEFTA was allowed in spite of this on January 
1, 1996, on the condition that Slovenia would sign the Association Agreement. 
The accession of Slovenia had no effect on the nature of the cooperation. It was 
clear to most Central European countries that Slovenia was a state that ought 
to have joined the western institutions in the first wave of accession. With the 
Slovenian membership, CEFTA remained relatively homogenous, economically 
speaking. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania had already indicated their 
desire to join. Ukraine also showed interest but, given the lack of an Association 
Agreement with the EU, it proved to be an unrealistic aspiration. Similar endeav-
ours by Croatia and Macedonia also needed to be treated with a degree of scepti-
cism, not to mention the aspirations of Belarus. Nonetheless, the desire by these 
states to integrate only proved that CEFTA was a success story: an institution had 
been successfully set up and was operating and producing economic results which 
a number of Central and Eastern European countries found attractive.  
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The original agreement was amended a number of times in the second half of the 
nineties. The aim of the modifications in each case was to accelerate the lifting of 
tariffs and increase the degree of liberalisation. The basic principle of cooperation 
remained, however, unchanged; that is to say that CEFTA did not endeavour to 
integrate the different states, but instead wished to increase and deepen the level 
of integration of the countries involved into the world economy by liberalising 
foreign economic relations. This, however, as had been noticed earlier, was an 
excellent method for less developed countries to ensure that, at a later stage, their 
participation in a larger integrating unit would be successful.
The significant expansion in the exchange of products between the CEFTA 
countries in the early 2000s was underpinned by a number of factors. One of the 
most important elements was the gradual but accelerating lifting of tariffs and 
quantity restrictions affecting the majority of traded products. The other main 
reason was that the majority of CEFTA countries had had relatively high GDP 
growth rates in the previous years. In other words, the chances of market en-
try improved among countries with growing economies, which ab ovo created 
favourable conditions for the interweaving of the economies of the region. 
Perhaps the most problematic area for CEFTA proved to be the trade of ag-
ricultural products. Hungary generated a trade surplus in agricultural produce 
compared to all of the other CEFTA countries. This can partly explain why Hun-
gary was subject to protectionist measures the highest number of times. The ag-
ricultural sectors in many CEFTA countries were struggling with surpluses. Since 
entering the strongly protected western markets was difficult, given the fact that 
the Association Agreements did not allow for total free trade of agricultural pro-
duce, and the eastern markets had lost the vast majority of their solvent demand 
as a result of the financial crisis of the late nineties, the logical alternative for the 
countries was to try to sell their agrarian surplus on the CEFTA market. Because 
Hungary produced relatively good quality and competitive products in compari-
son to the neighbouring countries, this comparative advantage was also reflected 
in the balance of the foreign trade of agricultural produce. For this reason, the 
agrarian war between the CEFTA countries became increasingly fierce in the early 
2000s.
The question of micro-level cooperation, that is the development of corporate 
relations, plays an important part in shaping the economic connections in the 
region. Already at the formation of CEFTA, it was an important point for analyti-
cal consideration to see what strategies the transnational corporations (TNCs) 
would adopt in the region. Many expected that this would encourage the emer-
gence of production units that would sooner or later target the entire regional 
market and with the lifting of restrictions hampering trade and capital turnover, 
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their supplier network would also be extended to cover the countries concerned. 
For the CEFTA region, the optimal solution seemed to be that individual TNCs 
would increasingly rely on regional resources for their supplies, in other words, 
the cheaper, semi-finished products of domestic companies working in the region 
would play a more important role in supply. This, however, was not realised for 
years because TNCs continued to satisfy their supply demands from their own 
network of “domestic” suppliers. There was however a gradual shift in this re-
spect, nevertheless, success is still questionable for two reasons: (1) In the CEFTA 
countries, the need to connect the supplier industry into the transnational ar-
teries increased. Doing so is an important step, but none of the countries have 
made great advances in this respect yet. (2) There is nothing to guarantee that 
the support industry will be better in entering the TNC’s supply arteries since the 
business policies of large corporations focus on where they can best and most ef-
fectively satisfy their needs from.
Also, we are witnessing a process wherein the vast majority of TNCs bring in 
their own supplier chain, i.e. the traditional system of corporate relations is being 
revived in Central and Eastern Europe. In a situation like this, it is very difficult, 
e.g. for Hungarian companies to join the ranks of suppliers. There is already a very 
lively trade between the various subsidiaries of multinational companies operat-
ing in the region, but it would be just as important to strengthen production links 
between Central and Eastern European companies as well. The division of labour 
and exchange of products between certain subsidiaries of multinational compa-
nies is obvious (e.g. Unilever, Nestlé).
Impact of the EU on the Economic Relations of Visegrad 
Countries during the Nineties 
For the past two decades the EU has played a key role in the development and 
deepening of regional economic relations, both directly and indirectly. The EU 
has had a major influence on the economic processes taking shape in these coun-
tries as well. It was the external anchor that forced significant changes within the 
economies of these countries. 
The accession of Central and Eastern European countries was the first time 
during the history of European integration that certain preconditions were re-
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quired to be fulfilled that had  not been included in the Treaty of Rome.5 One 
of the hidden preconditions of accepting Central European countries was the 
strengthened economic cooperation of these countries between themselves. It 
was also a new phenomenon that the accession negotiations took place in a time 
when deepening integration was also on the agenda. The adjustment to the acquit 
was an extremely difficult task for the Central European countries when com-
pared to previous enlargements, as the volume of legal material was much larger. 
Central Europe at that time was in an absolutely policy taker position, it had no 
real chance to influence substantially the negotiation processes. 
Due to these dependencies the EU was the unquestionable centre for this 
region. On the other hand, it was considered even in the late nineties that the 
Central European region would experience a quick growth period as accession 
approached. Business prospects for the region were promising, more and more 
small and medium sized enterprises realised this, in addition to the large multi-
nationals. With wave after wave of recessions in the world economy the growth 
potential of the region became more and more important for several Western 
European countries. There were EU countries that elaborated an economic de-
velopment strategy based on promotion of investments into the Visegrad region 
(Austria, Italy, and, partly, Germany). The mid-sized Central European market 
was revaluated in international economic relations due to its higher growth rates 
and favourable expectations linked to EU accession. East Central Europe was to 
become a growth pole of the European Union and high growth rates were hoped 
to stabilise the Eastern borders of the EU. This was advantageous for the other 
Member States as this would improve European competitiveness as well.
In other words, for a long time bilateral relations with the EU were far more 
important than regional ones, and even more important than the relations of the 
region as a whole with the EU. It was also assumed that there was low interest in 
regional cooperation if it had not been connected with the process of EU inte-
gration. Thus, multilateral regional cooperation had to be supported by bilateral 
processes of EU integration. 
The key areas of cooperation are relatively easy to identify in a region like the 
Visegrad countries. Those are dominated by the need to develop and to grow. The 
agenda of development is also reasonably clear, especially when it comes to in-
vestments in infrastructure, institutions, and human capital. Sustainable growth 
is a solution to almost every problem and there the issues of economic policy 
become paramount. Here regional cooperation may play a role especially when 
5   Inotai (1997).
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seen in the context of EU integration. Liberalization of trade and investments 
and economic policy cooperation makes a great contribution to stabilization and 
normalization in the region, and this importance may increase with the economic 
growth of the region and to particular countries in the region.
Several important areas have been identified as crucial when discussing the 
EU impact on regional integration. 
Trade Relations
During the nineties the EU had direct and indirect impact on Central Europe-
an economic development and regional cooperation in trade and direct invest-
ments.6 Statistics proved the importance of both EU membership and the 
preparation for it on influencing subregional trade flows.7 It was also considered 
that EU membership would have substantial influence on eliminating trade bar-
riers. Membership was also important regarding trade in agricultural products, 
as CEFTA could not achieve free trade in this field. Association agreements were 
also important, as they forced the conclusion of the CEFTA agreement. Thus the 
EU contributed indirectly to the strengthening of regional trade connections and 
speeded up economic adjustment and structural change. The outside pressures 
coupled with world economic competition due to liberalisation efforts drastically 
changed the economies of these countries. 
Most economic actors stress the importance of trade liberalisation. Subre-
gional trade may be developed substantially by the regional networks (trade, pro-
duction) built up by foreign investments. The volume of FDI also depends largely 
on the size of the available regional market, which is influenced mostly by the 
economic policy of the target country and international trade agreements con-
cluded with the most important economic partners. As most of the Central Eu-
ropean countries were already quite open to trade in the nineties, the volume of 
trade with the EU was an important growth factor in the economy of these coun-
tries. Higher growth rate results in higher income, which translates into bigger 
domestic demand. The possibility to export to the large EU market makes possi-
ble economies of scale for those companies operating in a given Central European 
country. As growth becomes sustainable in several Central European countries 
6   It was not by chance that not soon after the starting of accession negotiations efforts for the renewal of Visegrad 
cooperation were made.
7   After Spain and Portugal joined EU the level of trade between them was much higher than with the rest of the EU.
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and the living standard increases that definitely could weaken the negative atti-
tude between the region’s countries, which also creates better business opportu-
nities and opens export markets. 
The EU’s role in harmonising business cycles in the Visegrad countries was 
decisive; it also contributed to creating better conditions for regional trade. In the 
Visegrad countries primarily investments into the car industry played a crucial 
role in building stronger business networks. This led to a sort of cluster develop-
ment in the neighbouring regions of Hungary and Slovakia that also included the 
movement of workers.
Foreign Direct Investments
FDI can have a positive impact on economic growth and regional relations through 
different channels. There are clear advantages to a larger market when it comes to 
investments. Obviously, only some types of investments look for such markets. 
Larger markets as a result of economic liberalisation between the countries of 
the region can be crucial. Besides providing the benefits of economies of scale, 
there is also a benefit from increased competition. The development of a regional 
financial market is also partly a result of investments. In the Visegrad countries 
the privatisation of services, especially those in the banking sector, created the 
precondition for the high-quality financial services that are necessary for large 
scale investments and businesses. 
Common but competing strategies of the Visegrad countries to attract as 
many foreign investments as possible resulted in improvements in the local busi-
ness climate that depended on institutional and policy reforms in each particu-
lar country. These investments also resulted in normalization of international 
financial relations in the sense that the countries in the region became normal 
participants in the international financial markets. Investments in the region fi-
nally created new growth poles within the region with the potential to develop 
cross-border economic regions. As the culmination of these processes, after EU 
accession it was expected that foreign direct investment would further increase. 
This was exactly the case in the Visegrad countries.8
8   It was the case in almost each accession country except for Greece.
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Infrastructure development 
For any underdeveloped region to catch up quickly is crucially dependent on the 
rapid infrastructure development. However, infrastructure development between 
Central European countries met several challenges in the beginning of the 1990s. 
• Due to the collapse of regional trade at the beginning of transformation, it was 
not considered important to carry out projects that improved infrastructural 
connections between the Visegrad countries, especially before accession. 
• Each of the Central European countries aimed at becoming a regional centre 
for East-West relations, which resulted in further neglect of the already exist-
ing national infrastructural networks between them. 
• Resources for such programs were not available given the huge financial bur-
den of the economic transformation and social problems. 
It is also worth mentioning that large scale infrastructure projects that 
strengthen regional ties only started after the accession of new states in previous 
decades.9 This happened even in the case of the Benelux countries that already 
had developed infrastructure. In each regional cooperation initiative, infrastruc-
ture development is a priority.However, without external funding the results are 
always poor. This explains why the most feasible program for the Visegrad coun-
tries was to elaborate plans for common infrastructural development only after 
EU accession. However, the development was quite slow even after enlargement 
due to the huge development needs and a lack of willingness in certain cases for 
political reasons. The pattern between the Visegrad countries went something 
like this: “Yes we would like to renew and strengthen regional infrastructure con-
nections, but we expect financing for these projects from outside, mainly from 
the EU. Since accession it has also become clear that joint plans and efforts are 
very important tools for developing international infrastructure from EU funds.” 
Economic policy
Subregional trade liberalisation was slower than liberalisation of EU trade in 
general during the nineties. These two liberalisation processes were parallel, but 
the latter was faster. Besides the nature of the CEFTA agreement, this can be ex-
plained in a theoretical approach as well. According to this theory, larger entities 
9   Even more, e.g. in the case of Spain the real driver behind large infrastructural project were the large interna-
tional sport and cultural events. 
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exert greater influence on smaller regions, especially when institutionalised ties 
are strengthened. Similar experiences were observed in the case of the Mediterra-
nean countries. Institutionalised economic policy coordination started between 
Spain and Portugal only after accession. However, this coordination was always in 
cooperation with Brussels. Both countries tried to multilateralise their relations 
without having joint bilateral initiatives with Brussels. Only after realising that 
certain regional problems could not be solved through Brussels did they change 
their approach with regard to bilateral connections. 
Economic policy coordination between Visegrad countries was weak both dur-
ing the nineties and after accession. The most important reasons for this were as 
follows:
• As underdeveloped countries their policies were mainly aimed at satisfying 
EU needs. 
• Adjustment to the acquit was the most important task; improving regional 
relations lacked needed resources. 
• Each country of the Visegrad Group had to concentrate its efforts on solving 
certain economic problems caused by transformation. 
Another negative phenomenon that needs to be mentioned is regional rival-
ry. During the whole transition period, the “title” of regional champion shifted 
several times between the countries. At the beginning of the nineties the Czech 
Republic was the best-performing country in the region and it was considered 
that this country could follow a relatively independent economic policy. By the 
mid-nineties Hungary became the number one economy in the Visegrad region 
due to far reaching reforms and huge FDI inflow. In the early 2000s, Poland’s per-
formance was quite promising, then Slovakia emerged as the regional champion. 
Today, under the impact of the international crisis, Poland and, to a lesser extent, 
the Czech Republic, seem to be the most resilient against negative impact. This 
changeable ranking of the countries influenced their behaviour regarding eco-
nomic policy coordination. Instead of building a regional identity and stressing 
regional common features in the economic field – which certainly exist – the ri-
valry always prevented the strengthening of regional economic solidarity. 
Financial transfers
EU financial transfers became an important part of regional cooperation between 
less developed countries. Financial transfers available after accession have been 
important tools for hastening the catch-up process. Since the early nineties Por-
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tugal and Spain have made joint efforts to formulate EU budget policy regarding 
the financial resources available for them. That the countries from this region 
still look at each other as competitors rather than friends, even after 20 years of 
system changes, is not very promising. In spite of this, the four countries surely 
could find issues of common strategic and regional importance such as environ-
mental issues. In addition, the next EU budget negotiations may be a good mo-
ment to enhance the coordination between these countries.
It is also worth mentioning Slovakia’s adoption of the Euro. It means that this 
country now is under a different economic policy regime and has no exchange 
rate risk. At the official level it hardly has had an impact on the cooperation, but 
of course the psychological effects can be identified. Among the Central European 
countries there has been obvious competition for the “leading position” in the 
region. Each of the countries have played the role of the pre-eminent country” 
for a while from the economic point of view. The Euro has meant that recently 
Slovakia has occupied the leading position. However the advantage of having the 
Euro now seems to be rather a disadvantage to the competitiveness of Slovakia 
because exchange rate movements may worsen significantly, which can hurt eco-
nomic performance more there than in the other V4 countries. 
Competition 
As competition policies were quite under-developed in the region, the EU could play 
a significant role in this area too. As the process of integration sped up, EU com-
petition policy could be extended to the region. It was especially important in the 
reform of the public sector, which is certainly the key issue of the process of transi-
tion. State monopolies as well as private monopolies were characteristic for each 
of the East Central European countries, especially those that were falling behind 
in transition. Internally, competition policy would be very difficult to implement.
In the context of EU integration, competition policy could indeed be much 
more efficient. Indeed, in some cases, the fact that a country is outside of the EU 
or outside the process of EU integration has been used to grant monopoly rights to 
either domestic or foreign firms or banks, with some of the latter being from the 
EU countries. This has not only supported misallocation of resources, but has led 
to a slowdown in the process of integration in so far as it would mean the intro-
duction of antimonopoly measures. To an extent, the transformation of the local 
judiciary system, certainly the weakest link in the institutional setup, has been im-
peded because of the strong influence of state and private monopolies or lobbies.
168
Experiences with Economic Development since EU-Accession
The Hungarian economy has diverged from those of the other Visegrad countries 
in the last few years in terms of development. This has principally manifested it-
self in a substantial slowdown of growth, and there are many structural and equi-
librium factors that constitute serious risks from the perspective of long-term 
convergence as well. The lag in growth is probably most evident when compared 
to the development of the other EU Member States that joined in 2004.
The impacts of this adverse development are now clearly visible when mak-
ing international comparisons, and they increasingly point towards a long-term 
trend that will be difficult to reverse. This also means that, mainly from entering 
EU, the homogeneity of the Visegrad Group countries in terms of development 
has ceased.
There is some interesting and important macroeconomic data on develop-
ments in the new Central and Eastern European Member States. If we use data 
for the year accession negotiations were begun (1998) and the year before entry 
to the EU (2003) and also for 2008 (the year before the deepening of the world 
economic crisis), certain conclusions may be drawn on the success of domestic 
macroeconomic policies within the region. This comparison also shows us the dif-
ferent paths of the regions’ countries, taking into account the unique nature of 
each country. Generally, the so-called ‘Lisbon measures’ can best show the eco-
nomic convergence or divergence of the Member States. Here we have selected 
four out of the fourteen factors to evaluate.10 The comparison covers the period 
before 2009, as in that year the full impact of the global crisis was felt, which 
changed not only the position of the individual country’s economic position, but 
sometimes even brought into question the validity of the development model 
that had been applied previously. The implications of the crisis are described in 
the next chapter. 
In terms of per capita GDP, the most rapid convergence in 1998, when the EU 
accession negotiations started, was achieved by the Baltic countries and Slovakia. 
During this period the three largest countries in the new Member States, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary experienced very similar ‘catch-up’ growth, 
measured in per capita GDP. The trends of these years have clearly caused some 
reshuffling between the countries in the region. Estonia has had the most mo-
10   These fourteen measures are well describing the performance of Member States. The main targets of the Lisbon 
agenda are grouped under five broad headings: innovation; liberalisation; enterprise; employment and social inclusion; 
sustainable development and the environment.
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bility, moving up two places in the ranking of the 8 Central European countries 
which joined in 2004, with the other Baltic state Lithuania improving its standing 
by one position; Hungary and Poland suffered the largest fall (down 2 places). The 
importance of domestic economic policies is stressed by the poor performance of 
Hungary since its EU accession took place.
Table 1








Change in position 
between new Member 
States (1998-2008)1998 2003 2008
Slovenia 77.7 83.4 90.7 + 13.0 +7.3 1 ® 1
Czech Rep. 70.5 73.4 80.1 + 9.6 +6.7 2 ® 2
Slovakia 52.1 55.5 71.9 + 19.8 +16.4 4 ® 3
Estonia 42.5 54.5 68.2 + 25.7 +13.7 6 ® 4
Hungary 54.6 62.8 62.8 + 8.2 0.0 3 ® 5
Lithuania 40.4 49.1 61.1 + 20.7 +12.0 7 ® 6
Poland 47.8 48.9 57.6 +9.8 +8.7 5 ® 7
Latvia 35.6 43.3 55.8 + 20.2 +12.5 8 ® 8
EU-15 115.4 113.7 110.8
Source: Eurostat and own calculation. 
In terms of labour productivity, the convergence of Estonia and Slovakia after 
1998 was extremely rapid, while Slovenia, Poland, and the Czech Republic were 
some distance behind, though still managing to record relatively swift growth. 
The poorest performance came from Hungary. After the EU accession Hungary 
started to diverge from the other countries, while the others managed to gain 
steady ground in this field. In the relative rankings of the countries to each other, 
the only change was that Slovakia overtook Hungary and the Czech Republic, Es-
tonia bypassed Poland, and the Czech Republic Hungary. The current stage of eco-
nomic transition in the individual countries, as well as the trends in foreign direct 
investment (which have played a large role over the last fifteen years in boosting 
productivity), and given the world economic turmoil, make it likely that within 
the Visegrad group the only probable change is that convergence may pick up in 
Poland when it bounces back from the economic crisis, while productivity growth 
will slow in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The data clearly shows 
that Hungary failed to utilise those energies that were supposed to strengthen 
after EU accession while the rest of the Visegrad countries have achieved visible 
results in this measure. 
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Table 2
Labour productivity GDP 
in (PPS) per person em-








Change in position 
between new Member 
States (1998-2008)
1998 2003 2008
Slovenia 75.2 79.3 84.3 +9.1 +5.0 1 ® 1
Slovakia 56.3 63.4 79.0 +22.7 +6.6 4 ® 2
Czech Rep. 60.2 66.5 71.8 +11.6 +5.3 4 ® 3
Hungary 64.9 71.3 69.3 +4.4 –2.0 3 ® 4
Estonia 41.4 54.6 64.7 +23.3 +8.1 6 ® 5
Poland 50.7 60.0 63.3 +12.6 +3.3 5 ® 6
Lithuania 40.9 52.0 61.3 +10.4 +9.3 7 ® 7
Latvia 36.8 44.2 51.3 +14.5 +7.1 8 ® 8
EU-15 114.9 111.6 110.0
Source: Eurostat and own calculation. 
The employment rate rose most in the three non-Visegrad states in past years (be-
tween 1999 and 2008), while the others have experienced only modest changes. A 
different trend can be seen if we look only at the years since accession, as Poland 
and Slovakia were able to increase their activity levels substantially. At the same 
time all but Hungary increased the productivity level. This data set also proves 
the divergence Hungary has shown since 2003. None of the Visegrad countries 
has made any headway on the EU-15 average during this ten year period; in fact, 
the differences actually grew for each of them substantially. Looking at the wider 
region, only Slovenia, Latvia, and Estonia improved their position in regard to 
the EU average. 
All told, the positions of Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland did not improve in 
terms of employment rates, which may indicate the failure of labour market 
policies, a high proportion of unemployed citizens dependent on unemploy-
ment payments, and a flourishing black economy (e.g. due to high tax burdens 
and traditional features of the economy’s structure), but may also be explained 
by structural and regional characteristics (mostly in the case of Slovakia). When 
looking at the relative position of the Visegrad countries one should note the 
significant lag Hungary has in the regional comparison.
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Table 3























in 20081998 2003 2008
Slovenia 62.9 62.6 68.6 +5.7 +6.0 2 ® 1-2 +1.5 +1.3
Latvia 59.9 61.8 68.6 +8.7 +5.8 6 ® 1-2 –1.5 +1.3
Estonia 60.6 65.5 67.6 +7.0 +2.1 4-5 ® 3 –0.8 +0.3
Czech Rep. 65.6 64.7 65.3 –0.3 +0.6 1 ® 4 +4.2 –2.0
Lithuania 62.3 61.1 64.3 +2.0 +3.2 3 ® 5 +0.9 –3.0
Slovakia 60.6 57.7 62.3 +1.7 +4.6 5 ® 6 –0.8 –5.0
Poland 59.0 51.2 59.2 +0.2 +8.0 7 ® 7 –2.4 –8.1
Hungary 53.7 57.0 56.7 +3.0 –0.3 8 ® 8 –7.7 –10.6
EU-15 61.4 64.5 67.3 +5.9
Source: calculated by author based on Eurostat data
In regions undergoing rapid convergence it is common for gross fixed capital for-
mation to be high (this holds especially true for Far Eastern countries with high 
savings rates). It is very important for such activities of the corporate sector to be 
high, as growth based on substantial investments from the public sector is often 
not sustainable and principally involves infrastructure, which forms the basis for 
corporate sector investment. One of the key conditions for balanced and sustain-
able growth in the long term can be dynamic investment activity in the private 
sector. 
In recent years, two Baltic states, Latvia and Estonia, have been able to expand 
the investments of their respective business sectors substantially, with Lithuania 
following suit but to a lesser extent; such indicators generally worsened for the 
other countries, which, though it impacts negatively on the long-term sustain-
ability of growth, also indicates that other demand factors dominated in the ex-
pansion recorded by most countries. The significant expansion of investments in 
the Baltic countries has primarily been funded through external resources, which, 
coupled with borrowing patterns of households similar to those that played a key 
role in the growing external economic crisis, will be a serious risk factor in the 
coming years.
It is worth noting that the rate of gross fixed capital formation in the corpo-
rate sector has declined in all of the other countries. However, while the national 
investment rate in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Slovakia is above 25% of 
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GDP, given the commitment of the state, Hungary and Poland record figures that 
are much lower than this. Developments in 2008 reinforce these trends, and for 
Hungary the situation is set to get even worse. An indication of the rocky time 
ahead for Hungary is that, of the new Member States, Hungary has the lowest 
gross fixed capital formation figure relative to GDP in its corporate sector, af-
ter Poland (the same goes for its investment rate). Unless efforts to increase the 
investment rate significantly in the coming years succeed, this will constitute a 
major hindrance to the pace of economic growth in the long run.
Table 4
Goss fixed capital formation 









tion between new 
Member States 
(1998-2008)1998 2003 2008
Latvia 23.3 22.0 24.6 +1.3 +2.6 4 ® 1
Slovenia 21.2 20.6 24.6 +3.4 +4.0 6 ® 1
Slovakia 32.7 22.9 24.1 –8.6 +1.2 1 ® 3
Estonia 25.5 27.2 24.0 –1.5 –3.2 2 ® 4
Lithuania 21.3 18.1 20.2 -1.1 +2.1 5 ® 5
Czech Rep. 24.0 22.1 19.0 –5.0 -3.1 3 ® 6
Hungary 19.3 18.2 18.1 –1.2 –0.1 8 ® 7
Poland 20.2 14.9 17.5 –2.7 +2.6 7 ® 8
EU-15 17.6 17.0 18.3
Source: calculated by author based on Eurostat data
Economic perspective of the Visegrad Group
International economic relations of the countries of Central Europe underwent a 
radical change between 2004 and 2007 on account of the two enlargement waves 
of the European Union, creating new conditions for economic development 
and convergence. EU accession lent new momentum to the economic growth 
and, therefore, to the convergence of all the new Member States, including the 
V4 countries – with the exception of Hungary, where the initially higher rate of 
growth had slowed substantially by 2007.Hungary’s living standards, measured 
in terms of per capita GDP  have merely stagnated since joining the EU in con-
trast to the dynamic growth recorded in the other nine countries. Hungary’s per 
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capita GDP figure stagnated between 2004 and 2008 at a time when the other 
V4 Member States converged dynamically over the same period towards the liv-
ing standards of the more developed EU countries. On the whole the region de-
veloped at a pace rarely seen in economic history, which accelerated the pace of 
convergence, though it would be practically impossible to repeat this in the near 
future. The economies in the Central European region are supposed to formulate 
a radically different economic strategy under the new domestic and international 
conditions. The impacts of the adverse developments were clearly visible in inter-
national comparisons, and they increasingly pointed towards a long-term trend 
that would be difficult to reverse. This also means that, as a result of entering the 
EU, the homogeneity of the Visegrad group countries in terms of their develop-
ment path has ceased. 
From the perspective of growth and convergence based on both internal (in-
vestments, consumption) and external (capital flows, trade) factors it is evident 
that the new Member States which have coped better with the crisis so far are 
those which have produced high but not overheated growth since accession, cou-
pled with an appropriate level of external and internal financial stability, a low 
budget deficit, and a healthy public debt indicator. In the case of Poland an addi-
tional factor prevented a larger downturn. In other countries in the wider Central 
European region the credit based consumption and investment was much more 
widespread than in Poland, where the financial downturn was slower. In  other 
states where credit was the most important factor for increasing demand, the 
sudden drop in the financial market resulted in demand shock, or, in other words, 
the over consumption had to be adjusted to the available income. This shock was 
much bigger in other countries than it was in Poland.
The economies of the Central European region need to formulate a different 
economic strategy under current domestic and international conditions. This 
strategy is different from the previous one in two regards: The first is that achiev-
ing fiscal balance becomes the number one priority, and  the second is that the 
growth should be based much more on savings rather than easy credit. These 
changes affect the region’s countries differently, because of their non-uniform 
initial position, but the mainstream of the “new” economic policy points in this 
direction.   
The deepening crisis in the past two years required significant adjustment 
from all of these countries. This either meant improving the budget position or 
external equilibrium, which goes hand-in-hand with a decline in economic output 
and a rise in unemployment. Stabilising the situation essentially depends on how 
the international funding situation pans out. A protracted crisis triggers struc-
tural reforms and significant adjustments more quickly for countries in a worse 
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position from a long-term economic development perspective. This is why the 
conditions for long-term growth may turn out favourably in the countries most 
adversely affected – presuming they follow a satisfactory economic policy. Never-
theless, this may have severe social consequences in the Baltic States, but it can 
not be excluded in the Visegrad countries either. 
The expectation for the post-accession period was that the need to comply 
with the Maastricht criteria would push the Central European countries to de-
crease the economic disparities between their countries and the former EU Mem-
ber States. The indirect harmonisations of economic policies were supposed to be 
a tool to support convergences between their economies. In the longer run it is 
certainly true that outside pressures help indirectly with certain convergences of 
economic policies between the Visegrad countries, independently from economic 
policy coordination. This coordination has been almost non-existent during the 
past two decades and only being under serious (economic) security policy threats 
could alter the situation. This is exactly the case currently; however, develop-
ments in the region hint that the tools being chosen by the regions’ countries 
vary and the dividing line is again between Hungary and the others. 
In Hungary the visible government aim at the moment is to stabilise public fi-
nances with a revenue increase which is based on additional sectoral taxes, chan-
nelling private savings in the pension system into the budget and, at the same 
time, cutting income taxes both for households and the corporate sector. In the 
short run the Hungarian budget position, due to these steps will be in order, but 
the longer term consequences are not clear at the moment. The sustainability of 
the public finances and also the transfer system (pensions, social transfers etc.) 
will be questionable even as soon as 2012-2013. 
Revenue side stabilisations have rarely been successful in the past 15-20 years 
in Europe. The mainstream stabilisation efforts in Europe, and those that fol-
lowed in the other Visegrad countries, are much more based on the spending side. 
This difference explains why the future budget position and debt risk of Hungary 
and in the other three Visegrad countries is judged differently by the internation-
al actors at the moment. This is clearly reflected in the recent Moody’s downgrad-
ing of Hungary’ sovereign debt, putting it into the Baa3 category, while Czech 
and Slovak ratings are A1 and Polish is A2.
An interesting feature of each of the Visegrad countries is the changing in-
ternational strategies of global firms. Many firms have been forced to search for 
further cost cutting in order to regain their competitiveness in the face of an eco-
nomic environment where demand in several sectors is expected to stabilise at a 
lower level than before the crisis broke out. Under such circumstances, firms are 
eagerly looking for cost saving measures that in large firms may result in rethink-
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ing their global presence, which leads to closing high cost production facilities 
and moving them to lower cost countries. As large multinationals in some cases 
are deterred from closing facilities in their home countries (because of govern-
ment warnings, i.e. in some major Western European countries) they may chose 
to downsize their production in other high wage countries. The Visegrad coun-
tries are low cost locations and the capacities in some sectors (the car industry 
for example) are technologically modern and very competitive, so they can expect 
some additional investment as part of  the global cost optimization strategies 
of multinationals. It is by no means an accident that in Hungary we witnessed 
several additional investments from big car makers in recent months, even while 
future prospects for economic growth and fiscal stability are still not very bright. 
This phenomenon is very promising as it demonstrates that Central European 
countries as locations are attractive for international cooperation, whicht can be 
an additional element in maintaining export-oriented growth in Hungary, Slova-
kia, and the Czech Republic. Poland stands out a bit from the region as the size 
of its domestic market makes it possible for it to rely more on domestic demand 
instead of  the external demandthat is the major growth component for the other 
three countries of the region.
Conclusions
1. During the first half of the nineties, Visegrad was a truly important framework 
in which the Central European countries could coordinate their foreign policies 
against the weakening Soviet Union. The creation of the Visegrad cooperation 
was also a result of the realisation that a kind of regional cooperation was neces-
sary in the highly insecure, unstable world of the early nineties. 
2. On the other hand, for varying reasons, the strengthening of cooperation 
was also in the interest of the Western world. In their terminology Visegrad cov-
ered the economically most developed countries of Central Europe that also were 
the frontrunners of political transformation. They urged Central Europeans to 
establish stronger cooperation in order to create a bloc against Russia. Intensified 
cooperation was also considered to be a necessary step towards European integra-
tion with which these countries would prove their capability to integrate into a 
larger system, the European Union. 
3. Many politicians in Central Europe were afraid that cooperation would not 
be a preparatory phase, but rather be a final aim that would prevent EU integra-
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tion of the whole region. This fear was big enough to stop higher level political co-
operation, and room was given only for the creation of CEFTA, which deals solely 
with economic issues. Without a free trade zone among them, their products 
would have been in a dis-preferential situation compared to the goods produced 
in the EC (and EFTA) countries. It was the intention of the parties to establish a 
limited co-operation and not to go beyond that point.
4. The establishment of CEFTA was unavoidable after the signing of the Eu-
rope Agreements. It was also clear that security issues had lost some importance 
as Russia ceased to be a real threat to the independence of the Central European 
countries. That also reduced the need for any kind of political cooperation.
5. Beyond the increase of mutual trade in the region, it may be of some signifi-
cance that the countries of the group have increased their experience in the area 
of multilateral co-operation and bargaining within CEFTA structures. It was an 
important practical lesson for those countries that joined the European Union at 
the same time. 
6. Reports about CEFTA around the millennium were confined to the failures 
and “scandals” in the press, namely the cases in which members of the group in-
troduced protectionist measures, be they tariff or non-tariff barriers. They were 
most often applied in the field of agriculture. These conflicts may have helped 
the EU candidate countries prepare for membership, as agricultural matters are 
among the most controversial in the EU as well. The sometimes severe, tempo-
rary disturbances of multilateral trade relations in the region did not give ground 
to draw conclusions of lasting relevance.
7. CEFTA provided a framework for the development of economic coopera-
tion that anticipated a collective EU membership. This is why CEFTA became an 
important pre-accession instrument; for example, by providing a forum on vari-
ous cooperative endeavours among its member states, including EU compatible 
issues such as free movement of capital, liberalization of trade and services, com-
bating organized crime, expanding trade, etc. It became, in effect, a waiting room 
for EU membership.
8. The success of CEFTA and the Visegrad Group has been apparent in terms 
of the improvement in regional CEE ties and assistance in maintaining mutual 
political interaction and assistance. The initiatives represent a shift to the con-
cept of cross-border cooperation as the most efficient way for CEE countries to 
approach the EU collectively. Visegrad and CEFTA have demonstrated how joint 
regional economic and political cooperation could yield important dividends for 
participating states and further contribute to facilitating their EU negotiations.
9. In the wake of the EU-accession, mutual trade and economic relations had 
intensified while the economic structure was being shaped mainly by microeco-
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nomic relations through large foreign companies and their network of suppliers, 
and it was also driven by direct investments of small and medium-sized enter-
prises from the region. This period was also characterised by the emergence of 
large regional corporations gaining increasing influence at a regional level and 
interweaving economic ties along new patterns. 
10. The indirect harmonisations of economic policies connected with adopting 
EU regulations were supposed to be a tool to support convergences between the 
Visegrad countries’ economies. In the longer run it is certainly true that outside 
pressures indirectly helped with a certain convergence of economic policies be-
tween the Visegrad countries more than genuine economic policy coordination.
11. The current economic crisis may alter significantly the development path 
of the Visegrad countries. On the whole we may say that the previous economic 
development model of countries in Eastern Europe has ceased to exist. Develop-
ment based on cheap external funding has been replaced by development fuelled 
by domestic savings, which will thus be better conceived but significantly slower. 
The economic processes of countries in the region will evolve similarly in the pe-
riod after the crisis, following the significant divergence observed in recent years. 
Everyone will have to adapt to a new economic development model that will focus 
on gradually redressing the balance and mitigating the social implications of the 
crisis. External constraints will force countries previously not on a sustainable 
growth path to implement severe adjustments and corrections, which will prima-
rily involve measures encouraging sustainability.
Defining key issues regarding economic cooperation in the Western 
Balkans
The Impact of the disintegration of Yugoslavia
In the majority of South Eastern European countries, an economic decline of 
about ten years resulted in a sharp fall in living standards. As opposed to the 
expectations of the population and against the ambition of politicians, the eco-
nomic and political transformation has not resulted in prosperity and it has not 
created a basis for catching up with the West. In the Balkans, most of the produc-
tion facilities were destroyed and many people have left the labour market. It 
also means that, currently, basically the reindustrialization and reestablishment 
of production facilities is the most important task, the distribution problem of 
income will come after.
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The major reason for the 1990s economic crises in the Balkans was the dra-
matic decline of growth potential in the region. Fast liberalisation (the applica-
tion of the Washington consensus) with such an underdeveloped position had 
a tremendously negative impact on the production capacities there. These fac-
tors together eliminated a significant part of the existing physical and human 
capital, thus the output generating capacity. Finally, the differences between the 
East Central European countries in terms of adjustment capability have increased 
substantially. Those countries that originally had a stronger economic base and 
were more successful in attracting FDI have substantially increased their resist-
ance against business cycles as compared to the late transition countries of the 
Balkans. 
As the experiences of the more advanced and quickly transforming Central 
European transition countries show, the sustainable improvement of economic 
conditions can only begin when a significant part of production capacities – ei-
ther through privatisation, greenfield investment, or genuine domestic private 
initiative – become of a good enough quality enough to operate as the engine of 
growth (the indicator of this stage is generally substantially increasing export 
levels.)
Besides the immediate negative impacts of the Yugoslav disintegration we 
have to mention longer term economic problems in the region that are strongly 
related to history. Economic structures here were dominated by non- or low proc-
essed products (and in most countries this is still the case), although changes have 
started as a result of capital inflow, this was the main component of exports that 
further limited the pace and extent of industrialisation (as there was no demand-
side effect on improvement) The economic dilemmas of the nineties and still in 
some countries are very similar to those that prevailed during the 150 year long 
economic and political transformation beginning in the 19th century. Through the 
twentieth century, the relative economic situation of the Balkans compared to 
Western Europe has remained unchanged. While there have been moments of 
‘catch-up’ in the absolute level of backwardness,  there has not been much change 
in relative terms. Given these longer term characteristics and the experiences of 
the unsuccessful catch-up, it also became clear that the growth path and the de-
cisive determinants of growth have to be basically changed in order to achieve a 
real breakthrough compared to the previous periods.
Several dilemmas have arisen while finding the most suitable economic ap-
proach to the Western Balkans, most of them perhaps linked to basic ques-
tions researched by development economists. Three of them must be briefly ad-
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dressed.11 First: there is a dilemma between the priorities of development-driven 
and enlargement-driven strategies. Although several conditions set by the EU in 
its enlargement documents coincide with key issues of sustainable development, 
the EU-related adjustment process is mainly based on institution-building and 
legal harmonization, both of which are necessary framework factors of sustain-
able economic development and modernization. However, without genuine eco-
nomic progress, these framework conditions remain are simply a Potempkin fa-
cade without contents on which genuine cooperation in the “club” could be based. 
Second: it is not only a dilemma but, in many cases, a misconception to start from 
the assumption that trade integration with the EU can replace comprehensive 
development cooperation between countries at different levels of economic de-
velopment. Certainly, particularly in the case of small and export-oriented coun-
tries, free access to key external markets is a crucial element for growth, structur-
al change, and employment. However, the historically established development 
gap cannot be overcome simply through trade integration, even if it is understood 
to be asymmetrical, but, at the end of the day, a reciprocal process. Third: a simi-
lar gap is revealed between expectations (conditionality) and reality of regional 
free trade agreements. There is no question that, in principle, regional trade lib-
eralization can contribute to economic growth, cross-country specialization, and 
increased attraction of foreign (and regional) investors. However, this cannot act 
as a substitute for trade with large partners located outside the regional free trade 
zone. Moreover, even the potential positive impacts can be limited by bilateral 
protectionism (despite the text and spirit of the respective free trade agreement), 
similar production, export and import structures, administrative barriers (cus-
toms, taxes, etc.), the state of the physical infrastructure (including border cross-
ings), and the disruption or lack of regional business networks.
The Current State of the Economies in the Western Balkans
Analyses of economic growth trends in the previous economic era (before the po-
litical system change in the early nineties) no doubt proves that the improvement 
of the region’s economic development and real catch-up requires a substantial 
change in the basis of growth that creates conditions for growth factors in our 
times. The inability to close the economic gap is not a consequence of a special 
11   Inotai (2007).
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economic and political order, but instead implies the peripheral situation of the 
region that makes a rapid catch-up very difficult. A certain problem still exists in 
the Western Balkans: a new basis for long-term sustainable growth and develop-
ment is still missing.
The trade liberalisation immediately following the system change resulted in a 
surge in imports. Sometimes dynamically increasing imports may be an indicator 
of a following increase in exports that, with positive contribution to GDP growth 
may result in improving living standards. However, for many years this was not 
the case in the Balkans due to the earlier mentioned destruction of production 
capacities in each country. This kind of import, thus, could not become a so-called 
‘modernisation import’, a type that includes imports of modern, high technology 
level production means. If modernisation imports become a significant part of to-
tal imports, one may count improvement of capacities that are aimed at improv-
ing the quality and competitiveness of the production that eventually may result 
in an export surge. In Central European countries these modernisation imports 
finally really were transformed into export capacities, but in the Balkans only the 
first signs of this can be identified.
The Balkan countries at the end of the nineties mostly produced poor eco-
nomic indexes and their economic restructuring was very slow to unfold. There 
was a general stabilisation of economy in the former socialist countries of the 
Southeast European region during the first years after 2000. The rates of GDP 
growth were relatively high on the one hand, and inflation was being moderated 
or it was relatively low, and there was a growing dynamism in the size of foreign 
capital investments because of decreasing regional risk and production costs that 
were lower than in the Central European countries.12 In the 7-8 years leading up 
to the 2008 international economic crisis, the external conditions for these coun-
tries were favourable and the economic restructuring and the modernisation of 
the institutional system had accelerated. Favourable external conditions for some 
countries meant closer accession dates, the ending of international isolation, the 
resulting institutionalisation of the foreign economic system of relations, and a 
relatively balanced and more predictable level of long-term bilateral and multilat-
eral donor support. The acceleration of economic restructuring meant the launch 
and maintenance of longer-term structural reforms and a commitment to priva-
tisation. However these countries were facing a number of common economic 
problems, many of which are still causing daily problems there. 




All of the transforming countries in the Balkans had struggled with huge and 
unsustainable trade deficits in the years before the crisis. The initial balance of 
trade and payment deficits in the transforming economies could only be main-
tained in the longer-run and eventually made financeable if export revenues be-
gin to rise dynamically. Otherwise import will encourage domestic consumption 
or import substitute production, resulting in growing deficits beyond finance-
ability. From this it follows that a given country’s statically viewed foreign trade 
deficit will not necessarily present problems; however if this deficit is not turned 
into a means of growth and development, it may lead to instability and crisis. As 
a result of the crisis, right now all the transforming countries in the Balkans are 
characterised by ever poorer living standards and – owing to the resulting fall in 
imports – by improving foreign trade balance figures, which is still not accompa-
nied by improving exports.  The crushing balance deficits have subsided, yet the 
economies have not succeeded in becoming more competitive. It is questionable 
whether foreign balance is able to be maintained in the longer run as the impacts 
of the crisis fade away.  
The level of unemployment in all Balkan countries is high, which is primarily 
a result of the significant downsizing of industry and production capacities in the 
region. Of course, there are significant differences between the individual coun-
tries. Another sign of internal imbalance is that the number of people seeking 
to make a livelihood in the grey and black economy is on the rise. What‘s more, 
the contribution of agriculture to the GDP has expanded in all countries, and 
in some states even the percentage of agricultural workers among all employees 
has increased. Economically speaking the region is unquestionably backward, as 
some areas of former Yugoslavia are beginning to show features of pre-industrial-
isation. This problem is difficult to solve as the level of domestic savings is gener-
ally low, foreign loan capital is scarce as international liquidity is not expected to 
return soon, and foreign direct investors seem overly cautious in countries that 
have sizeable political and economic risks. 
The countries of the Western Balkans are struggling with high and often un-
sustainable fiscal deficits aggravated further by the crisis of the past three years. 
The quality level and (in)stability of state finances is a grave problem; there is a 
general and widespread pressure to minimise state expenditure and to reform 
public administration in the successor states of former Yugoslavia. In many cases, 
this requires or entails significant staff cuts and the restraining of wage increases 
in the state sector, the result of which is a falling living standard and increasing 
problems in the labour market as the business sector is not able to swallow more 
employees due to weak domestic demand (export demand is above weak as there 
is hardly any competitive export production in the region.)
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The less developed regions of the West Balkans encompass countries which 
one day may become financially sound partners even on the international scene 
(unless a radical reshuffling takes place). In the meanwhile, the institutional sys-
tem will be gradually cemented, the laws required for the proper operation of 
market economy will be approved and in force, and the foundations for a market 
economy will be laid down.  If we are seeking to find a clear premise to charac-
terise the period leading up to it, perhaps we ought to observe the transition 
of the Central European countries in the early nineties. Something very similar 
was going on in this region; something similar to what the West Balkans are cur-
rently going through (except that the problems faced then were somewhat less se-
vere); without, of course, the need for the kind of international intervention that 
the Western Balkans badly needs in order to trigger and maintain the economic 
transformation process.  The countries of Central Europe had lost their foreign 
markets in the beginning of the nineties, the internal economy had undergone a 
major decline, companies in mass were being closed down (this is analogous with 
the South Eastern European deindustrialisation process, but on a larger scale), 
many of the countries were in need of foreign support (Hungary, for example 
had huge foreign debts posing a real threat to its liquidity) so there was a strong 
pressure (figuratively speaking: conditionality) to accelerate economic transfor-
mation and to place emphasis on the involvement of private capital.  Central Eu-
ropean countries could more or less fulfil this by relying on their own resources, 
but there is a great  difference in economic, internal political, and security policy 
disposition with the Western Balkans. However, external coercive pressure is also 
evident in that with the onset of the EU-integration process and the condition-
ing of accession upon the fulfilment of criteria, these countries are also forced to 
satisfy conditions defined by the international community, which, in this case, 
means gradual adoption of the laws of the EU and meeting the Copenhagen cri-
teria.
Regional prospects, key tools for improving regional cooperation
The Balkans encompass economically very different countries. Therefore we must 
be careful not to make any generalisation on the whole of the region. Neverthe-
less, it is still possible to describe general features that may help better under-
stand the reasons behind instability in the region. When examining today’s situa-
tion, it is not possible to overlook the fact that economic dilemmas are not much 
different from those of previous decades (or even centuries for that matter). The 
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key breakthrough points for the economy from the middle of the nineties have 
focused on the following main goals:
1. Priority number one is the development of infrastructure. Transport and 
freight costs must be reduced, otherwise trade cannot become the driving force 
behind growth. (Croatia, of course, is an exception in this regard also just as much 
as regarding its integration with the EU.)
2. The second key area is the development of the private sector. As long as 
the local banking system and the local entrepreneurial sector is not sufficiently 
developed and financially strong, the responsibility for making investments will 
continue to rest with competitive foreign companies with more readily available 
financial resources. 
3. The third priority issue concerns the restructuring and modernisation of in-
dustry. The foreign trade-oriented sectors must become the driving force behind 
growth. By and large, these countries have capital resources that are economi-
cally non-viable and will take a long time and lots of investment to replace. The 
manufacturing industry in general is dominated by low or, at best, medium level 
technologies, and characterised by poor product quality and a high share of heavy 
industry. A sectoral approach would be needed that can help identify which sec-
tors ought and ought not to be developed and modernised; which areas interna-
tional support ought to be targeting, and how privatisation within the particular 
sectors ought to be implemented. 
These priorities are still important ones and there are three very important 
correlations in this regard to point out. 
• On the one hand, in the majority of the more developed Central European 
countries, the costs of production have significantly increased in the past 
few years and the process – evident in a couple of countries – by which for-
eign investors operating in labour intensive sectors relocate their activities to 
countries with lower labour costs has accelerated. It is yet to be seen whether 
foreign investors will find these less developed countries sufficiently stable to 
move their production capacities there, or will favour a completely different 
location on the globe in recognition of the opportunities of a global market. 
• On the other hand, the process of secondary privatisation has begun (this 
means that with the application of the allocation methods, assets have been 
placed in the hands of domestic investors with little capital to dispose. These 
private owners are now themselves seeking investors to diversify investment 
in their companies), which in many cases means concentration of assets in 
the hands of foreign investors. This process is inevitable and necessary to 
strengthen corporate management and to raise more capital. The benefits of 
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privatisation with FDI and greenfield investments in the development of ex-
port capacities are obvious in Central European countries. 
• Thirdly, because of the uncertain economic and political situation in the re-
gion, western investors are cautious in their approach; this, however, gives in-
vestors in the neighbouring states of the Western Balkans countries a chance 
to enter and penetrate the market.  It is obvious that when multinational com-
panies enter any given country, the companies from the less endowed regions 
with little capital will hardly stand the competition; i.e. regional competition 
is sidelined in the presence of multinational capital.  If, however, world com-
panies are not present, the weaker regional investors can divide up the market 
among themselves and – essentially competing with each other – they can 
make new and new successive investments. (These are, of course, much small-
er in volume on average than those of multinational corporations.) These are 
the types of investment we now can mostly expect to see in the Western Bal-
kans. Independently from the institutional setting, the relations with the EU, 
or free trade, business promotion can be the most suitable tool for strengthen-
ing regional ties. 
Prospects from an economic point of view largely depend on economic devel-
opment that mainly requires further influx of capital, as domestic savings are still 
not sufficient for the level of investments needed for an economic catch-up. 
The Western Balkan countries face not only a development gap characteristic 
of Central Europe. Their economies are also less developed, much weaker, still 
need to undergo most of the decisive structural changes and lack the critical mass 
of international productive investments. Thus, the evolution of a positive role for 
free trade is not supported by a rapid increase of output that could be exported to 
liberalized markets. The lack of output is tangible both in the insufficient volume 
of exportable goods and services and in the insufficient level of competitiveness. 
Therefore, trade liberalization is a necessary and favourable instrument that can 
contribute to economic development. However, for the sustainable economic de-
velopment of the Western Balkan countries, it is far from being a satisfactory 
external contribution.
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Defining key issues regarding economic cooperation in the EP 
Countries
The Impact of the disintegration of the USSR
In the course of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the COMECON was dis-
solved and its members started to orient themselves towards third countries and 
regions immediately. The aftermath of this political disintegration also hastened 
a process of economic disintegration which went far beyond the immediate ef-
fects of systemic economic reform (macro-economic stabilization, price liberali-
zation, privatization, legal and regulatory reform, and, more generally, the build-
ing of market institutions, etc.). The economic performance of the CIS countries 
began to plummet after they became independent states and switched to a new 
economic order, and no improvement was seen until around 1999. The decline 
between 1991 and 1998 was approximately 40%. Thereafter the annual growth 
rates – at CIS level – settled at around 5-9%, but in 2004 the gross domestic prod-
uct was still around 15% lower than the level recorded in 1989. 
Some key elements of this disintegration of the previously highly-integrated 
economic space were as follows in the post Soviet area:
1. The previously existing integrated payments and the non-cash inter-enterprise 
settlement system collapsed. As a result, enterprise relations broke down, fi-
nancial arrears mounted, and a long wave of bankruptcies evolved. Industry 
relations became scattered and the financing of business transactions became 
extremely difficult.
2. As the Soviet Union functioned also as a fiscal Union, financial transfers to 
the less developed republics were significant, reaching between 5 and 30% of 
GNP in the Central Asian Countries. This fiscal revenue was a very important 
resource for investments that were a precondition for growth. The cutting of 
these transfers had a very negative and immediate impact on the net benefici-
ary countries. 
3. Implicit price subsidies were reduced or eliminated, including those for en-
ergy. This price subsidy was perhaps the most important tool to control prices 
and also secured cheap fuel for households and the corporate sector.
4. Formal customs and trade barriers were introduced, making legal commerce 
difficult.  In addition, informal trade and transit barriers became common 
(corruption). Some of the republics’ borders were closed, for reasons of con-
flict, security, or economic policy. Clearly the disruption of economic relations 
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definitely contributed to the much larger economic decline in the Post Soviet 
area than in Central Europe.  
5. Transport prices were raised and transport services restructured, which led to 
longer delivery times. This also contributed to the sudden shrinking of trade 
figures within the region concerned.
6. Integrated power grids collapsed (in the South Caucasus and Central Asia).
7. Several thousand Russians, many of them highly skilled, returned to Russia 
from other CIS Republics, esp. from Central Asia. They faced, and caused sig-
nificant problems of resettlement in an economically depressed Russia and 
also impacted negatively on the knowledge base of the countries they left. The 
migration issue also gave rise to ethnic tensions in several countries. 
8. The central bureaucracy ceased to exist and new administrations had to be 
created in the former republics. The result was a weakening of administra-
tion that led to an increasing number of internal conflicts with and between 
republics, sometimes leading to ethnic clashes, and an increasing number of 
refugees and intensification of crime. 
These changes were much more complex than those taking place in the Cen-
tral European region were independent and more developed countries faced the 
challenges of economic transformation. As a result the economic depression in 
the former Soviet Union was much more pronounced than in the external part of 
the former COMECON area. This was reflected in certain data and trends as well.
First, on a macroeconomic level the transition recession was most severe for 
the small, land-locked CIS republics which were most dependent on external links 
and financial transfers. Obviously relying mostly on domestic poor endowments 
with production factors and without transfers coming from an external source 
led to immediate crisis there. In contrast, the transition recession was less serious 
for the countries of Central Europe, which were the least integrated into the Sovi-
et system. Although they too suffered a disintegration shock, their own economic 
structures, production basis, and geographical location made possible a swift eco-
nomic reorientation and also helped the immediate start of reintegration into 
the world economy through FDI and trade flows. Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic 
countries fall in between the two previously mentioned country groups in terms 
of the severity of both the transition recession and of the disintegration shock. 
The cause of the much more severe recession in the Baltic countries compared to 
that in Central Europe is explained by their closer integration with Russia at the 
time of the break-up of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, they were able to 
recover from the transition recession much sooner than Russia and Ukraine. This 
was due, to a large extent, to their small size and the underlying market-oriented 
economic reforms that coupled with their progressive integration with Western 
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Europe. They also did not suffer from the internal disintegration which character-
ized Russia and Ukraine. The economic decline, which essentially continued until 
1998, was quite substantial in some countries and regions. For example, boycott-
ed by its neighbours, Armenia was only able to show barest traces of investment 
activity throughout this period, and the situation was not too much different in 
Moldavia and Kazakhstan. Investments fell in Ukraine by four-fifths and in Rus-
sia by three-quarters over this period.
Second, trade suffered an extreme fall in terms of both volume and value. For 
the CIS, internal trade declined by over 80% between 1991 and 1993. Between 
1990 and 1992 exports among the FSU republics dropped from $320 billion to 
$20 billion.13 Over time the CIS countries, to varying degrees, were able to re-
orient their trade flows to the rest of the world, though this did not offset the 
trade losses they had incurred from the collapse of their intra-CIS commodity ex-
change. Trade shocks explained most of the GDP declines all over the East Central 
European region, though in the more developed and non land-locked countries 
the reorientation and development of international trade somehow was much 
more successful than in those countries with an unfortunate location. 
Only after the Russian financial crisis did an economic growth process start in 
the region, partly driven by the extremely low base data. Following the financial 
collapse which took place in Russia in the late summer of 1998 the road forward 
has led nowhere but upwards. On the other hand, the strengthening economic 
power of Russia primarily due to favourable price development for energy export-
ers had a positive impact on the whole region as well. Despite the implemented 
and continuing process of disintegration, the CIS countries still “laugh and cry” 
with Russia. The largely common and standard infrastructure could not be dis-
mantled everywhere and, where this did ensue, it often resulted in distorted so-
lutions. The similar and complementary production structures of the individual 
CIS countries require special forms of co-operation: e.g. Ukrainian metallurgy, 
the airplane industry that exports to many countries, and nuclear power plant 
development are inconceivable without Russian co-operation.
13   Munkácsy (2005).
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The Current State of the Economies in the Post Soviet Area 
Focusing on the EP countries, despite the many similar features given their com-
mon past, there are substantial differences as well. The economies of the region 
differ from each other in terms of their economic prospects, a difference that  is 
explained by their varying sizes, locations, and endowments with energy resourc-
es and raw materials. In general, each of the countries has experienced favourable 
growth trends through the several years preceding the 2008 economic crisis. As 
far as the individual country processes are concerned, the following main trends 
can be observed.14
Armenia had over 10% GDP growth yearly on average before 2009 for almost 
a decade. However, the country’s growth potential is still very limited due to its 
obsolete industrial structure, its land-locked geographical location, and the lack 
of natural resources. Given these unfavourable conditions Armenia continues to 
be the poorest country in the South Caucasus. Its structural features, among with 
the extremely high share of construction industry, reflects its one-sided econom-
ic growth and also explains the large GDP drop in 2009. The country is depend-
ent on Russian energy supplies and Russia also controls major economic sectors 
through its investments. There is also a peculiar feature of the country: the large 
number of remittances of Armenians living or working abroad which are sent 
back to fuel domestic consumption. Recently this flow of remittances also de-
creased, and domestic demand problems emerged. 
In contrast to Armenia, Azerbaijan is richest country in the South Caucasus 
due to its oil and natural gas reserves. The favourable terms of trade changes in re-
cent years for the country’s export products ensured its rapid economic develop-
ment and large revenues. The country almost exclusively depends on the export 
of natural resources, which poses some vulnerabilities for the country. Thanks 
to revenues from the export of fuels, which have risen in the last decade, Az-
erbaijan’s economy has been developing steadily. In her case the danger of ‚Dutch 
disease’ is mentioned several times, as industrial diversification is still lacking, 
investments are almost exclusively oriented towards the natural resource sectors, 
preventing large scale modernisation in other branches of the economy. Due to 
its geographical location, Azerbaijan could be an important transit route for natu-
ral resources imported from Central Asia. The key export routes of Azerbaijan’s 
natural resources lead westward through Georgia and Turkey. The country has 
diversified market interests, including Russia, the other CIS states, and the EU. 
14   In order to follow a similar approach the major sources of economic informations are international 
comparative analyses prepared by IMF and data available at www.easternpartnership.org
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Azerbaijan is also supposed to be an important supplier of gas to the Southern 
Gas Corridor transfer routes.
Belarus is also a special case in the EP area from the economic point of view. 
During the past few years the government re-nationalized a number of private 
companies, and state interventions in the operation of private business through 
pressures by central and local administrations are widespread. State owned com-
panies generate around 75% of country’s GDP. Continued state control over eco-
nomic operations make it very difficult to carry out market-based operations. The 
GDP trends were in line with the general trends in the post Soviet area, and were 
favourable before the 2008 crisis; average yearly growth was around 7% for almost 
a decade. Belarus enjoyed a very favourable oil prices due to a special relation-
ship with Russia that was also an important factor for maintaining high growth 
rates in spite of the existence of the inefficient, large state sector. Easy access to 
Russian markets also supported economic activity. Of the EP countries, Belarus 
has the deepest relations with Russia. However, due to falling demand for export 
products with the deepening of the crisis, and because Russia raised prices for gas 
substantially, the balance of payment position of Belarus worsened dynamically, 
leading to a standby-agreement with the IMF to assist with BoP shortfalls. In line 
with IMF conditions Belarus devalued the Ruble more than 40% and tightened 
some fiscal and monetary policies. In the field of international cooperation here 
it is worth recalling that Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus launched a customs 
union at the beginning of 2010 and in December they signed an agreement to 
form a Common Economic Space, while Russia removed all Belarusian oil duties.
Georgia has introduced several reform measures since 2004, the aim of which 
was to liberalise the economy and attract FDI in order to modernise the obsolete 
economic structure of the country. As a result of the reforms GDP growth was 
around 10% in the years following. However the conflict with Russia, coupled 
with the unfolding of the economic crisis, hit the Georgian economy hard. The 
outdated structure of the economy is best reflected by the overwhelming share 
of agriculture in employment, while the sector contributes only modestly to GDP 
production.  Georgia is almost completely dependent on the import of energy re-
sources, mostly from Azerbaijan. The construction of the Baku-T’bilisi-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline, the Baku-T’bilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline, and the Kars-Akhalkalaki Rail-
road are part of a strategy to capitalize on Georgia’s strategic location between 
Europe and Asia and to develop its role as a transit point for gas, oil, and other 
goods.
Moldova is one of the poorest European countries. The Moldovan economy 
depends heavily on agriculture, fruits, vegetables, wine, and tobacco. Moldova’s 
dependence on Russian energy was underscored at the end of 2005, when a Rus-
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sian-owned electrical station in the Transdnistria region cut off power to Moldo-
va and Russia’s Gazprom cut off natural gas in disputes over pricing, and again in 
January 2009, during a similar dispute. Russia’s decision to ban Moldovan wine 
and agricultural products, coupled with its decision to double the price Moldova 
paid for Russian natural gas, slowed GDP growth in 2006-07. However, in 2008 
growth exceeded 7%, boosted by Russia’s partial removal of the bans, solid fixed-
capital investment, and strong domestic demand driven by remittances from 
abroad. The country reversed course again in 2009, due to the onset of the global 
financial crisis and poor economic conditions in Moldova’s main foreign markets, 
which dramatically decreased remittances. The estimated number of expatriate 
workers from Moldova, who work mainly in Russia and EU member states, is 
nearly one million (1/4 of the population), and remittances from abroad account 
for approximately 40% of Moldova’s annual GDP. 
The Ukrainian economy suffered probably the most due to the dissolution of 
the USSR. GDP went into freefall and, as a result, in 1999 was only 40% of that in 
1991. After this very painful period a high growth decade followed, especially due 
to a favourable international economic environment that pulled up the country’s 
exports, which are concentrated mostly on metallurgical products. At the same 
time domestic demand also contributed positively to GDP growth. In 2008 the 
country was able to join the WTO, forcing the country to harmonise its regula-
tions to international standards, which makes it a more reliable business partner 
as well, and ensures improved access to international markets. The global finan-
cial crisis of 2008 had a strong, adverse impact on Ukraine. The sudden fall in 
demand on global markets caused a reduction in production by as much as 50% 
in the key branches of the country’s economy (the metallurgical and  chemical in-
dustries). In effect, GDP fell by 15% in 2009. The first signs of economic recovery 
were observed in 2010. Ukraine is almost totally dependent on Russian fuels (oil, 
gas and nuclear fuel);  its attempts so far at diversifying its supply sources have 
been unsuccessful.
From this short macroeconomic overview it is clear that the countries in ques-
tion are very diverse. This diversification is primarily related to their natural re-
source reserves. This makes most of them dependent on Russian energy supply 
to varioust extents. Those countries that have enough reserves are in a good posi-
tion regarding  their independent economic development, while others depend 
entirely on Russian energy and are in desperate need of Russian goodwill. In ad-
dition, the attempts to diversify energy relationships in most cases have been un-
successful. In spite of these substantial differences between the countries, their 
economic development shows certain similarities that are explained by changes 
in the international economic environment. After the shock of the USSR’s dis-
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solution, a favourable international growth environment both in Russia and on 
a global level ensured GDP growth in the whole region. It is also clear, however, 
that if Russian economic performance were bad, most of these countries would 
face serious economic problems, which proves the important role Russia plays in 
the economic development prospects here. 
The Current State of Economic Cooperation in the Post-Soviet Area 
The interest in the integration of the countries in the region theoretically is large, 
their varying sizes aside, but certainly for the smaller countries integration and 
cooperation with their regional neighbours is essential, serving as a basis for in-
tegrating with third countries, given their unfavourable geographical location. In 
this they need a lot of aid from the outside. On the other hand any kind of inte-
grational effort within the region should be based on some principals. 
• Generally speaking, cooperation should be different from how it was in the 
past. Inefficiency and artificial structures can not serve the final objective of 
the countries in the region. 
• Any cooperation has to be integrated into the global economy. Trading blocs 
with high protections today do not meet the requirements of today’s glo-
balised world. 
• The role of Russia and these countries’ relationship with Russia are crucial, as 
it is still the major player in the region. The main reasons behind the failures 
of integration attempts tend to be rooted in the role of Russia. Russia’s domi-
nant disposition makes partners reluctant and they tend to think twice before 
getting involved in the implementation of ventures that are often seen as new 
domains for Russia to exercise its power. Another major factor hurting inte-
gration is hesitation to partner with third countries outside the CIS (e.g. to 
the European Union); any such step would automatically exclude the concerned 
party from a favoured relationship with Russia, as these relations are – often, it 
seems – seen as mutually exclusive. 
Despite of the need for integration within the region, it is essentially the cen-
trifugal trends that prevail within the CIS. There are two main reasons for this: 
the first is the opposition and tensions within the Commonwealth. The second is 
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the ground gained by westerners, economically, politically and militarily, with the 
United States marching at the head.15
In spite of the disintegrating processes, a theoretical opportunity exists to in-
crease of the present degree of integration and readiness to cooperate, the reten-
tion of the post-Soviet economic region aside. These opportunities are:16 
• The entire post-Soviet region comprises a huge market, which allows for the 
exploitation of opportunities in economies of scale, provided that the free 
movement of factors within the region is secured. 
• It is often argued that the cultural and linguistic community and scientific co-
operation is a great opportunity, even though it is steadily losing significance. 
• The geographical – Eurasian – position of the post-Soviet region may also be a 
facilitator in preserving and strengthening cooperation, particularly when we 
think of the opportunities inherent in massive infrastructural projects. (The 
present infrastructure does little to exploit this potential.) 
• Operating as integrating links, there are interpersonal, transborder - often 
kinship - relations, which play a key role in the relatively intensive labour mar-
ket mobility around the CIS.  
• Economic problems (one-sided structure, the problem of poverty, the still low 
level of financial intermediation, etc.) are in many cases similar, which may 
also be a good foundation for common thinking. 
Besides the failed CIS-level notions, there have also been various integrat-
ing experiments involving a number of smaller groups in the post-Soviet region, 
which have generally involved the countries of the Eastern Partnership. Drawing 
on the experiences of the failures of CIS-level initiatives, in the past two decades, 
Russia has played a leading role in a number of integration attempts affecting a 
few post-Soviet countries within the CIS. These integrating initiatives are also 
similar in that they see the European Union as a reference point and envision a 
similar form of integration. It is partly this misguided objective to mimic the EU 
that makes these cooperation attempts inherent failures, together with the con-
flicts of interest that are evident in a number of specific issues. The unresolved 
dominance of Russia poses a great dilemma in all cases. 
The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC).17 The Eurasian Economic 
Community had originally tempted its founders with the reality of the formation 
of an integrating bloc based on real, mutual interests and the subsequent launch 
15   Grinberg (2006).
16   Ludvig (2008).
17   The classification of integrational efforts according to the degree of Russian involvment is taken from 
Glinkina (2008).
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of a new, independent power centre. The ultimate goal is to establish a common 
market and perhaps to simplify payment and accounting systems. EurAsEC did 
not, however, fulfil expectations; it did not promote trade between the concerned 
countries and did not facilitate mutual economic relations in general. Integration 
objectives have also been slow to be fulfilled, especially in contrast with the origi-
nal, very imposing plans. Based on these plans, the customs union ought to have 
been established long ago and by 2008 the common monetary union should also 
have been born. In contrast to this, customs union talks are still under way and 
there is no agreement on a timetable for progress, although the customs union 
negotiations between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan were successfully conclud-
ed at the end of 2007, (also, this integrated group faces variable geometry), and in 
2010 the relevant agreement entered into effect. At the same time, free trade is 
not all-encompassing; there are a number of exceptions and restrictions in force 
regulating trade between the member states, a few years ago even anti-dumping 
procedures were put into place. Among the problems in the background, one that 
is most likely to be important is that EurAsEC encompasses the richest and the 
poorest countries in the post-Soviet region; also, some of the Eastern Partner-
ship countries are members, while others are observers (Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan), which may lead to disharmonious economic 
interests, even if there are no serious conflicts between the countries in terms 
of their foreign trade aspirations and their level of exposure to external “threat”.
Common Economic Space. Being the second largest economy of the post-Sovi-
et region, Ukraine has shown reluctance towards all forms of integration within 
the region throughout the process, opting for the comfortable status of observer 
as opposed to becoming an active member in these initiatives. For this very rea-
son it was a major event when Ukraine joined an integration in the early 2000 
that also happened to be a Russian initiative: the Common Economic Space (CES-
4) of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Their aims included synchronised 
economic policies, legal harmonisation, and the coordination of the WTO-acces-
sion processes of the members. The new notion had envisioned a classic route 
to integration, leading from free trade through a customs union and common 
markets to an economic (-financial) and political union. 
This new integration initiative has been in the centre of international public 
interest from the onset; it was the first successful move to unite the four largest 
post-Soviet economies which – above all – tend to be closely interwoven. At the 
same time, the Ukrainian membership seemed to have rubbed away the former 
sharp dividing line within the post-Soviet region between the anti-Russia groups 
and those with Russian participation, which had only underlined the political im-
portance of this new initiative. Ukraine’s cooperation was not only considered 
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important from the sidelines, but also within the new integration, given that – in 
contrast to previous integration attempts – it carried the promise of being a real-
istic opportunity to counterbalance Russian dominance, provided that the three 
countries: Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, were able to take sides and be on a 
common platform regarding certain causes. The above goals had, however, car-
ried the potential for some serious problems from the very start. In the European 
Union the foundations of the new common policy that would treat Ukraine as 
an important target country, the new Neighbourhood Policy, were already taking 
shape. The Russian initiative also seemed a form of revenge against the EU expan-
sions motivated beside political considerations by purely economic necessities. 
The Ukrainian party, however, had made it decidedly obvious that it intended 
to limit its cooperation in creating the free trade zone. This was – according to 
the Ukrainian position –an integration level that did not pose a threat to the Eu-
ropean integration which had, in the meanwhile accelerated and been given new 
elements. Today the CES-4 has been reduced to CES-3, which killed the very es-
sence of the original notion. (The remaining three countries are already engaged 
in a similar cooperation under the frameworks of the EurAsEC.) 
The history of integration attempts without Russian participation within the 
post-Soviet region aiming to counterbalance or outright break the dominance of 
Russia goes back to the early and mid-nineties. The Central Asian countries were 
in 1993 already running consultations about establishing a Central Asian coop-
eration organisation (this paper will not treat this matter as the initiative does 
not extend to any countries within the Eastern Partnership), then, in 1997, a co-
operation initiative was launched without the European and Caucasian countries 
of the CIS, which later became known as the GUAM Group with the participation 
of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Members include states that are 
most reluctant to open up to Russia and which are seriously comprehend Russia’s 
hegemony within the post-Soviet region. The formation of the group was pri-
marily politically motivated; however, economically speaking the members show 
little homogeneity, there are huge differences in terms of development and the 
economic ties are not strong enough to make it a real integration. In contrast to 
the other integrations formed in the post-Soviet region, GUAM shows the weak-
est degree of commercial and trade interweaving of the economies, although it 
may show great variance from country to country and export and import volumes 
may also vary greatly, trading with the other members by Ukraine is explicitly 
marginal. GUAM’s original aim was to connect Europe, the Caucasus, and Asia 
through large transport corridors. 
The problems associated with GUAM tend increasingly to reach beyond the 
borders of the post-Soviet region. Because of the important transit role and the 
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Azeri oil reserves – similarly to the Central Asian region – the group is being 
followed with ever increasing interest by the most prominent power centres of 
international economic and political life. The United States of America and the 
European Union both pursue active politics in the region. Partly in relation to the 
large-scale energy projects taking shape, the objectives of the cooperation may 
coincide with the aims of other countries beyond the borders of the post-Soviet 
region. On the other hand, the anti-Russian disposition is also a feature that may 
direct the attention of other countries onto the organisation. Mainly due to these 
two factors the organisation also has observers from countries outside the CIS: 
Latvia and Turkey. In May of 2006, GUAM was transformed into an international 
organisation and renamed the Organization for Democracy and Economic De-
velopment; as such it can no longer be considered regional cooperation within 
the post-Soviet region and particularly not an economic integration. The declared 
aim of GUAM is to open up to the rest of the world, hence cooperation tends to 
reach beyond integration matters within the post-Soviet region.
With the announcement of the Eastern Partnership,18 the EU has once again 
displayed a regularly recurring feature in its approach to the building and shaping 
of its external relations (as was clearly the case in the Visegrad countries and the 
West Balkans). On the one hand, it has once again created a block of countries 
that may well be similar in many respects, yet are different in terms of a number 
of essential features (such as their willingness to join the EU at some future time 
or not). On the other hand, with the initiative, the EU has gained time to pro-
vide answers to questions such as, for example the Ukrainian, Moldavian and 
Georgian EU-membership ambitions. The Eastern Partnership, which does not 
rule out the possibility of prospective membership, is a flexible framework, which 
gives EU-aspirants and their supporting EU partner countries hope, and also sat-
isfies the demand of partner countries who do not aspire for membership but still 
seek strong cooperation with the EU, and also fulfils the desires of EU Member 
States who wish to put off enlargement of the EU with countries of the Eastern 
Partnership at this stage.
At the core of the multilateral economic dimension of the EP lies the deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA) aiming at economic integration. In 
certain partner countries, the tangible results of energy cooperation proclaimed 
under the framework of the Eastern Partnership may be seen as attractive, partic-
ularly those that may alleviate the tight grip of Russia. Yet, there is little specific 
progress to show in this regard. The EU in the region finds itself facing a number 
18   More on this issue and the debated topics see: http://www.easternpartnership.org/
196
of – often much more generous – challengers (e.g. Turkey, Russia, China). It is 
important for us to understand that the competition either does not make closer 
relations conditional upon any criteria, or if criteria are set, they are  considerably 
lighter than what the EU would impose. In addition to this, the objective of eco-
nomic integration does not – obviously – aim towards an economic integration 
with the EU. Belarus is, for example, a member of the recently launched Russian-
Kazakh-Belarusian customs union, while free trade and closer economic integra-
tion objectives within the CIS emerge time after time, with Ukraine pressing for 
them recently with an increased fervour.
Cross-regional Aspects of Key Issues and Best Practices, 
Recommendations
During the first half of the nineties, Visegrad was a truly important framework 
in which the Central European countries could coordinate their foreign policies 
against the weakening Soviet Union. The creation of the Visegrad cooperation was 
also the result of the realisation that a kind of regional cooperation was necessary 
in the highly insecure, unstable world of the early nineties. However, many politi-
cians in Central Europe were afraid that the cooperation would not be merely a 
preparatory phase, but rather a final goal that would prevent the EU integration 
of the whole region. This fear was big enough to stop higher level political coop-
eration, giving room for the creation of CEFTA  to deal only with economic issues.
In recent years there have been attempts to draw conclusions from regional 
cooperation initiatives in Central Europe in order to spread the ‘best practices’ to 
the Eastern or South Eastern less developed countries. The key question is how 
to manage a regional cooperation in order to achieve the largest positive impact. 
From the experiences of the Visegrad cooperation, it is evident that the interest 
of the countries in a given region may differ extremely, in spite of similar econom-
ic developments, which makes the elaboration and implementation of a really 
contentious cooperation especially difficult. The main features of ‘best practices’ 
regarding regional cooperation are the following:  
1. Political cooperation has worked only if external pressures and threats were 
strong enough to force the countries to strengthen their ties. Economic relations 
are much easier and more natural to be developed. In this regard, governments 
may create favourable conditions for business. High level and expert meetings 
among political leaders and economic policy makers can create a favourable at-
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mosphere for deepening economic ties. Common economic interests have to be 
realised (with a special emphasis on trade, investments, and infrastructure.) This 
friendly environment is a prerequisite for strengthening the economic activities 
of enterprises in each others’ economy. So the first step is to strengthen the rela-
tions at the macro-level and to find common economic interests. 
2. It is also assumed that there is low interest in regional cooperation if it is 
not connected with the process of EU integration. Thus, multilateral regional co-
operation has to be supported by bilateral processes of EU integration. Countries 
having an EU accession objective have to deepen every kind of cooperation with 
neighbouring countries. It is also important to share experiences gained from EU 
cooperation. Common strategies in this field may be more favourable then com-
peting with each other in order to achieve certain advantages over neighbours.
3. The Visegrad cooperation and other similar initiatives have proved that the 
integration into a larger entity makes the regional approach easier. Integration 
of countries from the same region into a larger entity means their adjustment 
to common rules. If they are forced to follow the same regulations and rules, it is 
easier to speak the ‘same language’’. It also means that the “homework” of each 
country has to been done. This may include modernisation of economic policies 
as well. (Indirect harmonisation)
4. In the Visegrad countries the regional cooperation was defensive in nature. 
The countries focused mostly on European integration, and the importance of the 
region was only secondary. But the integration itself indirectly contributed to the 
homogenisation of the region. It may be useful if countries from the same region 
can elaborate a common plan, a vision for their region. This vision can include 
economic issues as well, such as e.g. free trade, or joint efforts to attract foreign 
direct investments, or regional infrastructure projects.
5. Sustainable growth is a solution to almost every problem and there the is-
sues of economic policy become paramount. Here regional cooperation may play 
a role, especially when its contribution to economic growth and development may 
happen to be indirect via its influence on regional stability and opportunities. 
Indeed, the developments so far have tentatively confirmed this observation, as 
it is normalization and liberalization that have more important consequences 
for increased regional cooperation rather than growth of trade, investments, or 
production. The solution of problematic political and economic issues within the 
given region in the long run definitely has a better outcome than simply following 
a short term conflict strategy. Instead of competition, the atmosphere of coopera-
tion should be strengthened.
6. Regional business connections and activities are increasing, especially in 
places where there are few if any political and constitutional problems. Thus, it 
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could be argued that liberalization of trade and investments and economic policy 
cooperation make a greater contribution to stabilization and normalization in 
the region while their importance may increase with the economic growth of the 
region and in the particular countries in the region.
7. In the strengthening of relations in order to make recommendations, five 
different levels are important to take into account in future analysis. 
• The first is the interplay of cross-border regions, and the possibilities to de-
velop these geographically and economically unified regions. Support to joint 
transborder projects improves the relations between people living there and 
also contributes to economic development.
• The second is the enterprise level, including the activity of transnational cor-
porations with affiliates in several countries of the region, and the other is the 
active work of small and medium-sized enterprises that, in the future, may be-
come regional players and can be subcontractors for foreign firms. Developing 
a transborder cluster strategy with its agglomeration effects may be a useful 
tool for strengthening regional economic ties.
• The next level is that of high-level political relations. The drafting of common 
political and economic objectives and an institutional system for its support 
(supporting investments in the other countries, signing joint declarations and 
agreements, etc.) is a prerequisite for better economic relations. 
• The fourth is the possibilities associated with European level projects, includ-
ing infrastructure development and spatial development. It is certainly better 
to have a joint strategy for this, as it can help direct EU money in the region.
• And the fifth is at the individual level, including the development of tourism, 
cultural and educational exchange, and migration. The key is to increase the 
confidence in each other and in each others’ country.
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the Role oF CRoss-boRdeR CooPeRatIon  
In RegIonal CooPeRatIon 
“The lichen comes into being by symbiosis. An alga and a fungus nourish each other. 
They provided each other with what they can give and they take from each other what 
they need. But what happens once they decide that they must fight a final battle against 
each other for the possession of the stone on which they have lived? Only the stone re-
mains in its place, naked.”  Amosz Oz   
Introduction
Further development of cooperation with neighbouring countries is one of the 
key priorities for the European Union. In the present situation, when it is unre-
alistic to expect further expansion of the EU in this decade (except for Croatia), 
developing closer neighbourly relations in political, economic, and social areas is 
the best choice for promoting European integration. Cross-border cooperation 
(CBC), including its institutional forms such as Euroregions, is an integral part 
of this approach. 
The experiences of Western Europe and the Visegrad countries have proven 
that cross-border cooperation plays a crucial role in promoting regional coopera-
tion, which is one of the most important prerequisites for regional stability and 
European integration. Shared European values, common ambitions for prosper-
ity, and common interests of participating regions and countries enable them to 
cooperate in a number of areas to solve regionally important problems, while the 
borders as such are considered to be a connecting element and not a divisive one. 
Cross-border cooperation is therefore aimed at overcoming natural borders 
such as rivers or mountain ranges, and also political and administrative barriers 
as well as cultural and ethnic divides between neighbouring countries. In the long 
term, cross-border cooperation also contributes to dissolve prejudices, mental 
barriers, and to mitigate interstate disputes and inter-ethnic conflicts by over-
coming historical animosities and prejudices between communities.  
As border areas are located on the peripheries of given countries, cross-bor-
der cooperation also can play an important role to bridge the gap between the 
“centre” and “periphery” by promoting economic development in the bordering 
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regions, as well as the development of operational local/regional administrative 
structures in the fields of economic development, transport, infrastructure, envi-
ronment, education, culture, and people-to-people connections, thus contribut-
ing to the improvement of the quality of life for the people living in peripheral 
bordering areas. 
Countries taking part in several intergovernmental regional initiatives – in-
cluding the Visegrad Group in Central Europe, GUAM in Eastern Europe, or the 
Regional Cooperation Council in South East Europe – are experiencing deepened 
cooperation thanks to the strengthening of ties across borders. Furthermore, 
cross-border cooperation primarily concerns border areas of certain states, and 
thus it has a considerable local impact involving regional stakeholders like busi-
nesses, municipalities, and civil-society organisations. Cooperation develops 
synergistically between regions that are directly linked to each other and belong 
to states utilising the same integration or regional structures. However, cross-
border cooperation is additionally often developed between regions that are 
separated by state borders, a situation that presents a challenge to cross-border 
cooperation, requiring much more effort to be put forth by every side of such 
countries involved. 
The European Union’s expansion periods of 2004 and 2007 provided new 
motivation for improving cooperation among bordering areas, both between 
the newly added EU countries and their non-EU neighbour states in South East 
and Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, the broadening and deepening of cross-border 
cooperation was enabled by new conditions in the late 1980s and throughout 
the 1990s, including the creation of the European Single Market and the politi-
cal changes in Central and Eastern European countries. The EU regional policy 
catalysed the establishment of cross-border cooperation – initially through the 
INTERREG Initiative and later by Phare CBC, as well as by TACIS CBC and MEDA 
– and encouraged the expansion of cross-border programmes to provide solu-
tions for border problems interfering with European integration. Concurrently, 
long-term organisations providing cross-border cooperation frameworks were 
founded at practically every internal boundary of the EU, and also in all asso-
ciated countries at the EU’s external boundaries. The border regions started to 
initiate their policies at the onset of the 1970s with the assistance of the Associa-
tion of European Border Regions (AEBR), which provided strong contact with the 
European Parliament, the Council of Europe, and the European Commission with 
a goal of promoting CBC throughout Europe and among national governments, 
while its primary objectives shifted toward the development of CBC at every Eu-
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ropean border, the improvement of European integration, and the establishment 
of European aid programmes to assist border regions.1
Overall, three basic types of micro-, medium-, and macro-level cooperation 
beyond borders can be identified:
1. Cross-border cooperation: direct cooperation among transfrontier neighbours 
in all aspects of life between communities including the participation of all 
actors, like local and regional authorities (districts, oblasts, counties, etc.) and 
their institutions, and also non-governmental organisations such as civil soci-
ety organisations (Euroregions).
2. Inter-regional cooperation: primarily sectoral cooperation regarding specific 
topics such as economical or environmental issues, involving actors mainly 
from regional and local authorities. 
3. Transnational cooperation: cooperation between countries addressing a par-
ticular topic related to interconnected large geographical areas.2
We would like to highlight one of the numerous endeavours to elaborate ty-
pologies for the assortment of Europe’s cross-border regions, created by the As-
sociation of European Border Regions (AEBR), because this typology is pertinent 
to the subject of this study, specifically to compare the intensity and the level of 
integration, cohesion, and subsidiarity (democracy) existing in varied European 
(EU and non-EU) regions. 
1   European Commission, Practical Guide  to Cross-border Cooperation, 
http://www.aebr.net/publication/pdfs/lace_guide.en.pdf.   
2   See also European Commission,  Practical Guide to Cross-border Cooperation, 




High degree of overall cross-border integration:
– A high level of socio-cultural/economic cohesion
– A high level of cross-border cooperation intensity
Type 2:
Areas catching up to 
integration forerunners
Medium-high degree of overall cross-border integration:
–  High level for either socio-cultural/economic cohesion or 
cross-border cooperation intensity
–  Medium level for either socio-cultural/economic cohesion 
or cross-border cooperation intensity.
Type 3:
Integration candidates
Medium degree of overall cross-border integration:
– Medium level for either socio-cultural/economic cohesion. 
– Medium level for cross-border cooperation intensity. 
Type 4:
Areas catching up to inte-
gration candidates
Medium-low degree of overall cross-border integration:
–  Medium level for either socio-cultural /economic cohesion 
or cross-border cooperation intensity
–  Low level for either socio-cultural/economic cohesion or 
cross-border cooperation intensity
Type 5:
Areas still searching for 
integration perspective
Low degree of overall cross-border integration:
– A low level of socio-cultural /economic cohesion.
– A low level of cross-border cooperation intensity.
AEBR typology for border/cross-border areas in Europe:3
In summary, one can say that cross-border cooperation played the same role on 
a local and regional level as what the European integration process performed on 
a national and state level. The integration would be less successful if its aim and 
motivations were intended only from the “top” (from the centre), but it is equally 
important to create the framework and environment for “bottom-up” initiatives, 
which are rooted in local needs to complete the process. This was demonstrated 
in the past well over 50 years ago. 
The European Union has a major value: the subsidiarity, which means deci-
sions and actions at the closest level of competency to those affected. In the spirit 
of subsidiarity, the subnational territorial organisations should be regions, coun-
ties and other types of administrative locations or municipalities that have the 
freedom and competency to participate in international cooperation. The cross-
border cooperation system is for the lower-level administrative units, the most 
obvious form and level of international cooperation within they can define their 
own interest and set up their goals while strengthening socio-economic cohesion 
of given regions concerned.  
3   In: Cooperation between European Border Regions. Review and Perspectives
Association of European Border Regions (Ed.), Nomos, 2008 
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Regions and regionalisation in Europe 
The effects of the wider efforts towards European integration that occurred on 
the national and state level are similar to the impacts of cross-border cooperation 
on a local and regional level. Integration would not have been as effective if it had 
been instituted only with a top-down approach, from the centre outwards – the 
last half-century of Europe’s history definitely supports this assertion. The con-
cept of subsidiarity is a key tenet of the European Union: decisions and actions 
are taken at the level of competency nearest to those that they will impact. With 
this perspective, stakeholders including regions, counties, and other administra-
tive agencies or municipalities serve as sub-national territorial units empowered 
to participate freely in international cooperation. In this interest, a system of 
cross-border cooperation exists for lower-level administrative units. By defining 
their own interests and establishing their own goals, the stakeholders determine 
their future in the form and framework of international cooperation.
Western Europe
Internal or external factors did not diminish the development of civil societies in 
Western and Northern Europe, where frameworks for cross-border cooperation 
were established in institutional structures as early as the 1950s and 1960s. How-
ever, in Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, these frameworks 
came into being only in the early 1990s. Cross-border cooperation in Europe’s 
western and northern countries was inspired by the recognition of a need to find 
shared solutions for common or interrelated problems. Because of the peaceful 
coexistence between these states, national borders were not primarily about de-
fence among enemies (countries and peoples) from each other. Instead, as com-
mon crises arose on any side of a border, it was identified that these problems 
would best be tackled through cooperation and collective action across boundaries. 
In addition, citizens of free democratic societies with common values possess 
many opportunities; this situation is evident regarding neighbouring areas where 
institutions are separated only by arbitrary borders. Local communities, insti-
tutions, businesses, or civil-society organisations are linked by shared interests 
and goals that concern a wider area. Cross-border cooperation can definitely be 
applied within the institutional framework of a Euroregion, but other forms of 
cooperation also exist. For instance, cross-border groups with a goal of achieving 
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similar cross-border cooperation are the preferred structures in the Italian and 
Iberian peninsulas.
In some circumstances, the establishment of Western Europe’s cross-border 
cooperation frameworks and institutions was largely influenced by ethnically mo-
tivated processes, and was seen as a sensible type of cooperation for addressing 
shared problems. While most borders of Western and Northern Europe are long 
established in history, several cases exist where the land of a nation was displaced 
from the country’s present-day political borders (including Belgium, Finland, 
Germany, the Netherlands, South Tyrol, and Sweden). Regionalism presents a 
method of addressing these situations, being the most recognised manifestation 
of territorial or cultural autonomy in a European context. Therefore, cross-bor-
der cooperation can be perceived as a subsystem of European regional processes. 
With a common system of shared goals on a regional level, these areas are char-
acterised by an internal cohesion. However, their established borders often cross 
at least one state boundary.
Eastern Europe
The era of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe suppressed the es-
tablishment of regionalism as part of a policy with a goal of keeping states di-
vided and isolated. Membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(COMECON) and the Warsaw Pact under the Soviet Union’s oversight could be 
construed as a type of “regionalism” and regional “cooperation”, but obviously 
it was an extremely different form of regionalism compared to Western Europe, 
instead establishing a system of virtual colonisation under the principles of “pro-
letarian internationalism”. Regionalism in CEE – and, to a certain extent, in the 
Western Balkans – was not optional, and the system was devoid of any natural 
cohesion. Grounded in a Soviet-styled Marxist philosophy, the affiliated coun-
tries were bound together by external political, economic, military, and geopoliti-
cal forces applied by oppressive totalitarian regimes. In this regard there are at 
least two varying processes to examine, yet they are identical in some respects. 
The countries of the first category were those of the Eastern Bloc, which did not 
belong to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, countries of the second category 
were member states of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), such 
as the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Caucasus nations. The first catego-
ry was exposed to a much lower level of integration in comparison to the USSR 
group. However, the external forces at play disappeared with the system changes 
205
in Eastern Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the freshly liberated 
countries began to develop autonomously from each other.
The Western Balkans (formerly Yugoslavia) is a different case of regionalism, 
as the area has more common cohesive elements such as culture, language, and 
similar historical experiences. At the same time, the region is ethnically and re-
ligiously very diverse, and the Yugoslav system offered a kind of autonomy for 
nations in the frame of federation, and opportunity for economic development 
given a relatively big single market. 
The process of disassociation was considerably noticeable in the case of CEE 
countries; for instance, an aversion to direct cooperation between them is still 
considered a major hindrance. The EU currently offers a framework for coop-
eration, while an endeavour to strengthen regional cooperation under the aus-
pices of the Visegrad Cooperation (encompassing the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia) is encouraging these efforts. Regarding freshly liberated 
countries that previously belonged to the Soviet Union (with the exception of the 
Baltic States), the disintegration process was less rapid. Most of these countries 
later embarked upon a new path of integration, at least regarding their economic 
structures. These were the countries that established the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS). The disintegration of Yugoslavia was a bloody process, and 
the way of “re-integration” of the region, even if it has its own model for regional-
ism, is a difficult process that should be based on mutually beneficial cooperation 
between the small nation-states belonging to the region, regarding issues of the 
economy, environment, and more.      
The populations of these areas still foster a kind of “regional” mentality and, 
to some extent, identity, irrespective of the unnatural and hostile character of 
previous processes of integration and regionalisation. The people feel that they 
belong to their region by shared history and shared experiences (both negative 
and positive).
In the past, some countries of CEE forged hostile relationships with each other 
despite the standardised political regimes imposed by the Soviet Union through-
out the Eastern Bloc, and the imposed ideology that the region’s countries were 
supposed to be united as one entity. Grassroots territorial initiatives could not 
succeed in this environment because the centralised governance strove to control 
every aspect of society. As opposed to many borders of Western Europe, most 
CEE borders were not established as manifestations of historical events or the 
geographic layout. The borders of CEE are relatively new, drawn up as contrived 
dividing lines following the 20th century’s military conflicts that often divided 
formerly cohesive and integrated geographic territories. Furthermore, admin-
istrative hindrances are common, and in many cases people of the same ethnic 
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background comprise most of the population on both sides of a boundary, yet 
they cannot create cooperation frameworks between their communities in a wide 
range of issues, be they cultural, economic, interpersonal, or of other concerns.
Central Europe now belongs to the European Union, which has accelerated the 
process of minimising the divisiveness of borders (which may perhaps eventu-
ally disappear) over the past 20 years. The Carpathian Euroregion was created 
in Central Europe in the early 1990s as the first Euroregion, with financial and 
technical support provided primarily by organisations from Western Europe and 
the United States. These endeavours were designed for the dissolution of the in-
flexible framework of nation-states, anchoring cross-border cooperation in the 
spirit of democracy and harmony. In these first cases the process of a conscious 
“spread of democracy” became evident. Yet over time, it was increasingly appar-
ent that Euroregions formed solely because of external influences could never 
be truly successful. For these regions to succeed with this approach, Euroregions 
had to be founded on principles of subsidiarity, and had to be organised by shared 
goals, interests, and mutual benefits. Nonetheless, it should be noted that these 
first initiatives provided a useful model, and established a previously unknown 
framework of cross-border cooperation.
A delay in adopting new institutions is evident in the Western Balkans and 
in Eastern Europe, primarily in the states of the former Soviet Union. Most of 
this region’s newly created countries had no relevant history of sovereignty, and 
their ability to transform into democracies was also held in doubt. It was often 
unknown whether progress would last in many of these countries, adding to the 
causes for why the EU does not apparently consider admitting these countries as 
a priority. The nature of borders is increasingly becoming more divisive among 
these countries, as observed in the centralised governance, extensive bureauc-
racy, lacking infrastructure, ineffective civil-society organisations, and mutual 
wariness hindering regional and cross-border cooperation. For these countries, a 
true opportunity to gradually dissolve or permeate fixed boundaries is provided 
by raising awareness of possibilities for cooperation in the framework of Eurore-
gions or other types of cross-border initiatives. The negative perspectives of resi-




Europe’s present-day boundaries were formed over centuries of creation and con-
solidation of nation-states, a process that was mostly concluded by the late 1800s. 
Throughout most of history, frontier areas separating countries or kingdoms did 
not delineate defined cartographic or geographic territories as determined by 
international history or recognition, but instead represented a loose framework 
reflecting the development of the state to that point. A special status was usually 
conferred to these areas within the state (i.e. frontier, Grenzmark, kraina).
A major shift occurred in the 18th and 19th centuries when Europe’s emerg-
ing national borders were formed rather differently compared to before, and rep-
resented a fundamentally different role. During this period, national borderlines 
provided the territorial framework for the ideological development of nation-
states, and these frontiers were often used to enforce protectionist economic 
policies. Consequent to the rise of modern nation-states, borders began serving a 
defensive purpose, and dividing and separating neighbours became the primary 
role of borders. Nation-states placed a high value on their own identities, and 
elevated the function of boundaries to divide the populations, institutions, and 
economy of their country from adjacent competitors, or from enemy nations. 
Boundaries became fortified obstacles between neighbouring regions, purpose-
fully meant to hinder interaction; the establishment of dividing lines between 
states intentionally resulted in greater difficulty in the transportation of people 
and goods. This period of history also ushered in the introduction of passports, 
connected to the emergence of nation-state borders – passports functioned as 
administrative instruments for allowing passage across borders while increasing 
control over them, protecting the country.
At the expense of wars, especially WWI and WWII, Europeans have learned 
that there are no other acceptable alternatives to solve interstate conflicts and 
border disputes than cooperation between nations and countries, which must be 
based on mutual benefit and partnership. The shock after WWII led Europe to 
reconsider its existence as a common cultural, economic and political space. In 
this context, the various forms of cross-border cooperation beginning in the late 
1950s greatly contributed to deepening the process of European integration in 
Western Europe, as it brought Europe closer to its citizens. (Nonetheless, this era 
also witnessed a reversion to the old mindset regarding the mid-century events 
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of geopolitical forces forming a new dividing line between West and East Europe, 
symbolised by the Berlin Wall.) 
Boundaries in present-day Europe are no longer representing significant 
obstacles to interaction between regions and the free movement of people and 
commerce, thanks in large part to the EU. The significance of European borders 
will continually decline with the Schengen area’s expansion to increasingly more 
countries. However, the outer boundaries of the EU still maintain their purpose 
of dividing and protecting EU countries from the risks of unauthorised interna-
tional migration and trade; even within the EU, internal borders have effectively 
vanished only within the Schengen area.
The history of cross-border cooperation  
Euroregional synergy first began in Western Europe in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, when earlier animosity between Western European countries began di-
minishing. After WWII, much effort went into promoting cooperation, with an 
initial breakthrough occurring in 1958 with the signing of the “Euregio” head-
quarters agreement in Gronau, Holland, adopted by the Dutch and German gov-
ernments regarding the shared areas of the rivers Rhine, Ems and Ijssel. Another 
major breakthrough happened in Basel in 1963, with the establishment of the 
“Region Basiliensis” covering the Upper Rhine region of France, Germany and 
Switzerland.
Since the establishment of these cooperation milestones, many other institu-
tionalised cross-border initiatives were created in Western, Southern, and North-
ern Europe. Including Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and to some ex-
tent Eastern Europe, well over 100 diverse forms of Euroregional cooperation are 
established throughout Europe today. 
Rationale and conditions for the establishment of cross-border 
institutions
It is a fact that certain endeavours cannot be supported efficiently within the con-
straints of national boundaries, and this is the primary recognition leading to the 
establishment of institutionalised frameworks for cross-border cooperation. The 
inherently divisive nature of borders often runs counter to the natural organisa-
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tional logic of the territorial circumstances for functions such as health and hu-
man services or transport infrastructure. Border regions experience this problem 
with the greatest impact, because some functions must be established on both 
sides of the border – even for communities that are within close proximity to each 
other – in order to provide for populations within the geographical peripheries 
of both countries. Essential public services and institutions are organised and 
maintained more effectively if the territorial scope of their operations expands to 
the border areas of neighbouring countries, particularly regarding healthcare fa-
cilities, ambulance stations, fire departments, civil protection, sewage treatment, 
and disaster relief services.
In most cases, populations on both sides of border regions actually share more 
connections than divisions – be they familial, cultural, or ethnic – which is an 
additional factor supporting the establishment of institutional frameworks for 
cross-border cooperation. Encouraging communities on two sides of a shared 
border to understand that they have a great deal in common helps diminish mu-
tual tensions, especially if those issues are caused by an absence of positive rela-
tions. Wariness between populations on opposite sides of a boundary, stemming 
from these communities having limited contact with each other, has negative 
consequences for politics and diplomatic relations for both countries. However, 
when border communities establish fair and extensive cross-border interaction, 
a decidedly positive effect ordinarily follows that can improve diplomacy among 
the countries involved, by negating the divisive function of modern boundaries 
between states. 
Regions primarily compete with other regions in the global marketplace, and 
not always between entire countries, creating yet another factor supporting the 
enhancement of institutionalised cross-border cooperation and integration. No 
region can be competitive if it lacks effective infrastructure, keeping parts of the 
region in circumstances of economic isolation. This predicament can be avoided 
if opportunities for economic cooperation in all geographic directions are equally 
available in the boundary regions of a country as they are in areas more proximal 
to the country’s economical and/or political centre. Cross-border regional mar-
keting has continually gained significance as a crucial aspect of competitiveness. 
If adjacent regions and border areas are intentionally isolated from their neigh-
bours, the consequences are mutually detrimental. To improve the entire region’s 
competitiveness and mitigate the potentially detrimental impacts of being situ-
ated in peripheral locations, it is in the common interest of border regions to 
increase mutual cooperation.
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Do borders change function over time?
National boundaries have a distinct administrative character separating previ-
ously functional areas and establishing contrived border territories, found pri-
marily in the central regions of Europe but also to a lesser extent in Europe’s 
eastern parts. Such borders obstruct and often actively prevent cultural, political, 
economical, institutional, and human interactions that may have had historically 
strong connections. An additional detrimental factor impacts the border areas of 
Central, East, and South East Europe – central governments here did not consider 
the development of these regions as important because the boundaries changed 
so frequently and violently. The result of this is that these areas are characterised 
by economic deficiencies, low public investment, the outward migration of young 
professionals, a disproportionately aging population, high unemployment rates, 
and segregation, all leading to the marginalisation of boundary areas with culmi-
nating social and economic tensions that imprint the negative impression of the 
“periphery”, which stigmatises people that reside in these regions. 
The introduction of institutionalised cross-border cooperation in Western Eu-
rope obviously advanced with the developments of Europe’s integration efforts 
in the 1950s, later establishing the EU’s predecessor. Furthermore, the develop-
ment of cross-border partnerships provided a solution for widespread demand 
for cooperation: since Western Europe’s borders often coincided with functional 
boundaries established by history and geography, these frontier areas experi-
enced less stress, and following varied integration processes these problems are 
today virtually nonexistent.
A crucial precondition for cooperation among administrative units affiliated 
with different nation-states is the establishment of appropriate legal frameworks. 
Principles of subsidiarity and decentralisation have ordinarily been preeminent 
in administrative law throughout Western Europe since the 1950s. Commencing 
cooperation processes depended only on the identification of intentions and re-
quirements. In 1980 this process was sped up when, under the aegis of the Coun-
cil of Europe, “the European framework agreement about regional authorities and 
administrative organisation on border cooperation”4 was enacted in Madrid. 
4   European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or 
Authorities (Madrid, 21.V.1980). European Treaty Series (ETS), No. 106. [ON-LINE]. [Strasbourg]: Council 




Transfrontier cooperation refers to intentional action meant to foster and 
strengthen neighbourly interactions between territorial authorities or communi-
ties, in accordance with Article 2 of the European Outline Convention on Trans-
frontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (1980). 
Such communities or authorities can be institutions or organisations perform-
ing regional and local operations. An appropriate and formalised agreement sup-
ported by all parties is necessary in order to provide the required framework for 
cross-border cooperation. Transfrontier cooperation can encompass a wide scope 
of activities within the competencies of territorial authorities or communities, as 
established by their domestic laws.
The establishment and operation of a Euroregion represents a particular type 
of transfrontier cooperation structure pertaining to two or more bordering areas 
located in different European countries. Euroregions can fulfil useful purposes as 
a framework for joint coordination, consultation, and development cooperation.
A Euroregion may provide the added value of a cross-border partnership at a 
sub-national level within a legally defined framework pertaining to internal and 
external functions. Euroregions provide a structure for coordination and consul-
tation among participants. One especially useful benefit of Euroregions is their 
capacity to request, receive, and distribute funding on behalf of and in the in-
terest of all participants. The utility of this role of Euroregions is demonstrated 
by the joint drafting, coordinated implementation, and oversight of cross-border 
programmes and projects by partner entities. 
Euroregions vary drastically in form and function all over Europe. No particu-
lar legal framework has been used universally to establish Euroregions. Myriad so-
lutions have been utilised to establish organisational manifestations of cross-bor-
der cooperation. Some possible solutions from modern European history include 
transfrontier organisations with a permanent secretariat and administrative and 
technical teams with independent resources and a legal personality, associations 
of local or regional authorities on both sides of national borders with a collec-
tive administrative structure but without a legal personality, and communities 
of interest without a legal personality. Two primary legal forms exist – firstly, 
a “contractual” legal endeavour (cooperation agreement) establishing long-term 
transfrontier cooperation efforts and to begin commencement of coordination 
that would become possible through arrangements or frameworks without an or-
ganisational form to create a legally independent structure (an entity with legal 
personality). The other legal form is an “institutional” endeavour establishing an 
organisational structure for transfrontier cooperation conceived particularly for 
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that purpose and endowed with its own legal personality, enabling it to act inde-
pendently from its constituent members.
Whether the particular legal arrangement chosen will prove to be adequate 
and feasible depends on three factors:
1. the suitability of the purpose, role and modus operandi of the organisation for 
the proposed transfrontier projects;
2. the implications of the project partners’ involvement in the chosen organisa-
tional form in terms of the length of time needed for its establishment and 
launch of operation, including all administrative and financial operating pro-
cedures;
3. the applicable law that determines the conditions of its operation (funding, 
accounting, and reports on activities).
Regardless of significant variables in the European practice, common require-
ments can be identified that apply to the establishment of all cooperative struc-
tures and interactions between border communities and authorities in various 
countries spanning Europe. The most imperative common features are identified 
thusly:
• Local authorities and communities are provided with the means to exercise 
existing powers through transfrontier cooperation, without being granted any 
new powers on either side of a national border.
• Local authorities and communities participate in cooperation only within 
their respective competence areas.
• Transfrontier cooperation assumes the form of projects promoting shared lo-
cal interests with joint or coordinated activities promising tangible benefits.
• The scope of transfrontier cooperation excludes regulatory and enforcement 
powers. However, local authorities and communities may agree to coordinate 
their plans and policies in these areas in accord with domestic laws applicable 
to each partner country taking part in the cooperation.
• Authorities and communities participate in cooperation in deference to multi-
lateral and bilateral international accords that regulate transfrontier relations 
and varied related issues like mobility and border-crossing facilities.
• Local authorities may enact transfrontier agreements to formalise their coop-
eration, or may set up other relevant cooperation structures (with or without 
a separate legal personality). 
• Regarding formalised and structured transfrontier cooperation endeavours, 
the national law of one partner’s local communities or authorities shall be ap-
plied to the establishment and registration of the mutually agreeable institu-
tional form.
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The characteristics of a given legal entity are determined by the level achieved 
in the transfrontier cooperation process, and also on the goals of participants on 
both sides of the border. The European Parliament and the Council formed the 
European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) in 2006 as a new instru-
ment to facilitate cross-border, trans-national, and inter-regional cooperation. 
The objective of the EGTC was to empower local and regional authorities from 
varied EU-member states to cooperate more effectively with new possibilities, 
such as allowing them to apply for and manage European funding. A prerequi-
site for establishing EGTC is the involvement of partners from a minimum of 
two EU-member states, but an EGTC can also encompass its member partner’s 
non-EU member states. An early example of an EGTC in the EU was established 
between Hungary and Slovakia in the Ister-Granum region. By simplifying the 
management of cross-border cooperation projects among countries with varying 
laws and legal systems, an EGTC indisputably delivers added value.5 
Cross-border cooperation in the EU context 
Europe’s expansion of recent decades ushered in the transformation of cross-
border cooperation from defensive zones into places of reconciliation between 
communities and people. A country’s preparation for integrating into European 
structures depends on regional cooperation. The European Commission’s Third 
Report on Cohesion6 identifies cross-border cooperation as a major EU priority, 
aiming to support integration while mitigating social and economic fragmenta-
tion.
A dual transformation took place amid the process of the EU’s enlargement 
and cohesion – cross-border functions dissociated while the newly established 
EU area became one huge cross-border region. Consequently, Europe is viewed as 
a regional microcosm of the inevitable processes of globalisation, bringing about 
exchanges that establish the economic interactions that can foster peaceful rela-
tionships. 
Euroregions are among the most common instruments for the development 
of Europe’s border regions, and for supporting cross-border cooperation. Eurore-
5   http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/gect/index_en.htm
6   Third Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion /* COM/2004/0107 final */ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0107:FIN:EN:HTML
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gions should serve as hubs for the economic, cultural, and social development of 
the regions and communities concerned with cohesion within the activities of 
relevant authorities.7 Current Euroregions have no defined statute in the con-
text of the EU, because they are the endeavours of particular border areas or other 
regional entities of countries.
Euroregions are established according to any of the following legal structures: 
a public entity, a nongovernmental organisation, or a community group without a 
legal entity. Euroregions do not establish new types of governance at a cross-bor-
der level. The tasks, competencies, and powers of each Euroregion are determined 
by those regional and local authorities included in the Euroregion. A Euroregion 
could be defined as a cross-border framework established between entities of re-
gional or local government, established to promote shared interests. 
The development of cross-border cooperation is regarded as among the major 
priorities for both the EU and the Council of Europe. Cross-border cooperation 
is important for the EU as an instrument to ensure equalised development and 
integration throughout Europe, and a goal of EU cross-border cooperation is to 
counter the isolation and segregation of border territories. The legal structure for 
EU actions within cross-border cooperation encompasses these three EU policies: 
the Cohesion Policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the pre-accession 
policy for candidate countries.
The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was es-
tablished in 2007 with a particular cross-border cooperation component that fi-
nances “joint programs” to connect the regions of member states and partner 
countries with shared borders. Countries eligible for the ENPI are these: Algeria, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine. Thus, the 
ENPI and the Eastern Partnership comprise potential programmes that could en-
courage cross-border endeavours in Eastern Europe.
The ENPI is implemented through three forms of programmes:
1. Domestic or international programmes based on national action plans and 
approved by the EC concerning a set of national priorities to draw countries 
closer to the EU.
2. Thematic programmes addressing one or multiple challenges common to sev-
eral partner countries and pertaining to one or more member states (i.e. TEM-
PUS, LIFE).
7   Council of Europe. Committee of Advice for the Development of Transfrontier Cooperation in Central and 
Eastern Europe Initiative Concerning Trans-European Consideration Intended to Encourage Harmonious and 
Balanced Development of European territory (2004/C 226/02)
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3. Cross-border cooperation programmes between proximal areas in one or mul-
tiple member states and one or multiple partner countries at the EU’s external 
border.
Cross-border cooperation for the V4 Countries beyond the 
Visegrad Cooperation
Some of Europe’s newest borderlines are found among the boundaries of Central 
Europe. Many of these borders were determined after WWI and WWII, but more 
recent changes were established by the dissociation of Czechoslovakia, and also 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia between 1990 and 1992. 
Powerful historic and ethnic tensions were often evident along these new divid-
ing lines. Only after a transition period did institutionalised cross-border rela-
tions emerge in these regions, and the wary environment was difficult to change 
as rigid and fortified boundaries imparted strong feelings of separation. Coopera-
tion across interstate borders was clearly not within the experience of the admin-
istrative bodies adjacent to the new boundaries. 
V4 position on cross-border cooperation
Cross-border cooperation is regarded with special importance in the V4 coun-
tries, all of which have participated in the development of varied types of Eurore-
gions on the boundary areas with their Visegrad partners, EU members, and in 
the border regions with applicant countries (the Western Balkan countries) and 
other neighbouring countries (Ukraine, Belarus). 
Cross-border cooperation is referred to in important documents regarding co-
operation with the Visegrad Group, which considers this as a crucial aspect of the 
cooperation. For example, in 1991 the first enacted V4 declaration states that 
its signatories shall jointly undertake steps that would encourage the creation 
of free contact between citizens, institutions, churches, and social organisations; 
foster economic cooperation; focus on developing the infrastructure of commu-
nications; enhance cooperation in ecology; create favourable conditions for the 
unrestrained flow of information, press, and cultural values; and to encourage 
mutually beneficial cooperation among local government entities while establish-
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ing sub-regional contacts8 – all of these are vital elements for cross-border co-
operation. 
The so-called Kroměříž Declaration – the second Visegrad declaration – was 
adopted following the EU accession of the V4 countries. Attached to the Declara-
tion, the Guidelines on the Future Areas of Visegrad Cooperation identify cross-
border cooperation among the most crucial areas to be developed in the post-
accession period.9
Cross-border cooperation is expected to remain as a vital field of cooperation 
among the V4 countries – despite the diminishing significance of borders after 
these countries’ accession to the EU and their subsequently joining the Schengen 
area – as well as for the countries in the EU neighbourhood. 
The International Visegrad Fund has supported projects focusing on cross-
border cooperation, which remain as the only V4 institutions, while the IVF grant 
scheme stipulates the participation of at least three V4 countries, although in 
case of CBC projects this condition does not apply.
Examples of cross-border cooperation 
Establishing cross-border cooperation along the EU’s outer boundaries is a top 
priority for the EU. Euroregions are also regarded as a crucial instrument for im-
proving cooperation between the EU and its neighbouring countries. Enveloping 
the regions of four EU-member countries and Ukraine, the Carpathian Eurore-
gion is a good example of this instrument, and the EU has also adopted a particu-
lar measure aiming to encourage cooperation with its Eastern neighbours and 
Russia. The EU launched the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instru-
ment (ENPI) with the goal of enhancing the range for cross-border cooperation 
8   Declaration on Cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and 
the Republic of Hungary in Striving for European Integration, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID
=940&articleID=3940&ctag=articlelist&iid=1.  
9  Declaration of Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland 
and the Slovak Republic on cooperation of the Visegrad Group countries after their accession to the European 
Union (12 May 2004), http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=940&articleID=3939&ctag=articleli
st&iid=1 http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=941&articleID=3936&ctag=articlelist&iid=1. 
 More on ENPI in ENPI CBC Strategy Paper 2007/2013, to be found at http://www.huskroua-cbc.net/uploads/
editors/enpi_cross-border_cooperation_strategy_paper_en.pdf. 
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with neighbouring regions and countries, utilising previous experience with the 
TACIS and MEDA programmes.10 
The ENPI Hungary/Romania/Slovakia/Ukraine cross-border programme is 
perceived as an excellent example of this manner of cooperation. The programme 
became active on 23 September 2008, after being approved by the European 
Commission. With implementation occurring during the period of 2007-2013 
along the external border of participating EU-member states with Ukraine, the 
programme allots € 68.638.283 of ENPI funding over seven years, and offers di-
verse opportunities to potential beneficiaries through four priorities: economic 
and social development, enhancement of the environment, increasing border ef-
ficiency, and supporting people-to-people cooperation.
With an overriding objective to enhance and strengthen cooperation in a so-
cially, environmentally, and economically sustainable manner, the programme 
deepens ties between Ukraine’s Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska, and Chernivet-
ska regions and eligibly adjacent regions of Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia.
The programme presents wide-ranging possibilities to potential beneficiaries 
with its specific measures and priorities. The objective of each priority is estab-
lished as follows:
Priority 1: Promote economic and social development
Practise sharing and knowledge transfer to encourage joint developments of 
enterprises and enhance attractiveness of the area for tourism
measure 1.1 Harmonised tourism development 
measure 1.2 Creation of improved conditions for SMEs and business develop-
ment
Priority 2: Improve the quality of the environment 
To mitigate risks of damages to the environment and enhance the quality of air, 
water, soil, and woodlands resources 
measure 2.1 Sustainable management and use of natural resources and protec-
tion of the environment 
measure 2.2 Crisis preparedness
Priority 3: Increase efficiency of borders 
To improve efficiency of border management along Ukraine’s boundaries
10   More on ENPI in ENPI CBC Strategy Paper 2007/2013, to be found at http://www.huskroua-cbc.net/
uploads/editors/enpi_cross-border_cooperation_strategy_paper_en.pdf. 
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measure 3.1 Improving border-crossing transportation infrastructure and equip-
ment at border checkpoints
Priority 4: Encourage people-to-people cooperation 
To enhance effectiveness of public services and expand mutual understanding of 
varied societal groups
measure 4.1 Institutional cooperation
measure 4.2 Small-scale people-to-people cooperation
Applicants must collaborate in partnerships encompassing at least one partner 
from Ukraine and at least one partner from an EU-member state participating in 
the programme.
The programme area encompasses the regions within the Hungarian-Slovak-
Romanian-Ukrainian borders and includes a joint boundary with Ukraine that 
stretches for almost 600 kilometres, fully covering borderlines between Slovakia 
and Ukraine (97.9 km) and Hungary and Ukraine (134.6 km), and part of the 
border between Romania and Ukraine (366.4 km).
Euroregions
Europe’s earliest Euroregions (i.e. Carpathian Euroregion and the DKMT Eurore-
gion) were formed with foreign initiatives, aid, and technical assistance from the 
U.S. and Western Europe. These endeavours had an overriding goal of fostering 
knowledge and experience transfer across boundaries, but eventually the majority 
of them were not feasible over the long term. Subsequent cross-border coopera-
tion programmes were motivated by opportunities presented through assistance 
with EU pre-accession funding. Participating administrative agencies recognised 
that these programmes were useful as institutional frameworks to ease acquisi-
tion of further external funding, and the number of Euroregional cooperation 
projects grew.
Beside the European Union, since the early 1990s U.S.-based organisations 
such as the EastWest Institute, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the Rock-
efeller Brothers Fund, the German Marshall Foundation, the Ford Foundation, 
and others played an important, sometimes pioneering, role promoting regional 
and cross-border cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in South 
East Europe. These organisations (think tanks and private foundations) brought 
a specific dimension to CBC which is the eminent role of civil society, local com-
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munities, and philanthropy in cross-border and interethnic cooperation, and in-
troduced new institutional models such as grant-making organisations and com-
munity foundations at local, cross-border, and regional levels. 
With the help of US-based organisations, several important inter-regional and 
cross-border intermediary organisations were created (Carpathian Euroregion, 
Carpathian Foundation, Central European Environmental Partnership, etc.), 
which made a strong impact on community-based regional and cross-border co-
operation. 
Case: the Carpathian Euroregion and the Carpathian Foundation
Regional and local leaders from the neighbouring countries of Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine met in May of 1992 to discuss methods to en-
courage and improve cross-border cooperation in the Carpathian Mountains and 
the Tisza Valley. Called the Carpathian Euroregion, this endeavour was the first 
effort to create a Euroregion as an institutionalised manner of cross-border co-
operation. It was also the inaugural grouping of this kind in Central and East-
ern Europe when the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, local and regional leaders, and 
Catherine Lalumiere – the Secretary General of the Council of Europe – officially 
enacted the Carpathian Euroregion in 1993.
The Carpathian Euroregion is in the geographic centre of Europe, a mountain-
ous region enveloping the Tisza River basin and the Carpathian Mountain range. 
The area is characterised by economic under-development because of its periph-
eral location and complex history of interstate and inter-ethnic interactions11. 
While the region is diverse in terms of ethnicity, language, and religion, commu-
nities there have as many similarities as differences. A sense of community and 
an open attitude to cooperating with one another was created through the com-
mon geography and history, similarities in economic development, and shared 
desires for economic prosperity and integration. 
The Carpathian Euroregion is home to 16 million people, the most vulner-
able of them living in small towns and tiny villages. The total surface area of the 
Euroregion is 161,135 km2. These rural communities are isolated and their infra-
structure is poor. Many of these communities are inhabited by minority ethnic 
11   From the 18th century to the end of WWI, most of the Euroregion belonged to the Habsburg (later 
Austro-Hungarian) Empire. The trans-Carpathian region of Ukraine, the geographical core of the Euroregion, 
is a good indicator for the complicated history of the area thereafter. In the course of the 20th century, the 
region was governed by six different states. Frequent changes in borders left large minority groups separated 
from family, traditional markets, and urban centres. While official statistics suggest that every tenth resident 
of the Euroregion belongs to an ethnic minority, independent estimates suggest the real figure is closer to 17%. 
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groups that were cut off from their extended families and traditional places of 
employment by the frequent changes of international borders in the past cen-
tury. Misguided spatial policies and forced industrial development during the 
command-economy era depopulated the region, leaving many socially disadvan-
taged groups, including the poor and elderly, and the largest concentration of 
Roma people in Europe. Of the five national parts of the Euroregion, Slovakia is 
the smallest in terms of both size and population (9.7% and 9.8% respectively), 
yet is represented by the largest share of sovereign territory and people (32% and 
28.7%). In contrast, the Ukrainian national section, a relatively small part of the 
much larger Ukrainian state, represents 35% of the total territory and 39.8% of 
the total population of the Euroregion.
Ukrainians are also the largest ethnic group in the Euroregion, accounting for 
40% of the total population. According to official data, Poles are the next largest 
ethnic group (18%), followed by Hungarians (15%), Romanians (15%), Slovaks 
(8%), and Roma (7%)12. The religious makeup of the population in the Euroregion 
is similarly more complicated than is shown by official statistics.13 
The region suffered from economic underdevelopment due to the dominance 
of agricultural activity, restrictive food-import laws in neighbouring countries, 
and political-geographic isolation. The mountainous and bordering areas are 
distant from the national capitals and economic centres, and mostly belong to 
the poorest regions of the member countries – indicating all typical symptoms 
of CEE’s bordering regions. However, a  common history, geographical proxim-
ity, similarities in economic development, and common aspirations for economic 
prosperity and integration create a sense of community and a willingness to co-
operate. 
12   It is important to remember that these figures are provided by national statistics offices and do not 
always objectively mirror reality on the ground. For example, unofficial estimates of the Roma population 
of the Euroregion are as high as 1 million, though official statistics indicate just 700,000. The question of 
the Ruthenian minority is also complicated. Ruthenians have the status of an official minority in Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, and as such are also included in official statistics. In Ukraine, where the largest 
numbers of Ruthenians are thought to live, they are not included in official statistical data as other cultural 
minorities such as Huculs, Gorals, Mantas, etc.
13   According to national statistics offices, the religious structure of the Euroregion is: Orthodox – 33 %, 
Greek Catholic – 24 %, Roman Catholic – 24 %, Calvinist – 8 %, Protestant – 1 %, Jewish – 1 %, and other 
religions – 9 %. The recent history of the Greek Catholic Church, which was banned in all countries of the 
Euroregion except Hungary after World War II, makes it particularly hard to count. The Jewish community of 
the Euroregion, once large and vibrant, was decimated by the 1940s Holocaust, and only small but determined 
pockets remain.
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The other ingredients which make up not only the Carpathian but other re-
gions are the common natural components of the Carpathian Mountains and 
Tisza River watershed as a common ecosystem, the rich cultural and develop-
mental heritage based on interaction of different ethnic groups and cultures as 
a common cultural space, and the peripheral location as a socioeconomic space. 
These peculiarities are manifested in a kind of common identity and mentality. As 
Iván Illés14 wrote “… one of the peculiarities and distinguishing marks of the Carpathian 
Euroregion is its history and the exceptional changeability of its political geography … its 
history, demographics, ethnic and religious specialities more or less differ from the other re-
gions of the participating countries. Nevertheless, their social structures are also different: 
the ratio of the rural population is higher while that of the urban population is lower. All 
regions may be regarded as peripheries within their own countries. On the basis of this, it 
would be surprising if their political thinking and electoral characteristics were not different 
from those of the other regions in the respective countries. And really, there are remarkable 
deviations everywhere in the electoral results and party preferences... One thing is com-
mon in them. The relation to the political principles and attitudes is always more 
unanimous, obvious and sometimes more extreme than anywhere else in the 
country. The population of the Carpathian Region always took a stronger stand 
either in the acceptance or rejection of communism, or in the acceptance or rejec-
tion of the national absoluteness than the other parts of the country. And it is 
this attitude and behaviour that connects them”.
The primary goals of the Carpathian Euroregion are to promote the creation 
of cross-border projects, mutual intention toward cooperation with national in-
stitutions and organisations, and improving the quality of life for people living in 
the area to maintain peace, promotion of good relations between people on both 
sides of the borders, and to decrease the isolating effect of the borders. 
The Council is the interregional association’s primary body, which decides 
on the most crucial issues of general, personnel, and membership relevance, on 
membership in transnational organisations, etc. The Council also establishes 
working commissions, adopts project proposals brought about by them, and en-
sures conditions for implementation. Council Members are delegated from every 
member country, and the CE’s administrative agency is the International Sec-
retariat, which fulfils the operative tasks, coordinates daily activities, organises 
council meetings, and provides additional administrative services. The council 
also maintains contact with the National Offices and national representatives, 
coordinates activities of working commissions, establishes and maintains con-
14   Illés, Iván 1996:Carpathian (Euro)Region, ECFR Occasional Papers, No.6. Tübingen, Europeische Zentrum 
für Föderalismus-Forschung
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tact with international organisations, and participates in developing donations. 
The Council’s activity is fostered by the National Offices in member states, with 
national representatives who also take part in organisational, language, and co-
ordination activities. Working commissions created by the council oversee the 
implementation of plans adopted by the council – the Working Commissions 
dealing with Regional Development, Tourism, Environmental Protection, Trade, 
Mitigation of Natural Disasters, Social Infrastructure, and Audit and Control.
The Euroregion is an important factor in both professional and political re-
gards concerning the financial aspects of member regions on national and Euro-
pean levels. It can significantly contribute to setting the elements of coordination 
among different funding sources (basically concerning the INTERREG, PHARE 
CBC, and TACIS programmes) by its expertise. The location of the CE makes some 
member states concentrate on EU-related issues and tasks to be thought over – at 
the same time by the need to maintain the presently operating relationship in 
forthcoming decades. In the Europe of regions, the Carpathian Euroregion can 
serve as a bridge that links the countries of the region as a frame to fulfil the re-
quirements of the future in the heart of Central Eastern Europe.
One of the unique features of the Carpathian Euroregion that beside the Eu-
roregion, which is the “governmental arm” of the region, there is another institu-
tion with the same objective, the Carpathian Foundation (CF), which is the “civil-
society arm” of the region. 
Established in 1995 as an endeavour of the EastWest Institute with fiscal 
backing by the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the CF is a unique cross-border 
regional and private (non-governmental) foundation – maybe the only one of its 
kind in Europe – that provides grants and technical assistance to NGOs and local 
governments, focusing primarily on inter-regional economic development and 
transfrontier activities. It encourages the development of public/private/NGO 
partnerships, including cross-border and inter-ethnic approaches to promote re-
gional and community development and to help prevent conflicts. The foundation 
engages in both grant-making and programmatic activities, and since its creation 
it has granted a total of 15 million USD to more than 1,000 local organisations 
in five countries. Its grant-making activity covered a wide range of topics, such as 
Integrated Rural Community Economic Development, Carpathian Cultural Her-
itage, Interethnic Cooperation, Cross-border Cooperation, Carpathian Research, 
and Carpathian RomaNet programs and operational activities such as Carpathian 
Communal Expo and the Carpathian Fair, just to mention a few. 
The foundation played a crucial role in strengthening regional cohesion at the 
grassroots/community level, contributed to enhance the region’s absorption ca-
pacity via its grant programme, transferred know-how and innovations, and pro-
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moted the region in a wider Europe. Today, the foundation works as a network of 
five independent local foundations following the same goal with different means. 
Important lessons from the Visegrad Countries:
• In most cases the input for creating cross-border cooperation institutions 
originated from external entities. The collaborations formed by this coopera-
tion were brought about not because of common interests and regional re-
quirements, but instead focused on ideas and facilitate synergies.
• The earliest Euroregions encompassed areas too expansive to operate effec-
tively (i.e. the Carpathian Euroregion)
• Early problems arose in some countries (like Slovakia and Romania) because 
local laws did not permit lower-level administrative agencies to take part in 
transnational cooperation endeavours.
• The only Euroregions that retained operational feasibility had a genuine vested 
interest in cooperation and encompass geographically well-delineated areas.
• The predominantly common areas for cooperation are developing joint strate-
gies and institutional relationships, minor infrastructure development pro-
grammes, environmental stewardship and nature preservation, shared mar-
keting approaches, and fostering cultural identities of regions.
• The allocation of fiscal support is crucial for common development strategis-
ing, implementation, and operations, and it is important to create special 
non-governmental and independent cross-border grant-making organisations 
like the Carpathian Foundation.
• Many cooperation endeavours never progress beyond the level of protocol, 
and are never established with meaningful content.
• In some cases, cross-border ethnic relations were relevant as a factor of cohe-
sion in the facilitation of cooperation.
• Values and practises of democratic cooperation are spread through the imper-
ative functions of Euroregions involving both EU members and non-member 
states.  
Synergies in European Neighbourhoods
Cross-border cooperation remains as an important element of regional coopera-
tion. The Visegrad countries belong to the most active supporters of CBC, while 
their location on the external borders of the EU also enables them to enhance co-
operation with the neighbouring countries in Eastern and South East Europe. The 
examples of the Carpathian Euroregion and ENPI Hungary-Romania-Slovakia-
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Ukraine shows that concrete steps have been taken in order to develop coopera-
tion between some of the V4 countries on the one hand and Ukraine on the other 
hand. The joint involvement of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Hungary in 
the Danube-Drava-Sava Euroregion also shows that cross-border cooperation has 
huge potential to develop in the Western Balkans, too. 
The development of CBC is not possible unless all participating countries/re-
gions meet certain criteria. AEBR has adopted the following principles for suc-
cessful CBC: partnership, subsidiarity, existence of common development con-
cepts and programs, joint structures on regional/local levels, and independent 
sources of financing. 15 One has to add that the existence of shared values, a 
common identity, and regional consciousness are the preconditions for successful 
and long-lasting cross-border cooperation. 
It is difficult to determine which of the above-mentioned points plays the 
most important role in particular regions. The order in which these preconditions 
are listed might be different in the cases of the Visegrad Group, GUAM, or West-
ern Balkan countries. 
Also, a list of obstacles preventing countries from developing effective instru-
ments of cross-border cooperation can be made. Again, their relevance for partic-
ular regions is debatable and depends on local conditions. Besides other factors, 
such a list would contain the following: 
• different foreign policy orientation of participating countries – to what extent 
does it influence the cooperation of local authorities? 
• different perceptions of the role of national minorities – should they be con-
sidered as a divisive element or a bridge connecting regions/countries? 
• lack of stable sources of financing – how to secure continuous financing for 
CBC projects? 
• existence of technical barriers – visa issues and/or overall quality of border 
infrastructure 
• absence of political will on the side of national governments, or a lack of com-
munication between the local/regional authorities and central governments 
• lack of coordination between the stakeholders in the implementation of nec-
essary legislation.    
15  European Commission, Practical Guide to Cross-border Cooperation, http://www.aebr.net/publikationen/
pdfs/lace_guide.en.pdf.  
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Cross-border cooperation in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood
The national borders of Eastern Europe are regarded as “new frontiers” less fre-
quently than other boundaries of Central Europe. As identified by Bufon, the bor-
derlines established between states that formerly belonged to the Soviet Union 
represent an amalgam of both “old and new lines.”16
Obstacles
Throughout the Soviet era, the function of borders was very different from the 
role they transformed into after the bloc states became independent. The concept 
of regionalisation failed to gain popularity as an idea and as an instrument of 
alternative regional organisation in the area. According to Bufon, regions strad-
dling local borders in these areas have few possibilities for establishing cross-bor-
der endeavours by their own volition, and thus the function of external support 
and assistance is equally important here as it has been in Central Europe. These 
are typical characteristics of Eastern European border regions:
• Firm borders with a blatant purpose of separation
• Borders prevent historical functional cooperation
• Political and perceived levels of wariness obstruct the development of rela-
tions
• Insufficient information about each other and no history of engaging in co-
operation
• Centralised government with little regard for subsidiarity, leaving interna-
tional cooperation among territorial administrative agencies unregulated in 
local statutes
• Very limited or nonexistent fiscal support for fostering cooperation among 
border communities, particularly at local levels.
16   Bufon, M.: Le regioni nel transfrontaliere PROCESSO europea di unificazione. In: Bonavero, P., Dansero L’Europa 
delle regioni e delle reti. Torino, Utet, 1998
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Current state of cross-border cooperation
In most Eastern Neighbourhood countries – especially those belonging to GUAM 
– the CBC is regarded as a precondition of European integration processes and a 
facilitating cooperative instrument for realising shared goals, such as:
• encouraging economic development and higher living standards on both sides 
of boundaries;
• enhancing conditions for free commerce and free movement of services; 
• facilitating regional integration into European networks of transportation 
and communication;
• enhancing bilateral relations between the neighbour states;
• mitigating difficulties arising from the emergence of new boundary lines be-
tween the enlarging EU and adjacent non-accession countries;
• strengthening minority rights on each side of borders;
• facilitating political processes aiming to resolve territorial conflicts. 
Even though every GUAM country agrees on the effectiveness of CBC, its po-
tential remained mostly underdeveloped until now. Meaningful CBC efforts were 
often impacted by numerous detrimental factors, such as weak political commit-
ment; insufficient resource allocation; a lack of strategic planning; ineffective 
institutions and civil society because of incompetent governance; incomplete 
demarcation of boundaries; disrespect for laws; unresolved territorial conflicts; 
disputed property rights among partner countries; unfriendly political relations 
between certain countries; insufficient transport and communication infrastruc-
ture; and lingering interethnic tensions in boundary regions.
In the past and present, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are partic-
ipants in several regional organisations and endeavours encouraging CBC in the 
Eastern Neighbourhood area. These institutions and initiatives include the Com-
munity of Independent States (CIS), Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), 
GUAM, and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). However, ENP is the 
only organisation that has established a well-structured and fiscally substanti-
ated framework for encouraging CBC in the Eastern Neighbourhood. 
CIS could not promote CBC in the Eastern Neighbourhood 
Numerous economic, political, and structural deficiencies contributed to the fail-
ure of CIS to encourage CBC in the Eastern Neighbourhood. CIS could not realise 
an effective regional-cooperation mechanism sufficient to implement major ob-
jectives like the Free Trade Area and Common Economic Space because of cen-
trifugal properties of member states and internal systematic weaknesses. CIS has 
never had a feasible strategy for CBC backed up by the required funding. Moldova 
even declined to participate in regional cooperation fostered through a CIS mul-
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tilateral legal framework, and subsequent to Georgia’s leaving CIS in 2009 the 
opportunities for promoting inclusive CBC endeavours in the Eastern Neighbour-
hood under the auspices of the CIS have decreased.
BSEC17 has paid secondary attention to CBC
BSEC is overwhelmingly preoccupied with planning and carrying out high-profile 
initiatives, agreements, and projects to advance the concept that it represents a 
distinct political and economic region. The most pertinent regional endeavours 
of the BSEC are:
• Building Black Sea’s Beltway, an initiative established in 2008 that is still at 
the inception stage;
• A Memorandum of Understanding regarding facilitation of transportation 
and commercial activity around the Black Sea area, and facilitation of a visa 
system for professional businessmen and drivers;
• A Memorandum of Understanding regarding the development of Sea Trans-
port Corridors, which became active in 2008;
• The “Black Sea Regional Strategy (2009-2013), aiming to encourage regional 
interaction between BSEC and the EU;
• Promoting Parliamentarian Cooperation between BSEC and the EU.
The modest progress of GUAM in promoting CBC 
With political and financial assistance from the U.S. government, GUAM-mem-
ber countries achieved implementation of several CBC initiatives in the fields of 
border and customs enforcement over people and goods; money laundering; and 
preventing terrorism, cross-border organised crime, and smuggling of contra-
band. However, even with the U.S. fiscal support, the results of GUAM proved 
inconclusive regarding facilitation of commerce and transportation cooperation. 
The Japanese government initiated discussions to draft a project with GUAM 
in 2004 aiming to encourage tourism, especially to attract tourists from Japan. 
Tourism agencies from GUAM are elaborating and publishing a GUAM touristic 
guide in the framework of this project, but the implementation of it is at risk of 
being hindered by underdeveloped infrastructure and transportation, and obso-
lete hotelier infrastructures frequently found in GUAM countries. As an example, 
the feasibility of this project is already facing scepticism from some tourist agen-
17   BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) is an interesting overlap of EaP and Western Balkan, EU and 
non-EU countries as member BSEC countries are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, 
Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. www.bsec-organization.org  
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cies in Moldova. No medium or long-term strategy was drafted by GUAM for CBC 
supported by a fund of contributions from member countries. In this situation, 
CBC cooperation relies completely on external donors like the U.S. government, 
European Commission, OSCE, and other bilateral entities. 
Fiscal resources for promoting CBC 
The strategic framework for EC support fostering cross-border cooperation along 
the EU’s outer borders is established by the ENP CBC Strategy Paper 2007-2013 
and Indicative Program 2007-2010, and the programming framework and indica-
tive allocations are supplied by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI). The primary policy objectives of CBC around the Union’s ex-
ternal boundaries aim to boost economic and social development in regions on 
each side of shared borders; to tackle common challenges in issues ranging from 
the environment and public health to preventive efforts against organised crime, 
as well as ensuring secure borderlines; and promoting local cross-border people-
to-people actions.
Two sources provide financial support for the ENPI-CBC programmes: direct 
allocations from the ENPI, and from the European Regional Development Fund. 
With this funding, the total budget available for ENPI-CBC programmes for the 
period 2007-10 consists of € 274.92 million from ENPI and € 308.36 million from 
ERDF, totalling € 583.28 million. For the period 2011-13, it is predicted that a 
further € 535.15 million (€ 252.23 million from ENPI and € 282.93 million from 
ERDF) will be allocated. 
In the Eastern Neighbourhood, ENP is funding three Land-Border Pro-
grammes (Poland/Belarus/Ukraine: € 186.201 million; Romania/Moldova/
Ukraine: € 126.718 million; Hungary/Slovakia/Ukraine/Romania: € 68.638 mil-
lion) and one Sea-Basin Programme (Black Sea that covers ten states: € 17.306 
million). 
Euroregions – a CBC instrument that fell short of expectations  
The GUAM area presently encompasses three established Euroregions, involv-
ing Romania (eight border regions), Moldova (24 districts), and Ukraine (two 
regions). These two Romanian-Moldovan-Ukrainian Euro-regions are the Low 
Danube (1998) and Upper Prut (2000), in addition to the Moldovan-Romanian 
Euroregion Siret-Prut-Nistru (2000). 
Now in a dormant status, these Euroregions failed to fulfil expectations of 
communities that live in these areas. Revitalisation can take place only if exist-
ing legal frameworks for developing cross-border cooperation between Moldova, 
Romania, and Ukraine will encompass specific actions and projects based on the 
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requirements of relevant communities. Furthermore, the partners must jointly 
address the shared challenges that threaten the effectiveness and feasibility of 
the Euroregions. In this regard, a particular focus should be the enhancement of 
local authorities’ institutional and human capacities; improving transparency and 
institutional accountability of the authorities; reinforcing respect for the rule of 
law; increasing efforts to prevent corruption among local authorities; enhancing 
social capital by encouraging community development and “regional animation”; 
establishing easily understood procedures of direct joint actions taken by nation-
al authorities in border regions to foster common interests and interactions with 
EU partners; creating institutional mechanisms to include elected authorities and 
governments in cross-border cooperation endeavours at bilateral and multilateral 
levels; establishing common protocols for financing, administration, and moni-
toring of cross-border cooperation project implementation; harmonising border 
control, taxation, and customs standards and practises, along with tariff systems 
that are overregulated, especially regarding mobility of goods across borders; and 
establishing joint funds for financing or co-financing cross-border projects.  
Case: the Dniester/Nistru Euroregion as an opportunity for 
confidence building18
No political environment experiencing a frozen conflict has undergone an at-
tempt for improvement of relations through the viable instrument of the Eu-
roregion concept. The dormant conflict in the Transnistrian zone of Moldova is 
identified as a primary case where such a situation is considered for potential 
inclusion in a Euroregion initiative. The hypothetically successful establishment 
and implementation of this type of effort would be an experiment to potentially 
form a new function of the transfrontier model of cooperation already developed 
in numerous European regions. In this novel context, such an initiative would 
vary fundamentally from all other Euroregion iterations defined by sustained po-
litical animosity and historically involving violent confrontations.
The Euroregion’s tripartite nature does not inherently present any compli-
cations, instead carrying added value. The feasibility of trilateral solutions for 
18   The Dniester/Nistru Euroregion  (DNE) was initiated by local governments from Ukraine and Moldova 
several years ago. The International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT) has provided local and national 
stakeholders technical assistance by developing a feasibility study on the possible creation of the Euroregion. 
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boundary areas involving Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine is proven with other 
instances of Euroregions created with the participation of these same three ad-
jacent countries. The Upper Prut Euroregion and the Lower Danube Euroregion 
both present examples when two of the same partners in the proposed Eurore-
gion endeavour along the Dniester-Nistru engaged in structures of cross-border 
cooperation encompassing three frontiers within its geographical range.
Background
Transnistria is a site of continual political and military crises amid a frozen con-
flict representing major challenges. There appears to be no immediate solutions 
to the disagreements that would be acceptable for all parties. Beyond Transnis-
tria, many other European locations can be considered “frozen trouble spots”, like 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and in many 
respects Kosovo. 
Despite Transnistria’s declaration of independence in 1990, Russian troops 
are still stationed there now. Only two states have recognised it: South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, neither of which are internationally recognised as independent 
countries. The primary causes of Moldovan and Transnistrian conflict are rooted 
in ethnic and linguistic issues mainly pertaining to the 1989 ratification of the 
Romanian/Moldovan language as an official language.
Since 1812, the land comprising the independent Republic of Moldova was 
occupied by foreign powers for all but a few brief periods. After decades of Rus-
sian control, this territory was then subjugated by Soviet dominance for much of 
the 20th century. Amid an era of pro-Russian and anti-Romanian opinion here, 
Romanian was established as the official language, with the Latin alphabet as the 
official alphabet instead of Cyrillic. Consequently, the eastern raions of the Dni-
ester River – where the Slavic population (Russian and Ukrainian) held an abso-
lute majority – declared the independence of Transnistria, depending on Russian 
and Ukrainian political support. Negotiations are currently underway in a “5+2” 
framework to resolve the area’s status. The parties involved are Moldova, Rus-
sia, Transnistria, Ukraine, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE). Delegates of the EU and the United States serve as official ob-
servers. The Republic of Moldova and Transnistria are separated by an internal 
border that has made travel significantly more difficult between these adjacent 
areas. Consequently, numerous previously existing economic and transportation 
connections have vanished.
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The international legal status of Transnistria is still unresolved to this day, 
with the area’s leadership in Tiraspol operating according to the 1990 declaration 
of independence establishing itself as a de facto independent entity, although 
most international bodies do not recognise this. The area is an autonomous sec-
tor of the Republic of Moldova, according to the international and Moldovan 
perspective – a stance ratified in July 2005 by the Moldovan national assembly. 
While Ukraine backed this principle, Tiraspol did not recognise the legislation. 
The land of Transnistria is ruled by breakaway leaders enjoying fiscal and moral 
support from Russia, and unencumbered by Moldovan authority. 
Because of this lingering conflict, Ukraine is now involved in the issue: the pop-
ulation of Transnistria is primarily of Ukrainian nationality, and Ukraine shares 
a 409-km-long border with the area. Ukraine’s work with Moldova to address the 
conflict is evident in that the two countries have requested that the EU establish a 
mission – the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) – to Moldova 
and Ukraine to control border traffic between the two countries. Furthermore, 
EUBAM can ensure that Moldovan interests are considered at the Transnistrian-
Ukrainian boundary that is not yet patrolled by Moldova. In this crisis, Ukraine 
does not desire additional influence for either Russian or Moldovan (Romanian) 
interests. The optimal solution for Ukraine is for the area to be granted territorial 
and cultural autonomy within Moldova.
Because these tensions exist primarily at the levels of policy and politics and 
are not necessarily viewed by ordinary people at local levels, the Dniester-Nistru 
Euroregion can prove to be a practical tool for lessening tensions in the area. Ad-
ministrative, economic, institutional, civil, and other forms of local initiatives 
could be established with a bottom-up approach here. Local communities and 
economic, institutional, and civil society actors do not want to see the conflict 
continue, instead desiring to begin cross-border cooperation and the develop-
ment of local initiatives. The region is economically constrained and underdevel-
oped, with the provision of essentials for everyday life usually being the primary 
concern, made even worse by the difficulty of traversing borders and the poor 
infrastructure. The Dniester-Nistru Euroregion could serve as an example for 
conflict resolution for other frozen-conflict areas if it were to succeed. 
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Territorial characteristics
The Dniester-Nistru Euroregion’s primary territory is located amid the Podolian 
Upland, which is the south-western part traversed by the Dniester River basin. 
The area predominantly encompasses plains with some gentle hills; no tall moun-
tains are located there. The region’s two major rivers are the Dniester River and 
the Southern Buh, located in the Ukrainian territory of the Vinnitsya oblast. 
The planned territory of the DNE. Source: ICDT
The total territory of the Dniester-Nistru Euroregion would be 30,547.3 km2 with 
a population totalling some 2,036,000 within four districts (raions) from Moldo-
va, two districts (raions) from the other side of the Dnister River (Transnistria), 
and the Vinnitsa oblast from Ukraine, according to the National Bureau of Statis-
tics of the Republic of Moldova19 and the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.20
When examining the ethnic makeup only within the adjacent border zones 
and not of the entire Euroregion, the multiethnic composition is evident in this 
19   www.statistica.md
20   http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/
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region that includes three Ukrainian raions directly bordering the five Moldovan 
raions. The ethnic diversity and the challenges that accompany such diversity 
lend insight to the history of the area, which in varied eras has also been affiliated 
with varied prevailing political centres, which contributes to the establishment of 
a multiethnic society aiming for peaceful co-existence and receptive to multilin-
gualism and multicultural interaction.
Negative characteristics of this region include a weak economy, insufficient in-
frastructure, a disproportionately aging population, unemployment and outward 
migration of professionals, and severe environmental damage in the Dniester 
River. Nonetheless, the region bears several excellent opportunities that could 
present intensive and effective cross-border cooperation beneficial for not only 
the affiliated entities but also for the whole region, which could boost Transnis-
tria’s attempts to overcome isolation.  
Atmosphere of mistrust 
A strong sense of wariness exists on all sides of the boundary regarding politi-
cal and administrative authorities, institutions, and regional residents. One 
cause of this mistrust could be insufficient mutual knowledge about counterpart 
populations, or a prevalence of superficial knowledge. Several misconceptions or 
polarising political attitudes may be an additional factor. Cooperation within a 
Euroregion may foster an atmosphere of trust, or might at least assuage exist-
ing tensions to improve the region’s appearance both internally and externally. 
A healthy cross-border relationship could stand out as an example for coopera-
tion on higher or centralised political levels that can significantly ease overriding 
general political tensions. In some cases Euroregional cooperation has fostered 
democratic practises and respect for mutual values and interests, both within and 
beyond the areas participating in the cooperation.
Trust should be strengthened through the development of communities, in-
stitutions, and cooperation frameworks, and democratic cooperation should be 
enhanced. The causes of apparent tensions among nations and peoples are often 
from a lack of mutual understanding. An appropriate framework for cross-border 
cooperation and common development programmes can be fostered by the Eu-
roregion, offering opportunities to build personal impressions, experiences, and 
knowledge. The prospects of forging improved relations in the Dniester-Nistru 
Euroregion among individuals, organisations, and institutions can be enhanced 
if Russian is established as the language commonly spoken between potential 
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partner entities. Interactions among NGOs and institutions share the same goals 
and are enhanced by the idea that in numerous circumstances particular pub-
lic services can be more effectively provided through cross-border efforts than 
within domestic boundaries. To some extent, education and healthcare are also 
relevant to this category. Shared Euroregion-level planning could also be eased if 
the delegates of relevant administrative agencies develop good working relation-
ships, or potentially come to support some type of Euroregional understanding. 
Common themes and proposed strategic areas for cooperation
The findings of needs assessments and results of discussions between local stake-
holders following a thorough examination of external and internal conditions 
and possible opportunities have identified five common themes where positive 
change is viable. These themes encompass shared motives and encourage a frame-
work for developing a Euroregion:
1. Economic Development Cooperation:  The objective of economic development 
cooperation is to maximise all positive synergies that are available through 
regional cross-border cooperation with a goal of contributing to the strength-
ening of all elements of regional infrastructure. This would especially have a 
considerable impact on the region’s economic situation, creating jobs that lead 
to more diversified and efficient education.
2. Tourism Development Cooperation: Significant potential exists for coopera-
tion in tourism regarding the creation of feasible objectives in terms of Eu-
roregional collaboration. Every potential partner within the Dniester-Nistru 
Euroregion bears significant tourism potential, especially regarding the fields 
of cultural, medical, environmental, and rural tourism.
3. Infrastructure and Transportation Development Cooperation: Cooperation to 
enhance transportation and infrastructure is a prerequisite for all other forms 
of collaboration. The most obvious immediate obstacle to overcome could be 
the very poor condition of regional transportation infrastructure and cross-
border transport facilities.
4. Environmental and Disaster Management: The revival and conservation of 
the Dniester River’s natural life could be enhanced through cooperation on 
environmental issues, including water-quality improvement and widespread 
ecological protection. A major problem of the region is created by raw sewage 
being released into the river, creating detrimental effects on the ecosystem 
and negatively impacting tourism potential. Furthermore, weak coordination 
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over flood-prevention efforts along the Dniester River represents a dangerous 
threat that can be addressed through cooperation.
5. Cooperation among Communities, Institutions, and Individuals: Tensions 
among peoples and countries are often rooted in a lack of knowledge about 
one another. Efforts to overcome such ignorance can enhance trust and foster 
the advancement of democratic cooperation.
As a feasible instrument for enhancing collaboration, the Euroregion concept 
has not yet been utilised to ease the political environment of a frozen conflict. 
The unresolved disputes in Moldova’s Transnistrian region would represent the 
initiatory case where such circumstances are considered for possible resolution 
through a Euroregion initiative. If it could be created effectively, the endeavour 
would become an experiment to test a hypothetical new function of the transna-
tional model of cooperation already established in many European regions. In 
this context, an example of this type of Euroregion initiative would differ funda-
mentally from all other versions being characterised by long-term political con-
flict that once involved violent confrontation.
The Euroregion’s tripartite nature does not inherently present any complica-
tions to these efforts, and instead carries added value. Other examples of Eurore-
gions created to involve Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine established the effec-
tiveness of trilateral solutions for peripheral areas involving these three adjacent 
countries. The Upper Prut Euroregion and the Lower Danube Euroregion both 
present examples demonstrating when two of the same partners in this pro-
posed Euroregion initiative along the Dniester-Nistru participated in structures 
of cross-border cooperation that included three frontiers within its geographical 
range. 
The process of establishing confidence is a long-term effort requiring the sus-
tained engagement of all parties. Bringing together opposing sides by initiating 
coordination and establishing contacts is a crucial step in the gradual progress 
of confidence-building measures, even prior to any concrete result being realised 
in addressing the protracted conflict in Transnistria. The Dniester-Nistru Eu-
roregion has the potential to enhance the range of potential cooperation among 
participants via the implementation of viable projects, including the direct in-
volvement of the Transnistrian side to present considerable opportunities for 
collaboration and confidence-building among Moldova’s conflicting sides of the 
river.
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Cross-border Cooperation in the Western Balkans
Challenges 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia created political conditions in the region that 
limited prospects for and interest in regional and cross-border cooperation of any 
kind. From the very beginning of the decomposition of the Yugoslav Federation, 
the Western Balkan countries have been facing three parallel basic processes – 
first they have to build a modern and functioning state, which, unfortunately in 
most cases, is based on the ethnicity principle of the 19th century. The current 
level of achievements is highly unequal. There are functioning states (Croatia, 
Serbia), weak states (Albania, FYROM, Montenegro), and international protec-
torates that exhibit features of failed states (Bosnia-Herzegovina). Kosovo can 
most probably be put into the last category. Secondly, state-building is connected 
with the development of transforming states. To different degrees, all Western 
Balkan countries are still hostages of ex-Yugoslavia both in economic terms and 
in social attitudes. State-building concentrating on differentiation from others 
and seeking instruments of self-strengthening in closed, inward looking, and au-
tarchic policies would lead to a complete fiasco. Thirdly, adjustment to EU require-
ments produces a process of member-state building. Can establishing this as a 
top priority be considered as an adequate instrument to support state-building 
and transformation? Or should these countries achieve a certain level of normal 
state functioning before membership building becomes the highest priority? Is a 
top-down or a bottom-up process more promising? Or should both go their way 
simultaneously, hoping that history, favourable developments, or genuine and 
responsible government policies can create the interface where, at one moment 
in the future, the two processes meet each other and are smoothly connected? 
Since nation- and state-building is generally a process taking several decades and 
not without domestic and external (regional) tensions, and the Western Balkan 
political dynamism is much quicker, the EU had to support membership-building 
as an instrument to foster regional stability. The EU has had a key role in support-
ing economic rebuilding and stabilisation in the region. 
The idea of regional cooperation among the Balkan countries came onto the 
agenda at the end of the 1980s with the birth of the Balkan Stability and Coopera-
tion Conference; however, with the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis, the question 
of high-level cooperation necessarily and unavoidably lost all rationale after 1991. 
Instead, each Balkan state tried to smooth over the historic rifts by entering into 
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bilateral agreements. It is important to emphasise bilateralism: the countries of 
the region had never considered cooperation on a regional scale as a viable option. 
At the beginning of the 1990s in South Eastern Europe, the process of Bal-
kanisation accelerated as conflict followed conflict, which led to the development 
of smaller states and political units. In contrast to the dominant integration proc-
esses going on in Western and Central Europe, the Balkans witnessed fragmenta-
tion, wars, and economic decline. Balkanisation has presented serious security-
policy risks in this region and in the international community through indirect 
channels. One of the most important characteristics of the violent processes that 
occurred in the Balkans is that they spread from one country to the other, and 
were accompanied by floods of refugees, the penetration of criminal networks, 
and the spread of hard-line nationalism. These processes were able to uproot even 
the best-intentioned political leadership, and the opportunities for strengthening 
interstate relations as an option. It became increasingly evident that this proc-
ess could not be maintained forever, and all concerned parties agreed – at least 
at the level of words – that the international community had to assume greater 
responsibility in shaping the future of the region by encouraging and facilitating 
the improvement of intraregional relations at both political and economic levels.
It was essentially this objective that eventually led to the birth of the Stability 
Pact in June of 1999, and various Marshall Plan-like proposals that subsequently 
became futile.21 The proposals were underpinned by the fundamental realisation 
that democracy, stability, and economic prosperity could not be imported into 
the region, but at the same time they were also unable to evolve naturally because 
of conflicts within the region. The international community (and particularly the 
EU) may help establish the conditions, but establishing democracy, stability, and 
economic welfare is primarily the responsibility of the region’s people. Nonethe-
less, the Stability Pact was the first sign of the West trying to establish some sort 
of structure to knock the Balkans out of the vicious cycle of violence and dis-
integration. Now these external initiatives have proved invaluable in promoting 
intraregional cooperation. 
However, the development of regional relations stood little chance for many 
years to follow. In the period of time since the change of regime, the Balkans have 
distanced themselves from the mainstream world economy and world politics in 
all respects; their position is peripheral even in comparison with Central Europe. 
Despite the production structures in the individual countries being very similar, 
21   The external support as a precondition for mass investment programs (that can be an engine for catching 
up) in developing countries was heavily discussed during the 1950s and 1960s in economic thinking. For the 
South East Europe region, a similar proposal was drafted as early as 1943 by Rosenstein Rodan.
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the industrial production capacities of the former Yugoslavia had disintegrated 
or been destroyed in the war, while all of the usable components were transferred 
to foreigners. 
The stabilisation and association process (SAP) guiding the preparation of 
Western Balkan countries for accession to the European Union is crucially depend-
ent on regional cooperation. The process initiated in 2000 at Zagreb’s Balkan-EU 
summit was given fresh impetus by the European Council’s Thessaloniki meeting 
of June 2003, which strengthened SAP as the EU’s policy for the West Balkans 
while reinforcing EU perspectives of the SAP countries (with participating coun-
tries permitted to join the EU once fully prepared) with official acceptance of the 
“Thessaloniki Agenda”. A major benefit of the SAP is that it abated trade relations 
with the EU and also between countries in the region. The realisation of the pre-
vious objective was supposed to be eased by considerable allowances provided 
by the EU, and the latter objective was fostered by the free-trade agreements of 
the region’s countries. The range of bilateral free-trade agreements of South East 
Europe was complete by 2006 – from an economic perspective, the 2006 Central 
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA 2006) proved to be a breakthrough in 
regional cooperation; with the former parties concluding their membership as 
they joined the EU, the agreement was ratified by the governments of the West 
Balkans, which gave it content and purpose. 
Regional cooperation and reintegration among the Western Balkan states 
benefited from considerable support by the EU over the past ten years. It is wide-
ly assumed that increasing the level of regional cooperation will contribute to 
good neighbourly relations, with more effective and durable solutions of prob-
lems having a cross-border dimension, consequently enhancing living standards, 
a stronger democracy, and the emergence of tolerant multi-ethnic societies by 
bringing around reconciliation in the region. At the same time, regional coopera-
tion can be a kind of training ground for these countries where they can learn how 
to cooperate with each other on a bilateral or multilateral basis before actually 
entering the EU.
In this context it is clear that these are basically merely potential benefits that 
regional cooperation may bring with it – the extent to which these benefits will 
prove to become actual gains depends to a large extent on the motivations of 
the participating states. If the agreements aimed at facilitating regional coopera-
tion are perceived by these countries as a result of external pressure, and there 
is no real political will to implement them and enhance the way they function, 
they may not ‘teach’ these states to work together on a number of issues and ad-
vance good neighbourly relations. Their overarching aim will be to please the EU 
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by painting a positive picture about the region, and the agreements will have only 
as much content as is required to meet this aim.
Encouraging regional ownership
The Regional Cooperation Council took over for the Stability Pact for South-East-
ern Europe in 2008, solidifying a regionally controlled and independent structure 
for cooperation that emphasises local ownership while ensuring that the global 
community would continue participating in the consultation and coordination 
processes.
The other important issue is the outside framework for supporting region-
al cooperation.  Promotion of regional cooperation among applicant states was 
characteristic of the EU during the last round of enlargement as well, but it is 
not an exaggeration to state that the Union places far more emphasis on this 
issue than during previous enlargements, and it also faces more challenges. In 
the context of the Balkans we see that individual countries tend to focus on at-
tempting to distinguish themselves from the others. To this we may add that 
the EU’s enlargement policy based on ‘individual merits’ and – at least seemingly 
– building to a great extent on the principle of ‘divide and rule’ by organising a 
competition among the candidates in which the score is primarily only known 
in Brussels, does make it harder for countries here to choose a suitable partner 
with whom they could advance faster. All of these characteristics make regional 
and sub-regional cooperation in the Western Balkans harder to achieve, and they 
also compel the EU to undertake a more active role in this field compared to the 
previous enlargement, where one could also see applicants starting sub-regional 
integrations more or less ‘spontaneously’.
Current state of cross-border cooperation
As in the case of Central Europe, the EastWest Institute played an important role 
in the 1990s to initiate and assist cross-border cooperation in the Western Bal-
kans, such as the Prespa Euroregion in the bordering areas of Albania, Greece, 
and Macedonia, or the Nis-Skopje-Belgrade cooperation. 
Currently, there are 13 Euroregions in the Western Balkans, but only a few 
of them are functioning, such as the Adriatic Euroregion covering three Adri-
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atic countries (Albania, Croatia, and Italy) as well as the Euroregion Eurobalkan, 
which is the framework of the Nis-Skopje-Belgrade triangle cooperation. The rest 
of the Euroregions are dormant, existing only on paper with nice declarations 
and ambitious goals but no activity. The success of CBC initiatives in the region 
is challenged by many factors. First, the border municipalities are often left out 
of national-level programs targeting development, democratisation and capacity 
building. Secondly, municipalities and civil societies usually have much weaker 
capacities than those more centrally located. Thirdly, the tensions between eth-
nic groups are often higher in the border regions, and mistrust, which is one of 
the key conditions for CBC, is high, while central-level politics will always have 
a knock-on impact on the ground – making the social and political barriers to 
cooperation greater. Fourth, several unsolved interstate debates and conflicts ex-
ist, such as Kosovo’s declaration of independence and Serbia’s non-recognition of 
it, as well as the name debate between FYROM and Greece. All of these factors 
thwart cross-border cooperation.
Case: grassroots confidence building in the bordering areas of Kosovo, 
Macedonia, and Serbia
CBC is identified as key in re-establishing relationships between groups separated 
by both conflicts and new borders, and therefore has a fundamental purpose in 
conflict prevention and at re-building links while building positive connections 
between divided groups, and must be a basis for activities regarding shared needs 
and priorities, and addressing common interests (i.e. not just bringing people to-
gether for the sake of doing so, but instead as a functional conduit toward meet-
ing needs of all groups). The approach should be based in participatory method-
ology: working groups proposed by communities are voluntary, and define their 
own objectives and activities through collective agreement with guidance from 
implementers.
Definition and character of the micro-region22 
As a unit, the micro-region covered by the project consists of a territory cover-
ing four ethnically mixed municipalities – Gjilan/Gnjilane (Kosovo), Kumanovo 
22   This project was initiated by the EastWest Institute and the Institute for Stability and Development. The 
project description is the extract of Valbona Tahiri presentation at ICDT conference on the Role of CBC in 
Regional Cooperation held in Chisinau, Moldova, June 2010.  
241
(Macedonia), and Presevo and Trgoviste (south Serbia) – and therefore the acro-
nym GPKT was formed from the first letters of the names of the four towns. The 
region has more than 280,000 inhabitants of different ethnicities. 
The three main ethnic groups are the Albanian, Macedonian, and Serbian 
communities, and additionally there are smaller communities of Roma, Turk, 
and Vlach ethnic origin. The region is divided by two significant boundaries: the 
Macedonia-Serbia border, and between Kosovo and Serbia. 
Following the Kumanovo Memorandum of 2002, which was signed by local 
mayors from Macedonia, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Kosovo, with reference to the Sta-
bility Pact’s support in this area, EWI and key local municipalities agreed to con-
centrate on project-based activities on a core grouping of municipalities – G, P, 
and K, or the cross-border GPK ‘micro-region’ as it has become known. With SIDA 
and Danish funding, the GPK project activities were launched in early 2003. 
About a year later, following the March violence in Kosovo, the three mayors 
agreed at a strategic meeting that a fourth municipality should join the micro-
region, one with a majority Serb population in order to ensure that the micro-
region initiative would not be perceived as either pro- or anti-Albanian. The mu-
nicipality of Trgoviste was proposed and accepted as this new fourth member, 
and the micro-region became GPKT in 2004.
This inclusion of Trgoviste is a relevant example, indicating the importance of 
the aim of conflict prevention for the GPKT Project and associated municipali-
ties. The approach of the GPKT Project has therefore been to address inter-ethnic 
and cross-border relationship-building at the same time as engaging in municipal 
capacity-building and work on joint economic development. 
The GPKT Project objective is to foster sustainable inter-ethnic and CBC prac-
tises for systematic cooperation in the micro-region. Beside the work with com-
munities at local levels, ISD works to influence key decision-makers in national 
capitals and international organisations in favour of the border communities and 
affected population with whom it works, and to draw attention to their needs and 
aspirations, thus taking a ‘bottom-up and top-down approach’.
The wide range of activities is designed to:
• reduce tensions, 
• promote security and stability, 
• develop the capacity of the four municipalities and civil society, 
• promote key policy changes important to the micro-region, and 
• create frameworks for, and normalise, cross-border collaboration – between 
municipalities in terms of economic development, communication, and coor-
dination, but also between communities in various thematic areas. 
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Project architecture 
The four municipalities have been the major ‘building blocks’ of the project to date. 
The role of the GPKT Project in terms of municipal development was focused on 
facilitating strategic political dialogue between the municipal authorities and on 
building the capacities of the four municipalities for cross-border cooperation. 
The GPKT Project’s activities cover four key working groups with participation 
drawn largely from civil society, media, schools, and youth. 
Education Working Group
The type of activities the education committee is involved in depends on the de-
gree of autonomy each school has. There is a need for the governments to be 
made aware that the process of education, especially on recent history, needs to 
be managed carefully because of the diametrically opposite understanding of the 
developments in recent years. Thus, this includes the development of capacities 
of teachers that will be reconciliation-orientated.
Youth Working Group
In the summer of 2007, local NGOs were established in each of the three terri-
tories to “indigenise” the work of the Youth Council. Another question that it is 
important to raise is the sustainability of the Youth Council, which is dependent 
on committed leadership and financial support. 
Women’s Working Group
This working group includes female NGO activists and leaders, female pro-
fessionals, and female community representatives, and the group com-
prises women from all four municipalities and ethnicities in the GPKT area. 
The question of sustainability of the cross-border women’s initiatives also remains 
an issue. However, The establishment of a cross-border network of activists is 
something significant in itself, and advances the conditions for future work.
Media Working Group
From the aspect of trans-frontier cooperation, work with the media is key to suc-
cess in the process of promotion of such cooperation, and getting additional sup-
port to local ownership over the process. It has to be noted that due to the nature 
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of the media – whereas most of them are for-profit organisations – it has been 
quite difficult to keep them engaged on a voluntary basis in the process. 
Lessons learned from the process
Relationship building and confidence building is at the heart of this work, and it 
requires an enormous amount of time spent by staff to build and maintain trust, 
a process key to the success and ability to continue work in difficult and uncer-
tain circumstances. Plans for economic growth, security, and development in the 
broader region will be subject to collapse if the trust necessary for the mainte-
nance of relationships has not been built.
Links between the local level and the central level are key. In issues of borders 
often being on the periphery – despite the fact that the stability of the micro-re-
gion is critical for stabilisation throughout the broader region – local knowledge 
is critical for appropriate and effective planning.
Capacity building needs to be appropriate and institutionalised in this region 
plagued by issues of high turnover and erratic elections. Training frequency is 
another issue here – people are weary of being trained (even though capacity-
building is strongly needed), but if you train only one person the institutionalised 
memory can easily be lost.
‘Learning by doing’ is the best approach – take recommendations from partici-
pants about what they want to be trained in and how best to implement training. 
Development (including conflict prevention) requires long-term strategies 
premised on broad stakeholder involvement and local ownership if they are to be 
sustainable. 
Summary and conclusions
To overcome natural and governmental borders between countries to mitigate 
historical conflicts and prejudices between people and communities of bound-
ary areas, cross-border cooperation is imperative. CBC is also a tool to link the 
periphery and centre, while promoting economic development and improvement 
of operational local and regional administrative frameworks. 
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As one of the crucial factors of regional cooperation, CBC has bilateral, region-
al, and European dimensions. Local administrations, civil-society organisations, 
and local enterprises can be considered as important actors in the procedures of 
CBC.
Particular successes and failures of the Visegrad Cooperation can all be ben-
eficial as examples in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and in the Western Balkan 
regions. These experiences can be summarised thusly: 
1. Local-level CBC occurs as a result of natural development, and has therefore 
been a harder and lengthier process than the formation of the Visegrad Group 
itself. 
2. CBC can be more difficult to achieve than interstate relations. The real chal-
lenge for state-level institutions and international organisations regarding the 
promotion of CBC is to establish a sustainable legal and institutional structure 
for CBC. 
3. The delegation of authority regarding a particular issue to the lowest level 
where it can be addressed (subsidiarity) is crucial for CBC to succeed and pre-
vent decision making from becoming bureaucratic. 
4. Precise financial systems must be developed, such as in the case of the ENPI 
CBC instrument. 
5. Constant attention must be paid to local capacity building.
6. The function of CBC is crucial to the process of European integration.
CBC is an important instrument for most Eastern Neighbourhood countries, 
advancing European integration procedures across boundaries and serving as a 
useful mechanism of cooperation for realising shared goals, such as:
• Encouraging economic development and improved living standards for com-
munities of areas involved by improving conditions for investments, free 
trade, and unrestrained mobility of services, particularly by promoting re-
gional integration into European communication and transport networks;
• Enhancing bilateral relations among adjacent countries and assisting politi-
cal systems intended to address territorial conflicts, including the encourage-
ment of minority rights on each side of borders;
• Mitigating challenges stemming from the rise of new dividing lines between 
the expanding EU states and countries lacking prospects for membership. 
Three primary facets of analysing CBC (and regional hindrances to CBC) in 
the target areas are determining the role of states and local governments in CBC, 
financing and co-financing of CBC, and identifying mutual impacts of regional 
initiatives and CBC.
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The role of national and local governments in CBC
National governments perform a crucial function in the development of CBC. The 
state is a dominant actor in domestic politics, but also has a primary role on the 
global stage. Since states frame the entire development of CBC, specific attention 
must be paid to these factors:
Legislation
Legislation enacted by national governments should foster the development of 
CBC, and should consider suggestions of local-government representatives and 
civil society organisations. Countries that genuinely want to develop CBC should 
harmonise pertinent legislation with neighbour states. 
Decentralisation
The development of CBC hinges on the process of decentralisation. When region-
al and local governments acquire stronger competencies, opportunities for the 
improvement of CBC are expanded. 
Transparency in decision-making
Transparency concerns state governments in addition to regional and local ad-
ministrations. Preventing corruption is a pivotal challenge for both the Western 
Balkan and EaP countries, although the V4 countries should also address this is-
sue vigorously. Only a transparent decision-making process enables relevant CBC 
stakeholders to trust each other. 
Positive relations with neighbours
Good neighbourly relations comprise an important precondition for enhancing 
CBC. It is nearly impossible for neighbouring countries that contest their shared 
borders to develop fruitful CBC. Yet unsettled boundaries are not the sole chal-
lenge that can hinder positive neighbourly relations – other problems concern 
animosity between political leaders, or a lack of political will to address tensions.
Relations between local governments and the state 
The relationship between local and state governments is important from the per-
spective of creating effective CBC. One problem in this issue might be varying 
political orientations of the officials from local and state administrations.
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Relations among state and local governments and CSOs 
Positive relations among state and local governments and CSOs are another pre-
condition for effective CBC. Governments should regard CSOs as partners and 
not as distractions. This attitude also concerns the relationship between local 
governments and CSOs – regional administrations need to coordinate their ef-
forts at a grassroots level to be relevant at the central level. 
Financing and co-financing
Financing and co-financing is of paramount importance for CBC, and therefore 
states should actively participate in the financing of CBC, because positive rela-
tions with neighbours and regional cooperation are among their primary foreign-
policy priorities, and are necessary for advancement in efforts toward European 
integration. Additional funding sources include international financial institu-
tions and other donors (funds, foundations, etc.). For instance, the International 
Visegrad Fund apparently draws partners both in the Western Balkans and the 
EaP countries because it is a unique institution devoted to funding cultural, edu-
cational, and cross-border cooperation projects. During the decade of its exist-
ence, the IVF has developed into an important actor in supporting the encourage-
ment of Visegrad cooperation.  
Regional efforts and their impact on CBC
The function of the Visegrad group for the development of CBC is crucial. The 
importance of CBC in establishing positive neighbourly relations is not only rec-
ognised politically and embedded in all major V4 documents – including the para-
mount guidelines and declarations – but is also fiscally supported through the 
Visegrad Fund. 
Problems still plague the Western Balkans regarding insufficient indigenous 
and effective regional initiatives in this field. While initiatives exist that warrant 
consideration, like the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) or the Southeast Eu-
ropean Cooperation Process (SEECP), they lack sophisticated solutions to sup-
port the development of CBC.  
The participation of Eastern Neighbourhood countries in the Eastern Partner-
ship concept presents opportunities for the regional improvement of CBC. Still, 
expectations should be kept at a minimum for now, because the EaP remains at a 
stage of being fleshed out in practise. The EaP Civil Society Forum can provide an 
additional initiative to be used for CBC development. 
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Recommendations
While central authorities do not implement CBC, they need to establish the prop-
er legal, institutional, and financial preconditions for it. Continual coordination 
and sharing of experience and information between state and local levels is there-
fore imperative. The organisation of “NGO Fairs” – where all interested stake-
holders could share their ideas and goals, and thus create a platform for dialogue 
while seeking partners and funding – could provide a useful instrument in both 
areas. Furthermore, NGO Fairs may draw the attention of international donors. 
Dialogue should also be institutionalised among Euroregions to exchange experi-
ences and promote the development of this particular form of CBC. 
A recurring forum should be established for border dialogue in order to en-
courage CBC in a broader arena throughout Europe, and to represent the particu-
lar interests and requirements of boundary regions in the Western Balkans and 
the European Neighbourhood area at a transnational level. 
In support of replicating the IVF model in the EaP and Western Balkan re-
gions, the International Visegrad Fund is prepared to take part in establishing 
technical assistance on the IVF model for interested governmental and non-gov-
ernmental delegates. 
Because Euroregions are a crucial instrument for CBC, countries should begin 
the required endeavours to reinvigorate them by taking advantage of the best 
practises provided by well-established Euroregions, such as the Carpathian Eu-
roregion and the Carpathian Foundation. 
The experience of Visegrad also demonstrates that partnerships among local, 
regional, and central authorities are imperative for developing and carrying out 
cross-border cooperation projects. Such is the situation in Slovakia, where the 
inter-ministerial CBC committees have engaged the local, regional, and central 
authorities in an ongoing communication network regarding issues concerning 
CBC. These committees assist them in identifying concrete needs, developing 
projects, finding resources, and monitoring the realisation of projects.
The EU fulfils an increasingly crucial function in establishing medium-term 
strategies and fiscal resources for encouraging CBC. The strategic framework for 
EC support for cross-border cooperation on the outer boundaries of the European 
Union is provided for by the ENP CBC Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and Indicative 
Program 2007-2010, along with indicative allocations and programming struc-
tures under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). 
In the Eastern Neighbourhood, ENP is financing three Land-Border Programmes 
–Poland-Belarus-Ukraine (€ 186.201 million), Hungary-Slovakia-Ukraine-Roma-
nia (€ 68.638 million), and Romania-Moldova-Ukraine (€ 126.718 million) – and 
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one Sea-Basin Programme encompassing ten states (€ 17.306 million). Nonethe-
less, granting procedures for available EU funds to support CBC should be simpli-
fied; including major relief from administrative burdens imposed upon applicant 
NGOs and varied local organisations. Meanwhile, more (and more-flexible) fis-
cal support is required to support micro-projects and/or commence projects (i.e. 
small grant plans) as a way to increase dynamism to cross-border cooperation and 
involve more local actors.
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the Role oF CIvIl soCIety  
In RegIonal CooPeRatIon
Introduction
The European Commission President, Jose Barroso, speaking to journalists in 
Brussels about The European Council’s December 17, 2010 agreement to give 
Montenegro candidate status for EU membership, said “This is a strong signal of 
our commitment to the future of the Balkans”1 .
Half a year prior to this milestone, in June of 2010 the EU-Balkans High Level 
Meeting in Sarajevo marked the 10th anniversary of the Zagreb Summit of No-
vember 25, 2000, during which the EU launched the Stabilization and Association 
Process and the European perspective for Western Balkans. Before the meeting 
civil society representatives from the Western Balkans submitted a joint state-
ment calling for a new impetus for the process of their countries’ accession to 
the EU, and a reinvigorated and clarified policy towards full-fledged EU member-
ship. The statement, signed by over 450 NGOs from six countries of the region, 
highlights five policy recommendations. A key one of them is: “Encourage the 
countries of the region to strive for the following goals:  candidate status for all of 
the countries by the end of 2011. (Civil Society Representatives from the Western 
Balkans Call for New Impetus for EU Accession, 1, June 2o1o).”  
The fact that 450 organisations of the region were able to articulate a joint 
recommendation of such a major scale is an important achievement and shows 
the incredible stake that civil society has in this process, as well as the high level 
of organised civil society in the region. 
There are signs of organised, policy-oriented civil society in the Eastern Part-
nership countries too, where, for example, The Eastern Partnership Civil Society 
Forum gathered over 200 representatives of civil society from EaP countries and 
EU Member States to prepare comments, discuss, and make recommendations in 
order to help implement the goals of the Eastern Partnership, such as supporting 
democratic and economic reforms and advancement. Its Forum of CSOs prepared 
1   sofiaecho.com 
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recommendations which were then presented at the meeting of the European 
Council of Ministers, expressing a wish to become institutional partners of the 
EU’s institutions, Member States, and the EaP authorities, in planning, imple-
menting, monitoring, and evaluating the Eastern Partnership programmes. „This 
initiative provides an opportunity for the partner countries to integrate with Eu-
ropean institutions by developing stable democratic structures, and by enabling 
the stronger participation of civil society in areas such as human rights, electoral 
standards, media freedom, combating corruption, and the training and network-
ing of local authorities.”2
Against this background the International Centre for Democratic Transition 
(ICDT) has been working on its project “Sharing the Experiences of the Visegrad 
Cooperation in the Western Balkans and the EaP with a special focus on GUAM 
Countries”. One of the project’s focus areas is civil society. 
The three regions of the project are very different from one another, their 
context is incomparable, and their civil societies are hardly the same. Nevertheless 
there are some overarching similarities in their history and current development. 
The examined regions’ tradition of civil society shares the common historical 
heritage of the Communist past, when state dominance in all spheres of life was 
the norm for decades. The regions have all been influenced by negative experiences 
like enforced participation during the Communist decades; they have young 
and fragile newly minted civil society sectors and resource dry environments, 
to name a few similarities of concern. At the same time, they also share some 
mutual, positive elements such as the relative freshness of the sectors, the great 
opportunities for change, and substantial international attention (especially that 
of the US and the EU) towards democracy and civil society in these regions. 
The Post-Communist Civil Society of the region
This paper employs the notion of pluralistic representative democracy and re-
duces the object of the analysis to organized civil society; it focuses on recent 
developments based on case presentations. For the purposes of this paper, civil 
society is defined as an intermediary space between the area of private interests 
and the state, and it concentrates on organized civil society (as one component of 
civil society). Civil society is a vital part of participatory democracy and, as such 
2   http://www.epd.eu/eastern-partnership-civil-society-forum
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is located outside the spheres of market, state, and private life. It is in the sphere 
of civil society that active citizens become conscious of the interconnectedness 
of what the modern sociology calls the ‘lifeworld’. In this sense, our concept of 
civil society closely corresponds to Arendt’s, Kubik’s and Habermas’ definitions of 
civil society as a ground for the public sphere, or identical with the public sphere 
(Arendt 1998, Kubik 2000, Habermas 2003). 
From the 1970s on, the term, as well as the concept, of civil society itself has 
played an important role in opposition against the Communist regimes. Together 
with Latin America, the experiences of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have 
contributed to a revival of the term. The main authors who have influenced the 
understanding of civil society by CEE dissidents include the Hungarian philoso-
pher György Konrád, Polish journalist and writer Adam Michnik, and Czech play-
wright Vaclav Havel. For supporters of dissident movements, civil society was an 
integral part of their everyday life, it was a lifestyle. The dissidents’ understand-
ing of civil society was based on a number of core normative concerns: an ethical 
imperative for action, belief in humanism, support for human rights, opposition 
to the state, and the autonomy of the individual and the defense of human dig-
nity (Michnik, 1990. 11.3.). 
In this context civil society was a form of “anti-politics,” a term coined by Kon-
rád in the 1980s, or “parallel polis” as Petr Pithart put it at about the same time. 
Havel’s essay Power of the Powerless also played a very important role. In this es-
say he accentuated the ethical imperatives of action and coined the term “living in 
truth” as the antithesis of everyday life under an authoritative regime. For Havel 
and other dissidents across Central Europe, civil society was a project, vision, and 
program which did not so much exist in a separate social sphere from the state as 
in direct opposition to it and its totalitarian apparatus.
A very important feature of how civil society was conceived within the dis-
sident intellectual circles was its strong opposition to the use of violence. An ex-
ample of the rejection of violence in Central Europe can be seen in the public 
campaign entitled “Give the policeman an orange!” organized in Poland in 1980s, 
during which protesters presented on-duty policemen with the then-scarce tropi-
cal fruit. Another similar example was one of the key slogans used by the protest-
ers in Prague on  November 17, 1989: “We have bare hands!” The main goal of 
these actions was to highlight the non-legitimate use of violent force - a power 
that was concentrated in the hands of state. 
The discursive controversy surrounding the notion of civil society mirrors the 
ideological struggle between the proponents of an active merging of civil soci-
ety and politics (in CEE, one of the most active promoters of this approach is 
the former Czech president Vaclav Havel) and their counterparts (represented 
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in the CEE most vocally by the current Czech president Vaclav Klaus). The lat-
ter group view civil society as a dispensable addition to (elitist) representative 
democracy, and wish to reduce citizens’ participation solely to elections ((Klaus, 
2002). However, the core of this dispute is deeper - it concerns the delineation of 
state and civil society spheres of influence. In the area this paper concerns, the 
confrontation between these two approaches is especially contradictory and cru-
cial - based on historical experience. Post-Communist countries, as well as Europe 
as a whole, are currently facing discursive conflicts about the meaning and role of 
civil society. Current research in the field (Rakusanova 2007) demonstrates that 
the controversy reaches beyond opposing interests or power positions vis-à-vis 
civil society. Rather, the clash over the concept of civil society is an important 
manifestation of rival theoretical conceptualizations of democracy. As such, this 
clash is directly related to current debates about the nature of democracy in the 
emerging European polity. 
Main challenges and good practices 
This section reflects on the current state of organized civil society in the three 
regions of this project and highlights some specific examples and case studies of 
the efforts made to advance its development. The strengths and weaknesses of 
organized civil society in the three regions are assessed to evaluate the overall 
dynamics of civil society, while cases are presented to show the challenges and 
opportunities. 
The three regions and their component countries are vastly different, never-
theless there are some overarching issues, and certain patterns have emerged in 
the different countries and the response to them has varied according to the dif-
ferent actors, which is worth examination. 
The information included herein has to be extremely generalized as both the 
geographic and thematic scope of the paper is huge. Because valid information 
and published material and analyses are very limited in most of the countries, 
much of the information has been gathered from partners of ICDT in the regions, 
from secondary sources (especially USAID, the European Commission, and other 
donor reports) and, often, anecdotal references. It is hoped that the information 
gathered will serve to further discussions and generate new ideas for civil society 
development.
The core structure of this section includes the six key issues of sustainability 
that are generally recognized to be the crucial factors determining the sustain-
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ability of civil society organizations3, with the additional element of regionalism 
also being examined: 
(1) Financial viability, 
(2) Organizational capacity, 
(3) Public image, advocacy, 
(4) Infrastructure, 
(5) Legal environment and 
(6) Provision of services.
(+1) Regionalism
As we examine these areas we will aim to highlight concrete cases to illustrate 
the state of civil society affairs, including challenges and development with a fo-
cus on the experience of regional cooperation. 
Main challenges and good practices in the Visegrad countries
The four countries focused on in this section are often called the “Visegrad re-
gion” or “Visegrad Group” and are also called the “Visegrad Four” or “V4”. There 
is an alliance of the four states – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slova-
kia. All four members of the Visegrad Group became part of the European Union 
on May 1, 2004. These countries share in particular many common features of 
the region, and many characteristics of their civil society sectors have been and 
remain  similar.
The V4 region went through a major growth period for civil society after 1989, 
and it is the only region of the three we will discuss that has not yet had any major 
interruption to its quick and continuous development for the past few years. Ac-
cession to the EU has influenced the development of the civil society sector, but 
has not changed its overall structure and development. By 2010, however, many 
major structural changes had taken place and the speed of development slowed, 
while stagnation becoming notable in many areas of civil society development in 
the region.
3   Most importantly the 2008 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia by 
USAID as well as the World Bank Democracy and the CIVICUS Civil Society Index
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Financial viability 
Even after twenty years of development, the main weakness of the non-profit 
sector in the post-Communist Europe is its financial viability. This holds most 
true in the countries of the Eastern Partnership, to a lesser extent in the Western 
Balkans, and is true even in the V4. The three regions’ revenue structures are dif-
ferent from those of the old democracies’ and their challenges are different too.
This section presents a ‘snapshot’ of the main challenges and some concrete 
creative solutions that could be offered in the V4 countries to generate resources. 
As a general rule, in the V4, the rate of private giving (that is, individual, cor-
porate, and foundation-based philanthropy) remains very low. As a result, many 
civil organisations tend to rely on self-generated income (service fees, sales of 
products, membership dues, investment income, and unrelated business income) 
resulting in more service oriented sectors. As an alternative, reliance on public 
support (government and local government sources) is both frequent and sig-
nificant. This kind of revenue comes in several forms, through various mecha-
nisms of distribution. In traditional democracies the mechanisms of distribution 
are well-defined and are expected to be non-political, e.g. ‘normative’ (per capita) 
support or preferential to arms-length approaches and/or politically non-biased, 
transparent decision making processes. Many argue that not only are such mech-
anisms rare in the region, but also the size, focus, and distribution procedures 
of government grants are dependent on personal attitudes and interests, and 
vary from year to year and decision maker to decision maker. Some express (Kuti, 
2008), that this raises (at least) two important issues: one of them is “the endan-
gered independence of civil organisations; the other is the limited availability of 
public support.”4 
From a historical perspective it is a major achievement that regulatory practic-
es have been established throughout the region to support the financial sustaina-
bility of NGOs, but they have been established to inconsistent degrees. Although 
this paper does not seek to present an overview of those legal mechanisms and 
analyze the ways that laws and regulations can help (e.g. tax incentive, exemp-
tions etc.) it does observe the fact that it is not unusual of state actors in the V4 
to cut back on incentives that had been introduced earlier and not necessarily 
find replacements for the funds. Unfortunately neither the advocacy power of 
4   In the case of Hungary, for example, such practices have resulted by 2009 in court cases of hidden party financing 
via NGOs from central government’s civil society budgets, while in other cases, organisations being painted in political 
colours, harming the whole sector.
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national CSO actors nor regional solidarity were used to their full potential to 
minimise the harm in this area.
Needless to say, these tendencies hamper the already slow growth of  private 
giving. Although individual and corporate giving, against changing legal environ-
ments, has growing prestige, its real financial value still remains to be cashed by 
CSOs. It is also generally agreed that, although there are some positive excep-
tions, the giving practices of the early foreign private donors were not necessarily 
replaced or followed by local practitioners, either in terms of their transparent, 
non-political giving practices or in terms of their generosity and long term visions 
by investing into projects with long returns. The Donors’ Forums, established to 
support philanthropy and public benefit activities, and the creation of an ena-
bling environment for grant making and donor activities in their countries, have 
contributed a lot to this underdeveloped area, all recognising the need for further 
advancement of philanthropic culture in the V4.
There is not sufficient space in this paper to discuss the role of EU funds. They 
unquestionably constitute substantial financial assistance and shape the eco-
nomic, social, and environmental development of these countries. The appear-
ance of EU funds has influenced the work of many organisations, not only be-
cause of their large amounts (for a limited number of organisations) but also for 
setting up new organisational practices (e.g. of planning, administering, monitor-
ing, disseminating project plans and results) and have raised new challenges for 
the civil society sectors, among them the issues of transparency and transpar-
ent decision making and public participation. The conviction that citizens should 
have an opportunity to influence the way the resources available under the funds 
are distributed made the CEE Bankwatch Network5 develop a project on Public 
Participation in EU Funds6 addressing the “concept of public participation, i.e. 
the involvement of citizens in decisions on spending public money from EU funds 
like the structural funds, the Cohesion Fund, and the pre-accession funds (ISPA, 
SAPARD). Public participation can take place at different stages of the decision-
making process”…monitoring “the state of public participation in the central and 
eastern European region and advocating for wider inclusion of citizens in the de-
5   CEE Bankwatch Network is an international non-governmental organisation (NGO) with member 
organisations across the central and eastern European region, monitoring the activities of the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) which operate in the region, and propose constructive alternatives to their policies 
and projects in the region. 
6   http://www.bankwatch.org/project.shtml?w=147577&s=460581
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cision-making processes regarding EU funds.”7 The experience of such efforts is 
highly valuable outside the V4 region too.
Local solutions for resource mobilisation with regional influence 
The financial needs of the growing sector have lead to creative solutions from 
the different actors, and several of them have been followed with interest and 
adopted in various countries. Some of the most influential examples of creative 
solutions are the so- called Percentage Philanthropy; the structure of the Founda-
tion Investment Fund (FIF), and the example of community foundations. 
The first, percentage law created in the region was  the 1% law introduced 
in Hungary in 1996, which allowed taxpayers to transfer 1% of their previous 
year’s paid personal income tax to the charity of their choice, provided that the 
charity complied with certain legal requirements. The system has been positively 
received in the Hungarian NGO community, not only because of its revenue gen-
eration potential, but also, and mainly, for its potential of donor education; for at-
tracting resources to organisations that would rarely receive funding from central 
budgets; for diversification of funding, and for grassroots decision making. It did 
not take long to prove that the system does indeed bring resources to grassroots 
organisations that are known in the community by the citizens who are willing 
to contribute to them with their 1%-s and, thus, balance the dominance of the 
well-to-do NGOs of the capital city and bring attention and resources to local 
communities. It has also been able to advance the PR, communication, campaign, 
and networking skills of organisations and become the prime revenue source for 
some organisations. The model was critically assessed8, with the support of the 
Sasakawa Central Europe Fund, and similar solutions were developed elsewhere 
in the region (in Slovakia, Poland, Romania, and Lithuania) while some countries, 
after thorough examination (e.g. Estonia), have decided not to introduce a similar 
mechanism due to its limitations. 
Similar widespread interest has been achieved regarding privatization pro-
ceeds used for endowment funds, but the model could not be replicated, however 
timely it was. The forerunner of endowment building was the Foundation Invest-
ment Fund (FIF), which was established by the law passed by the ČNR (Czech 
7   http://www.bankwatch.org/project.shtml?w=147577&s=460581
8   See www.onepercent.hu
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National Council) in 1991, “with the aim to support foundations selected by the 
Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament on the proposal of the Government” by 
making use of 1% from the sale of shares in the second stage of the coupon pri-
vatization via competitive tender with a clear intention that the FIF contribution 
was intended for foundation endowment, and only foundations annual revenue 
would be used for grants. Such an increase in endowment was unprecedented in 
the region and is a significant contribution towards the self-support of founda-
tions that provide substantial financial resources for other non-profit organisa-
tions. Such development reinforces the financial sustainability of the entire non-
profit sector of the given country. As is rightly argued, the construction is unique 
not only because the state has donated financial resources to private foundations, 
but also “in the fact that its donation is not designed to be allotted but to be de-
posited in the foundation endowment. To dispose only of the income of the FIF 
means to ensure that the financial contribution of the state is not expended on 
short-term purposes but, to the contrary, that it serves as a tool for the develop-
ment of long-term strategies guaranteed solely by the annual income. During the 
past ten years it has not always been certain if the Foundation Investment Fund 
would really fulfil its original intention as stipulated by law (the state support of 
foundations) or if it would eventually be incorporated into the state budget. From 
this perspective, it is not significant which foundation succeeds in the competi-
tive tender. What is important, however, is that the entire foundation sector has 
succeeded because the financial resources earmarked for the sector have been re-
tained and eventually distributed.”9 Although, the economic environment that 
has made this construction feasible in the Czech Republic was present in other 
countries of the region, and the C.S. Mott Foundation has made efforts for dis-
seminating the model and its human expertise to other countries, the model has 
not really gained serious interest. 
Meanwhile, community foundations have marked their presence in the re-
gion. They are easily replicable models and send a clear message that citizens have 
enough energy and capability to solve their problems by bringing their own re-
sources together, which has turned it into a movement. The Healthy City Foun-
dation at Banská Bystrica in Slovakia is the first community foundation in the 
region. The mechanism that was developed was partly a self discovery and partly 
inspired by community foundations in the USA and the UK. Based on the model, 
the Foundation did not run its own projects but supported projects initiated by 
the citizens themselves,  where the foundation creates a platform on which the 
9   http://www.batory.org.pl/english/civil/nif.htm
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work, ideas and capability of individuals and organizations can meet with the 
support and financial help of others. The Healthy City Foundation has not only 
become the biggest non-profit organisation of Banská Bystrica and Zvolen and 
a key-player in the community, but has also ranked in the top list of endowed 
organisations in Slovakia. The model soon spread (though not to Hungary) and 
national associations were established, resulting in the organisation of the first 
V4 Community Foundation conference in 2008.
Considering the scale of EU assistance for the region, it is important to bear 
in mind that there are different side-effects, that, if cleverly used, can be benefi-
cial overall, not just for the financial development of the sector (among them are 
the issue of public participation as well as the immense opportunities for cross-
border cooperation and interest representation, to name a few).
The NGO sector’s sustainability has been somewhat enhanced in the region 
due to creative practical solutions, but prolonged commitment to developing this 
aspect of sustainability is of upmost importance. Certain creative solutions for 
resource mobilisation have spread with success in the region while others have 
not, most probably  due to underdeveloped interest in the representation and 
policy development skills of sector wide initiatives.
Organisational capacity
From a historical perspective, the third sector of the region has gone through a 
major development in its organizational capacity in the last twenty years. This 
is partly a natural development, as organisations have learned by practice, and 
partly a conscious, strategic investment of supporting entities. 
The early organizational capacity programs were closely modeled on the US ex-
perience and funded by US donors. A leading example is the Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity’s and Civil Society Development Foundations’ training of NGO trainers 
program, as well as third sector scholars fellowship opportunities to the US and 
Europe. The very same funders who have supported these programs have helped 
with the development of the organisational capacity of the sector by investing in 
institutions that have provided services to the renaissance of the sector. These 
entities have included capacity building organisations like the Nonprofit Infor-
mation and Training Centre (NIOK) in Hungary, Slovak Academy Information 
Agency – Service Centre for the Third Sector (SAIA-SCTS) in the Slovak Republic, 
JAWOR/KLON in Poland, and others in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, 
and elsewhere. These centres have formed the Orpheus Civil Society network to 
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facilitate sharing of knowledge and expertise among information and resource 
centres in the CEE and beyond. It was owned and directed entirely by the par-
ticipating members, and coordinating functions have been taken up by the Euro-
pean Foundation Centre (EFC). One similarity of the organisations has been their 
role in their countries, namely providing information to and about the sector; 
training and education in organisational capacity, skills development; advocacy 
for the sector, especially in legal and fiscal matters; mediation among the sectors 
and opening networking and communication channels within the sector, with 
donors, partners, and with international entities.
Exchanges of expertise among these centres have been facilitated via rapid 
aid funds, study visits, and workshops. This type of work and methodology was 
proven to be useful during those years when the first milestones of the sectors 
needed to be laid. The know-how exchange among the leaders of these organisa-
tions has assisted some corresponding developments and reduced unnecessary 
duplication of work. 
Unfortunately, after this phase which coincided with the departure of the for-
eign donors, many of these centres could not or did not want to adjust to the 
changed environment, where several of their original functions have been taken 
up by institutions with a more specific focus, e.g. universities have started to run 
accredited courses on NGO management, Donors Forums have been established 
to support the development of organized philanthropy and to create favourable 
conditions for giving, Volunteer Centres have sparked to support and promote 
volunteer activity and its legal environment. Although some have remained to 
be active players in their community, many have ceased to exist or stopped serv-
ing the development of the civil sector and, therefore, the network has become 
dysfunctional. 
Today, the organisational capacity development of the sector is rarely consid-
ered to be a priority. While there are serious challenges to overcome even today 
(e.g. the minimal number of full-time employees, a high turn-over of staff, a lack 
of long-term planning, transparency of the sector, constituency building, project 
based existence, uneven allocation of resources), with the departure of some key 
US funders (like the C.S. Mott Foundation, the Ford Foundation, The Rockefel-
ler Brothers Fund, the Soros Foundation) there are rare exceptions of resources 
available for this type of work (to name some key exceptions: EEA Financing 
Mechanism and the Norwegian Fund, the Trust for Civil Society in Central and 
Eastern Europe, some programs of the National Civil Fund, and the EU TÁMOP 
in Hungary). 
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Many argue that there is still a large role for entities responsible for the devel-
opment of organisational capacity of civil society in local development as well as 
in the international arena.
Public image, advocacy 
The time when it was thought that anything done by a non-profit organisation 
could only be good is over; citizens have gradually learnt that NGOs come in all 
sizes with all kinds of missions, means, and techniques. 
It has been a long learning process and not an easy one. The very first chal-
lenge that organisations faced was the difficulties of building and maintaining 
constituencies, members, and partners.  Membership based communication, as 
well as communication with the broader public, is a skill rarely practiced well by 
CSOs in the region. In some countries, where newspapers in the past offered sec-
tions for civil society work (e.g. Kurázsi of Magyar Hirlap in Hungary, Sme Daily 
newspaper in Slovakia) they have stopped this opportunity, leaving NGOs to be 
equal users of the free media, but lacking the know-how to deal with it. A telling 
example is the case of Hungary where the extreme right has had a continuous 
presence in the media, while civil demonstration against it, and against discrimi-
nation and homophobia hardly come through.
Although rarely featured in the national press, civil society organizations and 
their activities constitute an integral part of regional and local press coverage. 
Organisations more and more regularly make use of the public spaces by organis-
ing exhibits, demonstrations, public presentations, NGO markets etc. The NGO 
market is even organized on regional level by the prestigious FORUM2000, based 
on the conviction that „non-governmental organizations represent a key factor 
in the development of a strong civic society and that they play a vital role in 
transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, they should 
be provided with more opportunities and support in communicating with public, 
sharing experience with each other, establishing new partnerships and further 
education and growth.”10 This unique event has grown since 2000 to reach beyond 
the V4, largely thanks to IVF as its major partner, attracting NGOs active in 
education, volunteering, human rights, the environment, and other issues. 
10   http://www.forum2000.cz/en/projects/ngomarket/
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Civil society organisations are gaining more and more experience with regard 
to advocacy, campaigning and lobbying, and success stories, although sporadic 
help build confidence. The legal bases for such activities have, by now, been de-
veloped, while the resource and skills base remains underdeveloped. Neverthe-
less there have been some issue based successes in the different countries (e.g. 
against domestic violence in the Czech Republic, by the Alliance against Domestic 
Violence, the rights cases of the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, the work of the 
Initiative for Freedom of Association in Slovakia via www.slobodazdružovania.
sk, and others) while reportedly, thanks to the EU funds available for advocacy in 
Poland around 2008, many NGOs carried out advocacy work. 
On the European level there are more and more opportunities for interest rep-
resentation. The EU has become more open to the views of NGOs, while organisa-
tions have also been able to form coalitions on both the regional and European 
levels and get their voice heard in the EU. 
As one of the first success stories of influencing Brussels is a frequently cited 
example of the ad-hocly organised joint work of CSOs around 2004. When a re-
gion moves towards accession to the EU, most foreign financial donors of civil so-
ciety minimise or cease their support to the region; their absence has been most 
critical among the civil society development and pro-democracy, as well as human 
rights organisations. As an immediate reaction, a successful advocacy campaign 
was started with the coordination of the Open Society Institute (OSI) offices to 
advance the idea of a funding mechanism from European sources to support civil 
society in the New Member States. Although funding was promised, the Euro-
pean Commission’s management problems affected the grant procedures and re-
sulted in a protest letter initiated by the CSO leaders in Slovakia, to Mr. Franco 
Frattini of the European Commission. Following this, there have been three suc-
cessful funding years for civil society in the Member States that acceded to the 
European Union on the 1st of May, 2004 (in the areas of the rule of law, democ-
racy, fundamental rights, media pluralism, and the fight against corruption). This 
initiative has been marked by many as an example of when a coordinated joint 
effort of CSO leaders in the region has had clear results. The fact that, by now, 
leading NGOs have joined many interest representation associations of European 
nature (e.g. Social Platform, CEDAG, ECAS) shows that these organizations see 
great potential in expressing their views jointly on the European fora.
Since 2004 several channels and procedures have been established by the Eu-
ropean bodies themselves to hear the voice of civil society organisations. One 
example of this is the procedures and protocols (the so-called Dialogue with Civil 
society organisations and the Fundamental Rights Platform) introduced by The 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) regarding engagement 
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with civil society in order to fulfil its main objective of providing assistance and 
expertise relating to fundamental rights. Another method used is the hearing of 
issue-based groups, e.g. a conference in March 2010 organized by The Directo-
rate-General for Education and Culture to discuss the involvement and impact 
of EU programmes with the Roma minority. It is based on a selection of the best 
examples of projects related to the Roma people, all funded through various Eu-
ropean Commission programmes. 
There are also some rare examples of coordinated advocacy- building struc-
tures established to benefit the region. As the examples show, the public image 
and advocacy of the NGO sector’s sustainability has developed to some extent, 
and local NGO communities demonstrate examples of professionalism and good 
practices, but working on a regional level should be better employed, and there 
should be more creative and effective uses of the opportunities provided by EU 
membership.
Infrastructure 
As substantial investments have been made (by private foundations, like the 
Open Society Institute, C.S. Mott Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Sa-
sakawa Peace Foundation, as well as foreign government aid programs, like the 
Dutch Embassy’s MATRA KAP programs, USAID, and the Canadian CIDA) into 
infrastructure development, it is now among the better-rated aspects of sustain-
ability in the countries under study. 
One must agree that the basic infrastructure for a functioning civil society has 
been achieved, starting with the fundamental right for freedom of association 
and continuing to the field  of physical infrastructure and provision of office space 
and buildings owned by organisations. Data is available to feed into policy devel-
opment regarding the future of civil society; there were training programmes for 
trainers of civil society leaders at the Johns Hopkins University and elsewhere; 
later university courses were established on nonprofit management; there are 
civic information websites, Civil Service Centre networks, and Community Tech-
nology Centres, to name a few of the developments. Several programs have been 
supporting the IT development of the sector, the most recent one affecting sev-
eral countries is TechSoup.org, which offers nonprofits a one-stop resource for 
technology needs by providing products and training.
Several coalitions of NGOs have been formed spanning all levels, but the tech-
niques of such organizations still need to be developed.  One can claim that the 
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environmental organisations are the best equipped with skills on coalition build-
ing, which brings solid results on several levels. There are also committed leaders 
working in this area, which is due mostly to the almost twenty year old Environ-
mental Partnership for Sustainable Development (EPSD), and its investment of € 
20 million to support local initiatives. The consortium of six foundations in Bul-
garia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia work to mobi-
lize and empower people to improve their environment, their local communities, 
and societies. Using a flexible mixture of small grants, technical assistance, net-
working and training activities, as well as special programs, the EPSD has made 
its footprint in the region on a local as well as a regional level, and has become an 
active player in the non-political grassroots as well as in the political arena with 
its excellent interest representation (while steering clear of party politics).
The political role of the sector has grown, especially in those countries where 
the government is more receptive and open to working with civil society. In 
some cases government protocols are designed to channel the view of NGOs to 
influence state decision making. In Poland for example, NGOs have representa-
tives in ministerial advisory bodies and in the Government Board for Non-profit 
Organizations (RNNO), while in Hungary the decisions of the state’s National 
Civil Fund are made by elected NGO representatives. Furthermore, Polish civil 
society organizations successfully formed sectoral coalitions in order to have a 
representative on the European level in Brussels in the period preceding EU ac-
cession. Unfortunately, this model could neither be replicated by other interested 
pre-accession countries nor was there a coalition for a joint presence by the V4.
Among infrastructural organisation a pressing need has been recognised, 
namely the need for more professional policy making in the region. This has lead 
to the creation of several policy centres (often with the support of the OSI) whose 
focus includes civil society and democracy and, soon, the Policy Association for 
an Open Society (PASOS), a network of independent think-tanks that supports 
policy centres in promoting open society values, including democracy, good gov-
ernance, and the rule of law and human rights. Beyond setting the ground for 
policy professional work, PASOS conducts joint cross-border projects and joint 
advocacy to strengthen the voice of think-tanks from the new EU members and 
their eastern neighbours at the EU level, in other European structures, and in 
the wider neighbourhood of Europe and Central Asia. A major advantage of this 
organization is that it is capable of synthesizing the knowledge and experience of 
several countries.
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In its recent study11 PASOS argues that “in the new EU members of Central 
Europe, a lack of public confidence in the current political elites has resulted in 
turning citizens away from engagement in public debate, while the winners and 
losers of transition are increasingly evident in a widening socio-economic divide. 
In three of the Visegrad Four countries, a majority recognises more advantages 
and opportunities in democracies today than under the pre-1989 dictatorial re-
gimes, but there is an urgent need to win over a reticent public to support the 
transfer of democratic know-how to the EU’s eastern neighbours and to other 
countries. “ (Bútorová, 10 December 2009)
Unfortunately, there is no room in this paper to discuss the tremendous ef-
forts made by CSOs regarding the issues that are highlighted here for the na-
tional and regional level, and it is evident that more needs to be done to develop 
an infrastructure supportive of civil society and, especially, pro-democracy NGOs 
whose work is essential even today, more than twenty years after the fall of the 
Berlin wall. 
Legal environment
There is a significant level of variation among countries regarding the legal en-
vironment for civil society. In this area structured, conscious, development ef-
forts were made across borders, mostly by the coordination and experts of the 
European Centre for Not-For-Profit Law, as well as the SEAL Program of the Eu-
ropean Foundation Center. Recently, a similar, though less developmental and 
more coordinating role, has been taken by the EXPERT COUNCIL on NGO Law 
of the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe. It has produced thematic 
overviews for several countries, including the V4, on laws concerning the legal 
personality of NGOs, on creating the environment and the conditions for the 
reaffirmation and the strengthening of the legal status of NGOs following the 
scope of international standards applicable to their establishment  (Expert 
Council on NGO Law, January 2010).
Beyond this general framework, more specific, as well as broader, legal is-
sues affecting the work of civil society and democracy development are still on 
the agenda. A law on volunteering, for example, has just been issued recently in 
Hungary, while the operation and regulation of watchdog activities are still being 
11   The project is being carried out with the support of the Europe for Citizens Programme of the European 
Union, and of the International Visegrad Fund.
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worked out. (The Association of Leaders of Local Civic Groups in Poland, for ex-
ample, focuses on the latter and has created a platform for exchanging experience 
with organizations from other Central and Eastern European countries through 
annually organized seminars12). Broader issues include the questions of trans-
parency and accountability of public institutions (and of the CSOs themselves), 
the rights and consciousness of citizens, respect for constitutionality and the rule 
of law, and mutual understanding and acceptance of people and groups with dif-
ferences. These are burning issues and many of them are being dealt with by civil 
society organisations. 
Provision of services
The provision of services by CSOs is a growing phenomenon in the region. Civil 
society organizations in the CEE region generally provide a wide range of services 
in areas such as healthcare, social welfare, education, environmental protection, 
youth work, drug prevention, etc. State, local government and civil society rela-
tionships are strongest in this area and are also venues for conflict and clashes  of 
views and interests.
A general lack of financial reserves makes service providers especially vulner-
able in the case of state cuts or improper cash flow. Without funding, civil society 
organizations are not capable of continuing their services. This has become espe-
cially clear when an organisation could not cope with the funding model of larger 
state funds and EU programmes (where costs are often reimbursed ex-post, and 
often late). Governments, although they present CSOs as partners, often view 
CSO service providers as subcontractors. Many organisations, purely for survival 
reasons, enter into subcontracting relationships, establishing institutional expec-
tations towards themselves without a real strategy on how to fulfill these expec-
tations, and causing problems to their clientele when there are financial cuts or 
cash flow problems from the state. Although, civil society organizations are often 
the only providers of services in some of these areas-- for example, hospices are 
run solely by civil society organisations and civil society also dominates the pro-
vision of drug rehabilitation and HIV/AIDS prevention, etc.-- they often need to 
broaden their mission in order to be able to receive state support. As there are 
12   “Financed from the Batory Foundation and Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe.” http://
www.watchdog.org.pl/english.php?dzial=1&id=1
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limited alternatives to state funding, the degree of an organisations’ dependence 
on the state is often intolerable. 
It is also true that the legal form of a NGO is often used only as a nominal at-
tachment to various state entities to gain tax advantages or ease the administra-
tive burden of state entities, typically among hospitals and schools.
As the countries in question have economic shortfalls and emerging challeng-
es with social safety nets, the role of service-providing NGOs will inevitably grow. 
Although the collaborations of CSOs with state entities share many similari-
ties in the V4, there has been minimal sharing of experiences beyond issue-based 
thematic conferences. 
Regionalism
In Europe, there are large number of cooperation examples among several coun-
tries on issues of common interest, as well as in cases of cross-border regions. 
The scope for non-central governments to co-operate across borders has widened 
considerably in the last decades. To a large degree, this has been a natural process 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but it is also related to the macro-regional inte-
gration in Europe and, last, but not least, to the active support of different stake-
holders. In this section key stakeholders will be introduced who have invested in 
the regional cooperation and regionalism of civil society organisations effecting 
the V4 region.
Among the pioneers of this type of work is the Carpathian Foundation Net-
work, which uses the slogan “Five Nations, One Community” to express its de-
termination towards regionalism in the network of the five independent foun-
dations serving the Carpathian Euroregion in the bordering areas of Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Since as early as 1995, the Carpathian 
Foundations have supported the development of their diverse and multi-ethnic 
communities, encouraged local partnerships, and assisted grassroots non-profit 
organizations and local governments through capacity building operational pro-
grams as well as grants amounting to more than ten million Euros over ten years.
In addition to developmental work, there is an unlimited number of topics 
that activate citizens in the region. If one has not encountered some of these co 
operational efforts personally, it is enough to leaf through the reports of projects 
funded by the EU, the European Commission and its institutions, the website 
of the Open Society Institute, the CEE Trust Fund, The International Visegrad 
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Fund, the various countries’ state institutions, local governments reports,  and 
civil society websites, to name just a few.
Two supra-national bodies: the Council of Europe and the European Union, 
were important for improving the conditions of cooperation across borders: the 
Council of Europe has been active in improving the legal situation, while the Com-
mission of the European Union provides substantial financial support to such 
initiatives. There are official initiatives such as the EUREGIO and the ‘Working 
Communities’ in Europe, and many unofficial groupings of regions and regional 
initiatives13. Legally, the cooperation can take different forms, ranging from le-
gally non-binding arrangements to public-law bodies: typically local authorities, 
and occasionally, third party organizations, such as regional development agen-
cies, interest associations, chambers of commerce, and CSOs. Some initiatives 
remain strictly ceremonial contacts, others engage in enduring and effective col-
laboration on a variety of issues. 
The states of the V4 have working and funding mechanisms for CSOs to work 
regionally (e.g. some areas of the National Civil Fund of Hungary). In addition to 
the nationally available resources, the International Visegrad Fund was found-
ed by the governments of the countries of the Visegrad Group to facilitate and 
promote the development of closer cooperation among the V4 countries (and of 
the V4 countries with other countries, particularly,  but not exclusively non-EU 
member states in Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans, and the South Cauca-
sus) through the support of common cultural, scientific and educational projects, 
youth exchanges, cross-border projects, and tourism promotion.”14 The budget of 
the Fund (€6 million, as of 2010) consists of equal contributions from the Viseg-
rad Group’s governments. The Fund runs the following programs: three grant 
programs (Small/Standard/Strategic Grants), three scholarship schemes, artistic 
residencies, and a curriculum-building program for universities. In addition to 
NGOs, municipalities and local or regional governments, schools and universi-
ties, and even private companies and individual citizens from the Visegrad Group 
countries (and other countries) are eligible for the Fund’s support. In the case of 
small and standard grants, projects supported by the IVF projects, with the ex-
ception of cross-border cooperation, entities from at least three Visegrad Group 
(V4) countries are participating in and organizing activities in a variety of areas 
of civil life, such as cultural cooperation, scientific exchange and research, educa-
13   Some of them are often referred to as ‚Euroregions’ although this is originally a concept with specific 
attributes. 
14   http://www.visegradfund.org/about.html
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tion, youth exchange, cross-border cooperation and the promotion of tourism or 
“any field of activity (e.g. ecology, social affairs, sports and leisure, media, etc.)”15 
From sports festivals (e.g. 12th International Table Tennis Cup of Students) to 
social issues (e.g. Cooperation of Teachers of Hearing Impaired Children), to 
name a few. The Visegrad Strategic Program is more focused on supporting long-
term projects of a strategic nature that link institutions from all four Visegrad 
Group countries and match the priorities defined by the Conference of Minis-
ters for a given year, and follow the foreign policy priorities of the Presidency of 
the Visegrad Group; for example: V4 Response to the Decade of Roma Inclusion, 
Building a Green Visegrad,   Sharing V4 Know-how with Neighbouring Regions 
and V4 Promotion. While small grants add to the better understanding and co-
operation of regional actors especially at a grass roots level, the strategic grants 
result in thorough development of areas of mutual concern (among others: Oral 
History: Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Transition; Urbanity: Visegrad City, Self-Reflection and Perspectives of CE 
capitals; Creating a Sphere of Security in the Wider Central Europe). A specific 
focus is given to education through  the design of the Visegrad University Studies 
Grant (VUSG) for universities with the aim to promote and support the develop-
ment and launching of outstanding university courses and programs that deal 
with issues related to the Visegrad Group countries. A criticism that was often 
raised in the early years of the fund, namely that there was too much emphasis 
on regionalism and the V4, seems to have lessened after ten years of operation. It 
is largely due to this fact that the whole concept of regional cooperation has rip-
ened and that the increasing number of successful projects has proven the value 
of regional cooperation. The funding model of IVF, i.e. short and medium-length 
financial funding conditioned by co-funding model in most areas, although often 
difficult to manage, has also lead to deeper rooting of the fund’s mission in the 
region. The growing number of applications and awarded projects and the rate of 
successful projects implemented by civil society organizations highlight the fact 
that more and more NGOs are able to  form successfully networks of cooperation 
within the CEE region.
Some private donors share the vision of regionalism. Among them are the 
Open Society Institute and its network of institutions, the Trust for Civil Soci-
ety, the Central European Foundation (showing the variety of scale, function, and 
method). These private grant-giving organisations continue to make substantial 
15   http://www.visegradfund.org/grants.html
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investments into the development of civil society and encourage cross-border co-
operation and collaboration.
The Open Society Institute (OSI)16 works to build vibrant and tolerant democ-
racies whose governments are accountable to their citizens. The OSI’s initiatives 
address specific issue areas on a regional or network-wide basis. The effect of the 
OSI’s presence in the region will be covered another time, but one cannot ques-
tion the immense contribution it has made to the development of civil societies 
and advancing democracies, originally in CEE and, later, globally. Specifically fo-
cused on CEE cooperation is the East-East: Partnership Beyond Borders program, 
which supports international exchanges that bring together civil society actors 
to share ideas, information, knowledge, experiences, and expertise and to sup-
port the practical actions that result from that networking. One of the largest of 
the Soros network institutions is the Central European University, which is the 
exclusive beneficiary of a permanent endowment fund that is one of the larg-
est academic endowments in Europe. Its aim is to help the process of transition 
from dictatorship to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
to contribute to innovative academic research, progressive higher education, and 
the development of dynamic, sustainable open society, primarily in the former 
“socialist” countries. Both the CEU and OSI are regional leaders in thinking, sup-
porting and advising policy initiatives for both social and economic reform, work-
ing with local initiatives to strengthen good governance and address challenges 
as diverse as supporting civil society, independent media, and promoting public 
health. 
The Trust Fund for Civil Society17 was jointly established by Atlantic Philan-
thropies, C. S. Mott Foundation, the Ford Foundation, German Marshall Fund 
of the United States, OSI, and the Rockefeller Brother Fund, to support the 
long-term sustainable development of civil society and non-governmental 
organizations in Central and Eastern Europe, including cross-border and regional 
activities in which they may engage. The CEE Trust expects to allocate upwards 
of $75 million toward this aim by the end of 2012.  Its geographical objectives 
are the Visegrad countries, plus Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia. Its programme 
objectives are drawn from a thorough knowledge of the field, focusing on creating 
a supportive environment for civil society, which includes legal, fiscal, and political 
environments favourable to a strong civic life; capacity building, advocacy, intra-
sector and cross-sectoral cooperation and partnership, and enhancement of the 
16   This section is based on information available on www.soros.org and www.ceu.hu
17   This section is based on information available on http://www.ceetrust.org/
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financial sustainability of non-profit organizations. The CEE Trust awards grants 
and fellowships to individuals, as well as to in-country projects and cross-border 
initiatives. The scope and scale of the CEE Trust grant-making activity are deter-
mined by the size of its budget for the coming years until the end of 2012, as well 
as the priorities of the CEE Trust in the relevant countries. 
Besides being a grant-giving entity, the CEE Trust Fund has also taken up the 
role of being a hub for regional civil society energies. Its website, as well as the 
“Civil Society Forum” and the “Social Innovation Camp CEE” organised by the 
CEE Trust, are excellent examples of  this energy focus. The Civil Society Forum 
alone has attracted around three hundred participants working for the better-
ment of societies in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. (Topics of discussion at the event included e-participation 
in transition democracies, the economic crisis and CEE societies, interaction be-
tween civil society and other sectors, how to face a future of post-EU structural 
funding and cultivating home-grown philanthropy in the region.) From the major 
interest in and success of the event, it is clear that there is demand for such ven-
ues and hubs. As the Trust has a planned lifespan of its own, it remains to be seen 
how its values would be sustained and if there would be additional donors joining 
and/or continuing the initiative for the benefit of the same or other regions.
The Central European Foundation is a private, non-profit, grant-making 
organization, and has strived from the beginning to support the development of 
the Central European region. Its founders value the natural crossroads of cultures 
and ethnicities that coexist in a small space in mutual respect. It supports artistic 
activities and cultural events linking Slovakia with other countries in the region, 
contributing to the preservation and development of a multi-lingual and multi-
ethnic society in the region as a whole. In 2008 alone, the Foundation contributed 
almost 300  000 Euros to programmes advancing regional and community 
development and civil society. “In almost 15 years of work by the Foundation, our 
main mission has not changed. We are still focused on the values and the social 
and cultural overlap in Central Europe. Over the last few years in particular, we 
perceive a need to strengthen the role of Slovakia as an integrated and, at the 
same time, equal partner and neighbour, which is open to its environment and 
conscious of its own value as a participant in that environment.”18
As the examples in this paper suggest, there are several cases for collaboration 
in the area of civil society development in CEE, and there are some, although 
a limited number, of state as well as private stakeholders supporting regional 
18   http://www.cef.sk/EN/index.php?page=about
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development of and by CSOs. The regional cooperation of CSOs does not stop 
at the borders of the V4; instead more and more examples show cases in which 
CSOs from the V4 have cooperated in advancing civil society in other regions. The 
developmental lessons and techniques for cooperation learnt in the V4 are being 
made available to other regions to advance civil societies.
Main challenges and good practices of civil society of the Western 
Balkans
“Did the… Western Balkans become unanimously, once again, the ‘black hole’ of Eu-
rope? Not really. One of the main reasons why not is: the emergence of civil society 
in the midst of the Balkan calamity…in the heart of civil war a civil society was born 
throughout the region. (Licht, 2009)” 
Local civil society, independent media, and many of the churches have tradition-
ally played an important role in anti/war activism, peace building, and democracy 
development in this region. Substantial development is taking place in this area, 
to a large extent, due to international agencies, especially the Commission that 
recognises that „By contributing to a more open, participatory, and dynamic de-
mocracy, a lively and vibrant civil society is also conducive to tolerance and recon-
ciliation. The involvement of civil society organisations in the pre-accession proc-
ess contributes to the quality of and public support for accession-related reforms. 
A culture of acceptance and  an appreciation of the role played by civil society 
need to be in place to allow civil society organisations to engage in an effective 
policy dialogue. Public consultation on policy initiatives and draft laws should 
become the general principle. The access of civil society to government support is 
frequently hindered by a lack of transparency and poorly developed allocation cri-
teria. The civil society facility helps civil society organisations to strengthen their 
capacities and professionalism, allowing them to engage in an effective dialogue 
with public and private actors and to monitor developments in areas such as the 
rule of law and respect for fundamental rights.”  (Communication from The Com-
mission to The European Paliament and the Council, 9.11. 2010)
In the following section the key factors of civil society sustainability of the 
Western Balkan region are examined. 
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Financial viability 
As the sectors are relatively new, their financial viability is naturally limited, while 
the expectations regarding their role in the establishment of democracy are very 
high on the part of citizens as well as international actors. 
Unfortunately, there is no proper statistical data available regarding civil 
society in the region and, therefore, making an accurate judgement in this area is 
difficult. It is evident that the current economic crisis has hit this region heavily, 
dicreasing international and local donor funding, combined with negative 
tendencies in state support. As a positive example of a reaction to this situation 
is Croatia, where state funding of NGOs is more streamlined and the new EU and 
other regional funding opportunities are opening doors for NGO work. 
As part of the EU enlargement process of the V4 countries support was 
provided by the EU for the establishment and development of civil society under 
the auspices of the PHARE instrument, while in the Balkans, during the last years, 
civil society development has been underlined by the European Commission as 
one of the key priorities of the enlargement policy and, therefore, is a regional 
benchmark. 
Pre-accession assistance is an important factor in NGO financial viability. 
Its primary objective is to support the countries’ efforts to comply with the 
Copenhagen accession criteria. It is an acknowledged fact that the Commission 
continues to realize civil society as key priority through support to civil society 
organizations in form of the Civil Society Facility (CSF). The Facility often 
finances initiatives at the local level, regional networking, and short-term visits 
to the EU. Many criticise the design and implementation of the CSF for its 
minimal attention to demand-driven support to civil society for local civil society 
actors in supporting their own indigenous efforts; therefore the model developed 
in Poland years ago in this regard is worth examining. With the Commission 
reviewing the Facility it is expected that the Commission will better target needs 
in each country and provide longer-term seed-funding to NGOs. 
The major commitment of the Commission puts it in the postion of a key, if 
not the main financial supporter of civil society in the Balkan countries, a position 
it may or may not wish to occupy. Meanwhile, civil society lands in the position 
of becoming a channel to gap the missing link to address the internal problems of 
candidate countries, a responsibility that comes with great potential and a high 
risk factor.
Although available only to a varying degree, public support from national and 
local sources to civil society are not unusual in the region. The case of the National 
Foundation for Civil Society Development (NFCSD) in Croatia is an often-cited 
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positive example of a public funding entity with a broad mandate to promote and 
develop civil society in the Republic of Croatia. It is a public, non-profit entity 
established by the Croatian Parliament and acts outside the structures of state 
and local administration. In addition to providing a range of capacity‐building 
assistance to CSOs and conducting research on civil society, the NFCSD has be-
come a major grant‐making facility19.  While public contributions do exist, pri-
vate giving by companies and individuals is very limited. Although there are some 
national projects aimed at the development of this area (awards to corporations 
and individuals who have generously supported charitable causes and training 
programs in CSR) there is much room for improvement and lessons learned from 
other countries could be valuable here.
The high amount of EU-related and other international donor funding is 
expected to reach a plateau, then drop in the coming years. This will inevitably 
propel competition among NGOs, forcing many NGOs to close and the sector to 
weaken if public support mechanisms and regulations, as well as local resource 
mobilisation techniques, remain underdeveloped. 
There is still time to develop instruments and mechanisms that will assist with 
resource development for civil society issues. It is an investment that could have 
a long-term positive effect.
Organizational capacity
The civil society sector of the region is not yet consolidated regarding its organi-
sational capacity; there is a lot of room for development in the capacity building 
of organisations across all areas of the sector. The Commission, in its Enlarge-
ment Strategy of 2007, expressed that it considers that developing the capacities 
of local actors - so that they can play an important role in the decision making 
process and be an equal partner in the civil dialogue process - is an essential part 
19   Its main source of funds is the state lottery, but it has also received support from the state 
budget and a number of foreign donors, including USAID, DFID, the European Commission, and 
the Charles Stuart Mott Foundation. In 2008, its annual income amounted to 46 million HRK 
(approx 6.3 million EUR), of which 43 million HRK was provided by the lottery. In 2008, the NFCSD 





of CSOs in the enlargement process; therefore development of civil society and 
civil dialogue in the Western Balkans became one of the key reform priorities for 
the accession of the Western Balkans countries. There were four main reasons for 
civil society development and civil society dialogue to be prioritized according 
the Strategy: strengthening support for reforms; strengthening democracy and 
functioning democratic institutions; anti-enlargement fatigue measure, and 
ensuring public support for enlargement. 
The strategy requires a strong organisational capacity, which is in mid-transi-
ton in the region. The Civil Society Facility (CSF) was created under the Instru-
ment for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) to help support implementation of the 
policy goals set in the Strategy. More concretely, according to the Strategy, the 
CSF was established to help CSOs strengthen their capacities and professional-
ism, allowing them to engage in an effective dialogue with public and private ac-
tors, and to monitor developments in areas such as the rule of law and respect for 
fundamental rights. 
This would be a major boost to organisational capacity development in many 
countries and, if used well, could generate lasting change. It is unlikely that the 
region is to receive any major boost in its organisational capacity in the near fu-
ture and it is hoped that the resources will be used to assist organisations face the 
tasks ahead of them.
Public image, advocacy
A striking difference between the V4 countries’ and the Western Balkan’s civil 
society is the high level of advocacy and policy work of the Western Balkan or-
ganisations, an especially vivid difference when it is juxtaposed with the level of 
development in other areas of sustainability. The NGOs of the Western Balkans 
are active in national and international advocacy, lobbying, and watchdog efforts; 
activities that are still not the strongest areas of organisations in the V4 coun-
tries. 
In many of the Western Balkan countries representation of NGOs in the 
national and EU accession-related policy making is very visible. 
The priorities set by the EU in the enlargement countries are pushing the 
governments as well as CSOs in the direction of mutual understanding and 
engagement. The Commission’s attention is very much on the involvement of 
CSOs and other stakeholders in policy-development and the decision-making 
process. Partly for this reason, partly because new governments implement new 
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policies, and sometimes due to demand from civil society, governments are more 
frequently equipped with strategies for NGO-Government cooperation. They 
tend to have offices for civil society matters20 and also have already developed 
instruments for engaging civil society in policy development and dialogue. In 
Montenegro, for example, NGO representatives sit on the managing board of the 
public service broadcaster, the board of the National Commission for the Fight 
against Corruption and Organized Crime, and on an important parliamentary 
committee on EU integration.  At the same time, the fact that organisations may 
face government hostility for raising independent voices (as was the case last year 
in Montenegro) and government hostility (as was the case in Macedonia) shows 
that there is still room for advocacy to develop the relationship between the state 
and the third sector. 
Regarding state and NGO relations, there is much cooperation and mutual 
learning going on across borders in the Western Balkans. To assist this exchange, 
the Balkan Civil Society Development Network for the first time has compiled 
a database that provides complete information on the state of civil dialogue in 
the Balkan countries. The data include information on the legal framework, cur-
rent situation, history, and concrete mechanisms and structures that exist in ten 
countries (7 pre-EU and accession countries and 3 Balkan EU Member States). 
However much it is appreciated that the frameworks for civil dialogues have 
been established, critics still argue that implementation of the partnership 
principle has not yet been made full use of, that the consultation processes still 
need to be more content-oriented and less formal, the decision-making processes 
better designed and voices not only listened to, but also heard, so that this 
process of engagement and advocacy becomes a beneficial process of exchange on 
problems and solutions. 
Infrastructure
It is generally true that in many countries of these regions knowledge about the 
state and the shape of civil society is limited. Although there are two major bench-
marks: the NGO Sustainability Index of USAID21 that focuses on each country of 
20   For concrete list go to http://balkancsd.net/policy-research-analysis/civil-dialogue/national-level/338.
html
21   The annual NGO Sustainability Index is the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia’s premier instrument for 
gauging the strength and continued viability of the region’s NGO sectors. The Index analyses seven different 
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this region, and the European monitoring instruments, though they are limited 
in their scope due to the lack of available systematic information on CSOs and the 
civil society sector. When discussing and reflecting on the current state of civil 
society and the challenges it is facing there is a need for quantifiable, objective 
data from a valid source. 
It should be added  that it is also true that active, experienced NGOs publish 
information about themselves, and the number of annual reports with financial 
statements is increasing, but they remain only a fraction of the sector. The 
efforts made towards better serving the public with information and developing 
transparency have been highly praised (e.g. 200-plus member NGO Coalition 
“Together towards the Goal” fulfilling pledges made under the NGO Code of 
Conduct in Montenegro (The 2009 NGO Sustainability Index, 2010)) but further 
efforts need to be made to advance the transparency of individual NGOs and the 
data availability of the sector as a whole in order to face the job ahead of civil 
society.
The infrastructure of individual NGOs has developed in the recent years. In 
addition, there are local resource centers promoting the sector and providing ca-
pacity building services for organisations, often gapping the bridge between the 
different sectors. The V4 experience shows, however, that when these centers rely 
on foreign donations, they may not always be flexible enough to truly respond to 
the needs of their constituency, and when donors depart, so will the less respon-
sive resource centers.  However, others that can develop new ways of knowledge 
development for their sector will continue to exist, often taking upon new and 
more sophisticated roles serving the whole of the sector.  
Most of the organisations of the region are technically equipped to the level of 
their needs, basics like telephone lines and computers are a part of daily life. What 
all of the countries are struggling with is retaining a well-qualified staff when for-
eign donors are depart. Data on the number of full-time employees and salaries 
are barely available, but estimates suggest that they are limited in number. 
dimensions of the NGO sector: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, 
public image, service provision, and NGO infrastructure. Taken together, these dimensions provide a basic 
description of what a sustainable NGO sector should look like. Individually, these dimensions provide 
Missions, implementing partners and other international donors with a reasonable measure of impact over 
time, and a basis for identifying both needs and opportunities in a strategic planning process.
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Legal environment 
Although, there is still some criticism regarding the NGO legislation in Ko-
sovo and the tax code in Albania, overall the countries of the region have im-
proved the legal and financial environment in which CSOs act. This type of 
development is due to major efforts on the part of national and international 
actors who have put resources into developing suitable legislation (often us-
ing the expertise of the European Center for Not-for-Profit Law). Several ex-
pert visits were organised and books were published on the freedom of as-
sociation, on state responsibilities, on nonprofit legislation,  and on the 
legal aspects of volunteerism. Some of the materials provide general use-
ful information, while others are targeted to specific countries and issues. 
There has been some development in the area of respect for the rule of law and 
there was a visible increase in NGOs using all of the legal tools at their disposal 
(access to legal information and the various legal processes) to force the govern-
ment to be more accountable, open, transparent, and responsive.
Provision of services
Revenues from related or unrelated economic activities tend to be low in the re-
gion. Also low are the amounts that come from contracts signed by NGOs and 
state or local government actors for services the NGOs provide. Meanwhile, in 
the V4 there are all kinds of mechanisms for subcontracting practices in the V4 
when NGOs carry out work that traditionally is the responsibility of the state 
or local government, or even provide revenues for services that have not tradi-
tionally been the responsibility of state. Examples include new services (like the 
collaboration of the State Health Budget of Hungary and the Hungarian Hospice 
Foundation for the home care of cancer patients), and old ones, like schools run 
by NGOs in several countries of the V4.  In this area there is much room for de-
velopment in the Western Balkans and there is plenty of experience available in 
other regions of Europe.
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Regionalism
Some argue that, due to the nature of the region, classic, country-by-country de-
velopment will not necessarily be the best way forward with civil society develop-
ment, and instead a regional approach is recommended. An excellent example for 
regional thematic development is the Balkan Civil Society Development Network 
(BCSDN). It is a network of 12 civil society organizations from 9 countries and ter-
ritories in South East Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Romania, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia) launched in December 
of 2003 with the aim of empowerment of civil society in the Balkans through 
sharing and developing local practices, concepts and strengthening civil society 
actors.  Among their goals are: “to increase the role of civil society by strengthen-
ing its voice in policy- and decision-making on a national, regional, and EU level; 
strengthen communication, coordination, and cooperation between civil society 
actors in the Balkan region; promote civil dialogue between civil society actors, 
state institutions, and the European Union in order to influence public choices; 
develop civil society by increasing knowledge and skills of civil society actors as 
a base for higher quality of  their work; and promote intercultural dialogue and a 
culture of resource-sharing as a basis for efficient exchange and networking.”22 
Their events and policy papers speak for the region and serve a broad constitu-
ency. 
The Balkan Trust for Democracy (BTD) is another excellent example of re-
gional efforts making a lasting change. It is founded for 10-years ($36-million) 
as a grant-making initiative that supports democracy, good governance, and Eu-
roatlantic integration in Southeastern Europe. This award-winning public-private 
partnership was created in 2003 by the German Marshall Fund of the United 
States, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and 
the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. In addition to country specific issues, it 
gives regional grants to organizations promoting the benefits of a pan-Balkan 
network. 
Viewing the cooperative nature and output of their work, one wonders wheth-
er the working model developed in this region could be used for other sectors of 
civil society and other regions in development.
22   http://balkancsd.net/about-us/vision-mission-goals.html
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Civil society of the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood
In 2009 the Eastern Partnership of the EU was joined by six countries: Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine as an expansion to the 
former European Neighborhood Policy. The composition of the region is high-
ly diversified in terms of the size and power of its countries, their governance, 
their economic and financial structures, and human development indicators and, 
consequently, their civil society development is very different too. Among the 
three regions discussed in this paper, the weakest civil societies are in the Eastern 
Neighborhood countries. Cultural and historical factors aside, socio-economic 
factors also play an important role in determining the level of development. Com-
parisons of three types of countries –post-communist, post-authoritarian, and 
old democracies- show that the previous impact of Communist rule has the most 
negative impact on civil society. (Raik, February 2006). 
Many have hoped that the EU will bring about important changes in many ar-
eas, among them  the development of civil society, but in most cases these hopes 
remain to be realised, still leaving a lot of room for civil society development in 
the region.
The development of civil society in the Eastern Partnership region will be ex-
amined using the framework of key areas of sustainability.
Financial viability
„As a rule, the existing NGOs are financed by Western governments or private donors. 
Local charitable foundations only tend to offer support to those NGOs that make no call 
for government transparency or accountability. These are „peaceful” civil associations 
that operate in the cultural, educational, and healthcare sectors. (Bystrytsky, 2009)”
Only financially viable organisations that are capable of building institutions with 
independent voices can present the opinion of citizens in the long run and also 
provide shelter to equality-minded activists, if needed, and be prepared to protect 
citizens who have different opinions against the state’s power. Only financially 
viable organisations can provide much-needed services in areas neglected by the 
state and develop support mechanisms for the marginalised.  Financially viable 
organisations drive innovation and are willing to take risks for the sake of innova-
tive solutions to societal challenges. Therefore, financial viability is a key area of 
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development. It is quite unfortunate that the region has developed mechanisms 
that generate local resources only to a very small degree. All the areas of local 
resource mobilisation (self generated income, private giving, as well as state con-
tributions) are in need of substantial development.
Throughout the countries where they operate, the Eurasia Foundation Net-
work partners are leading the change to assist local corporations with their un-
derstanding of social responsibility. Focused corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
of the network aims to mobilize local sources to support civil society and expand 
the pool of donors in these countries beyond international governments and 
foundations. For example, the CSR development efforts of the East Europe Foun-
dation23 operate a diverse array of projects in Ukraine to develop corporate social 
responsibility practices and are noteworthy, as they have been able to develop 
mechanisms for delivering the message of corporate responsibility to an immense 
number of businesses and build a better environment for the development of phi-
lanthropy in Ukraine by promoting legislation for charitable organizations and 
businesses that support charitable activities. Unfortunately, by 2010 there had 
been a downturn even in those countries where, earlier, relative success had been 
reported in the area of private giving. Government support has been cut across 
the region and many international donors are also decreasing their funding.
There are still several international agencies and donors who are continuing 
their commitment to the development of the region (e.g. USAID, Council of 
Europe, OSCE, the Black Sea Trust for Democracy, the SIDA, the Dutch Matra 
program). A leading private entity, the Open Society Institute, has increased its 
aid funds, as a reaction to the financial crisis, by setting up an emergency fund. 
The Eurasia foundation, supported by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and other public and private donors, remains active in the 
region. 
Only a small percentage of the total assistance of the EU has been given to 
democratisation and civil society. The main instruments for supporting civil 
society have been the Tacis-based LIEN (Link Inter European NGOs) Programme, 
its successor: the Institution Building Partnership Programme (IBPP), and the 
EIDHR. While the purpose of LIEN and IBPP has been to interlink European 
NGOs with local civil society, the EIDHR has taken a more thematic approach, 
offering support to NGOs active in the areas of human rights, democratisation, 
23   Since 1994, Eurasia Foundation has awarded several thousands of grants in the region. Additionally, 
the Foundation created new local organizations, like the New Eurasia Establishment (NEE) and the East Europe 
Foundation (EEF.) 
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and conflict prevention. The sector is still learning how to make the best use of 
the resources available from these sources.
Organisational capacity
Without major investment, the organizational capacity of civil society is advanc-
ing only very slowly. 
Organisations often report that their existence is project based, and it is hard 
to maintain offices and qualified personnel. An important factor in organization-
al capacity is the number of people in paid and unpaid positions. In Azerbaijan, 
for example, one of the countries where state statistics are available, it is clear 
that there are a huge number of organizations that work without being regis-
tered entities, a very typical phenomenon in the region. At the same time, in this 
country, due to legal reforms, there has been growth in the number of organiza-
tions that decide to be registered. By 2010 there were 2500 registered organiza-
tions recorded by the Ministry of Justice. Major growth has been registered in the 
number of employees, to the level of tripling the number of full-time employees 
between 2004 and 2010 (from 1390 to 3979) (The Council of State Support to 
NGOs under the President of the Republic of Azebaijan, 2010). The national state 
report itself is skeptical about the reality of these numbers and states: “Another 
problem with NGOs is the passiveness of some of the registered NGOs. Some 
NGOs were registered, but they do not actually operate. Such cases show that 
the total number of NGOs taking part in the solution of the problems of society 
and the development of civil society is about 801.”24 Azerbaijan is also proud of 
the high number of volunteers active in civil life. Unfortunately, neither in this 
country, nor in other countries can we really know what proportion of volun-
teers work as volunteers, because the organization is unable to pay them and, 
very often, they would much rather be paid than doing volunteer work, but this 
decision is not theirs, and must be made by the financial circumstances of the 
organizations. (It is not unusual for project personnel to work as volunteers due 
to a lack of resources, to have unpaid accountants doing the books due to a lack of 
administrative funds etc.). This type of “volunteer” activity is typical in resource 
dry countries such as those of this region.
24   pp.35. The Council of State Support to NGOs under the President of the Republic of Azebaijan, 2010
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Many report that the financial situation of citizen-based civil society is even 
worse than statistics show, as the intermediary space between state and citizens 
is often occupied by CONGOs in this region, while independent, genuine civil 
society has retreated into a form of dissidence (Forbrig, 2009) with hardly any 
resources available at their hands. In addition, there are some organizations that 
are well known in the international donor scene and therefore receive a lion’s 
share of foreign funding and employ well paid staff, often to the envy of other 
organizations and citizens. The situation of civil society is even worse in the coun-
tryside, as not only numbers but also resources are very limited there.
Most of the countries of the region have some type of training for NGO per-
sonnel  (often supported by foreign donors), but human resources development 
at the university level is scarce, as are the books in local and minority languages 
on NGO management issues. This has become a major obstacle at times when 
making use of EU resources has required top management skills.
Public image and advocacy
Efforts have been made to promote the people’s involvement in the civil sector 
in order to more effectively solve community problems. Ukrainian civil society, 
due to systematic efforts, is at a relative advantage in this regard when compared 
to some other countries in the region. Nevertheless, even in the Ukraine, the 
National Employment Center claims that only 3.5 percent of youth would work 
for an NGO (The 2009 NGO Sustainability Index, 2010). As long as NGOs remain 
uncompetitive in the labor market, due to project based (often lasting only some 
months) and low salaries, the sector will continue to have a mixed public image 
(to say the least).
The openness of NGOs to cooperate among themselves and with other sectors 
is reported to be gradually increasing (this is especially true for issue-based organ-
isations), often resulting in joint advocacy work, but lasting collaborations based 
on recognised interests of the parties are rare. The tasks for advocacy groups are 
immense. “Accountable and transparent decision making processes where good 
governance is the rule of thumb are also brought into question as are independ-
ent, impartial, efficient, and effective judiciaries. Likewise an independent media 
free of intimidation, the need for vigorous civil society organisations, and the 
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influence of interest groups are issues of concern.” 25Although in existence to 
some extent (e.g. National Forum of NGOs and the National Council of NGOs in 
Moldova), proper advocacy for the whole of the civil sector is rare. When present, 
it is often successful. In Armenia, for example, NGOs were able to turn the Free-
dom of Information Law draft into a progressive piece of legislation by working 
in close collaboration with the National Assembly and Ministry of Justice. (The 
2009 NGO Sustainability Index, 2010). 
Successes like this one make the observer optimistic about the prospects of 
bottom up approaches. The lack of such efforts is a major disadvantage that slows 
development.
Still rarer are cases of interest-representation on the regional level. The East-
ern Partnership region cannot be compared to the Western Balkans in this re-
gard, where concrete steps for regional collaboration have been made. The EP’s 
priorities and needs still remain to be articulated. This should be a priority on the 
task list of the different actors to produce an agreed vision for the future and ar-
range the necessary coalitions to benefit the region. 
Infrastructure
Infrastructure, and especially civil society infrastructure has traditionally been 
more underdeveloped in this region in comparison with the other two regions. 
As CSOs are young, their existence is fragile in support and structure. There 
have been investments made (mostly by foreign donors, like USAID, UNDP, OSI, 
EU) into the NGOs physical infrastructure in most of the countries of the region. 
Models are available for development in this area, like the intermediary support 
organizations (ISOs) in Armenia, which provide quality services. It is not yet 
proven whether the infrastructure is sustainable, as local resources are rarely vis-
ible behind such development.
Although there are more and more efforts being made for sector-based net-
works and capacity building and infrastructure development of such entities, 
strong, cross-sectoral umbrella networks with infrastructure services on a na-
tional level hardly exist. This limits the sector’s ability to speak and work effec-
tively using its full potential in-country as well as regionally. CSOs and a variety 
25    pp.35. Mustafa Aydın, May, 2o1o
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of stakeholders, including national governments, need to work further on build-
ing the capacities of the sector.
Legal environment
Though in the Western Balkans NGO legislation has been developed, in the East-
ern Partnership this is not always the case. 
In Belorussia, for example, the government exercises strict control over NGOs, 
imposing criminal liability for participating in the activities of unregistered or-
ganizations, while in other countries, like Azerbaijan, success is recorded in im-
proving NGO legislation drafts as well as the legal environment for volunteerism. 
Although inviting NGOs to participate in the discussion of new policies and laws 
and to organise public consultations is not yet the norm, it is also not unprec-
edented. This is an area where development is easily measured and governments 
are made accountable by NGOs. In this area there is experience with assisting 
development both in the West Balkans and in the V4.
Provision of services 
The provision of services by civil society organisations is not an unusual practice 
in the V4, while revenues from related or unrelated economic activities, from con-
tracts signed by NGOs and state or local government actors for services provided 
by NGOs are scarce in the Western Balkans and even more so in the Eastern Part-
nership countries. The recognition of mutual benefits for services outsourced to 
NGOs by state actors are still to come and, therefore, the mechanisms for such 
financial structures rarely exist. In this area there is a lot of room for development 
in the region, and there is experience available in other regions of Europe. This 
is especially important when one considers the effect of the revenue generation 
potential of service provision.
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Regionalism
Although many recognise that a major drawback is an across-the-board lack of 
political support and understanding, within the region and internationally, of the 
already existing processes of regional cooperation, there is some hesitation, even 
among civil society leaders, regarding regional cooperation. 
Pragmatic action is needed and is asked for by many international actors. 
There are some actors who promote regional cooperation and good governance 
in the region. Among them is the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, a 
public-private partnership providing grants to indigenous organizations work-
ing to foster and strengthen regional cooperation, civil society, and democratic 
foundations in the Wider Black Sea Region, seeding the development of a thriv-
ing civil society and a cohesive regional identity that bonds the countries of the 
wider region to each other and to the countries of the transatlantic community 
(the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation). 
It is also hoped that the attention promised by the Polish government,  i.e. that 
this region will be one of the main priorities of the EU’s Polish presidency in 2011, 
and that it will force the Eastern Partnership to the top of the agendas of both 
the ‘Visegrad’ group (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, and the 
so-called ‘Weimar Triangle’ group – a cooperation between Poland, Germany, and 
France) and will bring about fruitful results in the development of the region. 
Meanwhile, it is often expressed that success requires a change in the mind-set of 
policy makers to comprehend the value of regional approaches to policy making 
(Mustafa Aydın, May, 2010), with a strong emphasis on the leadership role civil 
society leaders could take. 
Recommendations: areas in need of development
Civil society development has been crucial to the democratic transition for 
the last twenty years. It can be agreed that, over time, civil society has built an 
intermediary space between private interests and the state, to varying degrees in 
the three regions. It is true that civil society sectors were established after 1989 
and have since gone through major development, but there is no doubt that there 
is still room for development in all areas of sustainability.  
The Eastern Neighborhood is the region where the lessons of the other two 
regions will be most valuable, while the Western Balkans are likely to learn some 
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valuable lessons from the V4. It is also recognised that there are certain experi-
ences that are worth sharing among all three regions.
Related recommendations:
1. Measure success
Although there are some benchmarks for civil society development in use in 
the region (USAID NGO Sustainability Index, CIVICUS Civil Society Index), 
states themselves rarely make it their own responsibility to develop systems 
to measure successes and benchmark them. Data on civil society is scattered 
andinformation is rarely recorded. At the same time the experience of the 
countries in the V4 (like Hungary) shows that systematically collected data on 
civil society is a must for proper policy development. There are models avail-
able in the V4 for this type of work, as well as globally, like the UN Nonprofit 
Handbook Project. 
2. Develop lasting instruments and mechanisms for beneficial civil society and 
state relationships
a.  The states of these regions are starting to take civil society more and more 
seriously. This is partly due to the fact that the EU is requiring it, and partly 
due to the true recognition of the contribution civil society has made to a 
functioning democracy and the life of citizens. It is time to establish last-
ing mechanisms for public participation, i.e. the involvement of citizens in 
decisions on spending public money from the EU or local funds; the lasting 
involvement of civil society in policy decisions. There is relevant experience 
both in the V4 (e.g. Poland) and the Western Balkans and, to some extent, in 
certain countries of the Eastern Partnership. There is also available experi-
ence and infrastructure for recording and sharing experiences on a regional 
level (e.g. the civil dialogue) in the Western Balkans.
b.  Consider the variety of ways that states can promote NGO sustainability 
including, but not restricted to, direct state support. There is experience in 
the V4 countries in this regard.
3. While foreign attention and financial contributions are available, make the 
best use of them, but be prepared for their decreased availability .
a.  Heavy reliance on foreign support for the NGO sector is not the best strat-
egy. States and local governments need to be more active in providing fi-
nancial support to NGOs from their own resources (e.g. via funds for NGOs, 
contracting out for services, etc.) and also need to consider ways of indirect 
support. There are models available throughout the V4 for this. 
b.  Consider the feasibility of models regarding local resource mobilisation 
available in the V4 (e.g. percentage giving, foundation investment funds 
from Czech privatisation resources, community foundations etc.) and con-
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tinued exchange of information on creative solutions for resource develop-
ment, as all the three regions badly need it.
c.  There is a need for systematic training and education services for civil soci-
ety organizations and personnel. It is especially important to raise the level 
of administrative skills so that the financial absorption capacities of organi-
zations are up to EU standards (so that organizations can attract and man-
age larger amounts). There are accredited training courses in the V4 as well 
as university education in this area.
d.  Develop one-on-one relations between organizations and individuals of the 
civil society sectors of the regions.
4. Use NGOs as peace builders and change makers in regional development
a.  Encourage an exchange of information and cross border cooperation via 
developing networks on different issues, e.g. EU monitoring, ecology, local 
development etc.
b.  Promote the development of closer cooperation among the countries of the 
regions and strengthen the ties among people in the region. There is a model 
in the V4 that does exactly this via grant giving to different issues through 
a joint fund. Examine the model of the International Visegrad Fund for im-
plementation in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership
c.  Based on the some successful advocacy work in the Balkans, broaden the 
thematic and geographical scope of this work and involve broad constituen-
cies
5. Recognise and celebrate the role of individual people’s contributions to civil 
society development. Such people do exist, and most deserve recognition. 
There are a limited, well definable number of stakeholders who work to ad-
vance civil society in these regions. Besides local and international NGOs, active 
private donors, national and foreign state entities, as well as international bodies, 
like the Council of Europe and the European Union, have been important actors 
in this field in all three regions. These actors have shown commitment to the de-
velopment of these regions and have a high sense of responsibility in advancing 
this work. The V4 countries have also expressed their commitment by targeting 
some of their democracy assistance resources in these regions (Kucharczyk-Lo-




The previous impact of Communist rule has negatively affected civil society in all 
three regions mentioned in this paper, and some have had to live through periods 
of war and autocratic regimes. The development of civil society after 1989 has 
been faster in the V4 countries due to internal and external factors, and there is 
much hope that a similar scale of development will come to the Western Balkans 
and the Eastern Partnership countries as well.
The V4 and the Western Balkan countries have developed their legal systems 
relatively quickly and the countries of the V4 have set up some (although not 
enough) mechanisms to advance the institutional and financial well being of 
organisations. Although, to different extent, the financial sustainability of the 
civil sectors is a key challenge in all three regions. As many of the current foreign 
funding opportunities have a fixed lifespan, solutions for long-term sustainable 
mechanisms for securing financial sustainability of the third sector still need to 
be prepared, especially in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership coun-
tries. Meanwhile these regions also need to be prepared to be able to successfully 
absorb the “European” resources that, if used well, can be  a major boost not only 
to the well-being of some organizations, but also for the general development 
of the whole sector, including infrastructure, organizational capacity, state-third 
sector relationships,and the entire set of European values. Preparation for EU 
accession spurred some major developments in the V4 and, if they are well pre-
pared,  a similar, if not more vivid, development is about to be realised in the 
Western Balkans, while in the Eastern neighbourhood the real change remains 
to be seen.  
A stable environment can be good soil for nurturing indigenous civil society 
organisations that reflect the needs of their communities and are embedded in 
them and can rely on financial support from local sources and volunteer efforts 
of the local community.  As some pioneering engagements suggest in other re-
gions -- among them the V4, the Baltics, and the Western Balkans -- there is a 
receptiveness as well an already functioning cooperation to think and act more 
as a region. It is recommended to generate as much as possible a’clearing house’ 
of opportunities to share regional experiences and to provide a wide array of net-
working opportunities within and among different regions for macro and micro 
level issues equally. 
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To be able to do this, stakeholders need to understand theirrole and  to decide 
to set up institutional structures to advance those issues. In addition to supra-na-
tional entities and private foundations, the states of these regions have a special 
role to play in advancing civil society in their respective countries and regions for 
the benefit of the whole society.
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geneRal summaRy oF the PRojeCt
On 26-27 March 2009, a Preparatory expert meeting was held in Budapest to 
examine in detail the context in terms of regional co-operation in two directions 
of strategic importance not just for the Visegrad Countries but for the European 
Union as a whole. Decision was made on the project objectives, procedures, and 
the applied methodology and workshops were planned to be organized around 
regional clusters constituted by cross-cutting issues. The key target stakehold-
ers (Regional Cooperation Council, GUAM Secretariat, CEI Secretariat, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, the representatives of the target countries, civil 
society stakeholders) were successfully engaged and informed about the project.
The First Interregional workshop on regional security and confidence‐build-
ing was held on 28-30 October 2009, in Kiev. The objective of the event was to 
present the Visegrad perspective and experiences on regional security and the 
role of regional co-operation in confidence building, to analyze the challenges 
and opportunities in the two regions, and to develop project ideas for further co-
operation in this field within and among these regions. 
Firstly, the factors reinforcing Visegrad co-operation were defined and it was 
stated that it is a common interests of all Visegrad Group countries to promote 
a stable and safe neighborhood by assisting those states concerned in getting 
closer to Euro-Atlantic integration. The delegates of the Hungarian Presidency 
of V4 of that time introduced the joint achievement of V4 and emphasized the 
importance of further co-operation. Secondly, according to the discussion of EaP-
GUAM Working Group Session, the areas of co-operation with other V4-GUAM 
partner countries like Poland and Czech Republic are energy security, transporta-
tion, education, environmental protection and sharing of experience in EU inte-
gration matters. Thirdly, the Western Balkans Working Group Session, the region 
makes considerable efforts to overcome the inter- and intra-state challenges, to 
improve security in general and to stabilize the region of the Western Balkans. 
One of the most important issues is that the recognition of Kosovo’s independ-
ence created frictions between Serbia and countries in the region which recog-
nized Priština. Therefore, as security challenges are becoming more complex, the 
need for coordination both on the regional level and also with regard to specific 
countries is paramount to achieve the desired objectives.
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The second Interregional workshop, held on 10-12 March in Tbilisi, focused on 
economic co-operation. The objective of the workshop was threefold. First, well-
defined achievements and lessons learned of Visegrad economic co-operation in 
the context of EU integration and membership were presented. Second, in two 
parallel working groups participants analyzed the applicability of these experi-
ences in light of current economic challenges and opportunities in the Western 
Balkans and the GUAM countries in selected policy areas of trade, foreign direct 
investment, and energy. Thirdly, the idea of a regional development bank was 
also discussed, which can be used to finance development projects and also chan-
nel remittances as a major source of financing in the
The most significant ideas for initiatives involved the establishment of a data 
bank which could provide a database of business opportunities and an up-to-
date directory of regulations related to business activity and a collection of in-
formation on barriers for businesses in the existing legal framework and / or 
in the implementation of existing laws and regulations. Suggestion about the 
establishment of a regional independent research center dealing with key eco-
nomic issues was also made.  The concept of a Regional Business Forum, which 
could contribute to the fostering of economic relations between countries in the 
region, was proposed as well. The project idea of a Project Development Fund to 




The Third Interregional workshop was held in Chisinau, on 24-26 June 
2010, and aimed to present well-defined achievements and lessons learned of 
cross-border co-operation (CBC) within the V4 countries and the role of CBC 
in strengthening regional cohesion, good neighborly relations, and EU integra-
tion. The participants analyzed the applicability of these experiences in light of 
current challenges and opportunities in the Western Balkans and the Eastern 
Partnership (in particular GUAM) countries. For non-EU countries cross-border 
co-operation is a valuable instrument for promoting European integration proc-
esses, as well as a useful mechanism of co-operation for achieving common goals 
in both sides of the border. 
The following three main aspects of CBC were identified as problem areas: 
the role of states and local governments in CBC, financing and co-financing of 
CBC and the impact of regional initiatives on CBC and vice versa. Furthermore, 
according to the remarks, specific attention should be paid to the following as-
pects: legislation, decentralisation, transparency in decision-making, good rela-
tions with neighbours, and relations between the state, local governments, and 
civil society organizations.  As regards financing and co-financing, states as such 
should be interested and involved in the financing. It should be also considered, 
that regional initiatives have great impact on cross-border co-operation. In this 
regard, the Western Balkans still faces a problem concerning the lack of indig-
enous and efficient regional initiatives. 
The participants from Western Balkans emphasized that the success of the 
CBC initiatives in the region is challenged in addition by factors such as Kos-
ovo’s declaration of independence and Serbia’s non-recognition of it, the poor 
economic and social conditions in border regions in comparison with the central 
towns and regions or the tensions between ethnic groups in the border regions. 
All participants underlined the vital role played by non-governmental organiza-
tions in initiating cross-border co-operation and promoting confidence building 
measures, thus creating appropriate conditions for starting full-fledged cross-
border co-operation projects in different fields. 
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The Fourth Interregional workshop was organized on the issue of the role of 
civil society organisations in regional co-operation on 17-19 November 2010, in 
Sarajevo. First, ICDT presented well-defined achievements and lessons learned 
of Visegrad co-operation in the field of civil society in the context of EU integra-
tion and membership. Secondly, participants analyzed the applicability of these 
experiences in light of current challenges and opportunities in the Western Bal-
kans and the EaP countries in selected policy areas. Finally, the discussion in 
working groups focused on identifying common solutions, best practices and 
recommendations for further co-operation among these regions and civil socie-
ties or within them.
The participants the workshop all agreed that a strong and well function-
ing civil society is a core element of a democratic society and has an important 
role in expressing the citizen aspirations by encouraging their participation and 
raising awareness for their needs, demands and rights. The main weaknesses 
of the non-profit sector are its financial viability, the public image and percep-
tion of the organisations, the transparency of organisations and decision mak-
ing mechanisms, the independence of the sector, and also its absorbing capacity 
of substantial financial opportunities. The participants have expressed interest 
in know-how exchange with the V4 countries in the areas of civil society and 
state relations, civil society development strategy, development of private phi-
lanthropy, involvement of national and ethnic minorities of the region in civil 
society, etc.
Discussion took place regarding the applicability of the International Visegrad 
Fund in case of Western Balkans as the Fund may serve as an exemplary fund-
ing initiative for the region.  The most important advantage of the Fund, beyond 
generating resources from national governments for civil society issues, is its 
creative application of regional and local perspectives. ICDT has expressed its 
commitment to these ideas by offering the facilitation of the drafting of a feasi-
bility study where the need for involving actors from the governmental and non-
governmental sectors on local, national and regional level in this process is clear.
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The Closing Conference of the project was held in Budapest on 10-11 March 
2011. The participants of the conference, who represented 19 countries, took 
part in multiple plenary sessions. The sessions covered all of the subjects of the 
earlier workshops, such as regional co-operation in promoting security and sta-
bility, transferable experience in regional co-operation, best practices and in-
novations, and the role of economy in regional co-operation. Furthermore, two 
workshops were also held to discuss the ideas of two regional funds for civil soci-
eties in the Eastern Partnership countries and the Western Balkans.
As regards security and stability, the European integration of Moldova, en-
largement, transparency, democracy, and the need for more effective instru-
ments were identified as main challenges of the EU’s Eastern Partnership Policy. 
The importance of the role of inter-governmental co-operation, Eastern Partner-
ship, European integration in fields such as energy, infrastructure, free trade and 
cross-border co-operation was also highlighted. The growing importance of the 
economic co-operation is emphasized by the fact that as for EU and Eastern Part-
nership countries, economic integration together with economic convergence to 
EU and WTO standards is becoming more and more significant in the mirror 
of several projects such as Nabucco. In connection with regional co-operation, 
the significance of the example of the V4 co-operation and the opportunities 
meant by GUAM framework were underlined. Among the best practices and in-
novation the Border Dialogue Project, the Hungarian practices on cross-border 
co-operation, the activity of the Balkan Civil Society Development Network, and 
the Dniester/Nistru Euroregion project was presented.
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In conclusion, this project was designed and succeeded in involving a large rep-
resentation of people from all regions and political, economic and societal back-
grounds. All workshops had a selected list of invited guests,  some of them as 
speakers on the particular topics related to the core theme of the workshops. 
Having a pre-workshop document distributed to participants called; “food-for-
thought” not only informed the participants with general description of the par-
ticular topic but on the other hand provided light on the particular issues in the 
region. If one reviews all of the lists of participants, it can be detected that for 
each workshop the invited guests were representatives with political positions 
and/or  economic and social positions.  They had the ability to make decisions 
and influence changes in their field of work and in their country. There was a 
regular representation of members of V4 countries whose role was to share their 
experiences and reflect on the changes which  occurred in the Visegrad coun-
tries on the way to becoming members of the European Union. Most of the par-
ticipants in these workshops had multi-level expertise to share, based on their 
achievement in their fields and careers.  
The most significant achievement of this project was to bring together people 
from three different regions to tackle four significant issues  which could stand 
in the way of economic growth, regional security, border crossing and growth of 
civil society.
The key words were during all workshops; cooperation, sharing experiences, 
democracy building and assistance. The presentations not only provided facts 
but  looked at alternative solutions and offered assistance. Representatives from 
countries who shared common problems finally offered joint cooperation aiming 
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